April 2020 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Biometrics entrepreneurs say they're talking to governments fighting Covid-19 | Biometric Update

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.biometricupdate.com/202004/biometrics-entrepreneurs-say-theyre-…> Facial recognition was so hot for a while that most elevator pitches for biometrics seemed to at least name-checked it, hoping some cool would rub off. Now, facial recognition is hot in a different sense and some biometrics entrepreneurs are adamant that their idea is not facial recognition. Take for example the biometrics startup Traces AI (formally known as Traces Inc.), which sells services based on algorithms that track people appearing on video by noticing 2,000 parameters of a person, none of which is on their face. In an interview with Forbes.com, Traces AI Founders Veronika Yurchuk and Kostyantyn Shysh said they are talking with multiple Asian nations about using their service after the fact — to trace the contacts of people who test positive for the novel coronavirus. No further details have been released. Working from an image or a description, the software pores over frames from standard camera networks as small as eight (and with no top end). It searches for and tracks attributes including age and build, hair color and style, clothing and bags, watches and jewelry, phones and glasses. Faces are blurred. The Palo Alto, California company is a product of Y Combinator, which invested $150,000 in Traces AI last August. The founders have acknowledged in news coverage that during live searches, such as after a crime, its service’s usefulness degrades rapidly. Limitations on facial recognition continues to be debated, with a handful of states, cities and counties banning or debating a ban of the use by public agencies, businesses or both. Then there is the infamous case of web scraper Clearview AI, which has, without permission trawled social media to collect billions of face images posted to social media. But even factoring out opposition to face scanning, there still are practicalities to consider. Most significant, CCTV cameras as a rule are placed above people in order to monitor medium to large areas. And much of the urban population of Asia — especially in pollution-choked China — wear masks, making faces less useful in surveilling people. Traces AI is not the first player in biometrics to see bodies as valuable bits of evidence that artificial intelligence can gather. Researchers at the University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, for example, have developed an algorithm capable of correctly reading a person’s mood 82 percent of the time by analyzing how a person walks.

