October 2010 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] "Il gene umano non si può brevettare"

by Margoni, Thomas

fantastico, ma non so quanto valore possa avere, piu' interessante sara' l'appello di myriad genetics, il primo grado e' una decisione che consiglio a tutti di leggere... ________________________________________ From: nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it [nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it] On Behalf Of Marco Ciurcina [ciurcina(a)studiolegale.it] Sent: Sunday, October 31, 2010 1:41 PM To: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it Subject: [nexa] "Il gene umano non si può brevettare" http://www.repubblica.it/scienze/2010/10/31/news/gene_umano-8603028/?ref=HR… "Il gene umano non si può brevettare" Il Dipartimento di giustizia Usa: "Non invenzioni ma patrimonio dell'umanità". Insorgono le aziende biotech _______________________________________________ nexa mailing list nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Oct. 31, 2010

"Il gene umano non si può brevettare"

by Marco Ciurcina

http://www.repubblica.it/scienze/2010/10/31/news/gene_umano-8603028/?ref=HR… "Il gene umano non si può brevettare" Il Dipartimento di giustizia Usa: "Non invenzioni ma patrimonio dell'umanità". Insorgono le aziende biotech

Oct. 31, 2010

Re: [nexa] Tech Review: "Censorship Circumvention Tools Aren't Widely Used"

