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Re: [nexa] AI and antitrust in 10 minutes

by Giuseppe Attardi

Magistrale. In particolare sono convinto della necessità di scoraggiare il business model dei servizi gratuiti finanziati con la pubblicità, introducendo una tassazione altamente progressiva dei ricavi pubblicitari, come propone il nobel Paul Romer. So I am actually quite favourable, […] to a digital ad tax that creates more openness for alternative business models based on things like Wikipedia or subscription models in the online space. — Beppe > On 19 Jul 2023, at 04:44, nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it wrote: > > From: Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> > To: "nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it" <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> > Subject: [nexa] AI and antitrust in 10 minutes > Message-ID: <08789adc08254f80af9be9f171ad7521(a)unipi.it> > > Daron Acemoglu > Thank you, Cristina, for that wonderful introduction and to you and Tommaso for inviting me. […] > As Cristina said, I'm going to talk about something that's partly inspired by my book. AI and > antitrust in 10 minutes. So that's a tall order especially if I try to blend in ideas from the book, so > let me jump into it. I'm going to do 10 question and answers in 10 minutes, but since that's a very > short time I'll just give you the answers. I'll let your imagination do the job of the what the questions > might have been to which. These are the answers. > …

July 19, 2023

Re: [nexa] AI and antitrust in 10 minutes

by Fabio Alemagna

Il giorno mer 19 lug 2023 alle ore 12:05 Fabio Alemagna <falemagn(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > Anche il Technology Innovation Institute dell'Arabia Saudita > ha rilasciato un LLM come Open Source: https://falconllm.tii.ae/ Pardon, Emirati Arabi.

