January 2022 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] The Controversy Surrounding Hybrid Cryptography - Dhole Moments

by Stefano Quintarelli

passeremo ai cifrari di vernam precondivisi... LOL On 30/01/22 09:41, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa wrote: > <https://soatok.blog/2022/01/27/the-controversy-surrounding-hybrid-cryptogra… > <https://soatok.blog/2022/01/27/the-controversy-surrounding-hybrid-cryptogra…>> > > [...] > > Why Hybrid Cryptosystems? > > At some point in the future (years or decades from now), humanity may build a practical > quantum computer. This will be a complete disaster for all of the cryptography deployed on > the Internet today. > > In response to this distant existential threat, cryptographers have been hard at work > designing and attacking algorithms that remain secure even when quantum computers arrive. > These algorithms are classified as post-quantum cryptography (mostly to distinguish it > from techniques that uses quantum computers to facilitate cryptography rather than attack > it, which is “quantum cryptography” and not really worth our time talking about). > Post-quantum cryptography is often abbreviated as “PQ Crypto” or “PQC”. > > However, a lot of the post-quantum cryptography designs are relatively new or > comparatively less studied than their classical (pre-quantum) counterparts. Several of the > Round 1 candidates to NIST’s post quantum cryptography project were broken immediately > (PDF). Exploit code referenced in PDF duplicated below.: > #!/usr/bin/env python3 > import binascii, struct > > def recover_bit(ct, bit): > assert bit < len(ct) // 4000 > ts = [struct.unpack('BB', ct[i:i+2]) for i in range(4000*bit, 4000*(bit+1), 2)] > xs, ys = [a for a, b in ts if b == 1], [a for a, b in ts if b == 2] > return sum(xs) / len(xs) >= sum(ys) / len(ys) > > def decrypt(ct): > res = sum(recover_bit(ct, b) << b for b in range(len(ct) // 4000)) > return int.to_bytes(res, len(ct) // 4000 // 8, 'little') > > kat = 0 > for l in open('KAT_GuessAgain/GuessAgainEncryptKAT_2000.rsp'): > > if l.startswith('msg = '): > > # only used for verifying the recovered plaintext. > msg = binascii.unhexlify(l[len('msg = '):].strip()) > > elif l.startswith('c = '): > > ct = binascii.unhexlify(l[len('c = '):].strip()) > > print('{}attacking known-answer test #{}'.format('\n' * (kat > 0), kat)) > print('correct plaintext: {}'.format(binascii.hexlify(msg).decode())) > > plain = decrypt(ct) > > print('recovered plaintext: {} ({})'.format(binascii.hexlify(plain).decode(), plain == msg)) > > kat += 1 > > More pertinent to our discussions: Rainbow, which was one of the Round 3 Finalists for > post-quantum digital signature algorithms, was discovered in 2020 to be much easier to > attack than previously thought. Specifically, for the third round parameters, the attack > cost was reduced by a factor of 2^{20}, 2^{40}, and 2^{55}. > > That security reduction is just a tad bit more concerning than a Round 1 candidate being > totally broken, since NIST had concluded by then that Rainbow was a good signature > algorithm until that attack was discovered. Maybe there are similar attacks just waiting > to be found? > > Given that new cryptography is accompanied by less confidence than incumbent cryptography, > hybrid designs are an excellent way to mitigate the risk of attack advancements in > post-quantum cryptography: > > If the security of your system requires breaking the cryptography used today AND breaking > one of the new-fangled designs, you’ll always be at least as secure as the stronger algorithm. > Art: Lynx vs Jackalope > Why Is Hybrid Cryptography Controversial? > > Despite the risks of greenfield cryptographic algorithms, the NSA has begun recommending a > strictly-PQ approach to cryptography and have explicitly stated that they will not require > hybrid designs. > > Another pushback on hybrid cryptography comes from Uri Blumenthal of MIT’s Lincoln Labs on > the IETF CFRG mailing list (the acronym CRQC expands to “Cryptographically-Relevant > Quantum Computer”): > > Here are the possibilities and their relation to the usefulness of the Hybrid approach. > > 1. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is useless. > > 2. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms fail – Hybrid is useless. > > 3. CRQC arrived, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is > useless. > > 4. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – Hybrid useless. > > 5. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid > is useless. > > 6. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – > Hybrid helps. > > 7. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – > Hybrid is useless. > > 8. