July 2014 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Fwd: [CC-Europe] Commission Notice: 'Guidelines on recommended standard licences, datasets and charging for the re-use of documents'

by Federico Morando

Penso che a molti appassionati di open data e PSI in lista possa interessare in documento di cui in oggetto e sotto... Citando da una prima veloce scorsa: "the CC0 public domain dedication is of particular interest. As a legal tool that allows waiving copyright and database rights on PSI, it ensures full flexibility for re-users and reduces the complications associated with handling numerous licences, with possibly conflicting provisions. If the CC0 public domain dedication cannot be used, public sector bodies are encouraged to use open standard licences appropriate to a member state's own national intellectual property and contract law and that comply with the recommended licensing provisions set out below." Anche se si dice "In the light of the said recommendations, consideration should also be given to the possibility of developing a suitable national open licence.", ci si salva poi con: "Where licences are required by law and cannot be replaced by simple notices, it is advisable that they cover attribution requirements only, as any other obligations may limit licensees' creativity or economic activity, thereby affecting the re-use potential of the documents in question." Federico -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [CC-Europe] Commission Notice: 'Guidelines on recommended standard licences, datasets and charging for the re-use of documents' Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:25:11 +0200 From: Timothy Vollmer <tvol(a)creativecommons.org> To: cc-europe <cc-europe(a)lists.ibiblio.org>, cc staff all <cc-staff(a)lists.ibiblio.org> fyi - Commissioner Kroes announced this at the OKFestival today in Berlin https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/commission-notice-guidelines-re… -- Timothy Vollmer Public Policy Manager, Creative Commons Get Creative Commons Updates http://bit.ly/commonsnews

July 17, 2014

R: “A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo

by Blengino

...che non è tale solo per US ed extraUE ;) Com'era il tread su Gmail e l'università? Facciamo noi che facciamo meglio? -----Messaggio originale----- Da: nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it [mailto:nexa-bounces@server-nexa.polito.it] Per conto di Stefano Quintarelli Inviato: giovedì 17 luglio 2014 11:57 A: Marco Ciurcina; nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it Oggetto: Re: [nexa] “A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo allarmismo On 17/07/2014 11:52, Marco Ciurcina wrote: > http://iusletter.com/a-rischio-email-e-telefonate-degli-italiani-il-do > ssier-segreto-sul-tavolo-del-governo/ > > C’è un enorme buco nero nella sicurezza delle telecomunicazioni > italiane. Una falla talmente ampia da mettere a disposizione di > chiunque volesse attrezzarsi telefonate, sms, email, chat, contenuti > postati sui social network. Tutto il traffico online del Paese, > insomma. Non si tratta di un allarme generico ma di un pericolo più > che concreto, tanto che negli ambienti dello spionaggio internazionale > si dà per scontato che l’Italia sia da anni «interamente controllata». Da Nord a Sud. Quello che non si sa, però, è da chi. > A denunciare questo buco è una relazione riservata del Dipartimento > attività ispettive dell’Autorità garante per la protezione dei dati > personali, inviata al presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al > ministro per lo Sviluppo economico, a quello dell’Interno e al > sottosegretario con delega all’Intelligence Marco Minniti. Tre pagine > che riassumono un rapporto lunghissimo, stilato dagli ingegneri > informatici del Garante tra aprile e maggio dopo lo scandalo mondiale > del Datagate del 2013. E nonostante le rassicurazioni del governo > italiano, che in quell’occasione, per bocca dello stesso Minniti, > aveva detto che «la tutela della privacy delle comunicazioni interne in Italia è garantita con ragionevole certezza». > ... > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > ----- > Nessun virus nel messaggio. > Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com > Versione: 2014.0.4716 / Database dei virus: 3986/7867 - Data di > rilascio: 17/07/2014 > _______________________________________________ nexa mailing list nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 17, 2014