July 19, 2023

Re: [nexa] AI and antitrust in 10 minutes

by Fabio Alemagna

Il giorno mer 19 lug 2023 alle ore 10:44 Guido Vetere <vetere.guido(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > > un piccolo commento a caldo dopo aver dato una scorsa a questo illuminante intervento > noi diamo per scontato che i LLM non possano che essere ciò che oggi ci viene proposto dal dupolio Microsoft \ Google Non mi pare esista al momento un duopolio riguardo gli LLM: ne esistono decine di completamente open source, prodotti un po' in tutto il mondo. Anche il Technology Innovation Institute dell'Arabia Saudita ha rilasciato un LLM come Open Source: https://falconllm.tii.ae/ > ma se ci pensiamo un attimo, questa necessità non esiste: forse si tratta solo di un'illusione propagandistica > perché dobbiamo dare per scontato che chiunque sulla faccia della terra abbia bisogno di generare testo in qualsiasi lingua? Esistono centinaia di lingue sulla faccia della terra, mi pare sia abbastanza scontato che chiunque possa avere il diritto di generare testo nella propria lingua. > a me ad esempio un LLM in italiano e inglese andrebbe più che bene, dunque sono sicuro che la maggior parte dei millemila miliardi di parametri di GPT4 non li userò mai (pur pagandoli) La capacità generativa di un LLM in una specifica lingua non dipende solo dal training effettuato su quella specifica lingua, ma anche da tutte le altre lingue. I concetti appresi in ognuna delle lingue su cui il LMM è stato allenato entrano a far parte della stessa rete neurale, e di conseguenza contribuiscono alla generazione. Non è molto diverso da quello che accade quando io leggo qualcosa in inglese e poi uso ciò che ho appreso da quella lettura per scrivere un saggio in italiano. > il fatto che lo stesso LLM debba servirmi per la generazione di testo e di software è anche abbastanza strano: sarei ben disposto a ricorrere a piattaforme diverse > insomma io vedo grandi possibilità di downsizing "by task" Un training "generalista" consente al LLM di poter fare collegamenti interdisciplinari. È già previsto che, successivamente al training generalista, si possa poi proseguire con un training "verticale" nel settore preferito, eventualmente "alleggerendo" il modello di parti non rilevanti in modo da aumentarne la velocità durante le inferenze e diminuirne i consumi. > e qui viene la pregnanza di ciò che Acemoglu dice: dovremmo, con le politiche pubbliche, incentivare uno sviluppo che vada in una diversa direzione, non solo cercare di vincolare la direzione monopolistica attuale > di fatto, nella ricerca di nuovi modelli, già si muovono diverse realtà pubbliche e private > G. > > > > > On Wed, 19 Jul 2023 at 10:12, Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> wrote: >> >> Daron Acemoglu >> Thank you, Cristina, for that wonderful introduction and to you and Tommaso for inviting me. […] >> As Cristina said, I'm going to talk about something that's partly inspired by my book. AI and >> antitrust in 10 minutes. So that's a tall order especially if I try to blend in ideas from the book, so >> let me jump into it. I'm going to do 10 question and answers in 10 minutes, but since that's a very >> short time I'll just give you the answers. I'll let your imagination do the job of the what the questions >> might have been to which. These are the answers. >> - Yes, generative AI has great potential, so I am completely convinced that this is a very >> interesting technology that can bring lots of goods and has capabilities so we can build on >> that. But I think let's move forward. >> - And yes, I believe that monopoly is everywhere in the tech sector. So here, perhaps I differ >> from many IO economists, and I subscribe to the duck test. If something looks like a duck, >> walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck. So if you have companies that have >> reached sizes that have never been in human history, and that dominate a particular line >> of business, they are monopolies. So we have to grapple with that. And that means all sorts >> of regulatory tools have to be considered, including antitrust. So this is absolutely on >> target. >> - And yes, in my view this is getting worse with foundation models. Because there is a >> likelihood that we may go towards a duopoly. With Microsoft Open AI and Google as the >> two key players, even though open source and many other competitors are going to try to >> get into foundation models, but the current business model of foundation models is very >> resource intensive. So that raises the possibility, does not in any way creates a certainty, >> but it raises the possibility. These two companies and their models are going to be the >> dominant ones on which many others will have to build, raising all of the issues of vertical >> product creation and all sorts of other questions that are going to be central for >> policymakers and economists to grapple with. >> - But no, I actually don't think monopoly power leading to high prices is the main problem >> that we're dealing with. You know, of course, that is a problem. But if the only issue was >> that because the foundation models are controlled by, you know, Google and Microsoft, >> they’re going to charge higher prices, and as a result, the apps that are developed on them >> are going to be more expensive, that would be, of course a pity and it's something we can >> do something about, but it wouldn't be the end of the world. So we get many new apps. >> They cost a little bit more. We don't get quite the consumer surplus. Woe is us, but not the >> end of the world. The problem is the direction of innovation. The problem is that the current >> market structure is selecting a particular direction of innovation. And that has much more >> sweeping consequences. Taking the set of products and technologies as given and pricing >> them above marginal cost and thus losing some of the welfare triangle is not the main issue. >> There’s the potential for doing much greater damage. No, this is not because of existential >> risk. In fact, like Cristina was implying, when all of these tech leaders are talking about >> existential risk I see it as either a blind spot or a ploy for making us not worry about the >> bigger risks. The bigger risks in my mind are in the labour market. Most of us earn our living >> in the labour market, so what happens to jobs is the most important issue. And the current >> direction of AI looks