August 2021 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] Tassare la pubblicità per regolamentare le Big Tech

by db

Credo che ogni "cittadino digitale" (?) abbia il diritto di esprimere la propria opinione in modo anonimo, come credo che chi sia in una posizione di "svantaggio" in un'asimmetria di poteri abbia il diritto ad essere tutelato. Nell'individuazione delle condizioni per cui l'identificabilità si rende necessaria (come forma di tutela, se ritenuta tale), chiaramente si verificano le maggiori complessità. Se tuttavia si considera come per ragioni di ingegneria (anche e non solo sociale) l'anonimato assoluto sia mera illusione; l'intenzione "dolosa" si delinea nelle modalità e finalità per cui il diritto all'anonimato è esercitato. Presuppongo che essere sempre nell'anonimato non è necessariamente scelta preferibile in termini assoluti. Pertanto in un possibile contesto *strettamente* orizzontale composto da agenti con diverse capacità, nel caso di possibili asimmetrie o disaccordi ipotizzerei il verificarsi di affiliazioni ad un parere piuttosto che ad un altro con le conseguenti azioni operative. I presupposti fondamentali che dovrebbero delineare i limiti di queste azioni operative ed evitare degenerazioni sistemiche probabilmente si potrebbero fondare sulla complessa architettura di quelli che già sono principi in UE, ma chiaramente l'applicabilità dipenderebbe dall'efficacia della distribuzione del potere orizzontalmente. Nonostante le affermazioni di cui sopra, vi sono solo domande. Tendo tuttavia a credere ultimamente che la questione dell'anonimato, della libertà di espressione, non sia delegabile o risolvibile in termini assoluti: ma che presupposta la sempre possibile identificabilità si tratti di fisiologico e deregolamentato (nei limiti dei principi generali) esercizio dell'umana volontà in contesto digitale, dato che gli agenti vivono già in una condizione di equilibrio strumentale (se non loro in prima persona, altri per loro con cui condividono le intenzioni, che li hanno sviluppati). L'equilibrio tra gli agenti, nelle capacità culturali e tecniche che legittimano/rendono possibile l'esercizio di libertà, rende possibile il verificarsi di un ambiente _online_ equo e libero. D'altronde mi rendo conto che non siano ragionamenti nuovi, ma già discussi da secoli _offline_; pertanto mediante il rispetto e la comprensione reciproca di tutti gli agenti, costruire/conservare/mantenere un equilibrio dovrebbe essere possibile. Mi ritrovo nuovamente a considerare similarmente ciò che è _online_ da ciò che è _offline_ come realtà/contesti pensati da umani per umani. DB ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Wednesday, August 4th, 2021 at 16:27, Giacomo Tesio <giacomo(a)tesio.it> wrote: > Ciao Stefano, > > On Tue, 3 Aug 2021 09:35:51 +0200 Stefano Quintarelli wrote: > > > On 03/08/21 09:24, D. Davide Lamanna wrote: > > > > > https://www.senato.it/1025?sezione=120&articolo_numero_articolo=15. > > > come fare a garantire tecnicamente, contemporaneamente, il diritto e > > > > la