September 2024 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 18/09/24 12:52 PM, 380° via nexa ha scritto: > 380°<g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > >> siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli >> hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena >> analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. > mi stavo giusto chiedendo se ci fosse qualche precedente [...] rispetto al tema della sicurezza/controllo della "supply-chain", mi sono tornati alla mente queste due episodi (il primo, suggeritomi da uno studente): * 2014: "Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant" https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factor… * 2018 "The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies" https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-u… Bye, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

380° <g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli > hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena > analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. mi stavo giusto chiedendo se ci fosse qualche precedente e a rispondermi è Christine Gadsbym, Cybersecurity CISO in BlackBerry. ...poi l'articolo si trasforma in uno SPROLOQUIO sulla "software supply chain" (con soluzioni ridicole tipo gli SBOM - Software Bill Of Material), quindi mi limito a citare le parti pertinenti al supply chain attack in oggetto. https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/09/pagers-explode-supply-chain-securit… «Supply Chain Lessons from Thousands of Exploding Pagers» 09.17.24, Christine Gadsby --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- But the conversation soon shifted to another possible scenario: the pagers must have been intercepted along the supply chain so someone could place explosives inside each pager with a method of remotely triggering the blasts. Attackers have utilized [[https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Ayyash][similar attacks]] before, although not to this scale. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- COMUNQUE: il precedente indicato è del 1996 e riguarda il sabotaggio di UN telefono cellulare nel quale furono introdotti 15 grammi di esplosivo con un sistema di detonazione remoto. --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Kamal Hamad asked his nephew for the phone, which he later returned. It was almost certainly at this moment that the 2oz radio-controlled bomb was inserted. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/how-the-phone-bomb-was-set-up-1323…) Quindi non certo un supply chain attack, ma la tecnica pare la stessa identica di circa 30 anni fa, non proprio una novità per le agenzie di "intelligence", insomma. Saluti, 380° -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

380° <g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli > hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena > analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. altra fonte, France24: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240917-israeli-supply-chain-infiltr… «Israeli supply chain infiltration likely behind Hezbollah pager blasts: analysts» Issued on: 17/09/2024 - 20:51 Modified: 17/09/2024 - 20:49 --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Paris (AFP) – Israel has scored a major intelligence success by apparently infiltrating a supply chain to cause the simultaneous explosion of hundreds of Hezbollah pagers in a blow for the Lebanese militant group and its Iranian backers, analysts say. [...] With Hezbollah appearing to prefer the use of pagers for internal communications over smartphones for security reasons, analysts said it appeared Israel had corrupted the devices before delivery, allowing them to explode at a specific time. A source close to Hezbollah, asking not to be identified, told AFP that "the pagers that exploded concern a shipment recently imported by Hezbollah of 1,000 devices", which appear to have been "sabotaged at source". "For Israel to embed an explosive trigger within the new batch of pagers, they would have likely needed access to the supply chain of these devices," said Brussels-based military and security analyst Elijah Magnier. "Israeli intelligence has infiltrated the production process, adding an explosive component and remote triggering mechanism into the pagers without raising suspicion," he said, raising the prospect the third party which sold the devices could have been an "intelligence front" set up by Israel for the purpose. Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute said: "This was more than lithium batteries being forced into override. A small plastic explosive was almost certainly concealed alongside the battery, for remote detonation via a call or page." "Mossad infiltrated the supply chain," he concluded, referring to Israel's intelligence agency. 'Their big comeback' ───────────────────── The Wall Street Journal cited people familiar with the matter as saying the affected pagers were from a new shipment that the group received in recent days. [...] the images captured on camera of pagers exploding are a major security blow for Hezbollah and an illustration of Israel's reach even into its members' pockets. [...] French defence expert Pierre Servent said the latest action against Hezbollah would help Israeli intelligence services restore their reputation, which was badly dented by the October 7 attack. "The series of operations conducted over the past few months marks their big comeback, with a desire for deterrence and a message: 'we messed up but we're not dead,'" he told AFP. [...] 'Classic sabotage' ─────────────────── Former CIA analyst Mike Dimino of the US-based Defense Priorities think tank said that judging by images of the injuries a "very small explosive" implanted inside the devices was the most likely cause, rather than an overheating battery. "This was a classic sabotage operation," he said on X, adding such an operation takes "months if not years" to orchestrate. Dubai-based analyst Riad Kahwaji said that Israel had taken advantage of Hezbollah's move away from smartphones to pagers. Israel intelligence had conducted a "most professional operation", he said. "Without a doubt, one of the factories it (Israel) owns manufactured and shipped these explosive devices that exploded today," he said. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