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – > Hybrid is useless. > Uri Blumenthal, IETF CFRG mailing list, December 2021 (link) > > Why Hybrid Is Actually A Damn Good Idea > Art: Scruff Kerfluff > > Uri’s risk analysis is, of course, flawed. And I’m not the first to disagree with him. > > First, Uri’s framing sort of implies that each of the 8 possible outputs of these 3 > boolean variables are relatively equally likely outcomes. > > It’s very tempting to look at this and think, “Wow, that’s a lot of work for something > that only helps in 12.5% of possible outcomes!” Uri didn’t explicitly state this > assumption, and he might not even believe that, but it is a cognitive trap that emerges in > the structure of his argument, so watch your step. > > Second, for many candidate algorithms, we’re already in scenario 6 that Uri outlined! It’s > not some hypothetical future, it’s the present state of affairs. > > To wit: The advances in cryptanalysis on Rainbow don’t totally break it in a practical > sense, but they do reduce the security by a devastating margin (which will require > significantly larger parameter sets and performance penalties to remedy). > > For many post-quantum algorithms, we’re still uncertain about which scenario is most > relevant. But since PQ algorithms are being successfully attacked and a quantum computer > still hasn’t arrived, and classical algorithms are still holding up fine, it’s very clear > that “hybrid helps” is the world we most likely inhabit today, and likely will for many > years (until the existence of quantum computers is finally settled). > > Finally, even in other scenarios (which are more relevant for other post-quantum > algorithms), hybrid doesn’t significantly hurt security. It does carry a minor cost to > bandwidth and performance, and it does mean having a larger codebase to review when > compared with jettisoning the algorithms we use today, but I’d argue that the existing > code is relatively low risk compared to new code. > > From what I’ve read, the NSA didn’t make as strong an argument as Uri; they said hybrid > would not be required, but didn’t go so far as to attack it. > > Hybrid cryptography is a long-term bet that will protect the most users from cryptanalytic > advancements, contrasted with strictly-PQ and no-PQ approaches. > Why The Hybrid Controversy Remains Unsettled > > Even if we can all agree that hybrid is the way to go, there’s still significant > disagreement on exactly how to do it. > Hybrid KEMs > > There are two schools of thought on hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs): > > Wrap the post-quantum KEM in the encrypted channel created by the classical KEM. > Use both the post-quantum KEM and classical KEM as inputs to a secure KDF, then use a > single encrypted channel secured by both. > > The first option (layered) has the benefit of making migrations smoother. You can begin > with classical cryptography (i.e. ECDHE for TLS ciphersuites), which is what most systems > online support today. Then you can do your post-quantum cryptography inside the existing > channel to create a post-quantum-secure channel. This also lends toward opportunistic > upgrades (which might not be a good idea). > > The second option (composite) has the benefit of making the security of your protocol > all-or-nothing: You cannot attack the weak now and the strong part later. The session keys > you’ll derive require attacking both algorithms in order to get access to the plaintext. > Additionally, you only need a single layer. The complexity lies entirely within the > handshake, instead of every packet. > > Personally, I think composite is a better option for security than layered. > Hybrid Signatures > > There are, additionally, two different schools of thought on hybrid digital signature > algorithms. However, the difference is more subtle than with KEMs. > > Require separate classical signatures and post-quantum signatures. > Specify a composite mode that combines the two together and treat it as a distinct algorithm. > > To better illustrate what this looks like, I outlined what a composite hybrid digital > signature algorithm could look like on the CFRG mailing list: > primary_seed := randombytes_buf(64) // store this > > ed25519_seed := hash_sha512256(PREFIX_CLASSICAL || primary_seed) > pq_seed := hash_sha512256(PREFIX_POSTQUANTUM || primary_seed) > > ed25519_keypair := crypto_sign_seed_keypair(ed25519_seed) > pq_keypair := pqcrypto_sign_seed_keypair(pq_seed) > > Your composite public key would be your Ed25519 public key, followed by your post-quantum > public key. Since Ed25519 public keys are always 32 bytes, this is easy to implement securely. > > Every composite signature would be an Ed25519 signature concatenated with the post-quantum > signature. Since Ed25519 signatures are always 64 bytes, this leads to a predictable > signature size relative to the post-quantum signature. > > The main motivation for preferring a composite hybrid signature over a detached hybrid > signature is to push the hybridization of cryptography lower in the stack so developers > don’t have to think about these details. They just select HYBRIDSIG1 or HYBRIDSIG2 in > their ciphersuite configuration, and cryptographers get to decide what that means. > TL;DR > > Hybrid designs of post-quantum crypto are good, and I think composite hybrid designs make > the most sense for both KEMs and signatures. > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Jan. 30, 2022