by Marco Pancini

Su questo tema, vi segnalo un articolo sull'economist di questa settimana: http://www.economist.com/node/17361444 On Sat, Oct 30, 2010 at 7:18 PM, Andrea Glorioso <andrea(a)digitalpolicy.it>wrote: > Cari tutti, > > non per riaprire la discussione, ma vorrei segnalare un commento ad un > recente post di Ethan Zuckerman sullo studio del Berkman Center che mi > ha particolarmente colpito. > > Il post è disponibile presso > > http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/10/18/how-many-people-jump-the-grea… > . > > Il commento è il numero 7 e lo riproduco qui per comodità: > > "One thing that I’ve noticed is that anti-circumvention technology > really hasn’t thought through the legal and political context of what > the Chinese government is trying to do. > > It is not illegal under Chinese law to bypass the firewall and as far as > I know, no one has every been sentenced to prison for bypassing the > firewall. The strategy of the Chinese government is less to control > people *receiving* information than to control the ability of people to > either broadcast or organize via the internet. The main purpose of the > firewall is to let people know that big brother is watching so that > people start being careful about what they say and who they talk to, and > so that big brother can shut things down when it appears that there is > any sort of organization occurring. > > If you look at things this way, then the anti-circumvention technology > doesn’t work from a social viewpoint. If you are passively reading web > content, then the technology is too much. It is difficult to use, and > even the process of using it makes you realize that you are doing > something out of the ordinary which increases the tendency to self-censor. > > If you are doing something really subversive that could land you in > jail, then the anti-circumvention technology is not enough. If the > Chinese government really wants to get you, they can monitor networks, > grab internet logs, and generally use the power of the state is ways > that would negate any usefulness of anti-circumvention. If you start > trying to organize people for a demonstration, and it turns out that you > were the only one in the internet cafe using a VPN proxy server, then > you are doomed. > > The other thing is that this is extremely brittle. If you start using a > lot of high technology anti-circumvention software, and the next day you > just get a phone call from the PSB asking about it, then your choice at > this point is to become a professional dissident, in which case, > anonymity is useless, or you stop whatever you were doing. It also > doesn’t help that a lot of the technology is complex, and prone to fail > in non-obvious ways. > > And that gets at the biggest problem with these tools. Most people in > China simply are not interested in becoming a political dissident. There > is political repression in China, but the government realizes that too > much repression can be counterproductive, and so keeps the level of > repression low enough so that the costs of becoming a political > dissident far outweigh the benefits for most people. Also every internet > service that exists outside of China has a politically sanitized version > within China. > > Also, if you do want to become a political dissident, then > anti-circumvention tools tend to be useless since if you really do want > to challenge the Chinese state, the last thing that you want is to be > anonymous. > > One final thing is that it would be interesting to see how people how > have exposure to Western media change their attitudes, but it’s not > clear to me that just reading the New York Times will make anyone in > China into an anti-government dissident. I personally know of people > that have a lot of exposure to Western media, and it’s very common for > Chinese that do actively read Western media to conclude that Western > media is heavily biased against China, and that reading it actually > increases their support for the Chinese government." > > On 10/22/2010 12:21 PM, Andrea Glorioso wrote: > > Arturo, > > > > grazie per la reazione. A costo di essere ripetitivo, ma poiche` voglio > > essere assolutamente chiaro: non sostengo che chi utilizza strumenti > > volti a garantire l'anonimato, proteggere la propria privacy e/o aggirare > > blocchi e forme di censura sia necessariamente un "sovversivo" (non > > che essere un "sovversivo" sia, dal mio punto di vista, una > caratteristica > > necessariamente negativa). > > > > Ma in alcuni paesi l'equazione esiste, sia nella percezione delle > > autorita`, sia nella realta` pratica derivante dall'esistenza di leggi > > draconiane. > > > > Continuo a non vedere la grossonalita` nell'affermazione di Morozov, > > proprio in ragione della differenza di cui sopra; ma credo che possiamo > > tranquillamente "agree to disagree" e passare oltre, almeno per > > quanto mi riguarda. > > > > Ciao, > > > > Andrea > > > > 2010/10/22 <a.dicorinto(a)uniroma1.it>: > >> Grazie Paolo, grazie Andrea-- > >> > >> infatti è proprio l'affermazione dell'equivalenza tra sovversivo e > >> utilizzatore di strumenti anticensura che non mi va giù. E Morozov si è > >> rivelato una volta di più assai grossolano nel farla. > >> > >> Mi rifiuto di essere considerato un sovversivo. Io faccio quello che > faccio > >> perchè voglio un paese migliore, perchè voglio creare consapevolezza, > perché > >> voglio una democrazia globale. > >> > >> Il punto su cui rischiamo di arenarci è la definizione di "strumenti > >> anticensura". Si tratta infatti degli stessi strumenti che usiamo per > >> aumentare la nostra privacy e garantirci l'anonimato: diritti > costituzionali > >> nei paesi democratici. > >> > >> Io uso una gran quantità di mezzi anticensura: per capirli, raccontarli, > >> insegnarne l'uso. In realtà non li uso perchè personalmente temo la > censura, > >> ma perchè: > >> > >> a) devo alzare il mio grado di sicurezza in rete. Quando ho fatto delle > >> inchieste per la RAI sugli hate-sites nazifascisti credete che l'abbia > fatto > >> in chiaro? Ovviamente no. > >> > >> b) è necessario alzare il livello di protezione generale di chi li usa > per > >> scopi di sicurezza personale. Uno degli assiomi dell'uso "politico" > della > >> crittografia è che più gente la usa, più difficile sarà per i > controllori > >> monitorarne l'uso e creare la cultura del sospetto per cui chi li usa è > già > >> un potenziale colpevole...(quello che ha poi lasciato intuire Morozov) > >> > >> cheers > >> > >> PS: se vi serve, usate questo: https://amnesia.boum.org/ > >> > >> > >> > >> ********************** > >> I nemici della rete > >> di Arturo Di Corinto e Alessandro Gilioli. Prefazione Stefano Rodotà > >> > >> Formato: Tascabile > >> Pagine: 285 > >> Lingua: Italiano > >> Editore: BUR Biblioteca Univ. Rizzoli > >> Anno di pubblicazione 2010 > >> Codice EAN: 9788817042758 > >> Generi: Informatica, Internet e Web, Musica e spettacolo, radio & TV, > >> Politica > >> e società, Giornalismo e Editoria > >> > >> http://bit.ly/bkn1Yf > >> > >> > >> > >> Paolo Brini <paolo.brini(a)iridiumpg.com> > >> Sent by: nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it > >> 22/10/2010 00:24 ZE2 > >> > >> To nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > >> cc > >> bcc A Dicorinto/Dip-Psi/Dipartimenti/Didattica/Ateneo/Uniroma1/it > >> Subject Re: [nexa] Tech Review: "Censorship Circumvention > >> ToolsAren'tWidely Used" > >> > >> > >> Il 21/10/2010 23:25, Blengino ha scritto: > >>> Nonostante questo mio comportamento, non sono un sovversivo nemmeno > per > >>> le autorità. > >>> > >>> Paolo, sei sicuro di questo? ;-) > >> > >> Facciamo un esempio concreto realmente accaduto. > >> 1) Le autorità italiane oscurano uno dei server di Imageshack (uno dei > >> più grandi hosting service per immagini del mondo). > >> 2) In quel server ci sono le MIE immagini (legali). > >> 3) Cambio i DNS oppure uso una VPN e recupero le MIE immagini. > >> > >> In base a quanto sopra posso essere accusato di eversione nei confronti > >> dell'ordinamento democratico dello stato? > >> > >> Ho commesso altri reati? > >> > >> Ciao, > >> Paolo > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> nexa mailing list > >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> nexa mailing list > >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > >> > >> > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > -- Marco Pancini European Senior Policy Counsel Google Italy Corso Europa, 2 20122 Milano, Italia Tel. +39 02 36618524 Cell. +39.348.9946222 pancini(a)google.com Follow me on Twitter: http://twitter.com/googlepolicyit This email may be confidential or privileged. If you received this communication by mistake, please don't forward it to anyone else, please erase all copies and attachments, and please let me know that it went to the wrong person. Thanks.