Buongiorno, siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/8-dead-2700-injured-after-simultan… «11 dead, thousands injured in explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers. - Supply chain attack may be to blame.» [Nate Anderson] - Updated Sep 18, 2024 2:00 am UTC --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- A massive wave of pager explosions across Lebanon and Syria beginning at 3:30 pm local time today killed at least 11 people and injured more than 2,700, according to local officials. Many of the injured appear to be Hezbollah members, although a young girl is said to be among the dead. Anonymous officials briefed on the matter are now describing it as a supply chain attack in which Israel was able to hide small amounts of explosives inside Taiwanese pagers shipped to Lebanon. The explosive was allegedly triggered by a small switch inside the pagers that would be activated upon receiving a specific code. Once that code was received, the pagers beeped for several seconds—and then detonated. [...] The shocking—and novel—attack appears to have relied on a wave of recently imported Hezbollah pagers, according to [reporting in The Wall Street Journal]. (The group had already warned its members to avoid using cell phones due to both tracking and assassination concerns.) [...] (An [early story from a local media outlet] claimed that "the pager server was compromised, leading to the installation of a script that caused an overload. This likely resulted in the overheating of the lithium battery, which then exploded.") The WSJ quoted regional security analyst Michael Horowitz as suggesting the attack was likely caused by either 1) malware triggering the batteries to overheat/explode or 2) an actual explosive charge inserted in the devices at some point in the supply chain and then detonated remotely. [...] Late in the day, US and other officials anonymously [told the New York Times] that the attack was, in fact, caused by explosives. Israel managed to insert "as little as one or two ounces" of explosive material next to the battery inside each pager, officials said. [...] Reuters has a [similar report], using different sources, but it also notes that the president of Gold Apollo emphatically claimed today that the pagers were not made by his company in Taiwan. Rather, he said, they were made under license by a company called BAC, which then put Gold Apollo's branding on them. [...] /This breaking news story has been rewritten to incorporate updates added throughout the day./ [Nate Anderson] <https://arstechnica.com/author/nate-anderson/> [reporting in The Wall Street Journal] <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hundreds-of-hezbollah-operatives-pager…> [early story from a local media outlet] <https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/lebanon-news/796406/understanding-the-pager-an…> [told the New York Times] <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-pagers…> [similar report] <https://news.sky.com/story/explosive-pagers-used-by-hezbollah-had-been-modi…> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Larry Ellison's AI-Powered Surveillance Dystopia Is Already Here