Share the profits! Why US businesses must return to rewarding workers properly | Robert Reich | The Guardian

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jan/29/share-the-profits-us-…> According to this week’s release from the commerce department, the US economy has been growing at its fastest pace in almost 40 years. Corporate profits are their highest in 70 years. And the stock market, although gyrating wildly of late, is still scoring record gains. Where egos dare: Manchin and Sinema show how Senate spotlight corrupts Robert Reich Robert Reich Read more So why do most Americans remain gloomy about the economy? Mainly because their real (inflation-adjusted) wages continue to go nowhere. Steeply-rising profits, economic growth and stock market highs – coupled with near-stagnant wages – has been the story of the American economy for decades. Most economic gains have gone to the top. So why not share the profits? Profit-sharing was tried with great success in the early decades of the 20th century but is now all but forgotten. In 1916, Sears, Roebuck & Co, then one of America’s largest corporations with more than 30,000 employees, announced it would begin to share profits with its employees, giving workers shares of stock and thereby making them part-owners. The idea caught on. Other companies that joined the profit-sharing bandwagon included Procter & Gamble, Pillsbury, Kodak and US Steel. The Bureau of Labor Statistics suggested profit-sharing as a means of reducing “frequent and often violent disputes” between employers and workers. Profit-sharing gave workers an incentive to be more productive, since the success of the company meant higher profits would be shared. It also reduced the need for layoffs during recessions because payroll costs dropped as profits did. By the 1950s, Sears workers had accumulated enough stock that they owned a quarter of the company. And by 1968, the typical Sears salesperson could retire with a nest egg worth well over $1m, in today’s dollars. The downside was that when profits went down, workers’ paychecks would shrink. And if a company went bankrupt, workers would lose all their investments in it. The best profit-sharing plans took the form of cash bonuses that employees could invest however they wish, on top of predictable wages. But profit-sharing with regular employees all but disappeared in large US corporations. Ever since the early 1980s when corporate “raiders” (now private-equity managers) began demanding high returns, corporations stopped granting employees shares of stock, presumably because they didn’t want to dilute share prices. Sears phased out its profit-sharing plan in the 1970s. Yet, just as profit-sharing with regular employees disappeared, profit-sharing with top executives took off, as big Wall Street banks, hedge funds, private equity funds and high-tech companies began doling out huge wads of stock and stock options to their MVPs. The result? Share prices and chief executive pay (composed increasingly of shares of stock and options to buy stock) have gone into the stratosphere, while the wages of the typical worker have barely risen. Researchers have found that before the 1980s, almost all the increases in share prices on the US stock market could be accounted for by overall economic growth. But since then, a large portion of the increases have come out of what used to go into wages. Jeff Bezos, who now owns around 10% of Amazon’s shares, is worth $170.4bn. Other top Amazon executives hold hundreds of millions of dollars of shares. But most of Amazon’s employees, such as warehouse workers, haven’t shared in the bounty. Amazon used to give out stock to hundreds of thousands of its employees. But in 2018 it stopped the practice and instead raised its minimum hourly wage to $15. The wage raise got headlines and was good PR – Amazon is still touting it – but the decision to end stock awards was more significant. It hurt employees far more than the increased minimum helped them. Corporate sedition is more damaging to America than the Capitol attack Robert Reich Robert Reich Read more If Amazon’s 1.2 million employees together owned the same proportion of Amazon’s stock as Sears workers did in the 1950s – a quarter of the company – each Amazon worker would now own shares worth an average of more than $350,000. America’s trend toward higher profits, higher share prices, mounting executive pay but near stagnant wages is unsustainable, economically and politically. Profit-sharing is one answer. But how can it be encouraged? Reduce corporate taxes on companies that share profits with all their workers, and increase taxes on those that do not. Sharing profits with all workers is a logical and necessary step to making the system work for the many, not the few