riserva di legge ? > > Per rispondere a questa domanda frequente, è sufficiente rileggere > > l'articolo 15: > > La libertà e la segretezza della corrispondenza e di ogni altra forma > di comunicazione sono inviolabili. > > La loro limitazione può avvenire soltanto per atto motivato > dell'autorità giudiziaria [cfr. art. 111 c. 1] con le garanzie > stabilite dalla legge. > > > Il primo comma riconosce due diritti assoluti delle comunicazioni > > - libertà > - segretezza > > Il secondo comma stabilisce che la loro limitazione può avvenire solo: > - per atto motivato dall'autorità giudiziaria > - con le garanzie stabilite dalla legge > > La Legge ordinaria dunque può solo stabilire garanzie che limitino > > l'azione, motivata e dunque puntuale, dell'autorità giudiziaria. > > Nessun'altro al di fuori dell'autorità giudiziaria può limitarle. > > E l'autorità giudiziaria può limitarle SOLO in determinate condizioni. > > Dunque le garanzie che la Legge pone a tali limitazioni devono impedire > > che chiunque altro possa illecitamente violare la segretezza e la > > libertà di ogni forma di comunicazione. > > In altri termini, in Italia, la Legge può stabilire garanzie più > > stringenti di quelle già fornite dalla tecnologia, ma NON più lasse. > > Ora, viviamo un mondo in cui limitare la segretezza delle comunicazioni > > dei criminali è tecnicamente impossibile. > > Se anche venisse vietato l'uso di software di comunicazione con > > cifratura end-to-end, i criminali se li scriverebbero da zero > > (e se non son capaci, qualcuno che non fa domande si trova) > > Dunque la legge ordinaria non può autorizzare l'utilizzo di strumenti > > che permettano tecnicamente all'autorità giudiziaria (o ad altri) di > > violare la segretezza delle comunicazioni al di fuori delle condizioni > > suddette (atto motivato e puntuale) perché sarebbe: > - inefficace: riserverebbe tale segretezza ai criminali più pericolosi > - controproducente: il criminale potrebbe spiare il giudice o la vittima > - anticostituzionale: installerebbe una infrastruttura in grado di > > permettere tecnicamente la sorveglianza di massa, svuotando il diritto > > garantito dal primo comma dell'articolo 15 di qualsiasi significato. > > La sintesi fra queste due esigenze è un'attività di indagine che si > > possa avvalere di strumenti tecnici (come backdoors) ma solo > > installandole autonomamente laddove necessarie, un po' come le > > microspie di una volta. > > In pratica NON potendo usare come strumento di indagine sistemi di > > distribuzione (App Store) o esecuzione (Cloud) del software utilizzati > > dal resto della popolazione, ma dovendo manomettere i dispositivi > > personali dell'indagato uno per uno con altri mezzi. > > Per spiare il camorrista sarà necessario installare sul suo specifico > > cellulare certificati SSL, app modificate etc, ma senza la > > collaborazione di chi quel cellulare lo costruisce o gli fornisce > > aggiornamenti. > > Giacomo > > nexa mailing list > > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Aug. 19, 2021

