April 2015 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Conyers, Nadler Introduce the USA Freedom Act

by Andrea Glorioso

FYI http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?id=8C703FBE-0A0C-4261-8… Apr 28 2015 Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Conyers, Nadler Introduce the USA Freedom Act <http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=8C703FBE-0A0C-4261-8…> Bipartisan bill will be marked up on April 30th *Washington, D.C.* – Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), Ranking Member John Conyers (D-Mich.), and Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) today will introduce the *USA Freedom Act <http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/1cb59778-0a72-4c09-920d-0e22bf692bb…>*. This bipartisan bill builds on the Committee’s extensive work on this issue last Congress, containing even stronger protections for Americans’ civil liberties, providing for even greater transparency for both the private sector and government, and preventing government overreach, while enhancing national security. *The House Judiciary Committee will mark up this legislation on Thursday, April 30th at 10:00 a.m. in 2141 Rayburn House Office Building.* In June 2013, unauthorized disclosures of classified information revealed to the American people that the National Security Agency had been collecting bulk telephony “metadata” under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Following the revelation of this information, the House Judiciary Committee worked extensively last Congress to end the NSA’s bulk collection program: it conducted aggressive oversight of our nation’s intelligence-gathering programs operated under FISA and approved bipartisan legislation in Committee, which was ultimately passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives. However, the Senate failed to pass legislation on this issue. Crime Subcommittee Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Subcommittee Ranking Member Nadler praised the introduction of the bill in the joint statement below. *“As several intelligence-gathering programs are set to expire in a month, it is imperative that we reform these programs to protect Americans’ privacy while at the same time protecting our national security. The bipartisan bill introduced today builds on the Committee’s work on this issue last year. It enhances civil liberties protections, increases transparency for both American businesses and the government, ends the bulk collection of data, and provides national security officials targeted tools to keep America safe from foreign enemies. We look forward to expeditiously moving this strong, bipartisan bill through the House Judiciary Committee and then through Congress so that we rein in government overreach and rebuild trust with the American people. We thank Senators Lee and Leahy for working on this issue and introducing companion legislation in the Senate.”* *Key Components of the USA Freedom Act:* *Protects civil liberties: * · Ends bulk collection: Prohibits bulk collection of ALL records under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the FISA pen register authority, and national security letter statutes. · Prevents government overreach: The bulk collection prohibition is strengthened by prohibiting large-scale, indiscriminate collection, such as all records from an entire state, city, or zip code. · Allows challenges of national security letter gag orders: NSL nondisclosure orders must be based upon a danger to national security or interference with an investigation. Codifies procedures for individual companies to challenge nondisclosure orders. Requires periodic review of nondisclosure orders to determine necessity. *Improves transparency and better information-sharing with the American people:* · Expertise at the FISA court: The bill creates a panel of amicus curie at the FISA court to provide guidance on matters of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and other technical or legal matters. · Declassified FISA opinions: All significant constructions or interpretations of law by the FISA court must be made public. These include all significant interpretations of the definition of “specific selection term,” the concept at the heart of the ban on bulk collection. · Robust government reporting: The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence will provide the public with detailed information about how they use these national security authorities. · Robust company reporting: Tech companies will have a range of options for describing how they respond to national security orders, all consistent with national security needs. *Strengthens national security:* · Gives the government the tools it needs: Creates a new call detail records program that is closely overseen by the FISA court. · Contains an additional tool to combat ISIL: The bill closes a loophole in current law that requires the government to stop tracking foreign terrorists when they enter the U.S. This provision gives the government 72 hours to track foreign terrorists when they initially enter the United States (it does not apply to U.S. persons) – enough time for the government to obtain the proper authority under U.S. law. · Increases the statutory maximum prison sentence to 20 years for providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. · Enhances investigations of international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. · Protects United States’ maritime activities from nuclear threats, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats by implementing the obligations of various treaties to which the United States is a party. · Provides strictly limited emergency authorities: Creates new procedures for the emergency use of Section 215 but requires the government to destroy the information it collects if a FISA court application is denied. Learn more about the *USA Freedom Act* by clicking here <http://www.judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/usa-freedom-act>. Permalink: http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2015/4/goodlatte-sensenbrenner-conyers… -- I speak only for myself. Sometimes I do not even agree with myself. Keep it in mind. Twitter: @andreaglorioso Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/andrea.glorioso LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=1749288&trk=tab_pro