Jan. 30, 2022

The Controversy Surrounding Hybrid Cryptography - Dhole Moments

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://soatok.blog/2022/01/27/the-controversy-surrounding-hybrid-cryptogra…> [...] Why Hybrid Cryptosystems? At some point in the future (years or decades from now), humanity may build a practical quantum computer. This will be a complete disaster for all of the cryptography deployed on the Internet today. In response to this distant existential threat, cryptographers have been hard at work designing and attacking algorithms that remain secure even when quantum computers arrive. These algorithms are classified as post-quantum cryptography (mostly to distinguish it from techniques that uses quantum computers to facilitate cryptography rather than attack it, which is “quantum cryptography” and not really worth our time talking about). Post-quantum cryptography is often abbreviated as “PQ Crypto” or “PQC”. However, a lot of the post-quantum cryptography designs are relatively new or comparatively less studied than their classical (pre-quantum) counterparts. Several of the Round 1 candidates to NIST’s post quantum cryptography project were broken immediately (PDF). Exploit code referenced in PDF duplicated below.: #!/usr/bin/env python3 import binascii, struct def recover_bit(ct, bit): assert bit < len(ct) // 4000 ts = [struct.unpack('BB', ct[i:i+2]) for i in range(4000*bit, 4000*(bit+1), 2)] xs, ys = [a for a, b in ts if b == 1], [a for a, b in ts if b == 2] return sum(xs) / len(xs) >= sum(ys) / len(ys) def decrypt(ct): res = sum(recover_bit(ct, b) << b for b in range(len(ct) // 4000)) return int.to_bytes(res, len(ct) // 4000 // 8, 'little') kat = 0 for l in open('KAT_GuessAgain/GuessAgainEncryptKAT_2000.rsp'): if l.startswith('msg = '): # only used for verifying the recovered plaintext. msg = binascii.unhexlify(l[len('msg = '):].strip()) elif l.startswith('c = '): ct = binascii.unhexlify(l[len('c = '):].strip()) print('{}attacking known-answer test #{}'.format('\n' * (kat > 0), kat)) print('correct plaintext: {}'.format(binascii.hexlify(msg).decode())) plain = decrypt(ct) print('recovered plaintext: {} ({})'.format(binascii.hexlify(plain).decode(), plain == msg)) kat += 1 More pertinent to our discussions: Rainbow, which was one of the Round 3 Finalists for post-quantum digital signature algorithms, was discovered in 2020 to be much easier to attack than previously thought. Specifically, for the third round parameters, the attack cost was reduced by a factor of 2^{20}, 2^{40}, and 2^{55}. That security reduction is just a tad bit more concerning than a Round 1 candidate being totally broken, since NIST had concluded by then that Rainbow was a good signature algorithm until that attack was discovered. Maybe there are similar attacks just waiting to be found? Given that new cryptography is accompanied by less confidence than incumbent cryptography, hybrid designs are an excellent way to mitigate the risk of attack advancements in post-quantum cryptography: If the security of your system requires breaking the cryptography used today AND breaking one of the new-fangled designs, you’ll always be at least as secure as the stronger algorithm. Art: Lynx vs Jackalope Why Is Hybrid Cryptography Controversial? Despite the risks of greenfield cryptographic algorithms, the NSA has begun recommending a strictly-PQ approach to cryptography and have explicitly stated that they will not require hybrid designs. Another pushback on hybrid cryptography comes from Uri Blumenthal of MIT’s Lincoln Labs on the IETF CFRG mailing list (the acronym CRQC expands to “Cryptographically-Relevant Quantum Computer”): Here are the possibilities and their relation to the usefulness of the Hybrid approach. 1. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is useless. 2. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms fail – Hybrid is useless. 3. CRQC arrived, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is useless. 4. CRQC arrived, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – Hybrid useless. 5. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is useless. 6. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic hold against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – Hybrid helps. 7. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms hold – Hybrid is useless. 