Re: [nexa] “A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo

by Marco Ciurcina

In data giovedì 17 luglio 2014 11:56:56, Stefano Quintarelli ha scritto: > allarmismo il documento del Garante è reperibile? m.c. > > On 17/07/2014 11:52, Marco Ciurcina wrote: > > http://iusletter.com/a-rischio-email-e-telefonate-degli-italiani-il-dossie > > r-segreto-sul-tavolo-del-governo/ > > > > C’è un enorme buco nero nella sicurezza delle telecomunicazioni italiane. > > Una falla talmente ampia da mettere a disposizione di chiunque volesse > > attrezzarsi telefonate, sms, email, chat, contenuti postati sui social > > network. Tutto il traffico online del Paese, insomma. Non si tratta di un > > allarme generico ma di un pericolo più che concreto, tanto che negli > > ambienti dello spionaggio internazionale si dà per scontato che l’Italia > > sia da anni «interamente controllata». Da Nord a Sud. Quello che non si > > sa, però, è da chi. A denunciare questo buco è una relazione riservata > > del Dipartimento attività ispettive dell’Autorità garante per la > > protezione dei dati personali, inviata al presidente del Consiglio dei > > ministri, al ministro per lo Sviluppo economico, a quello dell’Interno e > > al sottosegretario con delega > > all’Intelligence Marco Minniti. Tre pagine che riassumono un rapporto > > lunghissimo, stilato dagli ingegneri informatici del Garante tra aprile e > > maggio dopo lo scandalo mondiale del Datagate del 2013. E nonostante le > > rassicurazioni del governo italiano, che in quell’occasione, per bocca > > dello stesso Minniti, aveva detto che «la tutela della privacy delle > > comunicazioni interne in Italia è garantita con ragionevole certezza». > > ... > > _______________________________________________ > > nexa mailing list > > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > > > > ----- > > Nessun virus nel messaggio. > > Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com > > Versione: 2014.0.4716 / Database dei virus: 3986/7867 - Data di rilascio: > > 17/07/2014

July 17, 2014

Re: [nexa] “A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo

by Luca Cicchelli

Concordo, con l’aggiunta di trovare notizie che riempiano le pagine nel mese di luglio. Al di là del contenuto dell’articolo, che contiene molte inesattezze, la cosa peggiore è il fatto che il garante dell privacy abbia di fatto diffuso la nota senza informare preventivamente i tre IXP sull’esito della loro ispezione -- Luca Il giorno 17/lug/2014, alle ore 11:56, Stefano Quintarelli <stefano(a)quintarelli.it> ha scritto: > allarmismo > > On 17/07/2014 11:52, Marco Ciurcina wrote: >> http://iusletter.com/a-rischio-email-e-telefonate-degli-italiani-il-dossier… >> >> C’è un enorme buco nero nella sicurezza delle telecomunicazioni italiane. Una >> falla talmente ampia da mettere a disposizione di chiunque volesse attrezzarsi >> telefonate, sms, email, chat, contenuti postati sui social network. Tutto il >> traffico online del Paese, insomma. Non si tratta di un allarme generico ma di >> un pericolo più che concreto, tanto che negli ambienti dello spionaggio >> internazionale si dà per scontato che l’Italia sia da anni «interamente >> controllata». Da Nord a Sud. Quello che non si sa, però, è da chi. >> A denunciare questo buco è una relazione riservata del Dipartimento attività >> ispettive dell’Autorità garante per la protezione dei dati personali, inviata >> al presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al ministro per lo Sviluppo >> economico, a quello dell’Interno e al sottosegretario con delega >> all’Intelligence Marco Minniti. Tre pagine che riassumono un rapporto >> lunghissimo, stilato dagli ingegneri informatici del Garante tra aprile e >> maggio dopo lo scandalo mondiale del Datagate del 2013. E nonostante le >> rassicurazioni del governo italiano, che in quell’occasione, per bocca dello >> stesso Minniti, aveva detto che «la tutela della privacy delle comunicazioni >> interne in Italia è garantita con ragionevole certezza». >> ... >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> >> ----- >> Nessun virus nel messaggio. >> Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com >> Versione: 2014.0.4716 / Database dei virus: 3986/7867 - Data di rilascio: 17/07/2014 >> > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 17, 2014

