May 2023 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] Dati della PA nei cloud [era Re: Is AI just 'Capital's Willing Executioner'?]

by Giacomo Tesio

On Mon, May 08, 2023 at 09:45:34AM +0200, Antonio wrote: > Il cloud, in definitiva, è come le cassette di sicurezza delle banche, sulle quali, > dalle lex horreorum, in poi, c'è una legislazione infinita. > Ma i dati non sono denari o gioielli. Uno spazio riservato su un cloud è come una > cassetta di sicurezza trasparente. Sicura e presidiata sì ma, appunto, trasparente. Non è una buona metafora, perché la copia dei dati non lascia traccia. Non è semplicemente trasparente: puoi tirar fuori infinite copie del contenuto della "cassetta" e usarli a tuo piacimento senza che nessuno se ne possa accorgere. Per questo nessuna legislazione progettata senza una profonda comprensione dell'informatica e del FUNZIONAMENTO dei sistemi di cui parliamo può proteggere davvero quei dati. > I politici tacciono, al più ti possono rispondere: "ne siamo coscienti e stiamo > lavorando al cloud nazionale, è solo questione di tempo e i dati "ritorneranno" in Italia). > Nel frattempo che si fa? La Rivoluzione? :-D In fondo, se la Legge non è ugiale per tutti, se le BigTech, i Dirigenti Scolastici, i Dirigenti Ospedalieri etc.. possono violarla impunemente... Se la Legge non conta più niente, cosa ci rimane? > Beh, si potrebbe, tornando all'analogia con le cassette di sicurezza, > mettere una cassettina con il lucchetto dentro. > Quindi criptare i dati in partenza ... Purtroppo rimangono innumerevoli dati personali contenuti in quelli impropriamente detti "metadati". Pensa ad esempio agli header SMTP delle email, agli header HTTP inviati dalle richieste web etc... Non è possibile criptare i destinatari di una email. O l'ora in cui è inviata. Giacomo

May 9, 2023

Re: [nexa] Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals

by Giacomo Tesio

Ciao Stefano, On Mon, May 08, 2023 at 08:38:55PM +0200, Stefano Zacchiroli wrote: > Ma da un punto di vista di policy pubbliche, se dobbiamo imporlo per > legge, allora è molto più facile imporre il libero accesso per audit a > tutto il software in esecuzione in un'auto da parte del regolatore. Che tanto non avrà mai il tempo, le risorse, le competenze e la volontà di debuggarlo e comprenderlo interamente. Questo approccio avrebbe una sua efficacia solo se tale dettagliatissima analisi del regolatore fosse PRErequisito alla messa in commercio. Se non fosse possibile mettere in commercio un qualsiasi device prima che il suo codice non sia stato approfonditamente sviscerato da un team pubblico di esperti, allora la quantità del codice commerciale in esecuzione si ridurrebbe di innumerevoli ordini di grandezza e la sua qualità aumenterebbe dello stesso numero di ordini di grandezza. Se però tale audit non fosse PRErequisito alla messa in commercio, sarebbe solo fumo negli occhi dei cittadini/consumatori. Ricordiamoci sempre che migliaia di scuole, ospedali e comuni stanno violando il GDPR alla luce del sole e l'Autorità GARANTE per la PROTEZIONE dei Dati Personali... tace. I regolatori sono molto facile da controllare. Giacomo

May 9, 2023

Re: [nexa] Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals

by M. Fioretti

On Mon, May 08, 2023 18:11:37 PM +0200, Andrea Trentini wrote: > (mi allaccio al thread > https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2022-December/049933.html e > seguenti) > > > -------- Forwarded Message -------- > Subject: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals > Date: Sat, 06 May 2023 16:58:09 +0300 > From: Lars Noodén <lars.nooden(a)gmx.com> > To: libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org > > Recent news¹ reminds us that back in 2015 a whistleblower exposed the > VW/Audi emissions scandal... Lars l'ho conosciuto nel 2010/2011, mi fa piacere vedere che sta ancora sul pezzo. Ma il "ruolo del FOSS nel prevenire nuovi scandali" tipo Dieselgate che lui propone adesso e' lo stesso che OTTO anni fa chiedevamo non solo io: https://stop.zona-m.net/2015/10/rogue-engineers-behind-volkswagen-scandal-s… ma Moglen e FSF (link a entrambi nel mio post): "If Volkswagen knew that every customer who buys a vehicle would have a right to read the source code of all the software in the vehicle..." READ, non "modificare apposta per, dopo revisione inevitabilmente solo formale, andarci in giro per strada" Quindi? Marco -- Vi aspetto su Substack! https://mfioretti.substack.com