by Daniela Tafani

Larry Ellison's AI-Powered Surveillance Dystopia Is Already Here Jason Koebler Sep 17, 2024 There’s a comment that’s become very popular on social media whenever a new, horrifying surveillance practice is revealed: “1984 was supposed to be a warning, not an instruction manual!” This sentiment has become a bit tiresome, in part because saying it doesn’t really mean anything, and our real world has long since surpassed George Orwell’s dystopian nightmare in a few ways. But invoking 1984 as warning, not instruction manual feels appropriate here, with Oracle CEO Larry Ellison, the fifth-richest person in the world, pitching his exciting vision for an always-on, 1984-style, AI-powered surveillance fever dream to an audience of investors. In the remarks, which were first reported by Business Insider, Ellison said police body cameras, car cameras, drones, and other cameras will be always on and streaming to Oracle data centers, where AI will constantly be monitoring the feeds. “The police would be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly watching and recording everything that’s going on,” Ellison said. “Citizens will be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on. It’s unimpeachable. The cars have cameras on them.” Ellison’s entire remarks are worth reading, because what he is pitching is a comprehensive surveillance apparatus that touches most parts of being in public. More importantly, every idea he is pitching currently exists in some form, and each has massive privacy, bias, legal, or societal issues that have prevented them from being the game-changing technology that somehow makes us all safer. Ellison: “Securing schools: We think we can absolutely lock down schools so that dramatically reduce the case of anyone being on campus that doesn’t belong on campus, and immediately alert someone, use AI cameras to immediately recognize that.” The idea that schools can be made safe with technology (or armed teachers, or more police) rather than, say, making guns harder to access, has become a cash cow for surveillance tech companies in the age of near-constant school shootings. Many schools have begun to implement AI-powered weapon detectors, which are notoriously inaccurate and which have, for example, detected notebooks as “weapons,” missed actual weapons, and led to what one administrator called “the least safe day” because of mass confusion associated with the scanners. Students are also being monitored in the hallways, in the bathroom, on social media, and on their school-issued devices. It’s unclear that any of this has made schools any safer. Axon, meanwhile, pitched the idea of taser-equipped drones that patrol schools, an idea that was quickly shelved after widespread public outrage and its own ethics board resigning over the idea. Ellison: “We completely redesigned body cameras. Our body cameras cost $70, normal body camera costs, I don’t know, $7,000. Our body cameras are simply lenses, two lenses attached to a vest attached to the smartphone you’re wearing. We take the video of the police officer. And the camera is always on. You don’t turn it on and off. [A police officer can say], ‘Oracle, I need two minutes to take a bathroom break,’ and we’ll turn it off. The truth is, we don’t really turn it off. What we do is, we record it, so no one can see it, so no one can get into that recording without a court order. So you get the privacy you requested, but court order, we will—a judge will order, that so-called bathroom break. Something comes up, I’m going to lunch with my friends. ‘Oracle, I need an hour of privacy for lunch with my friends.’ God bless. We won’t listen in, unless there’s a court order. But we transmit the video back to headquarters, and AI is constantly monitoring video.” Ellison is correct that police turning off their body cameras is a well-documented problem. Intuitively, you would also think that body cameras would improve police behavior. But the evidence for this is actually not that strong. Academics have shown that having a body camera on does not make a statistical or consistent difference in police behavior in part because there are many cases of police being filmed committing acts of brutality where the officer in question does not face severe consequences. Public access to body camera footage is also incredibly uneven; public records laws differ in each state about whether that footage can be obtained by journalists and police accountability organizations. Ellison is proposing a situation here where the footage would be held and analyzed not by a public police department but by Oracle and Oracle’s AI systems. “We won’t listen in, unless there’s a court order” means, of course, that it is listening in, and has all sorts of implications for who can access this sort of footage, when, and under what circumstances. Ellison: “Remember this terrible case in Memphis where the five police officers basically beat to death another citizen in Memphis? Well, that can’t happen because it’d be on TV at headquarters. Everyone would see it. Your body cameras would be transmitting that. The police would be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly watching and recording everything that’s going on. Citizens will be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on. It’s unimpeachable. The cars have cameras on them. I think we have a squad car someplace. Those applications—we’re using AI to monitor the video. So that altercation that occurred in Memphis, the chief of police would be immediately notified. It’s not people that are looking at those cameras, it’s AI that’s looking at the camera, [saying] ‘No, no no, you can’t do this. That’s an event.’ An alarm is going to go off and we’re going to have supervision. Every police officer is going to be supervised at all times. And if there’s a problem, AI will report it to the appropriate person, whether it’s the sheriff or the chief or whoever we need to take control of the situation.” AI-powered and connected smart cameras are already in use in the United States and across the world. So are automated license plate readers, AI-powered gunshot detecting microphones, connected home security cameras, facial recognition tech, etc. Tesla footage is being subpoenaed and used in police investigations. Crime still exists, and false positives and cases of mistaken identities are common across most of these technologies. Companies like Predpol, Shotspotter, Flock, Fusus, Axon, and many others have been pitching the idea of predictive and instantly-reactive policing as a deterrent for many years. These technologies are anything but “unimpeachable.” There have been numerous incidents of Black men being misidentified by facial recognition technology, instances of police automatically responding to a supposed gunshot that was not a gunshot, and cases of over-policing for minor crimes or minor disturbances. In South Africa, for example, AI-connected smart surveillance cameras have been accused of creating a “new Apartheid” because of bias within its systems. Ellison: “We have drones. A drone gets out there way faster than a police car. You shouldn’t have high-speed chases with cars. You just have the drone follow a car, it’s very simple. A new generation of autonomous drones. A forest fire—the drone spots a forest fire and then the drone drops down and looks around to see if there’s a human being near that heat bloom, and someone else either had an unattended campfire that caught fire, or it’s arson. We can do all of that. It’s all done autonomously with AI.” This system is called “drones as first responders,” it also already exists, and there are problems with this, too. Drones are being used to automatically surveil homeless encampments, house parties, teens being loud, and a person “bouncing a ball against a garage.” AI and drone tech to prevent forest fires is also something that has had millions of dollars poured into it, with underwhelming results so far. This is all to say that Larry Ellison’s surveillance fever dream isn’t actually a fever dream: All of these are technologies that already exist in some form, many of which have not measurably driven down crime or solved the complicated societal, political, and economic problems that lead to crime in the first place or the societal power structures that protect police at every turn. These technologies have collectively cost billions of dollars, made surveillance companies very rich, and have created new privacy problems. Big Brother is here, and, surprise, having AI “supervision” has not created a crimeless utopia. <https://www.404media.co/larry-ellisons-ai-powered-surveillance-dystopia-is-…>