April 28, 2015

consultazione del Garante privacy sull'internet delle cose

by Mauro Alovisio

Gent.mi segnalo dal sito del Garante interessante consultazione on line sull'Internet delle cose http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/… cordiali saluti Mauro Alovisio

April 28, 2015

Berkman Center Webcast live oggi ore 18 - Intellectual Privacy

by Giuseppe Futia

Intellectual Privacy http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2015/04/Richards <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/06/sigal> *with author Neil Richards* Today, 6.00 pm Webcast live: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interactive/webcast http://nexa.polito.it/berkman-webcast-live Why is it bad when the government or companies monitor our reading or web-surfing? We have intuitions that this kind of surveillance is bad, but have failed to explain why digital monitoring in an age of terror and innovation is really a problem. In Intellectual Privacy, Neil Richards offers a new way of thinking about monitoring of our thinking, reading, and communications, one that ensures that our ideas and values keep pace with our technologies. Although we often think of privacy and free speech as being in conflict, Richards shows how privacy and free speech are often essential to each other. He explains the importance of 'intellectual privacy,' protection from surveillance or interference when we are engaged in the processes of generating ideas - thinking, reading, and speaking with confidantes before our ideas are ready for public consumption. In our digital age, in which we increasingly communicate, read, and think with the help of technologies that track us, increased protection for intellectual privacy has become an imperative. A timely and provocative book on a subject that affects us all, Intellectual Privacy will radically reshape the debate about privacy and free speech in our digital age. About Neil Neil Richards is an internationally-recognized expert in privacy law, information law, and freedom of expression. He is a professor of law at Washington University School of Law, an affiliate scholar with the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, a member of the Advisory Board of the Future of Privacy Forum, and a consultant and expert in privacy cases. He graduated in 1997 with degrees in law and history from the University of Virginia, and served as a law clerk to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. Professor Richards is the author of Intellectual Privacy (Oxford Press 2015). His many writings on privacy and civil liberties have appeared in many academic journals including the Harvard Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, the Virginia Law Review, and the California Law Review. He has written for a more general audience in Time, Slate, Wired, CNN.com, Forbes, the Boston Review, and the Chronicle of Higher Education. Professor Richards regularly speaks about privacy, technology, and civil liberties throughout the United States and Europe, and also appears frequently in the media. At Washington University, he teaches courses on privacy, free speech, and constitutional law, and is a past winner of the Washington University School of Law's Professor of the Year award. He was born in England, educated in the United States, and lives with his family in St. Louis. He is an avid cyclist and a lifelong supporter of Liverpool Football Club.

April 28, 2015

Paper: "Towards Multilateral Standards for Surveillance Reform"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551164 *Towards Multilateral Standards for Surveillance Reform* Ian Brown University of Oxford - Oxford Internet Institute Morton H. Halperin Open Society Foundations (OSF) Ben Hayes Independent Ben Scott Independent Mathias Vermeulen European University Institute January 5, 2015 Oxford Internet Institute Discussion Paper, January 2015 Abstract: Edward Snowden’s revelations about the mass surveillance capabilities of the United States’ National Security Agency and its partners have created a unique opportunity to work towards the adoption of multilateral human rights-compliant standards for government surveillance conducted against nationals of other countries. This paper attempts to map a path toward new international standards for foreign intelligence collection, in order to achieve increased transparency, control and oversight of national surveillance practices. We provide a basic comparison of the legal frameworks governing foreign surveillance law in the US and selected EU Member States, and set out the applicable international human rights law and major reform initiatives in as far as they relate to foreign surveillance and its oversight. We attempt to identify key issues relevant to all signals intelligence reform efforts and to provide an analytical framework to guide the development of new standards and realistic options for reform. Number of Pages in PDF File: 40 Keywords: surveillance, interception, signals intelligence, international human rights law, FISA, FISA Amendments Act, European Convention on Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, privacy, sovereignty