April 3, 2020

Re: [nexa] epidemic control with digital contact tracing - Science

by Carlo Blengino

Grazie mille! Molto utile. CB Il giorno ven 3 apr 2020 alle ore 08:45 Giovanni Biscuolo <g(a)xelera.eu> ha scritto: > Cari nexiani, > > già altri lo hanno espresso bene prima di me e cercherò di non ripeterlo > più in questa lista, io però ribadisco che... > > Il contact tracing con strumenti digitali potrebbe aiutare, però per > come se ne discute mediamente sui mezzi di informazione generalisti mi > da l'impressione che rischi di _distrarre_ pensieri e risorse agli altri > mezzi di controllo dell'epidemia, che IMHO _devono_ comprendere anche un > netto "scatto di reni" nello studio qualitativo, oltre che quello > quantitativo (amo la statistica ma non mi basta). > > L'articolo di Science e tutti gli esperti dal WHO in giù dicono > chiaramente: > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > > The App should be one tool among many general preventative population > measures such as physical distancing, enhanced hand and respiratory > hygiene, and regular decontamination. > > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > Mancano i tamponi a tutti i pazienti sospetti e il cerchio è chiuso. > > Giuseppe Attardi <attardi(a)di.unipi.it> writes: > > > Articolo su Science. > > > > Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with > digital contact tracing > > > > A contact-tracing App > > [...] > > > https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936 > <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936> > > Leggere tutto l'articolo è troppo per me in questi giorni, lo metto in > lista; però un'occhiata rapida l'ho data... > > Io ne so troppo poco in merito all'efficacia clinica del contact tracing > (sto lentissimamente colmando l'ignoranza) però noto che molti esperti, > anche prima di questo articolo su Science, hanno deciso che questo è il > modo più efficace per contenere l'epidemia e sperare di tornare alla > normalità (o deficienza clinica pregressa) nel più breve tempo > possibile... non ho sinceramente capito se e come questo verrà > accompagnato da adeguati piani di testing, ma d'altronde mica me lo > devono dire a me :-) > > Noto però che nell'articolo su Wikipedia [1] (che potrebbe essere > decisamente carente) oltre ad altre cose interessanti c'è scritto: > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > > Contact tracing is not always the most efficient method of addressing > infectious disease. In areas of high disease prevalence, screening or > focused testing may be more cost-effective. > > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > Purtroppo manca il riferimento bibliografico a tale affermazione: > qualcuno in lista ha qualche riferimento preciso a studi in merito? > > Credo che il nocciolo dello studio pubblicato su Science sostanzialmente > sia che l'utilizzo di strumenti per il "digital instantaneous contact > tracing" sono talmente performanti che superano il limiti del contact > tracing manuale: > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > Published models (9–11, 32) suggest that in practice manual contact > tracing can only improve on this to a limited extent: it is too slow, > and cannot be scaled up once the epidemic grows beyond the early phase, > due to limited personnel. Using mobile phones to measure infectious > disease contact networks has been proposed previously > (33–35). Considering our quantification of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we > suggest that this approach, with a mobile phone App implementing > instantaneous contact tracing, could reduce transmission enough to > achieve R < 1 and sustained epidemic suppression > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > «Considering our quantification of SARS-CoV-2»... and considering the > *qualification*? > > Senza troppi sforzi, qualche studio effettuato in tempi **non > emergenziali** si trova: > > https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0000012 > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > > With these insights we explain why contact tracing was and will be > effective for control of smallpox and SARS, only partially effective for > foot-and-mouth disease, and likely not effective for influenza. > > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > Quindi dal punto di vista epidemiologico sarebbe importante capire se > SARS-CoV-2 assomiglia di più al nonno o all'influenza, senz'altro gli > scienziati sanno già tutto su questo, no? > > https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1762362/ > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > > We conclude that (1) there is no general predictive formula for the > proportion to be traced as there is for the proportion to be vaccinated; > (2) variability in time to detection is favourable for effective > tracing; (3) tracing effectiveness need not be sensitive to the duration > of the latent period and tracing delays; (4) iterative tracing primarily > improves effectiveness when single-step tracing is on the brink of being > effective. > > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > Non riesco a nemmeno a comprendere il periodo :-S > > Questo è invece uno studio recentissimo: > > https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.02.14.20023036v1.full.pdf > > --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- > > For contact tracing to be an effective public health measure requires > secondary cases to be discovered before they become infectious; hence > the time from the primary case becoming infectious to the tracing of > their contacts needs to be shorter than the incubation period. [...] > > Therefore, while contact tracing has the potential to control COVID-19 > (and other close-contact pathogens) the ultimate success relies on the > speed and efficacy with which suspect contacts can be contained > > --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- > > Quindi il "digital contact tracing" sarebbe di aiuto ma non la > soluzione. > > Per essere davvero efficace, il "digital contact tracing" _deve_ essere > adottato immediatamente... il che in pratica significa che in Lombardia > doveva già essere in uso da Dicembre... il che in pratica significa che > ho l'impressione che - nonostante gli scienziati lo sconsiglino > vivamente - finirà con qualcuno che vorrà imporre a tutti di girare con > la app "privacy preserving" al collo, nonni e bambini compresi :-) > > Faccio notare che ci sono numerosi casi nei quali _non_ sono riusciti a > tenere sotto controllo l'epidemia anche in contesti apparentemente > semplici come le case di riposo per anziani, dove il contact tracing, > l'isolamento e il testing sono perfino banali da organizzare. > > > Cordiali saluti. Giovanni. > > > [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contact_tracing > > > > P.S. personale: se passerà 'sta linea io sono fregato, già devo > discutere con qualcuno dei miei familiari o dei miei amici per il solo > fatto di non voler installare Wasapp sul mio telefonino; mi immagino già > le discussioni sul fatto che io non giro con la App di tracing :-S > > -- > Giovanni Biscuolo > > Xelera IT Infrastructures > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > -- *Avv. Carlo Blengino* *Via Duchessa Jolanda n. 19,* *10138 Torino (TO) - Italy* *tel. +39 011 4474035* Penalistiassociati.it