May 9, 2023

WhatsApp could disappear from UK over privacy concerns, ministers told | WhatsApp | The Guardian

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/08/whatsapp-could-disappear…> The UK government risks sleepwalking into a confrontation with WhatsApp that could lead to the messaging app disappearing from Britain, ministers have been warned, with options for an amicable resolution fast running out. At the centre of the row is the online safety bill, a vast piece of legislation that will touch on almost every aspect of online life in Britain. More than four years in the making, with eight secretaries of state and five prime ministers involved in its drafting, the bill, which is progressing through the House of Lords, is more than 250 pages long. The table of contents alone spans 10 pages. The bill gives Ofcom the power to impose requirements for social networks to use technology to tackle terrorism or child sexual abuse content, with fines of up to 10% of global turnover for those services that do not comply. Companies must use “best endeavours” to develop or source technology to obey the notice. But for messaging apps that secure their user data with “end-to-end encryption” (E2EE), it is technologically impossible to read user messages without fundamentally breaking their promises to users. That, they say, is a step they will not take. “The bill provides no explicit protection for encryption,” said a coalition of providers, including the market leaders WhatsApp and Signal, in an open letter last month, “and if implemented as written, could empower Ofcom to try to force the proactive scanning of private messages on end-to-end encrypted communication services, nullifying the purpose of end-to-end encryption as a result and compromising the privacy of all users.” If push came to shove, they say, they would choose to protect the security of their non-UK users. “Ninety-eight per cent of our users are outside the UK,” WhatsApp’s chief, Will Cathcart, told the Guardian in March. “They do not want us to lower the security of the product, and just as a straightforward matter, it would be an odd choice for us to choose to lower the security of the product in a way that would affect those 98% of users.” Legislators have called on the government to take the concerns seriously. “These services, such as WhatsApp, will potentially leave the UK,” Claire Fox told the House of Lords last week. “This is not like threatening to storm off. It is not done in any kind of pique in that way. In putting enormous pressure on these platforms to scan communications, we must remember that they are global platforms. “They have a system that works for billions of people all around the world. A relatively small market such as the UK is not something for which they would compromise their billions of users around the world.” A Home Office spokesperson said: “We support strong encryption, but this cannot come at the cost of public safety. Tech companies have a moral duty to ensure they are not blinding themselves and law enforcement to the unprecedented levels of child sexual abuse on their platforms. “The online safety bill in no way represents a ban on end-to-end encryption, nor will it require services to weaken encryption. “Where it is the only effective, proportionate and necessary action available, Ofcom will be able to direct platforms to use accredited technology, or make best endeavours to develop new technology, to accurately identify child sexual abuse content, so it can be taken down and the despicable predators brought to justice.” Richard Allan, the Liberal Democrat peer who worked as Meta’s head of policy for a decade until 2019, described the government approach as one of “intentional ambiguity”. “They are careful to say that they have no intention of banning end-to-end encryption … but at the same time refuse to confirm that they could not do so under the new powers in the bill. This creates a high-stakes game of chicken, where the government think companies will give them more if they hold the threat of drastic technical orders over them. “The government’s hope is that companies will blink first in the game of chicken and give them what they want.” Allan said another scenario could be that the government comes clean and declares its intent is to limit end-to-end encryption. “It would at least allow for an orderly transition, if services choose to withdraw products from the UK market rather than operate here on these terms. It might be that there are no significant withdrawals, and the UK government could congratulate themselves on calling the companies’ bluff and getting what they want at little cost, but I doubt that this would be the case.” Backers of the bill are unimpressed with efforts to rewrite it to suit big tech, though. Damian Collins, the Conservative MP who chaired a Westminster committee scrutinising the bill, said he did not support one amendment introduced to try to protect end-to-end encryption. “I don’t think you want to give companies subjective grounds for deciding whether or not they need to comply with the duties set out in the bill.” Collins added that the bill did not attack encryption because it would only require messaging companies sharing information that they have access to – which does not include message content. However, he said authorities should be able to access the background data behind users, including data about usage of the app, contacts, location and names of user groups. If users access WhatsApp through a web browser, the service can also collect information about websites visited before and after sending messages, Collins added. This week Politico reported that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology wanted to find a way through the row and is having talks “with anyone that wants to discuss this with us”. Last year, the chief executive of the trade association Digital Content Next, Jason Kint, flagged a US antitrust complaint that contained 2019 communications between Mark Zuckerberg and his policy chief, Nick Clegg, in which they discussed flagging the importance of privacy and end-to-end encryption as a “smokescreen” in any debate over integrating the back end of Meta’s apps. Clegg wrote: “Are you suggesting we should lead with E2EE and not interoperability? You may be right that – as a matter of political practicality – the latter is easier to block/hinder than the former.” He added that it was “very easy to explain” why E2EE is helpful to users whereas integrating the interoperability of apps looks like “a play for our benefit, not necessarily users”.