April 28, 2015

Ars: "NSA spied on EU politicians and companies with help from German intelligence"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*NSA spied on EU politicians and companies with help from German intelligence* /Spies failed to check properly what was being passed across to the US./ by Glyn Moody - Apr 24, 2015 10:21am ART Germany's intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), has been helping the NSA spy on European politicians and companies for years, according to the German news magazine Der Spiegel. The NSA has been sending lists of "selectors"—identifying telephone numbers, e-mail and IP addresses—to the BND, which then provides related information that it holds in its surveillance databases. According to the German newspaper Die Zeit, the NSA sent selector lists several times a day, and altogether 800,000 selectors have been requested. The BND realized as early as 2008 that some of the selectors were not permitted according to its internal rules, or covered by a 2002 US-Germany anti-terrorism "Memorandum of Agreement" on intelligence cooperation. And yet it did nothing to check the NSA's requests systematically. It was only in the summer of 2013, after Edward Snowden's revelations of massive NSA and GCHQ surveillance, that the BND finally started an inquiry into all the selectors that had been processed. […] Continua qui: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/24/nsa-spied-on-eu-politicians-a…

April 28, 2015

Re: [nexa] la copia di cortesia... telematica

by Simone Aliprandi

Sì, certo, Stefano. Infatti l'ho segnalato nel mio post. Il problema è però il metodo: si aggiunge (chiamandolo cortesia") a carico degli avvocati un onere che in realtà la legge non richiede. Ed emerge la solita domanda: se gli avvocati caricano una copia in formato "nativo" dell'atto di citazione, chi poi verifica che è proprio uguale a quella depositata invece in cancelleria in cartaceo? (ricordo che stiamo parlando a volte di atti di 40-50 pagine A4). E' tutto il sistema che va ripensato. Un caro saluto, Simone -- Simone Aliprandi - http://www.aliprandi.org | http://www.array.eu Il 27 aprile 2015 14:10, Stefano Quintarelli <stefano(a)quintarelli.it> ha scritto: > questo pero' ha piu' senso, serve per fare il search e le annotazioni... > > > On 27/04/2015 10:58, Simone Aliprandi wrote: >> >> Torno periodicamente sul tema del processo telematico e delle sue >> estrinsecazioni più bizzarre. Adesso arriva anche la copia di cortesia >> TELEMATICA. Ecco il decreto di un giudice monogratico di Salerno: >> >> http://aliprandi.blogspot.it/2015/04/copia-cortesia-telematica-salerno.html >> Un caro saluto. >> -- >> Simone Aliprandi - http://www.aliprandi.org | http://www.array.eu >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> >> ----- >> Nessun virus nel messaggio. >> Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com >> Versione: 2015.0.5941 / Database dei virus: 4334/9637 - Data di rilascio: >> 27/04/2015 >> >

April 27, 2015

Re: [nexa] la copia di cortesia... telematica

by Stefano Quintarelli

questo pero' ha piu' senso, serve per fare il search e le annotazioni... On 27/04/2015 10:58, Simone Aliprandi wrote: > Torno periodicamente sul tema del processo telematico e delle sue > estrinsecazioni più bizzarre. Adesso arriva anche la copia di cortesia > TELEMATICA. Ecco il decreto di un giudice monogratico di Salerno: > http://aliprandi.blogspot.it/2015/04/copia-cortesia-telematica-salerno.html > Un caro saluto. > -- > Simone Aliprandi - http://www.aliprandi.org | http://www.array.eu > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > ----- > Nessun virus nel messaggio. > Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com > Versione: 2015.0.5941 / Database dei virus: 4334/9637 - Data di rilascio: 27/04/2015 >

April 27, 2015

la copia di cortesia... telematica

by Simone Aliprandi

Torno periodicamente sul tema del processo telematico e delle sue estrinsecazioni più bizzarre. Adesso arriva anche la copia di cortesia TELEMATICA. Ecco il decreto di un giudice monogratico di Salerno: http://aliprandi.blogspot.it/2015/04/copia-cortesia-telematica-salerno.html Un caro saluto. -- Simone Aliprandi - http://www.aliprandi.org | http://www.array.eu