Oct. 30, 2010

Re: [nexa] R: Garante Privacy: Google Street View: le auto dovranno esserericonoscibili

by Marco Pancini

Come ho già avuto dire ad Oreste de visu, sono più d'accordo con l'interpretazione di Andrea. Vi segnalo anche questa interessante (e recente) decisione: http://daily.wired.it/blog/law_and_tech/google-un-motore-di-ricerca-tutto-s… Buon weekend. marco On Sat, Oct 30, 2010 at 5:15 PM, Andrea Glorioso <andrea(a)digitalpolicy.it>wrote: > Caro Oreste, cari tutti, > > On 10/27/2010 11:53 AM, Oreste pollicino wrote: > > A me sembra che non possa essere sottovalutato il fatto che il garante > abbia applicato senza indugi la normativa itaiana. 4 anni fa non sono > sicuro che l'avrebbe fatto in un caso del genere e sicuramente non l'ha > fatto in un caso, a tutti noto, che coinvolgeva la moglie di un politico > molto conosciuto. Caso sicuramente differente per elementi fattuali, > giuridici e tecnici. Ma che condivide con questo il fatto che il > trattamento avvenga principalmente, ma non esclusivamente, vista > l'applicazione della legge italiana, tramite server locati in usa e ad > opera di soggetti che hanno la sede principale di stabilimento al di > fuori de territorio ue. Ciao, o. > > In effetti la decisione di applicare la normativa italiana e` un > elemento molto interessante della decisione. Il riferimento al > "trattamento effettuato mediante strumenti situati nel territorio dello > Stato" (art. 5 del Codice, che traspone l'art. 4 della Direttiva > 95/46/CE) e` in linea con le piu` recenti riflessioni del Gruppo di > Lavoro Articolo 29, per esempio in tema di motori di ricerca e reti > sociali. > > Certo si potrebbe sostenere che in questo caso gli "strumenti" - le > macchine che raccolgono le immagini - sono piu` chiaramente "situati" > nel territorio italiano che in altri casi, richiamati nelle opinioni del > WP29, come per esempio l'utilizzo di "cookies". > > Personalmente ho trovato particolarmente interessanti due passaggi, ovvero: > > "CONSIDERATO che il servizio Street View, in ragione delle sue > caratteristiche, nonché sulla base degli elementi emersi dall'analisi > delle predette segnalazioni, rende necessaria una riflessione più ampia > sul rispetto dei principi in materia di protezione dei dati personali;" > > (ma non si capisce quali siano queste riflessioni piu` ampie) > > "CONSIDERATO che al caso in esame risulta applicabile la disciplina > relativa all'uso delle immagini e che quindi, in linea generale, non è > necessario acquisire il consenso degli interessati quando la ripresa > fotografica avviene in luogo pubblico, salve le limitazioni previste > dalla legge, quali, ad esempio, il divieto di diffusione di fotografie > quando ciò comporti pregiudizio all'onore, alla reputazione, al decoro > della persona ripresa (art. 97, comma 2, della l. 22 aprile 1941, n. > 633) o il divieto di diffusione di dati idonei a rivelare lo stato di > salute (art. 26, comma 5 del Codice);" > > (non ho capito a quale disciplina il garante si riferisca di preciso, a > parte le norme espressamente richiamate) > > A presto, > > Andrea > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > -- Marco Pancini European Senior Policy Counsel Google Italy Corso Europa, 2 20122 Milano, Italia Tel. +39 02 36618524 Cell. +39.348.9946222 pancini(a)google.com Follow me on Twitter: http://twitter.com/googlepolicyit This email may be confidential or privileged. If you received this communication by mistake, please don't forward it to anyone else, please erase all copies and attachments, and please let me know that it went to the wrong person. Thanks.

Oct. 30, 2010

Re: [nexa] Tech Review: "Censorship Circumvention Tools Aren't Widely Used"