like it is going to follow some of the trends we have seen with digital >> technologies before. Failing to create the complementarities which human workers and >> skills, and instead going much toward much more towards automation, hence generating >> inequality, potential job losses, especially for workers without very specialised skills such >> as those with postgraduate degree. >> - And no, it's not just economics. There is a real danger here that the current direction of >> generative AI could again continue existing trends that we saw in social media degrade >> political conversations. Increase the amount of misinformation and disinformation, with a >> much more powerful tool. Create a particular type of ecosystem in online forums where >> people are drawn on the basis of emotion rather than engagement. And hence generally >> act towards the exploitation of people in their capacities and duties as democratic citizen. >> It is this twin: Inequality and Elimination of good jobs in the labour market, as well as >> erosion of democratic capacity that I think are most problematic. >> - No, I am not a Luddite. So I am not saying that this is in the nature of technology, nor that >> we should oppose technological change. The issue here is that we are not along the right >> path. What's great about technology in general and generative AI in particular, that it's a >> very highly malleable type of technological platform or what some economic historians >> used to call general purpose technology, meaning that you can use it for creating many >> apps, many different types of sub technologies and many different directions are possible. >> It is not complete idle talk. When people used to talk about social media and other online >> tools creating new democratic spaces today, it looks like very naive. When people in the >> 2000s said oh, online communication and social media are going to democratise >> communication. But that potential was there, and that potential is much greater with AI. >> When some people in the tech industry talk about generative AI being useful to humans in >> terms of getting better information, performing better tasks so generative AI… actually, I >> think the great potential that I mentioned at the beginning is precisely in being a human >> complementary technology. The tragedy of our current age is that we have almost all >> information that is at least codified available in some form. But we do not have the >> processing power to decide which one we should retrieve, how we should interpret how we >> should process, and which types of information we should engage with in different forms. >> Generative AI has the capability to improve human interaction with information and hence >> generate a lot of tasks, not just for knowledge workers, but for electricians, for carpenters, >> for educators, for healthcare workers. So that possibility is there. >> - But no, we are not going in the right direction. So we do need a redirection of technological >> change. >> - And no. I don't think it is naive or unrealistic to think about the redirection of technological >> change. One view which is common among some economists and some tech leaders goes >> back to either to the view that technology somehow has a preordained path and we just >> have to follow it. No, I am denying that and I think history is quite a good guide on showing >> how malleable technology is. Goes back to a saying by Ferdinand de Lesseps of fame, from >> the Suez and the Panama Canal, which we discussed in this book where he said, don't worry, >> men of genius would arise and solve all problems. Who are today's men of genius. Maybe >> some Altman or Elon Musk. But no, I don't think we should trust them. So I think the >> direction of technology is malleable, but it's also a societal choice. >> - And yes, as Cristina was hinting, antitrust has a very important role in this. For two reasons. >> One, because if we want alternatives. They are not very likely to come from a duopolistic >> or highly oligopolistic structure, especially one further empowered by killer acquisitions >> and these companies being a block other types of technologies that do not fit well with >> their business model. So if we want more alternatives that go more in a human >> complementary direction or more pro democratic direction, or create a more open >> competitive environment, I think we have to use antitrust tools including potential breakup >> of the largest companies which are too big and one other reason is because this type of >> power comes with enormous social power. And by that social power, I mean economic >> power, and also general social power. Tech companies have an enormous sway on public >> opinion, which I think is associated with their mega profits. And again, I don't think that >> creates a healthy environment. >> - And no, finally, I don't think antitrust is the main tool as Cristina was also hinting in her >> introductory comment. I think antitrust is a very blunt tool and I think for the redirection >> of technology we need a suite of tools which should include exactly how data is used and >> accessed. We need a new interoperability type of approach as well as how do we >> compensate and how do we actually encourage more creation of creative data. We also >> need to provide explicit incentives, such as, for example, those that have been successful >> in the field of renewable technology, where we encourage more of the socially valuable >> types of technologies. And I think there are a number of tools for that and we may also >> need more tax policies to discourage the worst types of business models and create room >> for alternative business models. So I am actually quite favourable, although I think much >> more study is needed, to a digital ad tax that creates more openness for alternative >> business models based on things like Wikipedia or subscription models in the online space. >> - Finally, I think we also need to rethink other tools that we have, like fiscal tools that >> currently create a very asymmetric playing field between capital and labour and going back >> to the job market and labour market inequality issues. I think equating marginal tax rate >> between capital and labour are things that we should definitely revisit. Thank you. >> >> https://mailchi.mp/cepr/central-bank-communication-rpn-seminar-series-516707 >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 19, 2023