May 8, 2023

Intelligenza artificiale e diritto amministrativo 9 maggio 2023

by Mauro Alovisio

Gent.mi segnalo seminario in diretta streaming domani su Intelligenza artificiale a cura dell'Università degli Studi di Torino (credo sarà registrato e disponibile sul sito unito media )Un caro saluto Mauro Intelligenza artificiale e diritto amministrativo | 9 maggio 2023 ore 9.15 Pubblicato: Venerdì 14 aprile 2023 Presiede - *Roberto Cavallo Perin* 9.15 *Sergio Foà* - *Intelligenza artificiale e cultura della trasparenza * *amministrativa* 9.45 *Giancarlo Montedoro* - *Intelligenza artificiale, società e mercato* 10.15 *Gabriella M. Racca* - *Stato digitale, politica industriale e contratti pubblici* 10.45 *Francesco Cardarelli* - *Stato digitale e mercato* 11.15 *Tomas Font* - *Intelligenza artificiale e azione amministrativa* 11.45 *Carlo Emanuele Gallo* - *Intelligenza artificiale e giustizia amministrativa* Nell’occasione si presentano: *Lo Stato digitale. Una introduzione* di Luisa Torchia, Il Mulino, 2023 *Intelligenza artificiale e diritto: una rivoluzione?* a cura di A. Pajno, F. Donati, A. Perrucci, Quaderni di Astrid, Il Mulino, 2022 Con la partecipazione di *Luisa Torchia*, *Alessandro Pajno* e *Antonio Perrucci* 15.00 - Incontro con i dottorandi. Il convegno si terrà nell'*Aula Magna del Campus Luigi Einaudi* (Lungo Dora Siena 100/A | Torino). *Sarà possibile seguire a distanza l’evento collegandosi a Webexopen_in_new <https://unito.webex.com/meet/master.dpa> o in diretta streaming sul canale Live di Unito mediaopen_in_new <https://media.unito.it/?channel=4>.* *Per esprimere la propria partecipazione, occorre compilare il modulo dedicatoopen_in_new <https://forms.gle/rnCvhijBWL9BmpJT8>.*