The Taliban Have Seized U.S. Military Biometrics Devices

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://theintercept.com/2021/08/17/afghanistan-taliban-military-biometrics/> _The Taliban have_ seized U.S. military biometrics devices that could aid in the identification of Afghans who assisted coalition forces, current and former military officials have told The Intercept. The devices, known as HIIDE, for Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment, were seized last week during the Taliban’s offensive, according to a Joint Special Operations Command official and three former U.S. military personnel, all of whom worried that sensitive data they contain could be used by the Taliban. HIIDE devices contain identifying biometric data such as iris scans and fingerprints, as well as biographical information, and are used to access large centralized databases. It’s unclear how much of the U.S. military’s biometric database on the Afghan population has been compromised. While billed by the U.S. military as a means of tracking terrorists <https://www.army.mil/article/32609/bats_helps_id_insurgents_hostages> and other insurgents, biometric data on Afghans who assisted the U.S. was also widely collected and used in identification cards, sources said. “We processed thousands of locals a day, had to ID, sweep for suicide vests, weapons, intel gathering, etc.” a U.S. military contractor explained. “[HIIDE] was used as a biometric ID tool to help ID locals working for the coalition.” A spokesperson for the Defense Intelligence Agency referred questions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which did not respond to a request for comment. An Army Special Operations veteran said it’s possible that the Taliban may need additional tools to process the HIIDE data but expressed concerns that Pakistan would assist with this. “The Taliban doesn’t have the gear to use the data but the ISI do,” the former Special Operations official said, referring to Pakistan’s spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI has been known to work closely with the Taliban. The U.S. military has long used HIIDE devices in the global war on terror and used biometrics to help identify <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-biometrics-helped-to-identif…> Osama bin Laden during the 2011 raid on his Pakistani hideout. According to investigative reporter Annie Jacobsen, the Pentagon had a goal <https://www.npr.org/2021/01/14/956705029/first-platoon-examines-how-war-on-…> to gather biometric data on 80 percent of the Afghan population to locate terrorists and criminals. <https://www.army.mil/article/47549/new_equipment_helps_troops_locate_insurg…> “I don’t think anyone ever thought about data privacy or what to do in the event the [HIIDE] system fell into the wrong hands,” said Welton Chang, chief technology officer for Human Rights First, himself a former Army intelligence officer. “Moving forward, the U.S. military and diplomatic apparatus should think carefully about whether to deploy these systems again in situations as tenuous as Afghanistan.” The Defense Department has also sought to share the biometrics data collected by HIIDE with other government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office criticized <https://www.gao.gov/assets/a317375.html> the Pentagon for not doing enough to ensure these other surveillance agencies had easy access to the information, warning that the military “limits its federal partners’ ability to identify potential criminals or terrorists.” But the U.S. didn’t only collect information about criminals and terrorists; the government appears to also have been collecting biometrics from Afghans assisting diplomatic efforts, in addition to those working with the military. For example, a recent job posting by a State Department contractor sought to recruit a biometric technician with experience using HIIDE and other similar equipment to help vet personnel and enroll local Afghans seeking employment at U.S. embassies and consulates. The federal government has collected biometric data from Afghans despite knowing the risks entailed by maintaining large databases of personal information, especially given recent cyberattacks on government agencies and private companies. These efforts are continuing to expand. For example, a February 2020 article <https://peoiews.army.mil/aircraft-survivability-2-2/> published by the Army indicated that the service was modernizing its 20-year-old biometric processing technology and had saved more than 1 million entries in the Pentagon’s Automated Biometrics Identification System, or ABIS, which hosts HIIDE and data collected by other devices as well. “This updated database will make it more efficient for warfighters to collect, identify and neutralize the enemy,” wrote Col. Senodja Sundiata-Walker, project manager for the Pentagon’s biometrics program. President Joe Biden’s proposed budget for the Army in fiscal year 2022 seeks more than $11 million to purchase 95 new biometric collection devices expanding upon those used in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Aug. 19, 2021

US judge rejects suit over UK privacy law

by Enrico Nardelli

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-tech/2021/08/18/china-seeks-gr… (la notizia è in basso) A ruling by a federal judge in California this week will likely quash any potential efforts to bring stricter European privacy laws into the U.S. legal system. On Monday, the court ruled against a U.K. citizen’s attempt to sue an American company over alleged violations — on British soil — of the U.K.’s version of the EU’s privacy law. — How it went down: The plaintiff, Hugh Elliott, was trying to file a U.S. class action suit composed solely of U.K. residents against PubMatic, a California-based third-party advertising company that uses cookies for its targeted marketing. When the plaintiff filed his lawsuit, PubMatic had placed 45 cookies in his web browser. But the move was blocked in a Monday order from Judge Phyllis Hamilton of Northern California’s federal district court, after PubMatic said it would submit to jurisdiction in the courts of England and Wales. — The privacy tug-of-war across the pond: The U.S. and Europe are increasingly facing down each other over privacy, including U.S. court orders demanding information protected under GDPR. Both sides are working on a replacement for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield — a framework that allowed for transatlantic data transfers and had major implications for how U.S. tech companies operate in Europe — which has been invalidated by the courts. -- EN ===================================================================== Prof. Enrico Nardelli Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli(a)mat.uniroma2.it home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ ===================================================================== --