DPA norvegese blocca trattamento di Meta

by Stefano Quintarelli

The Norwegian Data Protection Authority imposes a ban on Meta carrying out behavioural advertising based on the surveillance and profiling of users in Norway. The ban will initially apply until October … In December last year, the Irish Data Protection Commission issued a decision on behalf of all data protection authorities across the EEA which established that Meta has conducted illegal behavioural advertising. Since then, Meta has made certain changes, but a fresh decision from the Court of Justice of the European Union (curia.europa.eu) has stated that Meta’s behavioural advertising still does not comply with the law. Therefore, the Norwegian Data Protection Authority is now taking action by imposing a temporary ban. https://www.datatilsynet.no/en/news/aktuelle-nyheter-2023/temporary-ban-of-…

July 19, 2023

Re: [nexa] AI and antitrust in 10 minutes

by Guido Vetere

un piccolo commento a caldo dopo aver dato una scorsa a questo illuminante intervento noi diamo per scontato che i LLM non possano che essere ciò che oggi ci viene proposto dal dupolio Microsoft \ Google ma se ci pensiamo un attimo, questa necessità non esiste: forse si tratta solo di un'illusione propagandistica perché dobbiamo dare per scontato che chiunque sulla faccia della terra abbia bisogno di generare testo in qualsiasi lingua? a me ad esempio un LLM in italiano e inglese andrebbe più che bene, dunque sono sicuro che la maggior parte dei millemila miliardi di parametri di GPT4 non li userò mai (pur pagandoli) il fatto che lo stesso LLM debba servirmi per la generazione di testo e di software è anche abbastanza strano: sarei ben disposto a ricorrere a piattaforme diverse insomma io vedo grandi possibilità di downsizing "by task" e qui viene la pregnanza di ciò che Acemoglu dice: dovremmo, con le politiche pubbliche, incentivare uno sviluppo che vada in una diversa direzione, non solo cercare di vincolare la direzione monopolistica attuale di fatto, nella ricerca di nuovi modelli, già si muovono diverse realtà pubbliche e private G. On Wed, 19 Jul 2023 at 10:12, Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> wrote: > *Daron Acemoglu* > Thank you, Cristina, for that wonderful introduction and to you and > Tommaso for inviting me. […] > As Cristina said, I'm going to talk about something that's partly inspired > by my book. > *AI and antitrust in 10 minutes*. So that's a tall order especially if I > try to blend in ideas from the book, so > let me jump into it. > *I'm going to do 10 question and answers in 10 minutes, but since that's a > very short time I'll just give you the answers.* I'll let your > imagination do the job of the what the questions > might have been to which. These are the answers. > - Yes, generative AI has great potential, so I am completely convinced > that this is a very > interesting technology that can bring lots of goods and has capabilities > so we can build on > that. But I think let's move forward. > - And yes, I believe that monopoly is everywhere in the tech sector. So > here, perhaps I differ > from many IO economists, and I subscribe to the duck test. If something > looks like a duck, > walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck. So if you have > companies that have > reached sizes that have never been in human history, and that dominate a > particular line > of business, they are monopolies. So we have to grapple with that. And > that means all sorts > of regulatory tools have to be considered, including antitrust. So this is > absolutely on > target. > - And yes, in my view this is getting worse with foundation models. > Because there is a > likelihood that we may go towards a duopoly. With Microsoft Open AI and > Google as the > two key players, even though open source and many other competitors are > going to try to > get into foundation models, but the current business model of foundation > models is very > resource intensive. So that raises the possibility, does not in any way > creates a certainty, > but it raises the possibility. These two companies and their models are > going to be the > dominant ones on which many others will have to build, raising all of the > issues of vertical > product creation and all sorts of other questions that are going to be > central for > policymakers and economists to grapple with. > - But no, I actually don't think monopoly power leading to high prices is > the main problem > that we're dealing with. You know, of course, that is a problem. But if > the only issue was > that because the foundation models are controlled by, you know, Google and > Microsoft, > they’re going to charge higher prices, and as a result, the apps that are > developed on them > are going to be more expensive, that would be, of course a pity and it's > something we can > do something about, but it wouldn't be the end of the world. So we get > many new apps. > They cost a little bit more. We don't get quite the consumer surplus. Woe > is us, but not the > end of the world. The problem is the direction of innovation. The problem > is that the current > market structure is selecting a particular direction of innovation. And > that has much more > sweeping consequences. Taking the set of products and technologies as > given and pricing > them above marginal cost and thus losing some of the welfare triangle is > not the main issue. > There’s the potential for doing much greater damage. No, this is not > because of existential > risk. In fact, like Cristina was implying, when all of these tech leaders > are talking about > existential risk I see it as either a blind spot or a ploy for making us > not worry about the > bigger risks. The bigger risks in my mind are in the labour market. Most > of us earn our living > in the labour market, so what happens to jobs is the most important issue. > And the current > direction of AI looks like it is going to follow some of the trends we > have seen with digital > technologies before. Failing to create the complementarities which human > workers and > skills, and instead going much toward much more towards automation, hence > generating > inequality, potential job losses, especially for workers without very > specialised skills such > as those with postgraduate degree. > - And no, it's not just economics. There is a real danger here that the > current direction of > generative AI could again continue existing trends that we saw in social > media degrade > political conversations. Increase the amount of misinformation and > disinformation, with a > much more powerful tool. Create a particular type of ecosystem in online > forums where > people are drawn on the basis of emotion rather than engagement. And hence > generally > act towards the exploitation of people in their capacities and duties as > democratic citizen. > It is this twin: Inequality and Elimination of good jobs in the labour > market, as well as > erosion of democratic capacity that I think are most problematic. > - No, I am not a Luddite. So I am not saying that this is in the nature of > technology, nor that > we should oppose technological change. The issue here is that we are not > along the right > path. What's great about technology in general and generative AI in > particular, that it's a > very highly malleable type of technological platform or what some economic > historians > used to call general purpose technology, meaning that you can use it for > creating many > apps, many different types of sub technologies and many different > directions are possible. > It is not complete idle talk. When people used to talk about social media > and other online > tools creating new democratic spaces today, it looks like very naive. When > people in the > 2000s said oh, online communication and social media are going to > democratise > communication. But that potential was there, and that potential is much > greater with AI. > When some people in the tech industry talk about generative AI being > useful to humans in > terms of getting better information, performing better tasks so generative > AI… actually, I > think the great potential that I mentioned at the beginning is precisely > in being a human > complementary technology. The tragedy of our current age is that we have > almost all > information that is at least codified available in some form. But we do > not have the > processing power to decide which one we should retrieve, how we should > interpret how we > should process, and which types of information we should engage with in > different forms. > Generative AI has the capability to improve human interaction with > information and hence > generate a lot of tasks, not just for knowledge workers, but for > electricians, for carpenters, > for educators, for healthcare workers. So that possibility is there. > - But no, we are not going in the right direction. So we do need a > redirection of technological > change. > - And no. I don't think it is naive or unrealistic to think about the > redirection of technological > change. One view which is common among some economists and some tech > leaders goes > back to either to the view that technology somehow has a preordained path > and we just > have to follow it. No, I am denying that and I think history is quite a > good guide on showing > how malleable technology is. Goes back to a saying by Ferdinand de Lesseps > of fame, from > the Suez and the Panama Canal, which we discussed in this book where he > said, don't worry, > men of genius would arise and solve all problems. Who are today's men of > genius. Maybe > some Altman or Elon Musk. But no, I don't think we should trust them. So I > think the > direction of technology is malleable, but it's also a societal choice. > - And yes, as Cristina was hinting, antitrust has a very important role in > this. For two reasons. > One, because if we want alternatives. They are not very likely to come > from a duopolistic > or highly oligopolistic structure, especially one further empowered by > killer acquisitions > and these companies being a block other types of technologies that do not > fit well with > their business model. So if we want more alternatives that go more in a > human > complementary direction or more pro democratic direction, or create a more > open > competitive environment, I think we have to use antitrust tools including > potential breakup > of the largest companies which are too big and one other reason is because > this type of > power comes with enormous social power. And by that social power, I mean > economic > power, and also general social power. Tech companies have an enormous sway > on public > opinion, which I think is associated with their mega profits. And again, I > don't think that > creates a healthy environment. > - And no, finally, I don't think antitrust is the main tool as Cristina > was also hinting in her > introductory comment. I think antitrust is a very blunt tool and I think > for the redirection > of technology we need a suite of tools which should include exactly how > data is used and > accessed. We need a new interoperability type of approach as well as how > do we > compensate and how do we actually encourage more creation of creative > data. We also > need to provide explicit incentives, such as, for example, those that have > been successful > in the field of renewable technology, where we encourage more of the > socially valuable > types of technologies. And I think there are a number of tools for that > and we may also > need more tax policies to discourage the worst types of business models > and create room > for alternative business models. So I am actually quite favourable, > although I think much > more study is needed, to a digital ad tax that creates more openness for > alternative > business models based on things like Wikipedia or subscription models in > the online space. > - Finally, I think we also need to rethink other tools that we have, like > fiscal tools that > currently create a very asymmetric playing field between capital and > labour and going back > to the job market and labour market inequality issues. I think equating > marginal tax rate > between capital and labour are things that we should definitely revisit. > Thank you. > > > https://mailchi.mp/cepr/central-bank-communication-rpn-seminar-series-516707 > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >

July 19, 2023

AI and antitrust in 10 minutes

by Daniela Tafani

Daron Acemoglu Thank you, Cristina, for that wonderful introduction and to you and Tommaso for inviting me. […] As Cristina said, I'm going to talk about something that's partly inspired by my book. AI and antitrust in 10 minutes. So that's a tall order especially if I try to blend in ideas from the book, so let me jump into it. I'm going to do 10 question and answers in 10 minutes, but since that's a very short time I'll just give you the answers. I'll let your imagination do the job of the what the questions might have been to which. These are the answers. - Yes, generative AI has great potential, so I am completely convinced that this is a very interesting technology that can bring lots of goods and has capabilities so we can build on that. But I think let's move forward. - And yes, I believe that monopoly is everywhere in the tech sector. So here, perhaps I differ from many IO economists, and I subscribe to the duck test. If something looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck. So if you have companies that have reached sizes that have never been in human history, and that dominate a particular line of business, they are monopolies. So we have to grapple with that. And that means all sorts of regulatory tools have to be considered, including antitrust. So this is absolutely on target. - And yes, in my view this is getting worse with foundation models. Because there is a likelihood that we may go towards a duopoly. With Microsoft Open AI and Google as the two key players, even though open source and many other competitors are going to try to get into foundation models, but the current business model of foundation models is very resource intensive. So that raises the possibility, does not in any way creates a certainty, but it raises the possibility. These two companies and their models are going to be the dominant ones on which many others will have to build, raising all of the issues of vertical product creation and all sorts of other questions that are going to be central for policymakers and economists to grapple with. - But no, I actually don't think monopoly power leading to high prices is the main problem that we're dealing with. You know, of course, that is a problem. But if the only issue was that because the foundation models are controlled by, you know, Google and Microsoft, they’re going to charge higher prices, and as a result, the apps that are developed on them are going to be more expensive, that would be, of course a pity and it's something we can do something about, but it wouldn't be the end of the world. So we get many new apps. They cost a little bit more. We don't get quite the consumer surplus. Woe is us, but not the end of the world. The problem is the direction of innovation. The problem is that the current market structure is selecting a particular direction of innovation. And that has much more sweeping consequences. Taking the set of products and technologies as given and pricing them above marginal cost and thus losing some of the welfare triangle is not the main issue. There’s the potential for doing much greater damage. No, this is not because of existential risk. In fact, like Cristina was implying, when all of these tech leaders are talking about existential risk I see it as either a blind spot or a ploy for making us not worry about the bigger risks. The bigger risks in my mind are in the labour market. Most of us earn our living in the labour market, so what happens to jobs is the most important issue. And the current direction of AI looks like it is going to follow some of the trends we have seen with digital technologies before. Failing to create the complementarities which human workers and skills, and instead going much toward much more towards automation, hence generating inequality, potential job losses, especially for workers without very specialised skills such as those with postgraduate degree. - And no, it's not just economics. There is a real danger here that the current direction of generative AI could again continue existing trends that we saw in social media degrade political conversations. Increase the amount of misinformation and disinformation, with a much more powerful tool. Create a particular type of ecosystem in online forums where people are drawn on the basis of emotion rather than engagement. And hence generally act towards the exploitation of people in their capacities and duties as democratic citizen. It is this twin: Inequality and Elimination of good jobs in the labour market, as well as erosion of democratic capacity that I think are most problematic. - No, I am not a Luddite. So I am not saying that this is in the nature of technology, nor that we should oppose technological change. The issue here is that we are not along the right path. What's great about technology in general and generative AI in particular, that it's a very highly malleable type of technological platform or what some economic historians used to call general purpose technology, meaning that you can use it for creating many apps, many different types of sub technologies and many different directions are possible. It is not complete idle talk. When people used to talk about social media and other online tools creating new democratic spaces today, it looks like very naive. When people in the 2000s said oh, online communication and social media are going to democratise communication. But that potential was there, and that potential is much greater with AI. When some people in the tech industry talk about generative AI being useful to humans in terms of getting better information, performing better tasks so generative AI… actually, I think the great potential that I mentioned at the beginning is precisely in being a human complementary technology. The tragedy of our current age is that we have almost all information that is at least codified available in some form. But we do not have the processing power to decide which one we should retrieve, how we should interpret how we should process, and which types of information we should engage with in different forms. Generative AI has the capability to improve human interaction with information and hence generate a lot of tasks, not just for knowledge workers, but for electricians, for carpenters, for educators, for healthcare workers. So that possibility is there. - But no, we are not going in the right direction. So we do need a redirection of technological change. - And no. I don't think it is naive or unrealistic to think about the redirection of technological change. One view which is common among some economists and some tech leaders goes back to either to the view that technology somehow has a preordained path and we just have to follow it. No, I am denying that and I think history is quite a good guide on showing how malleable technology is. Goes back to a saying by Ferdinand de Lesseps of fame, from the Suez and the Panama Canal, which we discussed in this book where he said, don't worry, men of genius would arise and solve all problems. Who are today's men of genius. Maybe some Altman or Elon Musk. But no, I don't think we should trust them. So I think the direction of technology is malleable, but it's also a societal choice. - And yes, as Cristina was hinting, antitrust has a very important role in this. For two reasons. One, because if we want alternatives. They are not very likely to come from a duopolistic or highly oligopolistic structure, especially one further empowered by killer acquisitions and these companies being a block other types of technologies that do not fit well with their business model. So if we want more alternatives that go more in a human complementary direction or more pro democratic direction, or create a more open competitive environment, I think we have to use antitrust tools including potential breakup of the largest companies which are too big and one other reason is because this type of power comes with enormous social power. And by that social power, I mean economic power, and also general social power. Tech companies have an enormous sway on public opinion, which I think is associated with their mega profits. And again, I don't think that creates a healthy environment. - And no, finally, I don't think antitrust is the main tool as Cristina was also hinting in her introductory comment. I think antitrust is a very blunt tool and I think for the redirection of technology we need a suite of tools which should include exactly how data is used and accessed. We need a new interoperability type of approach as well as how do we compensate and how do we actually encourage more creation of creative data. We also need to provide explicit incentives, such as, for example, those that have been successful in the field of renewable technology, where we encourage more of the socially valuable types of technologies. And I think there are a number of tools for that and we may also need more tax policies to discourage the worst types of business models and create room for alternative business models. So I am actually quite favourable, although I think much more study is needed, to a digital ad tax that creates more openness for alternative business models based on things like Wikipedia or subscription models in the online space. - Finally, I think we also need to rethink other tools that we have, like fiscal tools that currently create a very asymmetric playing field between capital and labour and going back to the job market and labour market inequality issues. I think equating marginal tax rate between capital and labour are things that we should definitely revisit. Thank you. https://mailchi.mp/cepr/central-bank-communication-rpn-seminar-series-516707