May 8, 2023

Re: [nexa] Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals

by Andrea Trentini

On 08/05/2023 20:38, Stefano Zacchiroli wrote: > È (purtroppo) un argomento fallace che vedo spesso circolare in ambiti > FOSS. concordo, non basta > Se qualcuno (VW/Audi in questo esempio) sta commettendo qualcosa di > illegale, non si capisce perché ci si dovrebbe fidare degli stessi > quando dicono "tutto il software dell'auto è software libero; abbiamo > pubblicato i sorgenti qua: <URL>". Se sono disposti a barare, possono > benissimo farlo anche quando dichiarano che il codice sorgente > pubblicato corrispondo a quello installato nei veicoli (quando ciò non è > vero). Non è certo la paura di non rispettare una licenza FOSS (ammesso > e non concesso che ci sia del copyleft nell'equazione) che farà loro > cambiare la bilancia costi/rischi/benefici. esatto, va aggiunta la possibilità (il diritto) di "flashare" ogni device (le cui azioni sono sotto la nostra responsabilità) con la versione compilata da noi, una sorta di "libertà -1" (oltre alla "freedom to run the program as you wish, for any purpose" serve una "freedom NOT to run the original program") [abbiamo già "litigato" ampiamente qui, non voglio rivangare flame] > Quindi serve un modo di permettere agli utenti delle auto di verificare > che il codice sorgente pubblicato corrisponda ai binari installati > nell'auto. Per tutto questo non bastano nemmeno i Reproducible Builds > (R-B) https://reproducible-builds.org/ , perché le auto di oggi sono > sistemi molto chiusi nel quale l'utente difficilmente riesce ad avere > accesso diretto al software installato. Ergo non ci si può basare sul > threat model di R-B (cf.: [1]) per una verifica basata su consenso di > build o terzi di fiducia. > > Ricapitolando, una soluzione tecnologica lungo questo asse richiede: (a) > 100% open source, (b) reproducible builds, (c) accesso completo ai > binari installati nell'auto. E tutto questo mi farebbe UN SACCO PIACERE. idem!!! > Ma da un punto di vista di policy pubbliche, se dobbiamo imporlo per > legge, allora è molto più facile imporre il libero accesso per audit a > tutto il software in esecuzione in un'auto da parte del regolatore. io sparerei più alto: accessa in lettura da parte di tutti, come minimo, per poi passare alla battaglia per il diritto di flashing (dal "right to repair" al "right to fully reprogram") > > Ciao > > [1]: Lamb, Chris, and Stefano Zacchiroli. "Reproducible builds: > Increasing the integrity of software supply chains." IEEE Software > 39.2 (2021): 62-70. (Per farmi perdonare della auto citazione, ecco > qua il preprint open access dell'articolo: > https://hal.science/hal-03196519/ ) grazie! -- Andrea Trentini ⠠⠵ http://atrent.it Dip.to di Informatica Università degli Studi di Milano