by Andrea Glorioso

Cari tutti, non per riaprire la discussione, ma vorrei segnalare un commento ad un recente post di Ethan Zuckerman sullo studio del Berkman Center che mi ha particolarmente colpito. Il post è disponibile presso http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/10/18/how-many-people-jump-the-grea…. Il commento è il numero 7 e lo riproduco qui per comodità: "One thing that I’ve noticed is that anti-circumvention technology really hasn’t thought through the legal and political context of what the Chinese government is trying to do. It is not illegal under Chinese law to bypass the firewall and as far as I know, no one has every been sentenced to prison for bypassing the firewall. The strategy of the Chinese government is less to control people *receiving* information than to control the ability of people to either broadcast or organize via the internet. The main purpose of the firewall is to let people know that big brother is watching so that people start being careful about what they say and who they talk to, and so that big brother can shut things down when it appears that there is any sort of organization occurring. If you look at things this way, then the anti-circumvention technology doesn’t work from a social viewpoint. If you are passively reading web content, then the technology is too much. It is difficult to use, and even the process of using it makes you realize that you are doing something out of the ordinary which increases the tendency to self-censor. If you are doing something really subversive that could land you in jail, then the anti-circumvention technology is not enough. If the Chinese government really wants to get you, they can monitor networks, grab internet logs, and generally use the power of the state is ways that would negate any usefulness of anti-circumvention. If you start trying to organize people for a demonstration, and it turns out that you were the only one in the internet cafe using a VPN proxy server, then you are doomed. The other thing is that this is extremely brittle. If you start using a lot of high technology anti-circumvention software, and the next day you just get a phone call from the PSB asking about it, then your choice at this point is to become a professional dissident, in which case, anonymity is useless, or you stop whatever you were doing. It also doesn’t help that a lot of the technology is complex, and prone to fail in non-obvious ways. And that gets at the biggest problem with these tools. Most people in China simply are not interested in becoming a political dissident. There is political repression in China, but the government realizes that too much repression can be counterproductive, and so keeps the level of repression low enough so that the costs of becoming a political dissident far outweigh the benefits for most people. Also every internet service that exists outside of China has a politically sanitized version within China. Also, if you do want to become a political dissident, then anti-circumvention tools tend to be useless since if you really do want to challenge the Chinese state, the last thing that you want is to be anonymous. One final thing is that it would be interesting to see how people how have exposure to Western media change their attitudes, but it’s not clear to me that just reading the New York Times will make anyone in China into an anti-government dissident. I personally know of people that have a lot of exposure to Western media, and it’s very common for Chinese that do actively read Western media to conclude that Western media is heavily biased against China, and that reading it actually increases their support for the Chinese government." On 10/22/2010 12:21 PM, Andrea Glorioso wrote: > Arturo, > > grazie per la reazione. A costo di essere ripetitivo, ma poiche` voglio > essere assolutamente chiaro: non sostengo che chi utilizza strumenti > volti a garantire l'anonimato, proteggere la propria privacy e/o aggirare > blocchi e forme di censura sia necessariamente un "sovversivo" (non > che essere un "sovversivo" sia, dal mio punto di vista, una caratteristica > necessariamente negativa). > > Ma in alcuni paesi l'equazione esiste, sia nella percezione delle > autorita`, sia nella realta` pratica derivante dall'esistenza di leggi > draconiane. > > Continuo a non vedere la grossonalita` nell'affermazione di Morozov, > proprio in ragione della differenza di cui sopra; ma credo che possiamo > tranquillamente "agree to disagree" e passare oltre, almeno per > quanto mi riguarda. > > Ciao, > > Andrea > > 2010/10/22 <a.dicorinto(a)uniroma1.it>: >> Grazie Paolo, grazie Andrea-- >> >> infatti è proprio l'affermazione dell'equivalenza tra sovversivo e >> utilizzatore di strumenti anticensura che non mi va giù. E Morozov si è >> rivelato una volta di più assai grossolano nel farla. >> >> Mi rifiuto di essere considerato un sovversivo. Io faccio quello che faccio >> perchè voglio un paese migliore, perchè voglio creare consapevolezza, perché >> voglio una democrazia globale. >> >> Il punto su cui rischiamo di arenarci è la definizione di "strumenti >> anticensura". Si tratta infatti degli stessi strumenti che usiamo per >> aumentare la nostra privacy e garantirci l'anonimato: diritti costituzionali >> nei paesi democratici. >> >> Io uso una gran quantità di mezzi anticensura: per capirli, raccontarli, >> insegnarne l'uso. In realtà non li uso perchè personalmente temo la censura, >> ma perchè: >> >> a) devo alzare il mio grado di sicurezza in rete. Quando ho fatto delle >> inchieste per la RAI sugli hate-sites nazifascisti credete che l'abbia fatto >> in chiaro? Ovviamente no. >> >> b) è necessario alzare il livello di protezione generale di chi li usa per >> scopi di sicurezza personale. Uno degli assiomi dell'uso "politico" della >> crittografia è che più gente la usa, più difficile sarà per i controllori >> monitorarne l'uso e creare la cultura del sospetto per cui chi li usa è già >> un potenziale colpevole...(quello che ha poi lasciato intuire Morozov) >> >> cheers >> >> PS: se vi serve, usate questo: https://amnesia.boum.org/ >> >> >> >> ********************** >> I nemici della rete >> di Arturo Di Corinto e Alessandro Gilioli. Prefazione Stefano Rodotà >> >> Formato: Tascabile >> Pagine: 285 >> Lingua: Italiano >> Editore: BUR Biblioteca Univ. Rizzoli >> Anno di pubblicazione 2010 >> Codice EAN: 9788817042758 >> Generi: Informatica, Internet e Web, Musica e spettacolo, radio & TV, >> Politica >> e società, Giornalismo e Editoria >> >> http://bit.ly/bkn1Yf >> >> >> >> Paolo Brini <paolo.brini(a)iridiumpg.com> >> Sent by: nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> 22/10/2010 00:24 ZE2 >> >> To nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> cc >> bcc A Dicorinto/Dip-Psi/Dipartimenti/Didattica/Ateneo/Uniroma1/it >> Subject Re: [nexa] Tech Review: "Censorship Circumvention >> ToolsAren'tWidely Used" >> >> >> Il 21/10/2010 23:25, Blengino ha scritto: >>> Nonostante questo mio comportamento, non sono un sovversivo nemmeno per >>> le autorità. >>> >>> Paolo, sei sicuro di questo? ;-) >> >> Facciamo un esempio concreto realmente accaduto. >> 1) Le autorità italiane oscurano uno dei server di Imageshack (uno dei >> più grandi hosting service per immagini del mondo). >> 2) In quel server ci sono le MIE immagini (legali). >> 3) Cambio i DNS oppure uso una VPN e recupero le MIE immagini. >> >> In base a quanto sopra posso essere accusato di eversione nei confronti >> dell'ordinamento democratico dello stato? >> >> Ho commesso altri reati? >> >> Ciao, >> Paolo >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> >