Aug. 18, 2021

Surveillance and capture: Two models of privacy (Philip E. Agre)

by 380°

Buongiorno, grazie infinite a J.C. De Martin che con la sua segnalazione [1] della /mitica/ quanto negletta persona di Philip E. Agre mi ha dato l'opportunità di leggere il suo *splendido* saggio «Surveillance and capture: Two models of privacy», 1994 disponibile sia su Sci-Hub: https://sci-hub.st/10.1080/01972243.1994.9960162 che qui, ripubblicato in The New Media Reader nel 2003: https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/cctp-506-spring2018/files/2015/12/51-a… Venti anni prima che Vincent Mosco descrivesse la vendita delle informazioni ai pubblicitari come "surveillance capitalism" e 25 anni prima di Shoshana Zuboff col suo famosissimo libro, Agre descrive le questione della privacy come dialettica tra metafore visuali (surveillance) metafore linguistiche (capture): --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Abstract: Two models of privacy issues are contrasted. The surveillance model employs visual metaphors (e.g., "Big Brother is watching") and derives from historical experiences of secret police surveillance. The less familiar capture model employs linguistic metaphors and has deep roots in the practices of applied computing through which human activities are systematically reorganized to allow computers to track them in real time. The capture model is discussed with reference to systems in numerous domains. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Ecco i due modelli "affiancati" (estratto da pag. 23): --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Let us review the definitions of these models, recalling once again that they are intended as metaphor systems and not as mutually exclusive categories: (1) The surveillance model employs visual metaphors, most famously Orwell's "Big Brother is watching you"; the capture model employs linguistic metaphors by means of various grammars of action. (2) The surveillance model emphasizes nondisruptive, surreptitious data collection; the capture model describes the readily apparent instrumentation that entails the reorganization of existing activities. (3) The surveillance model is concerned to mark off a "private" region by means of territorial metaphors of "invasion" and the like; the capture model portrays captured activities as being constructed in real time from a set of institutionally standardized parts specified by the captured ontology. (4) The surveillance model depicts the monitoring of activity as centrally organized and presumes that the resulting information is centrally stored; the capture model emphasizes the locally organized nature of contests over the capture process and their structuring within particular institutional contexts. (5) The surveillance model takes as its prototype the malevolent political activities of state organizations; the capture model takes as its prototype the quasi-philosophical project of ontological reconstruction undertaken by computer professionals in private organizations. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- É un saggio /molto/ denso, con numerosi richiami a ricerche e progetti informatici e anche a questioni filosofiche con riferimenti diretti ad Heidegger e - indirettamente - a Foucault, quindi un saggio praticamente *impossibile* da riassumere perché non-riassumibile. Tuttavia, tra le molte cose trattate, mi permetto di evidenziare il capitolo "Grammars of Action" (pag. 8) - che nel modello "capture" sono centrali - ed in particolare di quel capitolo: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] The capture model describes the situation that results when grammars of action are imposed upon human activities, and when the newly reorganized activities are represented by computers in real time. It is convenient to subdivide this process into a five-stage cycle. This division is, of course, a great oversimplification: The phases frequently operate concurrently, advances in one phase may force revision of the work done in an earlier phase, and work in each stage draws on a wide range of sociotechnical advances not necessarily related to the other stages. The five main stages are as follows: • Analysis. Somebody studies an existing form of activity and identifies its fundamental units in terms of some ontology (entities, relations, functions, primi tive actions, and so forth). This ontology might draw on the participants' terms for things, or it might not. Programming languages and systems analysis methodologies frequently supply basic ontologies (objects, variables, relations) upon which domain-specific ontologies can be built. The resulting ontologies are sometimes standardized across whole institutions, industries, or markets. • Articulation. Somebody articulates a grammar of the ways in which those units can be strung together to form actual sensible stretches of activity. This process can be complicated, and it often requires revision of the preceding ontological analysis. It is typically guided by an almost aesthetic criterion of obtaining a complete, closed, formally specified picture of the activity. • Imposition. The resulting grammar is then given a normative force. The people who engage in the articulated activity are somehow induced to organize their actions so that they are readily "parsable" in terms of the grammar. The "somehow" is typically both social (explicit procedures backed up by certain relations of authority) and technical (whether through machinery or simply through physical barriers); participants in the activity may or may not participate in the process and may or may not resist it. Institutions frequently impose grammars on activities for reasons other than real-time capture—for example, for security, efficiency, protection from liability, and simple control. • Instrumentation. Social and technical means are provided, whether through paperwork or machinery, and potentially with a complex division of labor, for maintaining a running parse of the ongoing activity. This phase may coincide with the imposition phase, or it may follow by years or decades. Afterward, the participants begin, of necessity, to orient their activities toward the capture machinery and its institutional consequences. • Elaboration. The captured activity records, which are in economic terms among the products of the reorganized activity, can now be stored, inspected, audited, merged with other records, subjected to statistical analysis, employed as the basis of Pareto optimization, and so forth. Likewise, concurrent computational processes can use captured records to "listen to" the ongoing activities for purposes of error detection, advice giving, performance measurement, quality control, and so forth. These additional processes might arise simultaneously with the instrumentation phase, or they may accumulate long afterward. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Ho la netta sensazione che questa analisi aiuti anche a comprendere /come/ l'informatica sarà uno strumento per ristrutturare i rapporti di potere tecnici, sociali, economici e politici così come li conosciamo oggi. OK smetto qui che è meglio :-D Saluti, 380° [1] https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2021-August/022080.html -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Aug. 18, 2021