May 8, 2023

Re: [nexa] Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals

by Stefano Zacchiroli

È (purtroppo) un argomento fallace che vedo spesso circolare in ambiti FOSS. Se qualcuno (VW/Audi in questo esempio) sta commettendo qualcosa di illegale, non si capisce perché ci si dovrebbe fidare degli stessi quando dicono "tutto il software dell'auto è software libero; abbiamo pubblicato i sorgenti qua: <URL>". Se sono disposti a barare, possono benissimo farlo anche quando dichiarano che il codice sorgente pubblicato corrispondo a quello installato nei veicoli (quando ciò non è vero). Non è certo la paura di non rispettare una licenza FOSS (ammesso e non concesso che ci sia del copyleft nell'equazione) che farà loro cambiare la bilancia costi/rischi/benefici. Quindi serve un modo di permettere agli utenti delle auto di verificare che il codice sorgente pubblicato corrisponda ai binari installati nell'auto. Per tutto questo non bastano nemmeno i Reproducible Builds (R-B) https://reproducible-builds.org/ , perché le auto di oggi sono sistemi molto chiusi nel quale l'utente difficilmente riesce ad avere accesso diretto al software installato. Ergo non ci si può basare sul threat model di R-B (cf.: [1]) per una verifica basata su consenso di build o terzi di fiducia. Ricapitolando, una soluzione tecnologica lungo questo asse richiede: (a) 100% open source, (b) reproducible builds, (c) accesso completo ai binari installati nell'auto. E tutto questo mi farebbe UN SACCO PIACERE. Ma da un punto di vista di policy pubbliche, se dobbiamo imporlo per legge, allora è molto più facile imporre il libero accesso per audit a tutto il software in esecuzione in un'auto da parte del regolatore. Ciao [1]: Lamb, Chris, and Stefano Zacchiroli. "Reproducible builds: Increasing the integrity of software supply chains." IEEE Software 39.2 (2021): 62-70. (Per farmi perdonare della auto citazione, ecco qua il preprint open access dell'articolo: https://hal.science/hal-03196519/ ) On Mon, May 08, 2023 at 06:11:37PM +0200, Andrea Trentini wrote: > (mi allaccio al thread > https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2022-December/049933.html e > seguenti) > > > -------- Forwarded Message -------- > Subject: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals > Date: Sat, 06 May 2023 16:58:09 +0300 > From: Lars Noodén <lars.nooden(a)gmx.com> > To: libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org > > Recent news¹ reminds us that back in 2015 a whistleblower exposed the > VW/Audi emissions scandal, which I guess had been going on since 1999. > The companies executives used closed source, proprietary software in the > vehicles to hide the fact that the vehicles were emitting 40 times the > allowed NOx when actually out on the roads and not in the testing > centers. Even with fines and prison sentences, there is no way to be > sure the companies are not working on more of the same -- unless the > development is done out in the open. > > Clearly we see both physical and economic harm from neglecting to > require FOSS even in embedded computers, such as the 100+ now found in > each new car. because these companies have already shown that the > closed source model *cannot* be trusted such style of development should > not be allowed any more in regards to vehicles. Surely a FOSS-based > workflow can be figured out. > > Perhaps it is a timely and appropriate topic for institutions like FSF, > OSI, EFFI, and so on to address that publicly? Even a short statement > in passing would at least raise awareness and provide an opportunity to > ratchet things forward in regard to Software Freedom. > > /Lars > > > ¹ Many sites on this topic, too, here is a small sample of three: > > "Former Audi Chief to Plead Guilty in Emissions Scandal" > https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/business/diesel-emissions-scandal-audi-r… > > "Ex-Audi CEO to Plead Guilty Over 'Dieselgate' Scandal " > https://www.voanews.com/a/ex-audi-ceo-to-plead-guilty-over-dieselgate-scand… > > "Former head of Audi to confess in 'dieselgate' fraud trial| > https://www.dw.com/en/former-head-of-audi-to-confess-in-dieselgate-fraud-tr… > > _______________________________________________ > libreplanet-discuss mailing list > libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org > https://lists.libreplanet.org/mailman/listinfo/libreplanet-discuss > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa -- Stefano Zacchiroli . zack(a)upsilon.cc . https://upsilon.cc/zack _. ^ ._ Full professor of Computer Science o o o \/|V|\/ Télécom Paris, Polytechnic Institute of Paris o o o </> <\> Co-founder & CTO Software Heritage o o o o /\|^|/\ https://twitter.com/zacchiro . https://mastodon.xyz/@zacchiro '" V "'

May 8, 2023

Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals

by Andrea Trentini

(mi allaccio al thread https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2022-December/049933.html e seguenti) -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals Date: Sat, 06 May 2023 16:58:09 +0300 From: Lars Noodén <lars.nooden(a)gmx.com> To: libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org Recent news¹ reminds us that back in 2015 a whistleblower exposed the VW/Audi emissions scandal, which I guess had been going on since 1999. The companies executives used closed source, proprietary software in the vehicles to hide the fact that the vehicles were emitting 40 times the allowed NOx when actually out on the roads and not in the testing centers. Even with fines and prison sentences, there is no way to be sure the companies are not working on more of the same -- unless the development is done out in the open. Clearly we see both physical and economic harm from neglecting to require FOSS even in embedded computers, such as the 100+ now found in each new car. because these companies have already shown that the closed source model *cannot* be trusted such style of development should not be allowed any more in regards to vehicles. Surely a FOSS-based workflow can be figured out. Perhaps it is a timely and appropriate topic for institutions like FSF, OSI, EFFI, and so on to address that publicly? Even a short statement in passing would at least raise awareness and provide an opportunity to ratchet things forward in regard to Software Freedom. /Lars ¹ Many sites on this topic, too, here is a small sample of three: "Former Audi Chief to Plead Guilty in Emissions Scandal" https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/business/diesel-emissions-scandal-audi-r… "Ex-Audi CEO to Plead Guilty Over 'Dieselgate' Scandal " https://www.voanews.com/a/ex-audi-ceo-to-plead-guilty-over-dieselgate-scand… "Former head of Audi to confess in 'dieselgate' fraud trial| https://www.dw.com/en/former-head-of-audi-to-confess-in-dieselgate-fraud-tr… _______________________________________________ libreplanet-discuss mailing list libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org https://lists.libreplanet.org/mailman/listinfo/libreplanet-discuss