July 19, 2023

Re: [nexa] Il Cyber Resiliency Act dell'Unione Europea minaccia il software Open Source

by Fabio Alemagna

Il giorno mer 19 lug 2023 alle ore 00:05 Fabio Alemagna <falemagn(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > > Il 19 luglio 2019 2023, chiaramente.

July 18, 2023

Il Cyber Resiliency Act dell'Unione Europea minaccia il software Open Source

by Fabio Alemagna

Il 19 luglio 2019 (domani, mentre scrivo) il Parlamento Europeo voterà il CRA (Cyber Resiliency Act), che ha l'obiettivo di imporre requisiti stringenti riguardo la sicurezza del software alle entità che lo producono, di fatto stabilendo come il software va prodotto in modo da assicurarsi che abbia il minor numero possibile di vulnerabilità. Per quanto l'intento sia di per sé positivo, il testo che il parlamento si appresta a votare rischia di destabilizzare in maniera irreparabile la produzione di software Open Source in Europa. La Eclypse Foundation sta seguendo molto da vicino l'evolversi della situazione, e al seguente link si può leggere in dettaglio di quali rischi stiamo parlando: https://eclipse-foundation.blog/2023/01/15/european-cyber-resiliency-act-po… Qualche giorno fa anche Github è uscita con un comunicato: https://github.blog/2023-07-12-no-cyber-resilience-without-open-source-sust… E oggi l'azienda che produce FileZilla client e Server, per la quale io stesso lavoro, ha deciso di non fornire più il software in download, come forma di protesta. Qui il comunicato: https://filezilla-project.org/cra.php Si chiede a tutti di contattare i propri parlamentari che fanno parte della commissione ITRE affinché vengano edotti sui problemi derivanti dal corrente testo: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/itre/home/members Fabio