Re: [nexa] “A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo

by Stefano Quintarelli

allarmismo On 17/07/2014 11:52, Marco Ciurcina wrote: > http://iusletter.com/a-rischio-email-e-telefonate-degli-italiani-il-dossier… > > C’è un enorme buco nero nella sicurezza delle telecomunicazioni italiane. Una > falla talmente ampia da mettere a disposizione di chiunque volesse attrezzarsi > telefonate, sms, email, chat, contenuti postati sui social network. Tutto il > traffico online del Paese, insomma. Non si tratta di un allarme generico ma di > un pericolo più che concreto, tanto che negli ambienti dello spionaggio > internazionale si dà per scontato che l’Italia sia da anni «interamente > controllata». Da Nord a Sud. Quello che non si sa, però, è da chi. > A denunciare questo buco è una relazione riservata del Dipartimento attività > ispettive dell’Autorità garante per la protezione dei dati personali, inviata > al presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al ministro per lo Sviluppo > economico, a quello dell’Interno e al sottosegretario con delega > all’Intelligence Marco Minniti. Tre pagine che riassumono un rapporto > lunghissimo, stilato dagli ingegneri informatici del Garante tra aprile e > maggio dopo lo scandalo mondiale del Datagate del 2013. E nonostante le > rassicurazioni del governo italiano, che in quell’occasione, per bocca dello > stesso Minniti, aveva detto che «la tutela della privacy delle comunicazioni > interne in Italia è garantita con ragionevole certezza». > ... > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > ----- > Nessun virus nel messaggio. > Controllato da AVG - www.avg.com > Versione: 2014.0.4716 / Database dei virus: 3986/7867 - Data di rilascio: 17/07/2014 >

July 17, 2014

“A rischio email e telefonate degli italiani” il dossier segreto sul tavolo del governo

by Marco Ciurcina

http://iusletter.com/a-rischio-email-e-telefonate-degli-italiani-il-dossier… C’è un enorme buco nero nella sicurezza delle telecomunicazioni italiane. Una falla talmente ampia da mettere a disposizione di chiunque volesse attrezzarsi telefonate, sms, email, chat, contenuti postati sui social network. Tutto il traffico online del Paese, insomma. Non si tratta di un allarme generico ma di un pericolo più che concreto, tanto che negli ambienti dello spionaggio internazionale si dà per scontato che l’Italia sia da anni «interamente controllata». Da Nord a Sud. Quello che non si sa, però, è da chi. A denunciare questo buco è una relazione riservata del Dipartimento attività ispettive dell’Autorità garante per la protezione dei dati personali, inviata al presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, al ministro per lo Sviluppo economico, a quello dell’Interno e al sottosegretario con delega all’Intelligence Marco Minniti. Tre pagine che riassumono un rapporto lunghissimo, stilato dagli ingegneri informatici del Garante tra aprile e maggio dopo lo scandalo mondiale del Datagate del 2013. E nonostante le rassicurazioni del governo italiano, che in quell’occasione, per bocca dello stesso Minniti, aveva detto che «la tutela della privacy delle comunicazioni interne in Italia è garantita con ragionevole certezza». ...

July 17, 2014

Re: [nexa] migrazione ateni italiani su gmail

by Andrea Trentini

suggerirei anche questo: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2602322 "Owning and using" Non cita direttamente il nostro caso ma descrive bene la scelleratezza di dare in outsourcing la propria conoscenza... On 10/07/2014 13:07, M. Fioretti wrote: > On Thu, Jul 03, 2014 15:12:39 PM +0200, Luciano Paccagnella wrote: >> Cari nexiani, come qualcuno di voi sicuramente già sa, diversi atenei >> italiani -- tra cui l'Università di Torino -- stanno dismettendo i >> propri sistemi di gestione della mail istituzionale, per aderire >> all'offerta educational di Gmail. > > ancora sull'argomento: > > What legal protections apply to e-mail stored outside the US by US > companies? "practically none" > > http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-leg… > -- Nulla basta a colui per il quale cio' che basta e' poco. -- Epicuro -- /\_______________ /--\ndrea |rentini http://atrent.it Laboratorio Software Libero @ . Dipartimento di Informatica @ ..: Universita' degli Studi di Milano