Per i social l’Afghanistan diventa un “dilemma”

by don Luca Peyron

Anche il mondo social lato aziende in fibrillazione per l'avanzata talebana. Un sunto dello stato dell'arte dl https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/over-the-top/facebook-vieta-i-contenut… _________________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

Aug. 17, 2021

OpenAI's GPT-3-based pair programming model – Codex – now open for private beta testers through an API

by don Luca Peyron

Un passo non particolarmente sorprendente immagino, tuttavia un passo fatto. Buona lettura dl https://www.theregister.com/2021/08/16/in_brief_ai/ _________________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

Aug. 17, 2021

Tesla’s Autopilot faces US investigation after crashes with emergency vehicles

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/aug/16/teslas-autopilot-us-inve…> The US government has opened a formal investigation into Tesla’s driver-assistance system known as Autopilot after a series of collisions with parked emergency vehicles. The investigation covers 765,000 vehicles, almost everything that Tesla has sold in the US since the start of the 2014 model year. Of the crashes identified by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) as part of the investigation, 17 people were injured and one was killed. NHTSA says it has identified 11 crashes since 2018 in which Teslas on Autopilot or Traffic Aware Cruise Control have hit vehicles at scenes where first responders used flashing lights, flares, an illuminated arrow board or cones warning of hazards. The agency announced the action on Monday in a posting on its website. “Most incidents took place after dark and the crash scenes encountered included scene control measures such as first responder vehicle lights, flares, an illuminated arrow board, and road cones,” the agency said. The investigation covers Tesla’s entire current model lineup, the Models Y, X, S and 3 from the 2014 through 2021 model years. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also has investigated some of the Tesla crashes, has recommended that NHTSA and Tesla limit Autopilot’s use to areas where it can safely operate. The NTSB also recommended that NHTSA require Tesla to have a better system to make sure drivers are paying attention. NHTSA has not taken action on any of the recommendations. The NTSB has no enforcement powers and can only make recommendations to other federal agencies such as NHTSA. Autopilot has frequently been misused by Tesla drivers, who have been caught driving drunk or even riding in the back seat while a car rolled down a California highway. The investigation is the latest in a series launched by NHTSA which has opened at least 30 crash investigations involving Tesla cars that it suspected were linked to Autopilot. One investigation into a 2016 crash cleared Tesla’s Autopilot of any blame. Tesla and other manufacturers warn that drivers using the systems must be ready to intervene at all times. Teslas using the system have crashed into semis crossing in front of them, stopped emergency vehicles and a roadway barrier. A message was left early on Monday seeking comment from Tesla, which has disbanded its media relations office. Earlier this month Tesla tweeted that “a Tesla with Autopilot engaged experienced 0.2 accidents per million miles driven, while the US average was 9x higher”. The crashes into emergency vehicles cited by NHTSA began on 22 January 2018 in Culver City near Los Angeles when a Tesla using Autopilot struck a firetruck that was parked partially in the travel lanes with its lights flashing. Crews were handling another crash at the time. Since then, the agency said there were crashes in Laguna Beach, California; Norwalk, Connecticut; Cloverdale, Indiana; West Bridgewater, Massachusetts; Cochise county, Arizona; Charlotte, North Carolina, Montgomery county, Texas; Lansing, Michigan; and Miami, Florida. “The investigation will assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist and enforce the driver’s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation,” NHTSA said in investigation documents. In addition, the investigation will cover object and event detection by the system, as well as where it is allowed to operate. NHTSA says it will examine “contributing circumstances” to the crashes, as well as similar crashes. An investigation could lead to a recall or other enforcement action by NHTSA. “NHTSA reminds the public that no commercially available motor vehicles today are capable of driving themselves,” the agency said in a statement. “Every available vehicle requires a human driver to be in control at all times, and all state laws hold human drivers responsible for operation of their vehicles.” The agency said it has “robust enforcement tools” to protect the public and investigate potential safety issues, and it will act when it finds evidence “of noncompliance or an unreasonable risk to safety”. In June NHTSA ordered all automakers to report any crashes involving fully autonomous vehicles or partially automated driver assist systems. The measures show the agency has started to take a tougher stance on automated vehicle safety than in the past. It has been reluctant to issue any regulations of the new technology for fear of hampering adoption of the potentially life-saving systems. Shares of Tesla, based in Palo Alto, California, fell nearly 2% before the opening bell.