July 18, 2023

Re: [nexa] Artificial Intelligence, Persuasive Technology and Manipulation

by Alberto Cammozzo

Buongiorno, grazie per l'articolo molto chiaro e ricco di riferimenti tecnici e giuridici. Mi permetto di evidenziarne succintamente alcuni punti per chi non l'ha letto, sperando di non travisare. La prospettiva dell'applicazione massiva dell'hypernudging è che chi detiene le informazioni sugli individui ha la facoltà di 1) scegliere chi manipolare e 2) usare le strategie più efficaci per influenzarne le decisioni, senza che 3) l'interessato sappia di essere oggetto di un tentativo di persuasione. Di conseguenza non solo viene violata la sua privacy, ma viene minata la capacità dell'individuo di formarsi opinioni autonome e di compiere scelte razionali conseguenti, quando non viene danneggiato sul piano psichico ed economico. Questo nonostante esista una formidabile mole di dottrina filosofica e giuridica, radicata nella concezione kantiana di autonomia, che sancisce il diritto, o meglio la libertà, di esercitare tali capacità. Per contrastare il consolidarsi del macchinismo di cui sopra è richiesta la tutela del diritto alla sovranità o /libertà cognitiva/: il non essere misurati e analizzati perché sia mantenuta l'auto-determinazione mentale. Questo diritto è distinto da quello della libertà di espressione in quanto la formazione del pensiero anticipa la sua espressione: se la formazione del pensiero non è libera, non lo sarà né l'espressione né gli atti che ne conseguono. E -incidentalmente- la persona non potrà nemmeno essere considerata responsabile di atti compiuti seguendo pensieri non formati liberamente. Se ho compreso bene la testi esposta, che mi sembra del tutto condivisibile, il /condizionamento/ del pensiero su scala e con metodo industriale mina la libertà di formare un pensiero individuale autonomo, che va difesa tutelandola come un diritto distinto da quello di espressione. Mi chiedo tuttavia se non sia possibile ampliare il punto di vista guardando anche agli effetti sociali oltre che a quelli giuridici centrati sull'individuo. Infatti un ruolo analogo a quello del condizionamento dell'hypernudging è da sempre svolto dal contesto culturale e sociale. Il pensiero individuale, pur libero, non si forma nel vuoto di una pura razionalità, ma nel contesto relazionale, culturale e sociale che da sempre ha posto i vincoli e le /condizioni/ all'interno dei quali può esprimersi. Tanto che diverse culture e diversi contesti sociali in diverse epoche storiche declinano differentemente questa medesima libertà, ed eventualmente giungono a proteggere o negare diritti diversi. Il contesto pone condizioni e limiti all'individuo affinché formi e trasmetta determinati pensieri, e al contrario non possa formare e diffondere pensieri contrari o pericolosi (ideologicamente, religiosamente, filosoficamente) per il contesto stesso. In questo modo un contesto culturale e sociale si riproduce tra generazioni, e grazie a mutazioni e ibridazioni culturali, evolve. Il pensiero individuale è dunque sempre stato condizionato, ma /socialmente/: la differenza significativa introdotta dall'industrializzazione delle relazioni personali è che ora può essere condizionato da una oligarchia industriale, seguendo ragioni non più interne alla società, ma esterne, e in particolare secondo determinanti economiche di remunerazione del capitale, e con tempi ridotti rispetto a quelli dei mutamenti sociali. In aggiunta, viene a mancare il dibattito interno alla società che porta al mantenimento o alla mutazione delle condizioni di riproduzione delle relazioni sociali. Guardando da questa prospettiva, gli attori dell'industria della sorveglianza si stanno appropriando del controllo esercitato originariamente dalla collettività sociale per sostituirvisi ovunque sia possibile monetizzarlo. L'attore commerciale tende a sostituirsi al contesto culturale all'interno del quale veniva esercitato il condizionamento sociale del pensiero. Se questo avvenisse in scala, metterebbe in gioco non solo la libertà individuale, ma la capacità delle relazioni sociali di riprodursi. Il pensiero della Thatcher, se ricordo bene, era "There's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families." Quale dottrina giuridica difende, oltre all'individuo, la libertà delle società di determinarsi autonomamente? Credo che cada a proposito quanto leggiamo nel thread sull'antitrust in questa stessa lista. Un saluto, Alberto On 04/07/23 09:32, Stefano Faraoni wrote: > Buongiorno a tutti, > > Leggo questa mailing list con estremo piacere da tempo, e oggi per la > prima volta provo a contribuire. > > Il mio articolo "Persuasive Technology and computational manipulation: > hypernudging out of mental self-determination" e' appena stato > pubblicato da Frontiers on Artificial Intelligence, e spero possa > farvi piacere leggerlo. > > https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2023.1216340/full > > Parla di manipolazione computazionale, dark patterns e hypernudge, e > della necessita' di riconoscere un nuovo diritto fondamentale, il > diritto alla sovranita' cognitiva o autodeterminazione mentale. > > Un saluto a tutti. > > Stefano > > > > *Stefano Faraoni* > /Founder and Director > Avvocato Patrocinante in Cassazione > Adjunct Professor in Legal English, University of Turin > PGR in AI Law, University of York/ > > *Lumen Legis - Law Firm* > INTERNAZIONALE | CONTRACT LAW | IT LAW | DIRITTO CIVILE | DIRITTO PENALE > > *w*: lumenlegis.com <https://lumenlegis.com/> *@*: > stefano.faraoni(a)lumenlegis.com > > > **** Riservatezza/Confidentiality **** > > In ottemperanza al Regolamento Europeo 679/2016 (GDPR) in materia di > protezione dei dati personali, le informazioni contenute in questo > messaggio sono strettamente riservate ed esclusivamente indirizzate al > destinatario indicato (oppure alla persona responsabile di rimetterlo > al destinatario). Vogliate tener presente che qualsiasi uso, > riproduzione o divulgazione della informativa in esso contenuta è > vietata. Nel caso in cui lo aveste ricevuto per errore, vi preghiamo > di accettare le nostre scuse e di distruggerlo, informandoci > immediatamente tramite l’indirizzo e-mail stefano.faraoni(a)lumenlegis.com > > / According to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) concerning > privacy, if you are not the addressee (or responsible for delivery of > the message to such person) you are hereby notified that any > disclosure, reproduction, distribution or other dissemination or use > of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received > this message in error, please accept our apology and destroy any > copies and delete it from your computer system, then inform us > immediately sending a message to stefano.faraoni(a)lumenlegis.com > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 18, 2023