Oct. 30, 2010

Re: [nexa] R: Garante Privacy: Google Street View: le auto dovranno esserericonoscibili

by Andrea Glorioso

Caro Oreste, cari tutti, On 10/27/2010 11:53 AM, Oreste pollicino wrote: > A me sembra che non possa essere sottovalutato il fatto che il garante abbia applicato senza indugi la normativa itaiana. 4 anni fa non sono sicuro che l'avrebbe fatto in un caso del genere e sicuramente non l'ha fatto in un caso, a tutti noto, che coinvolgeva la moglie di un politico molto conosciuto. Caso sicuramente differente per elementi fattuali, giuridici e tecnici. Ma che condivide con questo il fatto che il trattamento avvenga principalmente, ma non esclusivamente, vista l'applicazione della legge italiana, tramite server locati in usa e ad opera di soggetti che hanno la sede principale di stabilimento al di fuori de territorio ue. Ciao, o. In effetti la decisione di applicare la normativa italiana e` un elemento molto interessante della decisione. Il riferimento al "trattamento effettuato mediante strumenti situati nel territorio dello Stato" (art. 5 del Codice, che traspone l'art. 4 della Direttiva 95/46/CE) e` in linea con le piu` recenti riflessioni del Gruppo di Lavoro Articolo 29, per esempio in tema di motori di ricerca e reti sociali. Certo si potrebbe sostenere che in questo caso gli "strumenti" - le macchine che raccolgono le immagini - sono piu` chiaramente "situati" nel territorio italiano che in altri casi, richiamati nelle opinioni del WP29, come per esempio l'utilizzo di "cookies". Personalmente ho trovato particolarmente interessanti due passaggi, ovvero: "CONSIDERATO che il servizio Street View, in ragione delle sue caratteristiche, nonché sulla base degli elementi emersi dall'analisi delle predette segnalazioni, rende necessaria una riflessione più ampia sul rispetto dei principi in materia di protezione dei dati personali;" (ma non si capisce quali siano queste riflessioni piu` ampie) "CONSIDERATO che al caso in esame risulta applicabile la disciplina relativa all'uso delle immagini e che quindi, in linea generale, non è necessario acquisire il consenso degli interessati quando la ripresa fotografica avviene in luogo pubblico, salve le limitazioni previste dalla legge, quali, ad esempio, il divieto di diffusione di fotografie quando ciò comporti pregiudizio all'onore, alla reputazione, al decoro della persona ripresa (art. 97, comma 2, della l. 22 aprile 1941, n. 633) o il divieto di diffusione di dati idonei a rivelare lo stato di salute (art. 26, comma 5 del Codice);" (non ho capito a quale disciplina il garante si riferisca di preciso, a parte le norme espressamente richiamate) A presto, Andrea

Oct. 30, 2010

Re: [nexa] US Air Force: "CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, 15 July 2010"

by Andrea Glorioso

Caro Juan Carlos, cari tutti, On 10/25/2010 1:38 PM, J.C. DE MARTIN wrote: > Caro Andrea, > > grazie a te per i commenti e i link. > Sull'argomento ho appena segnalato un lungo articolo di Hersh (premio > Pulitzer) > appena apparso sul The New Yorker. Grazie per la segnalazione. Ho letto l'articolo, che mi pare una buona ricostruzione di alcune delle discussioni piu` salienti sul tema. Mi pare particolarmente interessante il richiamo alla distinzione tra "cyber-espionage" e "cyber-war", anche se non mi sembra che l'articolo vada sino in fondo ad una delle domande di base, ovvero se e quando le politiche economiche (piu` o meno legali) divengano, in quanto strumento di dominio sull'avversario, qualcosa di equiparabile alla guerra. Non bisogna dimenticare che la difesa degli interessi economici e`, in molti casi, parte integrante della "sicurezza nazionale". > Ricordo inoltre che Bruce Sterling aveva parlato di cyberspace > e cyberwar durante il suo memorabile keynote speech il 30 giugno 2010 > a University & Cyberspace: > http://www.celm.polito.it/polistream/gestione/pagina.php?id=248 > In sintesi: l'esercito ama il termine "cyberspace" perche' lo spazio si > difende. > E chi lo difende da sempre? L'esercito. Interessante. E` disponibile una trascizione dell'intervento di Sterling? A presto, Andrea

Oct. 30, 2010

UN: ACTA a danger to human rights

by Paolo Brini

UN Special Rapporteur calls #ACTA danger to human rights [and more stuff] http://bit.ly/c6xlKw Ciao, Paolo