July 17, 2014

Re: [nexa] UN Human Rights: "Dangerous practice of digital mass surveillance must be subject to independent checks and balances"

by Federico Guerrini

Certo che se non c'era Snowden... difficile sottostimarne l'importanza storica, anche se non è detto che poi le cose vadano a buon fine, visto che in Uk stanno cercando di rendere legale la sorveglianza. e anche in Usa i dati digitali sono stati esclusi dalle protezioni del quarto emendamento... http://www.businessinsider.com/us-decides-digital-not-protected-fourth-amen… On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 5:06 PM, J.C. DE MARTIN <demartin(a)polito.it> wrote: > *Dangerous practice of digital mass surveillance must be subject to > independent checks and balances - Pillay * > > > http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14875&Lang… > > GENEVA (16 July 2014) – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay > warned Wednesday that studies by her office and others have revealed a > “disturbing” lack of transparency about governmental surveillance policies > and practices, “including de facto coercion of private sector companies to > provide sweeping access to information and data relating to private > individuals without the latter’s knowledge or consent.” > > “This,” she said, “is severely hindering efforts to ensure accountability > for any resulting human rights violations, or even to make us aware that > such violations are taking place, despite a clear international legal > framework laying down governments’ obligations to protect our right to > privacy, and other related human rights.” > > Pillay said her Office has been working for over a year on the complex web > of issues relating to the right to privacy in the face of modern digital > technology and surveillance measures. It has examined existing national and > international legislation, a number of recent court judgments, and compiled > information from a broad range of sources, including via a questionnaire > sent to States, international and regional organisations, national human > rights institutions, non-governmental organisations and private sector > businesses. > > As part of this ongoing process, Pillay’s office on Wednesday published a > report requested by the UN General Assembly in December 2013, which > stresses the need for vigilance and procedural safeguards against > governmental surveillance programmes. > > The report, entitled “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” warns that > Governmental mass surveillance is “emerging as a dangerous habit rather > than an exceptional measure” and that practices in many States reveal “a > lack of adequate national legislation and/or enforcement, weak procedural > safeguards, and ineffective oversight.” > > “The technological platforms upon which global political, economic and > social life are increasingly reliant are not only vulnerable to mass > surveillance”, the report says, “they may actually facilitate it.” > > “The very existence of a mass surveillance programme…creates an > interference with privacy. The onus is on the State to demonstrate that > such interference is neither arbitrary nor unlawful,” Pillay said, noting > that article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights > states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful > interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor > to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.” The Covenant, a > binding treaty ratified by 167 States, also says that “everyone has the > right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” > > The High Commissioner’s report points out that “Secret rules and secret > interpretations – even secret judicial interpretations – of law do not have > the necessary qualities of ‘law’. The secret nature of specific > surveillance powers brings with it a greater risk of arbitrary exercise of > discretion which, in turn, demands greater precision in the rule governing > the exercise of discretion, and additional oversight.” > > The report states that while judicial involvement can help assess whether > such surveillance meets the standards required by international human > rights law, “judicial involvement in oversight should not be viewed as a > panacea.” It calls for States to establish independent, institutions to > monitor such surveillance. > > “In several countries, judicial warranting or review of the digital > surveillance activities of intelligence and/or law enforcement agencies > have amounted effectively to an exercise in rubber-stamping,” it states. > “Jurisprudence at the regional level has emphasised the utility of an > entirely independent oversight body, particularly to monitor the execution > of approved surveillance measures.” > > While safeguards may take a variety of forms, the report notes that > attention is turning increasingly towards mixed models of administrative, > judicial and parliamentary oversight. “The involvement of all branches of > government in the oversight of surveillance programmes, as well as of an > independent civilian oversight agency, is essential to ensure the effective > protection of the law,” it states. > > The report emphasizes that when conducted in compliance with the law, > including international human rights law, surveillance of electronic > communications data can be necessary and effective for legitimate law > enforcement or intelligence purposes. > > Where there is a legitimate aim and appropriate safeguards are in place, a > State might be allowed to engage in surveillance. “However,” the report > says, “the onus is on the Government to demonstrate that interference is > both necessary and proportionate to the specific risk being addressed.” > > The laws governing such surveillance must also be publicly accessible and > must contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use > of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims, as noted > by the UN Human Rights Committee. The laws must be sufficiently precise and > provide for effective safeguards against abuse. > > “Mass or ‘bulk’ surveillance programmes may thus be deemed to be > arbitrary, even if they serve a legitimate aim and have been adopted on the > basis of an accessible legal regime. In other words, it will not be enough > that the measures are targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; the > proper measure is the impact of the measures on the haystack, relative to > the harm threatened.” > > Mandatory third-party data retention, the report states, appears “neither > necessary nor proportionate.” > > “Any capture of communications data is potentially an interference with > privacy and, further, the collection and retention of communications data > amounts to an interference with privacy whether or not those data are > subsequently consulted or used,” it states. > > On the role of the private sector, the report notes strong evidence of a > growing reliance by Governments on the private sector to conduct and > facilitate digital surveillance. “On every continent,” it says, > “Governments have used both formal legal mechanisms and covert methods to > gain access to content, as well as to metadata.” > > “The enactment of statutory requirements for companies to make their > networks ‘wiretap-ready’ is a particular concern, not least because it > creates an environment that facilitates sweeping surveillance measures,” it > adds. > > It warns that a company that supplies data to the State, in response to a > request that contravenes human rights law, itself “risks being complicit in > or otherwise involved with human rights abuses.” > > “Where enterprises are faced with government demands for access to data > that do not comply with international human rights standards, they are > expected to seek to honour the principles of human rights to the greatest > extent possible, and to be able to demonstrate their ongoing efforts to do > so,” it states. “This can mean interpreting government demands as narrowly > as possible, seeking clarification from a Government with regard to the > scope and legal foundation for the demand, requiring a court order before > meeting government requests for data, and communicating transparently with > users about risks and compliance with government demands. There are > positive examples of industry action in this regard, both by individual > enterprises and through multi-stakeholder initiatives.” > > While the report focused on the right to privacy, it notes that other > rights are at risk due to mass surveillance, the interception of digital > communications and the collection of personal data. These include the > freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of peaceful assembly and > association, the right to a family life and the right to health. > > “The constant stream of new revelations shows how disturbingly little we > really know about the precise nature of surveillance, and the extent to > which our human rights are being violated, and responsibility for those > violations is being evaded,” Pillay said. “This report is a useful outline > of the international legal framework governing these issues, and points to > some alarming gaps in implementation, and some important remedies. As an > immediate measure, States should review their own national laws, policies > and practices to ensure full conformity with international human rights > law. They must also act to eradicate discriminatory approaches, both > against their own nationals and in relation to nationals of other > countries.” > > “The complexity of the challenges to the right to privacy in this rapidly > and dramatically evolving digital age is going to require constant scrutiny > and dialogue between all key sectors, including Governments, civil society, > scientific and technical experts, the business sector, academics and human > rights specialists,” Pillay added. “Some incredibly important principles > are at stake which go right to the core of each and every individual’s > rights.” > > The report is due to be presented by the High Commissioner for Human > Rights to the Human Rights Council at its next session in September, and to > the General Assembly at its 69th session in October. > > ENDS > > To read the full report, please visit: > http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.… > > To read the opening remarks by High Commissioner Navi Pillay at the press > conference held in Geneva Wednesday, log on to: > http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14874&Lang… > > Visit the OHCHR page on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: > http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx > > *For more information or media requests, please contact Rupert Colville > (+41 22 917 9767 <%28%2B41%2022%20917%209767> / rcolville(a)ohchr.org > <rcolville(a)ohchr.org>), Ravina Shamdasani (+41 22 917 9769 > <%28%2B41%2022%20917%209769> / rshamdasani(a)ohchr.org > <rshamdasani(a)ohchr.org> ) or Cécile Pouilly (+41 22 917 9310 > <%28%2B41%2022%20917%209310> / cpouilly(a)ohchr.org <cpouilly(a)ohchr.org> )* > > *UN Human Rights, follow us on social media:* > *Facebook:* https://www.facebook.com/unitednationshumanrights > * Twitter:* http://twitter.com/UNrightswire > *Google+* gplus.to/unitednationshumanrights > * YouTube:* http://www.youtube.com/UNOHCHR > *Storify: *http://storify.com/UNrightswire > *Check the Universal Human Rights Index:* http://uhri.ohchr.org/en > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > -- https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fellowships/journalist-fellows/p… www.federicoguerrini.com Il mio ultimo libro: Vivere Social http://www.bol.it/libri/Vivere-social.-Manuale/Federico-Guerrini/ea97888971…