Re: [nexa] The FTC is investigating whether ChatGPT harms consumers

by Giuseppe Attardi

+1 Della GDPR apprezzo il fatto che si basi sull’affermazione di diritti degli utenti, più che a imporre vincoli a chi fornisce servizi: https://www.privacypolicies.com/blog/gdpr-eight-user-rights/ Invece ho sentito Dragosh Tudorache, uno dei relatori del European AI Act, criticarla proprio per questo e ribadire che l’approccio giusto è quello dell’Act, di specificare casi vietati e imporre vincoli. A me pare sia proprio l’opposto: non dovrebbe importare dettagliare in una legge tutti ciò che è illecito (è “illecito ogni comportamento che è esplicitamente o implicitamente vietato dall’ordinamento"). Dovrebbero essere poi i guardiani dei diritti (autorità o tribunali) a intervenire per punire chi viola tali diritti. Lo stesso Tudorache ammette che ci sarà incompatibilità tra le legislazione europea, basata sul diritto civile e quella americana, basata sul diritto comune. Per evitare il conflitto, sarebbe appunto stato meglio non addentrarsi in tale tipo di legislazione. Già si è visto che l’ultima versione dell’Act si è dovuta aggiornare in fretta e furia per aggiungere dei vincoli al Generative AI, che non era contemplata nella versione di soli pochi mesi fa, fatta circolare a governi e consiglio dopo una consultazione pubblica. Al pubblico non è stato consentito pronunciarsi sulla nuova versione, tanto per dire quanto contasse. — Beppe > On 18 Jul 2023, at 04:04, <nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it> <nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it> wrote: > > From: Carlo Blengino <blengino(a)penalistiassociati.it <mailto:blengino@penalistiassociati.it>> > To: Maurizio Borghi <maurizio.borghi(a)unito.it <mailto:maurizio.borghi@unito.it>> > Cc: Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it <mailto:daniela.tafani@unipi.it>>, > "nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it <mailto:nexa@server-nexa.polito.it>" <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it <mailto:nexa@server-nexa.polito.it>> > Subject: Re: [nexa] The FTC is investigating whether ChatGPT harms > consumers > Message-ID: > <CAKd_52ZOiwr5y07WzU4ACXR4VFieKTy7NE=d2HXZVMQXFo=hug(a)mail.gmail.com <mailto:CAKd_52ZOiwr5y07WzU4ACXR4VFieKTy7NE=d2HXZVMQXFo=hug@mail.gmail.com>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Mi permetto solo un'osservazione rispetto al post di Maurizio, ringraziando > sempre tutti per i contributi in lista, che mi pare abbiano, tutti, una > parte di verità e tutti meritano attenzione (non ho letto cretinate!) > > Il giorno sab 15 lug 2023 alle ore 12:37 Maurizio Borghi via nexa < > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it <mailto:nexa@server-nexa.polito.it>> ha scritto: > >> >> *Infine, alcune delle interrogazioni (ad es. la n. 22) riguardano in >> maniera dettagliata la raccolta e il trattamento di dati personali, con la >> richiesta di specificare le modalità impiegate da Open AI per escludere >> l’impiego di informazioni personali come training data. Qui la FTC da’ >> chiaramente per acquisito che il trattamento di dati personali come >> training data senza consenso sia illegale. Forse una riprova del fatto che >> i tanto vituperati rilievi del Garante italiano non erano così infondati?* >> >> >> > Credo che le "informazioni personali" di cui si preoccupa la FTC al punto 22* > non siano *i "dati personali" nella amplissima accezione data dal GDPR -che > ha base nel diritto fondamentale tutto made in UE alla protezione dei dati- > ma siano solo le informazioni che consentono ex sé di identificare > direttamente (a seconda del contesto) un soggetto -nome, cognome, indirizzo > e numeri di contatto o documenti d'identità- e che sono tutelati in U.S., > se non sono resi pubblici dall'interessato stesso, sul diverso presupposto > del right to be let alone, la mitica "privacy". > Poi noi facciamo confusione ed usiamo i due termini come sinonimi, ma non è > così: sono come noto due concetti affini ma profondamente diversi. > I timori della FTC sono legati al "doxing" ( > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxing) fattispecie a noi europei ignota (e > solo parzialmente e faticosamente tutelata dal GDPR), che invece ha grande > rilievo in U.S. (è l'incubo delle piattaforme) ove appunto non esiste un > diritto fondamentale alla protezione del dato (che infatti è usato e > sfruttato a man bassa) ma una forte sensibilità alla privacy (tema su cui > noi europei, con la riservatezza, siamo paradossalmente un po' più in > difficoltà, soprattutto nei confronti del potere statuale). > > Se così non fosse e la FTC avesse improvvisamente adottato il consenso per > il trattamento dei dati personali intesi "all'europea", avremmo risolto > tutti i problemi: non esisterebbe Google search così com'è, né > il capitalismo della sorveglianza "a la Zuboff". Nel bene e nel male, > potremmo chiudere il web, o quanto meno questo web. Con strepiti e brindisi > a seconda delle fazioni. > Escludo che l'FTC consideri illegale il training con dati personali senza > consenso, ma chiede tutela sulle "informazioni personali", che sono altro. > > In realtà i due interventi (quello del Garante e quello della FTC) hanno > poco in comune e lo spettro di competenza delle Authority non è > paragonabile, come non è paragonabile la base giuridica ed il > quadro normativo su cui agiscono. > > A chiosa pongo questa riflessione. > Ormai il GDPR è utilizzato in UE e in Italia (sic!) come una clava, per > perseguire fini anche meritori e reali ma del tutto estranei alla > protezione del dato personale. Lo usiamo per tentare di regolare il > mercato, a fini anticoncorrenziali, come grimaldello per perseguire una > insana "sovranità digitale" che non promette nulla di buono sotto il > profilo della riservatezza, e fin anche per regolare i contenuti illeciti o > sgraditi, come forma di censura alle notizie o come viatico per > diffamazioni inesistenti, in ultimo, persino nella protezione dei minori > dalle brutture del web e per regolare il porno (cfr proposta Calenda), come > se fosse l'unica legge che ci salverà sulla rete. > Non va bene, ed il rischio è che quella fondamentale normativa, di per sé > aperta e flessibile, impostata ab origine su costanti bilanciamenti di > interessi contrapposti, perda il suo senso ed il suo significato e diventi > davvero incompatibile con l'innovazione. > > Facciamo attenzione, non è un buon servizio alla comunità strumentalizzare > un diritto acerbo come la protezione del dato personale per fini estranei > ed eccentrici rispetto all'originario intento. > > CB > > > -- > *Avv. Carlo Blengino* > *Via Duchessa Jolanda n. 19,* > *10138 Torino (TO) - Italy* > *tel. +39 011 4474035* > Penalistiassociati.it <http://penalistiassociati.it/>

July 18, 2023