Oct. 30, 2010

Fwd: [A2k] 75+ Profs Call on Obama to Halt ACTA

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Begin forwarded message: > From: "Sean Flynn" <sflynn(a)wcl.american.edu> > Date: 29 ottobre 2010 03.48.01 GMT+02.00 > To: <a2k(a)lists.keionline.org> > Subject: [A2k] 75+ Profs Call on Obama to Halt ACTA > > Over 75 Law Profs have signed a sharply worded letter to president Obama calling for the opening of the process for considering ACTA. > > The letter calls on the President to "direct the USTR to halt its public endorsement of ACTA and subject the text to a meaningful participation process that can influence the shape of the agreement going forward." > > The original letter was drafted and circulated by > > Chris Sprigman, University of Virginia, 434-249-4345 > > Dave Levine, Elon University, 336-279-9298 > > Sean Flynn, American University, 202-294-5749 > > This afternoon at a public consultation on ACTA and the right to health, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to health commented that the process for creating acta appears to violate international human rights obligations for ensuring participation in law making affecting access to medicines and other health issues. > > Blog version: > > http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/over-70-law-profs-call-for-h… > > > President Barack Obama > 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW > Washington, DC 20500 > > Dear President Obama: > > As academics dedicated to promoting robust public debate on the laws and public policies affecting the Internet, intellectual property, global innovation policy and the worldwide trade in knowledge goods and services, we write to express our grave concern that your Administration is negotiating a far-reaching international intellectual property agreement behind a shroud of secrecy, with little opportunity for public input, and with active participation by special interests who stand to gain from restrictive new international rules that may harm the public interest. > > Your Administration promised to change the way Washington works. You promised to bring increased truthfulness and transparency to our public policy and law, including the Freedom of Information Act. You promised that wherever possible, important policy decisions would be made in public view, and not as the result of secret special interest deals hidden from the American people. > > Your Administration's negotiation of ACTA has been conducted in stark contrast to every one of these promises. In the interest of brevity, we'll focus here on the three principal ways in which your Administration's negotiation of ACTA undercuts the credibility of your previous promises. > > First, ACTA's negotiation has been conducted behind closed doors, subject to intense but needless secrecy, with the public shut out and a small group of special interests very much involved. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) has been involved in negotiations relating to ACTA for several years, and there have been drafts of portions of the agreement circulating among the negotiators since the start of negotiations. Despite that, the first official release of a draft text took place only in April, 2010. And following that release the USTR has not held a single public on-the-record meeting to invite comments on the text. Worse, in every subsequent meeting of the negotiating parties, the U.S. has blocked the public release of updated text. The U.S. often has acted alone in banning the distribution of the revised text, contrary to the strong majority view of other negotiating partners to promote public inspection and comment. Because the negotiations have operated on a consensus basis, the U.S. vote against transparency has been dispositive. > > This degree of secrecy is unacceptable, unwise, and directly undercuts your oft-repeated promises of openness and transparency. Rather than seeking meaningful public input from the outset, your Administration has allowed the bulk of the public debate to be based upon, at best, hearsay and speculation. Yet, ACTA is a trade agreement setting out a range of new international rules governing intellectual property; as the G-8 called it, a "new international framework." It is not (the claims of the USTR notwithstanding) related in any way to any standard definition of "national security" or any other interest of the United States similarly pressing or sensitive. The Administration's determination to hide ACTA from the public creates the impression that ACTA is precisely the kind of backroom special interest deal - undertaken in this case on behalf of a narrow group of U.S. content producers, and without meaningful input from the American public - that you have so often publicly opposed. > > Second, the Administration has stated that ACTA will be negotiated and implemented not as a treaty, but as a sole executive agreement. We believe that this course may be unlawful, and it is certainly unwise. > > Now that a near-final version of the ACTA text has been released, it is clear that ACTA would usurp congressional authority over intellectual property policy in a number of ways. Some of ACTA's provisions fail to explicitly incorporate current congressional policy, particularly in the areas of damages and injunctions. Other sections lock in substantive law that may not be well-adapted to the present context, much less the future. And in other areas, the agreement may complicate legislative efforts to solve widely recognized policy dilemmas, including in the area of orphan works, patent reform, secondary copyright liability and the creation of incentives for innovation in areas where the patent system may not be adequate. The agreement is also likely to affect courts' interpretation of U.S. law. > > The use of a sole executive agreement for ACTA appears unconstitutional. The President may only make sole executive agreements that are within his independent constitutional authority. The President has no independent constitutional authority over intellectual property or communications policy, the core subjects of ACTA. To the contrary, the Constitution gives primary authority over these matters to Congress, which is charged with making laws that regulate foreign commerce and intellectual property. ACTA should not be pursued further without congressional oversight