July 16, 2014

UN Human Rights: "Dangerous practice of digital mass surveillance must be subject to independent checks and balances"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Dangerous practice of digital mass surveillance must be subject to independent checks and balances - Pillay * http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14875&Lang… GENEVA (16 July 2014) -- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay warned Wednesday that studies by her office and others have revealed a "disturbing" lack of transparency about governmental surveillance policies and practices, "including de facto coercion of private sector companies to provide sweeping access to information and data relating to private individuals without the latter's knowledge or consent." "This," she said, "is severely hindering efforts to ensure accountability for any resulting human rights violations, or even to make us aware that such violations are taking place, despite a clear international legal framework laying down governments' obligations to protect our right to privacy, and other related human rights." Pillay said her Office has been working for over a year on the complex web of issues relating to the right to privacy in the face of modern digital technology and surveillance measures. It has examined existing national and international legislation, a number of recent court judgments, and compiled information from a broad range of sources, including via a questionnaire sent to States, international and regional organisations, national human rights institutions, non-governmental organisations and private sector businesses. As part of this ongoing process, Pillay's office on Wednesday published a report requested by the UN General Assembly in December 2013, which stresses the need for vigilance and procedural safeguards against governmental surveillance programmes. The report, entitled "The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age" warns that Governmental mass surveillance is "emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure" and that practices in many States reveal "a lack of adequate national legislation and/or enforcement, weak procedural safeguards, and ineffective oversight." "The technological platforms upon which global political, economic and social life are increasingly reliant are not only vulnerable to mass surveillance", the report says, "they may actually facilitate it." "The very existence of a mass surveillance programme...creates an interference with privacy. The onus is on the State to demonstrate that such interference is neither arbitrary nor unlawful," Pillay said, noting that article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation." The Covenant, a binding treaty ratified by 167 States, also says that "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." The High Commissioner's report points out that "Secret rules and secret interpretations -- even secret judicial interpretations -- of law do not have the necessary qualities of 'law'. The secret nature of specific surveillance powers brings with it a greater risk of arbitrary exercise of discretion which, in turn, demands greater precision in the rule governing the exercise of discretion, and additional oversight." The report states that while judicial involvement can help assess whether such surveillance meets the standards required by international human rights law, "judicial involvement in oversight should not be viewed as a panacea." It calls for States to establish independent, institutions to monitor such surveillance. "In several countries, judicial warranting or review of the digital surveillance activities of intelligence and/or law enforcement agencies have amounted effectively to an exercise in rubber-stamping," it states. "Jurisprudence at the regional level has emphasised the utility of an entirely independent oversight body, particularly to monitor the execution of approved surveillance measures." While safeguards may take a variety of forms, the report notes that attention is turning increasingly towards mixed models of administrative, judicial and parliamentary oversight. "The involvement of all branches of government in the oversight of surveillance programmes, as well as of an independent civilian oversight agency, is essential to ensure the effective protection of the law," it states. The report emphasizes that when conducted in compliance with the law, including international human rights law, surveillance of electronic communications data can be necessary and effective for legitimate law enforcement or intelligence purposes. Where there is a legitimate aim and appropriate safeguards are in place, a State might be allowed to engage in surveillance. "However," the report says, "the onus is on the Government to demonstrate that interference is both necessary and proportionate to the specific risk being addressed." The laws governing such surveillance must also be publicly accessible and must contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims, as noted by the UN Human Rights Committee. The