8. CRQC doesn’t arrive, Classic broken against classic attacks, PQ algorithms broken – Hybrid is useless. Uri Blumenthal, IETF CFRG mailing list, December 2021 (link) Why Hybrid Is Actually A Damn Good Idea Art: Scruff Kerfluff Uri’s risk analysis is, of course, flawed. And I’m not the first to disagree with him. First, Uri’s framing sort of implies that each of the 8 possible outputs of these 3 boolean variables are relatively equally likely outcomes. It’s very tempting to look at this and think, “Wow, that’s a lot of work for something that only helps in 12.5% of possible outcomes!” Uri didn’t explicitly state this assumption, and he might not even believe that, but it is a cognitive trap that emerges in the structure of his argument, so watch your step. Second, for many candidate algorithms, we’re already in scenario 6 that Uri outlined! It’s not some hypothetical future, it’s the present state of affairs. To wit: The advances in cryptanalysis on Rainbow don’t totally break it in a practical sense, but they do reduce the security by a devastating margin (which will require significantly larger parameter sets and performance penalties to remedy). For many post-quantum algorithms, we’re still uncertain about which scenario is most relevant. But since PQ algorithms are being successfully attacked and a quantum computer still hasn’t arrived, and classical algorithms are still holding up fine, it’s very clear that “hybrid helps” is the world we most likely inhabit today, and likely will for many years (until the existence of quantum computers is finally settled). Finally, even in other scenarios (which are more relevant for other post-quantum algorithms), hybrid doesn’t significantly hurt security. It does carry a minor cost to bandwidth and performance, and it does mean having a larger codebase to review when compared with jettisoning the algorithms we use today, but I’d argue that the existing code is relatively low risk compared to new code. From what I’ve read, the NSA didn’t make as strong an argument as Uri; they said hybrid would not be required, but didn’t go so far as to attack it. Hybrid cryptography is a long-term bet that will protect the most users from cryptanalytic advancements, contrasted with strictly-PQ and no-PQ approaches. Why The Hybrid Controversy Remains Unsettled Even if we can all agree that hybrid is the way to go, there’s still significant disagreement on exactly how to do it. Hybrid KEMs There are two schools of thought on hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs): Wrap the post-quantum KEM in the encrypted channel created by the classical KEM. Use both the post-quantum KEM and classical KEM as inputs to a secure KDF, then use a single encrypted channel secured by both. The first option (layered) has the benefit of making migrations smoother. You can begin with classical cryptography (i.e. ECDHE for TLS ciphersuites), which is what most systems online support today. Then you can do your post-quantum cryptography inside the existing channel to create a post-quantum-secure channel. This also lends toward opportunistic upgrades (which might not be a good idea). The second option (composite) has the benefit of making the security of your protocol all-or-nothing: You cannot attack the weak now and the strong part later. The session keys you’ll derive require attacking both algorithms in order to get access to the plaintext. Additionally, you only need a single layer. The complexity lies entirely within the handshake, instead of every packet. Personally, I think composite is a better option for security than layered. Hybrid Signatures There are, additionally, two different schools of thought on hybrid digital signature algorithms. However, the difference is more subtle than with KEMs. Require separate classical signatures and post-quantum signatures. Specify a composite mode that combines the two together and treat it as a distinct algorithm. To better illustrate what this looks like, I outlined what a composite hybrid digital signature algorithm could look like on the CFRG mailing list: primary_seed := randombytes_buf(64) // store this ed25519_seed := hash_sha512256(PREFIX_CLASSICAL || primary_seed) pq_seed := hash_sha512256(PREFIX_POSTQUANTUM || primary_seed) ed25519_keypair := crypto_sign_seed_keypair(ed25519_seed) pq_keypair := pqcrypto_sign_seed_keypair(pq_seed) Your composite public key would be your Ed25519 public key, followed by your post-quantum public key. Since Ed25519 public keys are always 32 bytes, this is easy to implement securely. Every composite signature would be an Ed25519 signature concatenated with the post-quantum signature. Since Ed25519 signatures are always 64 bytes, this leads to a predictable signature size relative to the post-quantum signature. The main motivation for preferring a composite hybrid signature over a detached hybrid signature is to push the hybridization of cryptography lower in the stack so developers don’t have to think about these details. They just select HYBRIDSIG1 or HYBRIDSIG2 in their ciphersuite configuration, and cryptographers get to decide what that means. TL;DR Hybrid designs of post-quantum crypto are good, and I think composite hybrid designs make the most sense for both KEMs and signatures.