Aug. 17, 2021

Sul lavoro agile Generali scrive le regole per il post emergenza

by don Luca Peyron

Interessante sperimentazione con accordo tra le parti sociali, un primo approccio che rimette al centro le persone, di interesse per gli studi in questo senso Buona lettura dl https://www.snfia.it/wp-content/uploads/20210727-Gruppo-Generali-Accordo-Ne… _________________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

Aug. 17, 2021

Re: [nexa] discorso di Jeffrey Sachs

by 380°

"J.C. DE MARTIN" <juancarlos.demartin(a)polito.it> writes: > Breve discorso (10') del Professor Jeffrey Sachs. > > Ammetto che i riferimenti al digitale ci sono (parla anche di "digital > access") > ma non sono certo predominanti; tuttavia consentitemi lo stesso di > segnalarvi > questo discorso perché è raro sentire parlare in un'occasione ufficiale > in questo modo, ovvero, con così tanta lucidità, passione e coraggio: > > https://youtu.be/WZ1xc491mnU Grazie infinite per l'OT (che in realtà, /anche/ per i temi cari a questa lista, dovrebbe essere considerato l'Only Topic!). Segnalo che la trascrizione integrale del discorso è pubblicata sul suo sito personale (salvato anche su https://web.archive.org/) https://www.jeffsachs.org/recorded-lectures/5jf86pp5lxch35e6z3nct6xnmb8zy5 come segno di infinita stima nei confronti di chi queste cose le ha comprese - oltre che ricordarle [1] - e le dice in faccia a chi di dovere, riporto il nocciolo della questione: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- We’ve just heard from the Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many point a finger of blame at the DRC and other poor countries for their poverty. Yet we don’t seem to remember, or want to remember, that starting around 1870, King Leopold of Belgium created a slave colony in the Congo that lasted for around 40 years; and then the government of Belgium ran the colony for another 50 years. In 1961, after independence of the DRC, the CIA then assassinated the DRC’s first popular leader, Patrice Lumumba, and installed a US-backed dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, for roughly the next 30 years. And in recent years, Glencore and other multinational companies suck out the DRC’s cobalt without paying a level of royalties and taxes. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Saluti, 380° [...] [1] perché la memoria non serve a nulla se /prima/ non c'è la comprensione, /reciproca/ comprensione. P.S.: non sono le uniche cose "antipatiche" e "fuori dal coro" (ovvero dalla propaganda) che sostiene Sachs, e.g.: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-should-withdraw-unjustif… -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Aug. 16, 2021