April 3, 2020

Re: [nexa] PEPP-PT: Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing

by Giovanni Biscuolo

Stefano Zacchiroli <zack(a)upsilon.cc> writes: [...] > Ma c'è anche questo sulla homepage: > > The PEPP-PT mechanisms will have these core features: > [...] > 6. Our reference implementation is available under the Mozilla License > Agreement. Ah perfetto, scusa me l'ero perso :-S > Quindi mi aspetto che tutto sarà open source, ma sono un'inguaribile > ottimista ! Beh basterebbe che il primo che ottiene il binario della loro implementazione richiedesse il sorgente e lo pubblicasse un po' dove gli pare e piace, io lo vedrei bene in Software Heritage :-D Per ottenere il binario bisogna essere partner in questo momento... io ci provo (appena ho 10 minuti liberi) [...] Grazie, Giovanni -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures

April 3, 2020

Re: [nexa] A few links of interest [notsp]

by Giovanni Biscuolo

"Diego.Latella" <diego.latella(a)isti.cnr.it> writes: [...] > 3) It is useful to circulate this message from ACA > https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/focus/pandemic-reveals-misplaced-pr… Per quel che conta, mi permetto di consigliare la lettura di questo articolo che ben inquadra l'attuale emergenza in un contesto più ampio di gestione delle questioni di sicurezza nazionale (USA) e internazionale... a proposito di priorità Fornisce anche interessanti cifre che rendono bene l'idea :-) --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- The U.S. stockpile of medical supplies includes 12 million medical-grade N95 masks and 30 million surgical masks, which is only about 1 percent of the 3.5 billion needed in a year to deal with a disease pandemic. At the price of $0.50 a mask, it would cost approximately $1.75 billion to build up the N95 stockpile and about $350 million a year to replace expired masks, according to a report published by The War Zone. That is less than the $3.2 billion increase above fiscal year 2020 levels that the Pentagon is seeking for its multiyear programs to sustain and rebuild the U.S. triad of nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, and bombers. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- [...] Grazie Diego. -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures

April 3, 2020

Re: [nexa] epidemic control with digital contact tracing - Science

by Giovanni Biscuolo

Cari nexiani, già altri lo hanno espresso bene prima di me e cercherò di non ripeterlo più in questa lista, io però ribadisco che... Il contact tracing con strumenti digitali potrebbe aiutare, però per come se ne discute mediamente sui mezzi di informazione generalisti mi da l'impressione che rischi di _distrarre_ pensieri e risorse agli altri mezzi di controllo dell'epidemia, che IMHO _devono_ comprendere anche un netto "scatto di reni" nello studio qualitativo, oltre che quello quantitativo (amo la statistica ma non mi basta). L'articolo di Science e tutti gli esperti dal WHO in giù dicono chiaramente: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- The App should be one tool among many general preventative population measures such as physical distancing, enhanced hand and respiratory hygiene, and regular decontamination. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Mancano i tamponi a tutti i pazienti sospetti e il cerchio è chiuso. Giuseppe Attardi <attardi(a)di.unipi.it> writes: > Articolo su Science. > > Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing > > A contact-tracing App [...] > https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936 <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936> Leggere tutto l'articolo è troppo per me in questi giorni, lo metto in lista; però un'occhiata rapida l'ho data... Io ne so troppo poco in merito all'efficacia clinica del contact tracing (sto lentissimamente colmando l'ignoranza) però noto che molti esperti, anche prima di questo articolo su Science, hanno deciso che questo è il modo più efficace per contenere l'epidemia e sperare di tornare alla normalità (o deficienza clinica pregressa) nel più breve tempo possibile... non ho sinceramente capito se e come questo verrà accompagnato da adeguati piani di testing, ma d'altronde mica me lo devono dire a me :-) Noto però che nell'articolo su Wikipedia [1] (che potrebbe essere decisamente carente) oltre ad altre cose interessanti c'è scritto: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Contact tracing is not always the most efficient method of addressing infectious disease. In areas of high disease prevalence, screening or focused testing may be more cost-effective. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Purtroppo manca il riferimento bibliografico a tale affermazione: qualcuno in lista ha qualche riferimento preciso a studi in merito? Credo che il nocciolo dello studio pubblicato su Science sostanzialmente sia che l'utilizzo di strumenti per il "digital instantaneous contact tracing" sono talmente performanti che superano il limiti del contact tracing manuale: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Published models (9–11, 32) suggest that in practice manual contact tracing can only improve on this to a limited extent: it is too slow, and cannot be scaled up once the epidemic grows beyond the early phase, due to limited personnel. Using mobile phones to measure infectious disease contact networks has been proposed previously (33–35). Considering our quantification of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we suggest that this approach, with a mobile phone App implementing instantaneous contact tracing, could reduce transmission enough to achieve R < 1 and sustained epidemic suppression --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- «Considering our quantification of SARS-CoV-2»... and considering the *qualification*? Senza troppi sforzi, qualche studio effettuato in tempi **non emergenziali** si trova: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0000012 --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- With these insights we explain why contact tracing was and will be effective for control of smallpox and SARS, only partially effective for foot-and-mouth disease, and likely not effective for influenza. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Quindi dal punto di vista epidemiologico sarebbe importante capire se SARS-CoV-2 assomiglia di più al nonno o all'influenza, senz'altro gli scienziati sanno già tutto su questo, no? https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1762362/ --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- We conclude that (1) there is no general predictive formula for the proportion to be traced as there is for the proportion to be vaccinated; (2) variability in time to detection is favourable for effective tracing; (3) tracing effectiveness need not be sensitive to the duration of the latent period and tracing delays; (4) iterative tracing primarily improves effectiveness when single-step tracing is on the brink of being effective. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Non riesco a nemmeno a comprendere il periodo :-S Questo è invece uno studio recentissimo: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.02.14.20023036v1.full.pdf --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- For contact tracing to be an effective public health measure requires secondary cases to be discovered before they become infectious; hence the time from the primary case becoming infectious to the tracing of their contacts needs to be shorter than the incubation period. [...] Therefore, while contact tracing has the potential to control COVID-19 (and other close-contact pathogens) the ultimate success relies on the speed and efficacy with which suspect contacts can be contained --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Quindi il "digital contact tracing" sarebbe di aiuto ma non la soluzione. Per essere davvero efficace, il "digital contact tracing" _deve_ essere adottato immediatamente... il che in pratica significa che in Lombardia doveva già essere in uso da Dicembre... il che in pratica significa che ho l'impressione che - nonostante gli scienziati lo sconsiglino vivamente - finirà con qualcuno che vorrà imporre a tutti di girare con la app "privacy preserving" al collo, nonni e bambini compresi :-) Faccio notare che ci sono numerosi casi nei quali _non_ sono riusciti a tenere sotto controllo l'epidemia anche in contesti apparentemente semplici come le case di riposo per anziani, dove il contact tracing, l'isolamento e il testing sono perfino banali da organizzare. Cordiali saluti. Giovanni. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contact_tracing P.S. personale: se passerà 'sta linea io sono fregato, già devo discutere con qualcuno dei miei familiari o dei miei amici per il solo fatto di non voler installare Wasapp sul mio telefonino; mi immagino già le discussioni sul fatto che io non giro con la App di tracing :-S -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures

April 3, 2020

Re: [nexa] Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool

by Alberto Cammozzo

Agghiacciante. Terrorismo o virus, promettono di risolvere con la sorveglianza. Dove andranno tutti quei dati? Sono l'unico a pensare che affidere un contratto a P. sia alto tradimento? A. On 02/04/2020 20:28, Enrico Bergamini wrote: > https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/palantir-in-talks-with-g… > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