April 27, 2015

R: Re : Re: Scatole nere algoritmiche -- e che problema c'è?

by Blengino

>From Resolution 2045 (2015) On Mass Surveillance Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe: 19. The Assembly therefore urges the Council of Europe member and observer States to: 19.1. ensure that... the creation of back doors or any other techniques to weaken or circumvent security measures or exploit their existing weaknesses should be strictly prohibited; all institutions and businesses holding personal data should be required to apply the most effective security measures available; Per dire. Buon 25 aprile a tutti C. -----Messaggio originale----- Da: nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it [mailto:nexa-bounces@server-nexa.polito.it] Per conto di Stefano Quintarelli Inviato: venerdì 17 aprile 2015 17:53 A: Antonio Casilli Cc: 'nexa' Oggetto: Re: [nexa] Re : Re: Scatole nere algoritmiche -- e che problema c'è? l'articolo dell'epoca diceva che gli ISP dovevano individuare i comportamenti sospetti e decrittare le comunicazioni. queste sono funzioni di polizia da un lato e non vedo come sia possibile decrittare, dall'altro. l'articolo attuale non mi pare dica le stesse cose e non spiega i contorni dell'operazione. c'e' il testo della legge, per capire bene ? ciao!, s. On 17/04/2015 09:23, Antonio Casilli wrote: > Ahinoi per le black boxes non si tratta affatto di perquisizioni a distanza, ma di intercettazioni massive-passive extragiudiziali di tutto il traffico, con vaghe possibilità di ricorso ex post presso (di fatto esautorati) organi di controllo da parte dei FAI. Purtroppo non posso per ragioni di tempo rispondere oggi nel dettaglio a questa mail, ma (giustamente per sapere cosa aspettarsi in discussione della legge intercettazioni) ecco il pezzo di Fabio Chiusi apparso su wired: > http://www.wired.it/attualita/2015/03/22/sorveglianza-digitale-lotta-t > errorismo-perche-nuova-legge-francese-non-modello-imitare/ > > + GoogleTranslation del pezzo di Andrea Fradin, che ha intervistato dei ricercatori in algoritmica p: > https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&nv=1&rurl= > translate.google.com&sl=fr&tl=en&u=http:%2F%2Frue89.nouvelobs.com%2Fno > de%2F258672&usg=ALkJrhgRPtkDyH228H4h9d0qFVLRTTRdkQ > > ----- Mail d'origine ----- > De: Stefano Quintarelli <stefano(a)quintarelli.it> > À: Antonio Casilli <antonio.casilli(a)telecom-paristech.fr>, nexa > <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> > Envoyé: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 21:17:01 +0200 (CEST) > Objet: Re: [nexa] Scatole nere algoritmiche -- e che problema c'è? > > scritto cosi' ci sono ben poche informazioni per dare un giudizio... > > l'emendamento che ho segnalato nella legge del terrorismo prevedeva la > possibilita' di installare trojan che acquisissero lo stock delle > informazioni presenti nei computer bersaglio. > > questo e' simile ad una perquisizione con la differenza che in questo > caso il sospettato non sa di essere oggetto di perquisizione; altra > differenza e' che si prendono tutti i dati di una vita (come in una > perquisizione), ma questi dati sono molto piu' di dettaglio (nel > fisico magari conservi le lettere alla morosa e le bollette, non i > messaggini agli amici e non per tutta la vita) > > cosa ben diversa e' una intercettazione che, per l'appunto, intercetta > il flusso delle conversazioni (non lo stock dei dati) da un certo > momento in poi e per un periodo limitato. > > entrambe le fattispecie sono limitate per quanto riguarda le ipotesi > di reato in cui possono essere disposte, e sono disposte da un giudice. > > un giudice domani decide che si devono intercettare tizio e caio per > una ipotesi di reato e le loro conversazioni e SMS che si scambiano, > per un periodo limitato di tempo, vengono registrati ed archiviati, > per un periodo limitato di tempo. > > ovviamente quando viene decisa una intercettazione, a differenza della > perquisizione, la decisione e' segreta (mica diciamo all'imputato > "guarda che ti stiamo intercettando") > > le informazioni nel post indicato da Antonio (grazie!) fanno intuire > che