and a meaningful opportunity for public debate. > > The USTR has insisted that ACTA's provisions are merely procedural and only about enforcing existing rights. These assertions are simply false. Nearly 100 international intellectual property experts from six continents gathered in Washington, DC in June, 2010 to analyze the potential public interest impacts of the officially released text. Those experts - joined by over 650 other experts and organizations - found that "the terms of the publicly released draft of ACTA threaten numerous public interests, including every concern specifically disclaimed by negotiators." The expert statement notes that: > > * Negotiators claim ACTA will not interfere with citizens' fundamental rights and liberties; it will. > * They claim ACTA is consistent with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); it is not. > * They claim ACTA will not increase border searches or interfere with cross-border transit of legitimate generic medicines; it will. > * And they claim that ACTA does not require "graduated response" disconnections of people from the internet; however, the agreement encourages such policies. > > Academics and other neutral intellectual property experts have not had time to sufficiently analyze the current text and are unlikely to do so as long as there is no open public forum to submit such analysis in a meaningful process. Rather than create such a forum, the USTR has released text accompanied by the announcement that the negotiations are finished and the time for public comment, which was never granted in the first instance, is over. This is not meaningful, real-time transparency, and it is certainly not the kind of accountability that we were expecting from your Administration. We know enough to know that ACTA's provisions are of significant interest to the general public, because they touch upon a wide range of public interests and are likely to alter the substantive law governing U.S. citizens. It is clear that before ACTA negotiations proceed further, Congress must be involved. > > Third, and finally, we are concerned that the purpose that animates ACTA is being deliberately misrepresented to the American people. The treaty is named the "Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement". But it has little to do with counterfeiting or controlling the international trade in counterfeit goods. Rather, this agreement would enact much more encompassing changes in the international rules governing trade in a wide variety of knowledge goods - whether they are counterfeit or not - and would establish new intellectual property rules and norms without systematic inquiry into effects of such development on economic and technical innovation in the U.S. or abroad. These norms will affect virtually every American and should be the subject of wide public debate. > > Our conclusion is simple: Any agreement of this scope and consequence must be based on a broad and meaningful consultative process, in public, on the record and with open on-going access to proposed negotiating text and must reflect a full range of public interest concerns. For the reasons detailed above, the ACTA negotiations fail to meet these standards. > > While you cannot go back in time, you still have the opportunity to allow for meaningful public input, even at this late date. Accordingly, we call on you to direct the USTR to halt its public endorsement of ACTA and subject the text to a meaningful participation process that can influence the shape of the agreement going forward. Specifically, we call on you to direct USTR to: > > 1. Signal to other negotiators that the U.S. will not sign ACTA before the conclusion of a meaningful public participation process and another round of official negotiations where public participation is encouraged; > 2. Hold a meaningful open, on-the-record public hearing on the draft text, the results of which will be used to determine what proposed changes to the agreement the administration will propose; > 3. Renounce its position that the agreement is a "sole executive agreement" that can tie Congressional authority to amend intellectual property laws without congressional approval and instead pledge to seek congressional approval of the final text; > 4. Consider reforms to the USTR's industry trade advisory committee (ITAC) process that would allow for a wide range of official advisors; > 5. Propose new language for the creation of the ACTA Committee that would require open, transparent and inclusive participation that takes into account the viewpoints of other stakeholders, including inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations, in line with the principles of the World Intellectual Property Organization's development agenda. > > > Signed, > > > > > > > > > > > > > Brook Baker > Northeastern University School of Law > > Derek E. Bambauer > Brooklyn Law School > > Mark Bartholomew > University at Buffalo Law School > > Barton Beebe > New York University School of Law > > Yochai Benkler > Harvard Law School > > Heidi Bond > Seattle University > > Denis Borges Barbosa > Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro > James Boyle > Duke University School of Law > > Annemarie Bridy > University of Idaho School of Law > > Dan L. Burk > University of California, Irvine > > Diane Cabell > Berkman Center, Harvard University > > Michael A. Carrier > Rutgers Law School-Camden > > Michael Carroll > American University Washington College of Law > > Brian W. Carver > UC Berkeley School of Information > > Colleen Chien > Santa Clara University School of Law > > Andrew Chin > University of North Carolina School of Law > > Margaret Chon > Seattle University School of Law > > Susan Crawford > Cardozo Law School > > Michael Davis > CSU College of Law > > Alexander S. Dent > The George Washington University > > Alex Feerst > Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society > > Giusella Finocchiaro > University of Bologna > > William Fisher > Harvard Law School > > Sean Flynn > American University Washington College of Law > > Dave Fagundes > Southwestern Law School > > Jon M. Garon > Hamline University School of Law > > Michael Geist > University of Ottawa School of Law > > James Gibson > University of Richmond > > Shubha Ghosh > University of Wisconsin School of Law > > Debora J. Halbert > University of