Sept. 17, 2024

Re: [nexa] Copyright law makes a case for requiring data information rather than open datasets for Open Source AI - Felix Reda

by Giacomo Tesio

Salve Maria Chiara, Il 17 Settembre 2024 00:43:38 UTC, Maria Chiara Pievatolo ha scritto: > > L'Unione Europea abbraccia formalmente i principi della scienza aperta. Beh anche l'OSI abbraccia "formalmente" i "principi dell'Open Source". Ma propone una definizione di Open Source AI che ammette le black box. Pensaci... Open Source Black Box! Sarebbe ridicolo, l'ennesima prova della mala fede dell'organizzazione che ha rifiutato la SSPL su indicazione di Amazon. Ma purtroppo la definizione avrà un ruolo legale, aprendo un loophole enorme nella normativa. > non si vede perché i SALAMI debbano (e possano) essere offerti come scatole nere, > e sottratti all'indagine scientifica pubblica, in nome di una concezione proprietaria > del copyright. Perché lo dice l'OSI? Già, perché OSI lo dice? Non certo nell'interesse della ricerca scientifica, della sicurezza informatica o della tutela delle minoranze che subiranno le consuete discriminazioni, ma in modo automatizzato e su una nuova scala. Cui prodest? Fortuna vuole che basterà guardare gli sponsor dell'OSI e delle organizzazioni che faranno endorsement per questa definizione così smaccatamente contraria ai principi che dichiara in premessa, per scoprirlo. D'altro canto l'OSI ha un Board of Directors: <https://opensource.org/about/board-of-directors> Persone che si stanno assumendo pubblicamente la responsabilità morale dei danni che queste black box open washed faranno. Segnamoci i loro nomi e teniamo traccia di dove li porteranno le sliding doors alla fine del loro mandato. Sono certo che spiegherà molte cose. Giacomo

Sept. 17, 2024

Re: [nexa] Copyright law makes a case for requiring data information rather than open datasets for Open Source AI - Felix Reda

by Maria Chiara Pievatolo

On 15/09/24 10:31, Stefano Zacchiroli wrote: > https://opensource.org/blog/copyright-law-makes-a-case-for-requiring-data-i… > > (Personalmente ne traggo una conclusione diversa da Felix, ovvero che > bisognerebbe quindi agire per *cambiare* il copyright in modo che > permetta di incorporare lavori protetti in dataset aperti, anziché > limitarsi alla data mining exception. È quella eccezione che ha creato > il disequilibrio di potere che avvantaggia le aziende come Open AI in > questo momento. Ma resta una delle letture più interessanti che mi è > capitato di leggere a supporto della posizione di compromesso adottata > in OSAID.) Questa diversa conclusione, messa in pratica, permetterebbe di fare qualcosa di più che resistere all'istituzione di un ulteriore diritto sui generis connesso al materiale sotto copyright usato come dato d'addestramento, che, temo, verrà proposta al parlamento europeo. L'Unione Europea abbraccia formalmente i principi della scienza aperta. Meriterebbe di essere presa in parola: non si vede perché i SALAMI debbano (e possano) essere offerti come scatole nere, e sottratti all'indagine scientifica pubblica, in nome di una concezione proprietaria del copyright. Buonanotte, MCP

Sept. 17, 2024

Open Washing AI definition by OSI?