trattasi di cosa piu' simile ad una intercettazione, con la > differenza che non si consoce il contenuto, in quanto cifrato. meno > invasivo quindi rispetto ad una intercettazione normale. > > si intuisce anche che non tutto il traffico viene intercettato ma solo > una parte sulla base di criteri (che come nelle intercettazioni devono > necessariamente essere segreti). > > l'importante e' che cio' avvenga per un periodo limitato, arcivhiato > per un periodo limitato, e disposto da un giudice, ed attuabile per > un limitato numero di ipotesi di reati gravi. > > ripeto il "si intuisce", perche' non ci sono elementi sufficienti nel post. > > se invece fosse deciso non da un giudice, per qualunque fattispecie di > reato, per un tempo indefinito, ed intercettasse e registrasse tutto > il traffico in transito (ma mi pare tecnicamente assai arduo, to say > the least), beh, allora sarebbe decisamente una cosa grave. > > se qualcuno ha elementi in piu', il tema mi interessa, dato che tra > poco avremo da parlare di intercettazioni, alla Camera. > > ciao!, s. > > > On 16/04/2015 13:39, Antonio Casilli wrote: >> Dear all, >> >> ieri, in piena notte e in presenza di appena 30 deputati, l'Assemblée Nationale francese ha approvato l'emendamento più pericoloso della Legge Intelligence ("Loi renseignement") attualmente in discussione: quello sulla istallazione di "scatole nere" presso i fornitori d'accesso internet, per intercettare dei pattern di "comportamenti sospetti" sulla base di algoritmi non sottoposti a controllo democratico (v. mia mail del 30 marzo scorso). >> >> Un post di un informatico franco-italiano vi aiuterà a comprendere dov'è il problema e per quale motivo la cosa concerne l'Italia. >> >> http://signord.tevac.com/2015/04/16/declinazioni-nazionali-sorveglian >> za/ > >> >> Per quelli che invece vogliono fare lo sforzo immane di usage Google Translate, ecco una selezione di articoli degli ultimi giorni: >> - Le Monde >> http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2015/04/15/pourquoi-la-loi-sur-l >> e-renseignement-cristallise-les-critiques_4615766_4408996.html >> - Le Nouvel Obs >> http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2015/04/15/lalgorithme-gouvernement-sera-i >> ntrusif-inefficace-prouve-258672 >> - Numerama >> http://www.numerama.com/magazine/32809-l-assemblee-adopte-les-boites- >> noires-qui-surveilleront-votre-comportement.html >> - Il sito NextInPact fa dei rendiconto in tempo reale del dibattito >> (agghiacciante) all'Assemblée Nationale >> http://www.nextinpact.com/news/93837-loi-renseignement-compte-rendu-t >> roisieme-journee-debats.htm >> >> Nel frattempo, la lista degli oppositori a questa legge, che già >> contava magistrati, poliziotti, la CNIL, Human Rights Watch, la Lega >> dei Diritti dell'Uomo, Amnesty International, da ieri conta anche il >> World Wide Web Consortium: >> https://twitter.com/w3c/status/588372724805951488 >> >> > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > _______________________________________________ nexa mailing list nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

April 25, 2015

Re: [nexa] "Please consider the impacts of banning HTTP" (issue #107 di WhiteHouse/https su GitHub)

by Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists

On 4/24/15 7:27 PM, Simone Basso wrote: > > Voi cosa ne pensate? Condivido in particolare il punto che la maintenance sia decisamente maggiore e che questo sia un problema legato alla gestione dei certificati digitali, che richiede interventi manuali fatti con una certa periodicità (oltre a costi). Solo quando abilitare HTTPS e gestire il certificate-lifecycle sarà interamente automatizzato con un approccio machine-to-machine sarà possibile una diffusione pervasiva dell'uso di TLS/SSL. Con l'ACME protocol [1] del progetto letsencrypt [2] queste problematiche dovrebbero risolversi. [1] https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec [2] https://letsencrypt.org/getinvolved/ -- Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights http://logioshermes.org - https://globaleaks.org - https://tor2web.org - https://ahmia.fi

April 24, 2015