laws must be sufficiently precise and provide for effective safeguards against abuse. "Mass or 'bulk' surveillance programmes may thus be deemed to be arbitrary, even if they serve a legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an accessible legal regime. In other words, it will not be enough that the measures are targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; the proper measure is the impact of the measures on the haystack, relative to the harm threatened." Mandatory third-party data retention, the report states, appears "neither necessary nor proportionate." "Any capture of communications data is potentially an interference with privacy and, further, the collection and retention of communications data amounts to an interference with privacy whether or not those data are subsequently consulted or used," it states. On the role of the private sector, the report notes strong evidence of a growing reliance by Governments on the private sector to conduct and facilitate digital surveillance. "On every continent," it says, "Governments have used both formal legal mechanisms and covert methods to gain access to content, as well as to metadata." "The enactment of statutory requirements for companies to make their networks 'wiretap-ready' is a particular concern, not least because it creates an environment that facilitates sweeping surveillance measures," it adds. It warns that a company that supplies data to the State, in response to a request that contravenes human rights law, itself "risks being complicit in or otherwise involved with human rights abuses." "Where enterprises are faced with government demands for access to data that do not comply with international human rights standards, they are expected to seek to honour the principles of human rights to the greatest extent possible, and to be able to demonstrate their ongoing efforts to do so," it states. "This can mean interpreting government demands as narrowly as possible, seeking clarification from a Government with regard to the scope and legal foundation for the demand, requiring a court order before meeting government requests for data, and communicating transparently with users about risks and compliance with government demands. There are positive examples of industry action in this regard, both by individual enterprises and through multi-stakeholder initiatives." While the report focused on the right to privacy, it notes that other rights are at risk due to mass surveillance, the interception of digital communications and the collection of personal data. These include the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the right to a family life and the right to health. "The constant stream of new revelations shows how disturbingly little we really know about the precise nature of surveillance, and the extent to which our human rights are being violated, and responsibility for those violations is being evaded," Pillay said. "This report is a useful outline of the international legal framework governing these issues, and points to some alarming gaps in implementation, and some important remedies. As an immediate measure, States should review their own national laws, policies and practices to ensure full conformity with international human rights law. They must also act to eradicate discriminatory approaches, both against their own nationals and in relation to nationals of other countries." "The complexity of the challenges to the right to privacy in this rapidly and dramatically evolving digital age is going to require constant scrutiny and dialogue between all key sectors, including Governments, civil society, scientific and technical experts, the business sector, academics and human rights specialists," Pillay added. "Some incredibly important principles are at stake which go right to the core of each and every individual's rights." The report is due to be presented by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council at its next session in September, and to the General Assembly at its 69th session in October. ENDS To read the full report, please visit: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.… To read the opening remarks by High Commissioner Navi Pillay at the press conference held in Geneva Wednesday, log on to: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14874&Lang… Visit the OHCHR page on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx /For more information or media requests, please contact Rupert Colville (+41 22 917 9767 / rcolville(a)ohchr.org <mailto:rcolville@ohchr.org>), Ravina Shamdasani (+41 22 917 9769 / rshamdasani(a)ohchr.org <mailto:rshamdasani@ohchr.org> ) or Cécile Pouilly (+41 22 917 9310 / cpouilly(a)ohchr.org <mailto:cpouilly@ohchr.org> )/ *UN Human Rights, follow us on social media:* *Facebook:* https://www.facebook.com/unitednationshumanrights * Twitter:* http://twitter.com/UNrightswire *Google+* gplus.to/unitednationshumanrights * YouTube:* http://www.youtube.com/UNOHCHR *Storify: *http://storify.com/UNrightswire *Check the Universal Human Rights Index:* http://uhri.ohchr.org/en