Cashed out: a fond farewell to coins and notes | Money | The Guardian

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/money/2021/aug/15/cashed-out-a-fond-farewell-to…> [...] This anecdotal stuff is backed by hard fact: cash payments fell by 35% in 2020 in the UK and five out of six payments are now cashless. In 2019, the Access to Cash review predicted that only one in 10 payments in the UK would be cash within a decade; now, chairman Natalie Ceeney says, “Covid might have accelerated that to next year.” In April, Rishi Sunak announced a joint Treasury-Bank of England taskforce to explore the scope for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in the UK: it’s intended to provide a sort of official, ultra-secure alternative to bitcoin. So is that it? Is dirty cash (90% of dollar bills test positive for cocaine residue) over? Covid compounded our suspicions around banknotes – the preserve of drug dealers and tax dodgers – with since-discredited warnings of contagion risk and government advice to retailers to favour contactless payments. Now, given the ease and ubiquity of mobile payment, why seek out an increasingly hard-to-find and grimy ATM, skirting pools of beer or worse, when you have everything you need on your phone? Once the habit was disrupted, cash started to seem weird as well as suspect: grubby paper and discs of base metal in return for goods and services. Admittedly, contemporary cash is no stranger than other systems of currency. Felix Martin’s Money: An Unauthorised Biography recounts an American anthropologist’s 1903 encounter with the Pacific Yap islanders, whose currency was fei – vast stone wheels up to 12ft in diameter. These rarely if ever physically changed hands: one family’s wealth was in a large fei that had sunk in a shipwreck several generations previously (they are still used even now, for symbolic exchanges). We know money is only an idea: a headline I love from the satirical magazine The Onion reads; “US Economy Grinds to Halt as Nation Realises Money Just a Symbolic, Mutually Shared Illusion.” Does it matter if we lose the physical expression of that illusion? Sweden suggests not. Already basically cashless, it’s committed to being entirely digital by 2023. One Swedish friend says she “hardly knows what our new notes and coins look like”. “Cash is useless,” says another. Swish, the transfer service has spawned a verb, swisha, and most homeless people (yes, Sweden has a few) usually have a smartphone to take Swish payments. But even in Sweden, there are rumblings of unease: the Kontantupproret movement (Cash Rebellion) warns of the potential cybersecurity, individual freedom and privacy implications of a cashless society. There’s also the question of what happens in the worst-case scenario. “Isn’t cash the last resort between us and anarchy in the apocalypse?” asks Gottfried Leibbrandt, one of the authors of The Pay Off: How Changing the Way We Pay Changes Everything. “Your bank is not infallible digitally,” warns Gareth Shaw, head of money at Which? “Cash is the ultimate backstop, a bulwark against lots of things.” That seems to be reflected in Bank of England data indicating there are 10% more banknotes in circulation since the start of the first lockdown: we may not be using cash day-to-day, but some of us want it around, just in case. We might swerve the apocalypse, but cash still matters: nothing else currently offers all the attributes of notes and coins. Universally accessible without a bank account, fixed address, national insurance number or smartphone, cash can be received and spent by anyone. Notes and coins are also easily recognisable, which is important for visually impaired consumers, many of whom find the split-second digital display for card and contactless payments difficult to read. “We’ve seen a really diverse group of people relying on cash,” says Shaw. He describes the Which? Freedom to Pay campaign as “Trying to ensure we are not sleepwalking into a cashless society without some guardrails on it.” Eight million people in the UK would struggle in a cashless society, mainly those on lower incomes. Cruelly, those who rely most on cash find it hardest to access: free-to-use ATMs vanish from deprived areas at a much faster rate than from prosperous ones according to University of Bristol research. Cash also offers the bracing “pain of paying”. That’s how behavioural economics explains the way we feel making physical payments, in contrast to the dismayingly discreet, frictionless, digital cascade of payments that exit our bank accounts for subscription services we’ve forgotten about and in-app purchases we don’t notice. It’s why cash is a cornerstone of budgeting strategy. “We’ve spoken to people in severe debt and one of the biggest pieces of advice is to cut up your cards and start paying in cash,” says Shaw. [...]

Aug. 15, 2021