Hawai`i at Manoa > > Robert A. Heverly > Albany Law School of Union University > > Cynthia Ho > Loyola University of Chicago School of Law > > Dan Hunter > New York University School of Law > > Peter Jaszi > American University Washington College of Law > > David R. Johnson > New York Law School > > Amy Kapczynski > UC Berkeley School of Law > > Alex Leavitt > Comparative Media Studies, MIT > > Lawrence Lessig > Harvard Law School > > David Levine > Elon University School of Law > > Jake Linford > Florida State University College of Law > > Michael J. Madison > University of Pittsburgh School of Law > > Mark McKenna > Notre Dame Law School > > Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe > University of Puerto Rico Law School > > Gabriel J. Michael > The George Washington University > > Viva R. Moffat > University of Denver College of Law > > Michael R. Morris > University of Edinburgh > > Ira Nathenson > St. Thomas University School of Law > > Tyler Ochoa > Santa Clara University School of Law > > Kevin Outterson > Boston University > > Dr Luigi Palombi > Australian National University > > Frank Pasquale > Seton Hall School of Law > > Malla Pollack > co-author, Callmann on Unfair Competition > > Kenneth L. Port > William Mitchell College of Law > > David G. Post > Beasley School of Law, Temple University > > Srividhya Ragavan > University of Oklahoma College of Law > > R. Anthony Reese > UC Irvine School of Law > > Jerome H. Reichman > Duke Law School > > Betsy Rosenblatt > Whittier Law School > > Patrick S. Ryan > University of Colorado at Boulder > > Pam Samuelson > UC Berkeley School of Law > > > Jason M. Schultz > UC Berkeley School of Law > > Susan K. Sell > The George Washington University > > Jessica Silbey > Suffolk University Law School > > Brenda Reddix-Smalls > North Carolina Central University School of Law > > Christopher Sprigman > University of Virginia School of Law > > Elizabeth Stark > Yale University > > Katherine Strandburg > New York University School of Law > > Talha Syed > UC Berkeley - Boalt Hall > > Deborah Tussey > Oklahoma City University School of Law > > Jennifer M. Urban > UC Berkeley - Boalt Hall > > Yousuf A Vawda > University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa > > Jonathan Weinberg > Wayne State University > > Darryl C. Wilson > Stetson University College of Law > > Jane K. Winn > University of Washington School of Law > > Mark Wojcik > John Marshall Law School > > Peter K. Yu > Drake University Law School > > Diane L. Zimmerman > New York University School of Law > > Jonathan Zittrain > Harvard Law School > CC: > > The Honorable Max Baucus > Chairman > Senate Committee on Finance > > The Honorable Chuck Grassley > Ranking Member > Senate Committee on Finance > > The Honorable Ron Wyden > Chairman > Senate Committee on Finance > Subcommittee on Trade, Customs, and > Global Competitiveness > > The Honorable Mike Crapo > Ranking Member > Senate Committee on Finance > Subcommittee on Trade, Customs, and > Global Competitiveness > > The Honorable Sander Levin > Acting Chairman > House Way and Means Committee > > The Honorable Dave Camp > Ranking Member > House Ways and Means Committee > > The Honorable John S. Tanner > Acting Chairman > House Ways and Means Committee > Subcommittee on Trade > > The Honorable Kevin Brady > House Ways and Means Committee > Subcommittee on Trade > > The Honorable Patrick Leahy > Chairman > Senate Committee on the Judiciary > > The Honorable Jeff Sessions > Ranking Member > Senate Committee on the Judiciary > > The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. > Chairman > House Committee on the Judiciary > > The Honorable Lamar Smith > Ranking Member > House Committee on the Judiciary > > > > > > > The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton > Secretary of State > > The Honorable Gary Locke > Secretary of Commerce > > Victoria Espinel > U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator > > David Kappos > Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property > Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office > > Alan Hoffman > Deputy Chief of Staff > Office of the Vice President > > Cameron F. Kerry > General Counsel > Department of Commerce > > Geovette E. Washington > Deputy General Counsel > Department of Commerce > > Marc Berejka > Senior Policy Advisor > Office of the Secretary > Department of Commerce > > Quentin Palfrey > Deputy General Counsel for Strategic Initiatives > Department of Commerce > > Andrew McLaughlin > Deputy Chief U.S. Technology Officer > > Phil J. Weiser > Deputy Assistant Attorney General > Department of Justice > > Miriam Sapiro > Deputy U.S. Trade Representative > > Lisa Garcia > Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for > Intergovernmental Affairs > > Daniel Weitzner > Associate Administrator > Office of Policy Analysis and Development > > Andrew Reynolds > Acting Science and Technology Adviser to the > Secretary of State > > > Sean Flynn > Associate Director > Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property > American University Washington College of Law > 202 274 4157 > www.pijip.org > > _______________________________________________ > A2k mailing list > A2k(a)lists.keionline.org > http://lists.keionline.org/mailman/listinfo/a2k_lists.keionline.org

Oct. 29, 2010

standard aperti: nuovo libro e nuovo progetto

by Simone Aliprandi

Annuncio l'imminente uscita del mio nuovo libro "Apriti standard! Interoperabilità e formati aperti per l'innovazione tecnologica". Il sito ufficiale dell'iniziativa editoriale è http://www.aliprandi.org/apriti-standard . A breve verranno comunicate le date della disponibilità in libreria e degli eventi di presentazione. Il libro sarà rilasciato con licenza Creative Commons by-sa. Se volete contribuire alla promozione dell'inziativa, oltre al sito ufficiale, potete anche diffondere la "like-page" di Facebook ai vostri contatti: http://www.facebook.com/pages/StandardApertiit/154792307896018 Il libro accompagna l'inaugurazione di un nuovo progetto divulgativo da me curato specificamente dedicato all'idea di standard aperto e di interoperabilità. Il sito del progetto (per ora ancora in costruzione) è http://www.standardaperti.it/. Sono ben accetti commenti e suggerimenti. Un cordiale saluto a tutti. -- Simone Aliprandi - http://www.aliprandi.org

Oct. 29, 2010