Jan. 30, 2022

Re: [nexa] What is the quantum apocalypse and should we be scared?

by Giacomo Tesio

Ciao Franco e don Luca On January 29, 2022 4:28:03 PM UTC, Franco Marra <marrafranco(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Ma che succederà quando tutta questa potenza di calcolo sarà messa a > servizio della IA? Intendi al servizio di GMail? Di Google Analytics? Di Facebook? Dietro qualsiasi software "AI" ci sono sempre persone con interessi da mascherare. Altrimenti non la riuscirebbero a chiamare "AI" senza ridere. > Il giorno sab 29 gen 2022 alle ore 14:38 don Luca Peyron <dluca.universitari(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > > > Profezie o tentativi di esorcizzare le paure? Secondo me, per il momento, è qualcosa di molto più astuto e strategico: ``` there is currently something of a post-quantum cryptography "beauty parade" taking place at the US National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) just outside Washington DC. The aim is to establish a standardised defence strategy that will protect industry, government, academia and critical national infrastructure against the perils of the quantum apocalypse. ``` Gli standard del NIST sono notoriamente mooltooo sicuri. E poi... lo dicono tutti i migliori criptografi americani: "don't roll your own cryptography. Let's NSA do it for you!" [1][2] Giacomo [1] https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/11/4718694/how-far-did-the-nsa-go-to-weaken… [2] https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-nsa-and-nist-a-toxic-relationship/

Jan. 29, 2022

Re: [nexa] What is the quantum apocalypse and should we be scared?

by Franco Marra

Ma che succederà quando tutta questa potenza di calcolo sarà messa a servizio della IA? Il giorno sab 29 gen 2022 alle ore 14:38 don Luca Peyron < dluca.universitari(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > Profezie o tentativi di esorcizzare le paure? > > Buona lettura > > dl > > https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60144498 > _______________________ > don Luca Peyron > Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria > Arcidiocesi di Torino > www.universitari.to.it > via XX settembre 83, Torino > tel. 011 5156239 > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >

Jan. 29, 2022

What is the quantum apocalypse and should we be scared?

by don Luca Peyron

Profezie o tentativi di esorcizzare le paure? Buona lettura dl https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60144498 _______________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

Jan. 29, 2022

Re: [nexa] Cloud: pubblicato il "bando" UFFICIALE per il Polo Strategico Nazionale

by Stefano Quintarelli

ciao, prima di tutto, non e' una assegnazione ma una convenzione. le amministrazioni potranno accedere con contratti di 10 anni. alcune amministrazioni saranno obbligate (quelle rientranti nel perimetro cibernetico che' l'ACN deve definire). se si guarda alla gara cloud precedente (mi pare 2014), si puo' avere una idea di come si sviluppera'. ciao, s. On 29/01/22 11:36, Damiano Verzulli wrote: > "Procedura aperta per l’affidamento, mediante un contratto di partenariato > pubblico-privato, della realizzazione e gestione del Polo Strategico Nazionale" > > => https://www.difesaservizi.it/pubblicazione-gara-per-il-Polo-Strategico-Nazi… > > > 13 anni di durata, 723M€ di valore. Scadenza il 16/03/2022 > > Chissa' come andra' a finire.... > > Saluti, > DV > > -- > Damiano Verzulli > e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it > --- > possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} > --- > "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of > income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able > to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not > here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 > http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Jan. 29, 2022

Cloud: pubblicato il "bando" UFFICIALE per il Polo Strategico Nazionale

by Damiano Verzulli

"Procedura aperta per l’affidamento, mediante un contratto di partenariato pubblico-privato, della realizzazione e gestione del Polo Strategico Nazionale" => https://www.difesaservizi.it/pubblicazione-gara-per-il-Polo-Strategico-Nazi… 13 anni di durata, 723M€ di valore. Scadenza il 16/03/2022 Chissa' come andra' a finire.... Saluti, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

Jan. 29, 2022

Re: [nexa] Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology - 2018 (was Re: "Generative AI" paper and talk by Alexandre Gefen)

by Antonio Iacono

> Il negro, l'ebreo, il nemico... DEVE essere non umano, poiché altrimenti > ucciderlo, stuprarlo o usarlo rivelerebbe come disumano l'oppressore. In occasione della giornata della memoria: "Quando milioni di ebrei e di altre vittime pensavano alla propria morte imminente e si domandavano "perché devo morire, se non ho fatto niente per meritarlo?", probabilmente la cosa più semplice sarebbe stata rispondere che il potere era completamente concentrato nelle mani di un solo uomo, e che a quell'uomo accadeva di odiare la loro "razza" Sarah Gordon

Jan. 28, 2022

"The Worker as a Data Subject: Resources for Data Protection Day"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*The Worker as a Data Subject: Resources for Data Protection Day* Jeremias Adams-Prassl /Professor of Law// //Oxford University/ Since 2006, the Council of Europe has celebrated 28 January as Data Protection Day—known globally as Privacy Day. Data processing now impacts on many spheres of life. One of these is employment: increases in the scale and ease of data processing have led to a sharp increase in employers’ use of algorithmic management tools, which facilitate hitherto inconceivable worker surveillance and analysis and enable the automation of functions that were once carried out by HR. To help raise awareness of data protection at work, the team at iManage—Halefom Abraha, Aislinn Kelly-Lyth, and Prof Jeremias Adams-Prassl—have brought together ten resources examining this new phenomenon through a data protection lens. As the GDPR enters its fourth year of application, these papers provide a great starting point for stakeholders to understand and address data protection issues around AI systems in the workplace. We explore these and related challenges in the course of our weekly Algorithms at Work Discussion group (held in hybrid format)—if you are interested in joining, please get in touch. And, most importantly: Happy Data Protection Day! [...] continua qui: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2022/01/worker-data-subject…

Jan. 28, 2022