by Giacomo Tesio

Ciao a tutti, un piccolo aggiornamento dal fronte^W forum dell'OSI dedicato alla definizione della "Open Source AI". 10 minuti prima di scrivere una risposta alla mia proposta, Nick Vidal (Community Manager di OSI) mi ha silenziato su discuss.opensource.org senza alcun contatto precedente (di seguito la comunicazione). La cosa è particolarmente interessante perché subito dopo ha scritto una risposta in cui mi pone alcune domande e ha chiuso il thread senza darmi modo di rispondere, ironicamente accusandomi di non lasciare spazio agli altri per commentare. Il tutto dopo quasi 24 ore di silenzio sul forum. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ https://discuss.opensource.org/t/rfc-separating-concerns-between-source-dat… Poco dopo ha chiesto endorsements pubblici [1] per una definizione che, di fatto, non garantisce né la libertà di studio né quella di modifica, ma solo quella di fine tuning, permettendo ovvie forme di open washing nonché di nascondere nei modelli "open source" sia backdoor [2] che bias contro minoranze specifiche, senza che nessuno possa esaminare i dataset sorgente per individuarle e rendendo di fatto meno sicuro l'intero ecosistema open source. Sarebbe stato interessante discutere invece del merito della proposta che, non richiedendo la redistribuzione di dataset già disponibili online, non richiede che gli sviluppatori che li utilizzano per il training li debbano redistribuire. Quanto al fatto che sia tecnicamente impossibile ricalcolare esattamente i pesi di un LLM dalle informazioni e dai dati sorgente, è ovviamente una sciocchezza a meno di bug hardware di cui comunque è sempre possibile evitare il verificarsi. Vidal lo sa. Allora perché questo nervosismo? Perché questa fretta di raccogliere endorsements su una bozza ancora evidentemente prematura? In qualunque caso, una definizione di Open Source AI che non garantisca né la studiabilità dei dati utilizzati per il calcolo dei pesi né la riproducibilità del processo, favorirà ogni sorta di open washing, aprendo un enorme loophole anche nella normativa dell'AI Act. [3] Con l'account sospeso non posso fare molto né per rispondere alle domande di Vidal, né per migliorare la proposta, ma vi invito a partecipare attivamente al dibattito (nella speranza che abbiate maggior fortuna e non veniate anche voi silenziati). Giacomo [1] https://discuss.opensource.org/t/endorse-the-open-source-ai-definition/570 [2] https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.06974 [3] come in effetti aveva già ipotizzato Claudio a Giugno. _____ Data: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 19:28:00 +0000 Da: OSI Discuss <notifications(a)opensource2.discoursemail.com> A: giacomo(a)tesio.it Oggetto: [OSI Discuss] Your account has been silenced You have been silenced from the forum until September 23, 2024, 7:27pm. Reason - Would not listen to staff feedback Please present new arguments, don’t open new topics repeating the same arguments over and over, and leave space for others to comment. Don’t flood the conversation and be respectful of the guidelines.

Sept. 16, 2024

Data center emissions probably 662% higher than big tech claims. Can it keep up the ruse? | Technology | The Guardian

by J.C. DE MARTIN

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/sep/15/data-center-gas-emission… (messaggio spedito in movimento - scusate brevità ed eventuali refusi)

Sept. 16, 2024

116° Nexa Lunch Seminar | 25 settembre 2024, ore 13.00

by Nexa - Media

Gentilissime, gentilissimi, Vi invitiamo a partecipare al 116° Nexa Lunch Seminar che si terrà mercoledì 25 settembre, dalle ore 13.00 alle ore 14.00, con un incontro dal titolo: "Bringing Archives to Life. Costruire Knowledge Graphs con i Large Language Models". Ospite dell'incontro: Giuseppe Futia (Fellow del Centro Nexa). L'incontro si terrà IN PRESENZA e ONLINE. SEDE FISICA dell'incontro: Centro Nexa su Internet e Società, Politecnico di Torino, Via Boggio 65/a, Torino (1° piano). Per accedere alla sala si raccomanda di suonare al citofono Portineria e di seguire le indicazioni segnalate lungo il percorso. QUI<https://nexa.polito.it/contatti> maggiori informazioni su come raggiungerci. STANZA VIRTUALE dell'incontro: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent Di seguito maggiori dettagli: https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-116<https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-116/> Cordiali saluti, -- Valeria Bergantino Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino - DAUIN Via Pier Carlo Boggio, 65/A - 10138 Torino web: https://nexa.polito.it/ mail: valeria.bergantino(a)polito.it<mailto:valeria.bergantino@polito.it> tel: 3473443585

Sept. 16, 2024