July 16, 2014

23° Nexa Lunch Seminar e Hackathon sulla trasparenza dell'uso delle risorse pubbliche - 23 luglio 2014

by Giuseppe Futia

Se non visualizzi correttamente questo messaggio clicca qui <http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-23> NEXA 23° Nexa Lunch Seminar Mercoledi 23 luglio 2014, ore 13.00 - 17.30 13-14 (seminario) 14-17.30 (hackathon) - Per partecipare è necessario portare e utilizzare il proprio computer Via Boggio 65/a, Torino (primo piano) http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-23 Hackathon sulla trasparenza dell'uso delle risorse pubbliche Speakers Mauro Alovisio (fellow Centro Nexa), Lorenzo Canova (tirocinante Centro Nexa) This event will be webcast live: http://nexa.polito.it/upcoming-events Il 23° Nexa Lunch Seminar costituirà l'occasione per introdurre l'*hackathon *che si svolgerà durante l'intero pomeriggio del 23 luglio e in cui verrà effettuato un monitoraggio "distribuito", supportato da una wiki semantica <http://trasparenza.nexacenter.org/w/index.php/Pagina_principale>, per la verifica del rispetto degli *obblighi di trasparenza relativi all'impiego delle risorse pubbliche dei principali comuni italiani*. La fase introduttiva, a cui potranno contribuire con spunti e idee anche coloro che non parteciperanno alla fase di ricognizione, sarà affidata a *Mauro Alovisio*, fellow del Centro Nexa su Internet & Società, e *Lorenzo Canova*, laureando in Ingegneria gestionale e tirocinante del Centro Nexa. Nella pratica, l'hackathon si concentrerà su 2 ambiti specifici (i) *beni immobili* (ii) *sovvenzioni, sussidi e contributi*, valutando se e come in questi due contesti gli obiettivi del "Decreto Trasparenza <http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/lazione-del-ministro/decreto-legislativo…>" vengano adempiuti dalle amministrazioni pubbliche e verificando l'aderenza con le specifiche tecniche richieste (ad es. in termini di campi delle tabelle). I risultati della ricognizione dovranno essere raggiunti e discussi entro il termine dell'hackathon e saranno presentati in occasione del 24° Nexa Lunch Seminar <http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-24> che si svolgerà il 24 settembre 2014. Durante l'hackathon potrà essere utilizzato il documento condiviso disponibile all'indirizzo: http://etherpad.nexacenter.org/p/trasparenza. La wiki semantica è disponibile online all'indirizzo: http://trasparenza.nexacenter.org/w/index.php/Pagina_principale. /Ingresso libero - Saranno disponibili panini e bibite per coloro che si saranno registrati su http://lunch23.eventbrite.com/ entro il 21 luglio./ Speakers - e informazioni supplementari [Amministrazione trasparente] MAURO ALOVISIO è fellow del Centro Nexa su Internet & Società e lavora attualmente presso lo Staff Legale dell'Università degli Studi di Torino. Laureato in Giurisprudenza presso l'Università degli Studi di Torino, è specializzato in protezione dei dati personali e in diritto delle nuove tecnologie. Mauro è autore di articoli scientifici pubblicati su riviste italiane e co-autore di testi di diritto (Utet, Ipsoa, Maggioli, Experta). È presidente del "Centro Studi di Informatica Giuridica di Ivrea-Torino". LORENZO CANOVA è studente di Ingegneria gestionale presso il Politecnico di Torino. Nella sua tesi di laurea magistrale, discussa a luglio del 2014, si è occupato della definizione di un modello standard per valutare qualità degli Open Data. Ciò gli ha permesso di entrare in contatto con il Centro Nexa su Internet & Società da cui ha ricevuto una borsa di studio per continuare la propria attività di ricerca nell'ambito degli Open Government Data italiani. Maggiori informazioni sugli speakers e sulle letture consigliate sono disponibili sul sito del Centro Nexa <http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-23>. Che cosa sono il Centro Nexa e i cicli di incontri "Mercoledì di Nexa" e "Nexa Lunch Seminar" Il Centro Nexa su Internet & Società del Politecnico di Torino (Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica) è un centro di ricerca indipendente e interdisciplinare che studia Internet e il suo effetto sulla società. Maggiori informazioni all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/about. Durante i "*Mercoledì di Nexa*", che si tengono *ogni 2° mercoledì del mese* alle *ore 18 in punto*, il Centro Nexa su Internet e Società apre le sue porte non solo agli esperti e a tutti coloro i quali lavorano con Internet, ma anche a semplici appassionati e cittadini. Il ciclo di incontri intende approfondire, con un linguaggio preciso ma divulgativo, i temi legati alla Rete: motori di ricerca, Creative Commons, social networks, open source/software libero, neutralità della rete, libertà di espressione, privacy, file sharing, big e open data, smart cities e molto altro. Al centro di quasi tutti gli incontri un ospite pronto a dialogare con i direttori del Centro Nexa, il Prof. Juan Carlos De Martin del Politecnico di Torino e il Prof. Marco Ricolfi dell'Università di Torino, nonché lo staff e i Fellows del Centro Nexa. Maggiori informazioni sui Mercoledì di Nexa, incluso un elenco di tutti i "Mercoledì" passati, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi. Si segnala inoltre che dal maggio 2012 *ogni 4° mercoledì* del mese *dalle ore 13 alle ore 14* il Centro Nexa organizza anche i "*Nexa Lunch Seminar*". Una lista di tutti i "Lunch Seminar" passati è disponibile all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-seminars. See our events calendar <http://nexa.polito.it/events> if you're curious about future luncheons, discussions, lectures, and conferences not listed in this email. Our events are free and open to the public, unless otherwise noted. Maggiori informazioni sui Nexa Lunch Seminar e i Mercoledì di Nexa, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/events. Weekly Events Newsletter. Sign up <http://nexa.polito.it/mailing-lists> to receive this newsletter if this email was forwarded to you. To manage your subscription preferences, please click here <https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa>. Connect & get involved: Jobs, internships, and more <http://nexa.polito.it/get-involved> Nexa Center for Internet and Society Newsletter

July 16, 2014