May 8, 2023

GAO Report - Software Acquisition: Additional Actions Needed to Help DOD Implement Future Modernization Efforts

by Diego.Latella

Software Acquisition: Additional Actions Needed to Help DOD Implement Future Modernization Efforts GAO23-105611 https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105611?utm_campaign=usgao_email&utm_con… DL -- Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR/ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it [1]) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) CNR/GI-STS (http://gists.pi.cnr.it) https://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, fax: +390506212040 =================== Links: ------ [1] http://www.isti.cnr.it

May 8, 2023

[CFP] 35th International Teletraffic Congress - Deadline Approaching

by Martino Trevisan

[Apologies if you receive multiple copies of this mail] *35th International Teletraffic Congress* *3-5 October, 2023, Turin* *Website: https://itc35.itc-conference.org/* /_*CALL FOR PAPERS*_/ /The International Teletraffic Congress (ITC) 35, to be held October 3-5, 2023 at Politecnico di Torino, Italy, is the 35th edition of this international flagship congress in the field of networking science and practice. ITC was founded back in 1955 by enthusiastic scientists and engineers who were willing to deploy networks in a holistic way. Since then, it has established a multi-decade tradition as the primary forum for presenting and discussing the latest technical advances in the broad areas of teletraffic models, network systems, and measurements. ITC 35 solicits cutting-edge papers spanning both theory and experimentation in all areas of networking, ranging from traffic engineering and control with application also to emerging softwarized/virtualized network paradigms, up to innovative wireless scenarios brought about by the emergence of B5G and IoT systems. ITC 35 especially encourages original contributions which bridge the gap between performance modeling and real-life operational aspects, including works which leverage measurement data to provide a better understanding of the wired and wireless networks’ operation under realistic conditions. A selection of the best papers presented at the conference will be fast tracked to Performance Evaluation and Computer Networks journals after the conference. ITC 35 will offer a number of _*student travel grants*_ to support full-time students for attending._* *_/ /_*TOPICS*_/ *ITC 35* covers topics in the following areas: * Performance Evaluation, Control and Optimization * Network Measurements and Big Data * Networking Architectures and Paradigms * Wireless and Cellular Networks /_*IMPORTANT DATES*_/ * *May 23, 2023:**Paper registration deadline,* /_*15 days left*_/ * *May 30, 2023:* Paper submission deadline * *Jul 17, 2023:* Notification date * *Aug 16, 2023:* Camera-ready paper and author registration deadline * *Oct 3-5, 2023:* Conference Date Both full papers and short papers are welcome. Submission instructions can be found at the conference website: https://itc35.itc-conference.org/authors.html /_*KEYNOTE SPEAKERS*_/* * * *Silvia Giordano*, SUPSI, Switzerland * *Colin Maclay*, University of Southern California, US More keynote speakers will be announced in the next weeks /_*ORGANIZING COMMITTEE*_/* * *General chairs:* * *Markus Fiedler*, BTH, Sweden * *Michela Meo*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy *TPC chairs:* * *Zhiyuan Jiang*, China * *Sara Alouf*, INRIA, France * *Oliver Hohlfeld*, University of Kassel, Germany *Local arrangement:* * *Daniela Renga*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy * *Greta Vallero*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy *Publicity chairs:* * *Martino Trevisan*, Università di Trieste, Italy * *Yuxuan Sun*, Beijing Jiaotong University, China *Web chair:* * *Gianluca Perna*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy For additional information visit *https://itc35.itc-conference.org/* <https://itc35.itc-conference.org/> For any questions do not hesitate to contact the conference organization under***itc35_oc(a)tlc.polito.it* /Best Regards,/ /*ITC 35 *//Organizing Team/

May 8, 2023