April 2, 2020

Re: [nexa] Automated decision-making systems and the fight against COVID-19 – our position – AlgorithmWatch

by Alberto Cammozzo

Concordo! Bellissmio intervento. Alberto On 02/04/2020 18:17, Enrico Nardelli wrote: > > L'apertura del pezzo è spettacolare (evidenziazione mia) > > *The COVID-19 is not a technological problem*. Analyses of actual > responses to the outbreak show that successful interventions are > always grounded in broader public health policies. Singapore, South > Korea and Taiwan, frequently cited as role models in keeping the > epidemic in check, all had plans in place, most of them designed after > the 2003 SARS outbreak. Preparedness for an epidemic reaches beyond > technical solutions: it means having resources, competences, plans, > and the political legitimacy and the will to quickly deploy them when > needed. > > Bravo Fabio! > > Ciao, Enrico > > Il 02/04/2020 10:30, J.C. DE MARTIN ha scritto: >> https://algorithmwatch.org/en/our-position-on-adms-and-the-fight-against-co… >> >> >> (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any)) >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > -- EN > > ===================================================================== > Prof. Enrico Nardelli > Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" > Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma > tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 > mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli(a)mat.uniroma2.it > home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli > blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ > http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ > ===================================================================== > -- > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

April 2, 2020

Get Used to It: This Lockdown Won’t Be the Last

by Enrico Nardelli

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/lockdowns-hong-ko… HONG KONG—As the number of confirmed coronavirus cases exploded in China early this year, Hong Kong, densely populated and connected to the mainland, was able to largely contain the virus’s spread. A combination of community response and official action held back the pace of infections, with the number of patients discharged from treatment until recently outpacing those remaining in the hospital. This month, civil servants on work-from-home orders were allowed to return to their office. Soon, private businesses started to do the same. Commuters began to refill the buses and subways. Bars and restaurants left largely vacant for weeks saw patrons remerge. As reports of outbreaks abroad worsened, Hong Kong appeared to be slowly returning to form. In recent days, this semblance of normalcy has vanished. The number of confirmed cases here has ticked upward at a much quicker pace than before, worrying health experts. The government reversed course on its easing of restrictions, sending workers back home, closing parks and city facilities, and reiterating calls for social distancing. It also introduced newer, more stringent measures, barring tourists and transit passengers from Hong Kong’s airport, one of the world’s busiest, and quarantining those who are allowed in. (A large portion of the recent confirmed cases are imported.) Another cluster of confirmed cases has been linked to bars and live-music venues, so gatherings of more than four people have been deemed illegal for the next two weeks; restaurants will reduce their capacity, and entertainment areas like cinemas and arcades must temporarily close. -- EN ===================================================================== Prof. Enrico Nardelli Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli(a)mat.uniroma2.it home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ ===================================================================== --

April 2, 2020

The EARN IT Act Violates the Constitution | Electronic Frontier Foundation

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/earn-it-act-violates-constitution> Since senators introduced the EARN IT Act (S. 3398) in early March, EFF has called attention to the many ways in which the bill would be a disaster for Internet users’ free speech and security. We’ve explained how the EARN IT Act could be used to drastically undermine encryption. Although the bill doesn’t use the word “encryption” in its text, it gives government officials like Attorney General William Barr the power to compel online service providers to break encryption or be exposed to potentially crushing legal liability. The bill also violates the Constitution’s protections for free speech and privacy. As Congress considers the EARN IT Act—which would require online platforms to comply with to-be-determined “best practices” in order to preserve certain protections from criminal and civil liability for user-generated content under Section 230 (47 U.S.C. § 230)—it’s important to highlight the bill’s First and Fourth Amendment problems. [...]

April 2, 2020

Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool

by Enrico Bergamini

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/palantir-in-talks-with-g…

April 2, 2020