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IBM and the Holocaust

by 380°

Buongiorno, non mi pare fosse già stata segnalata in questa lista. Non è cronaca, è storia (controversa?); essendo stata raccontata nel 2001, è storia di 5 minuti fa. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_and_the_Holocaust --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation is a book by investigative journalist and historian Edwin Black which documents the strategic technology services rendered by US-based multinational corporation International Business Machines (IBM) and its German and other European subsidiaries for the government of Adolf Hitler from the beginning of the Third Reich through to the last day of the regime, at the end of World War II when the US and Germany were at war with each other. [...] Dehomag, the German subsidiary of which IBM owned 90%, [...] On April 12, 1933, the German government announced plans to conduct a long-delayed national census.[2]: 54 The project was particularly important to the Nazis as a mechanism for the identification of Jews, Roma, and other ethnic groups deemed undesirable by the regime. Dehomag offered to assist the German government in its task of ethnic identification, focusing upon the 41 million residents of Prussia.[2]: 55 This activity was not only countenanced by Thomas Watson and IBM in America, Black argues, but was actively encouraged and financially supported, with Watson himself traveling to Germany in October 1933 and the company ramping up its investment in its German subsidiary from 400,000 to 7,000,000 Reichsmark—about $1 million (equivalent to $23.5 million in 2023).[2]: 60 This injection of American capital allowed Dehomag to purchase land in Berlin and to construct IBM's first factory in Germany, Black charges, thereby "tooling up for what it correctly saw as a massive financial relationship with the Hitler regime".[2]: 60 [...] The 1933 census, with design help and tabulation services provided by IBM through its German subsidiary, proved to be pivotal to the Nazis in their efforts to identify, isolate, and ultimately destroy the country's Jewish minority. Machine-tabulated census data greatly expanded the estimated number of Jews in Germany by identifying individuals with only one or a few Jewish ancestors. Previous estimates of 400,000 to 600,000 were abandoned for a new estimate of 2 million Jews in the nation of 65 million.[2]: 110 As the Nazi war machine occupied successive nations of Europe, capitulation was followed by a census of the population of each subjugated nation, with an eye to the identification and isolation of Jews and Romani. These census operations were intimately intertwined with technology and cards supplied by IBM's German and new Polish subsidiaries, which were awarded specific sales territories in Poland by decision of the New York office following Germany's successful Blitzkrieg invasion.[2]: 193 Data generated by means of counting and alphabetization equipment supplied by IBM through its German and other national subsidiaries was instrumental in the efforts of the German government to concentrate and ultimately destroy ethnic Jewish populations across Europe.[2]: 198 Black reports that every Nazi concentration camp maintained its own Hollerith-Abteilung (Hollerith Department), assigned with keeping tabs on inmates through use of IBM's punchcard technology.[2]: 351 In his book, Black charges that "without IBM's machinery, continuing upkeep and service, as well as the supply of punch cards, whether located on-site or off-site, Hitler's camps could have never managed the numbers they did."[2]: 352 [...] In his book, Black quotes Leon Krzemieniecki, the last surviving person involved in the administration of the rail transportation to Auschwitz and Treblinka, as stating he knew the punched card machines were not German machines, because the labels were in English. Black details how income from the machines leased in Poland was sent through Geneva to IBM in New York. (giusto per evidenziare come le sanzioni abbiano sempre funzionato benissimo, n.d.r.) [...] No machines were sold – only leased. IBM was the sole source of all punch cards and spare parts. It serviced the machines on site either directly or through its authorized dealer network or field trainees. There were no universal punch cards. Each series of cards was custom-designed by IBM engineers to capture information going in and to tabulate information the Nazis wanted to extract. After the publication of the 2012 expanded edition, he wrote for the Huffington Post, "The punch cards, machinery, training, servicing, and special project work, such as population census and identification, was managed directly by IBM headquarters in New York, and later through its subsidiaries in Germany, known as Deutsche Hollerith-Maschinen Gesellschaft (DEHOMAG), Poland, The Netherlands, France, Switzerland, and other European countries." He added that the punch cards bore the indicia of the German subsidiary Dehomag.[10] [...] In early 2021, Black published the 20th anniversary edition with special public events and a syndicated article stating that in twenty years, "not a comma has been changed", adding that "IBM has never requested a correction or denied any facts in the book." --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- C'è pure stata una controversia sull'editing dell'articolo stesso: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_and_the_Holocaust#Wikipedia_editing_contr… La cosa *tristissima* è che a distanza di più di 60 anni c'era e c'è ancora chi nel /mainstream/ _disquisice_ sulle responsabilità dirette i meno di IBM nell'organizzazione dell'olocausto, l'aggiramento dei divieti all'esportazione e minchiate simili. Il *cuore* della questione, invece, è affrontato solo da "freaks" con la *fissa* per la protezione dei (meta)dati personali, SPECIALMENTE quelli sensibili, ma la protezione deve essere per *tutti* i (meta)dati personali; leggiamo in cosa consiste il cuore di questa questione: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- In the early 1880s, Herman Hollerith (1860–1929), a young employee at the U.S. Census Bureau, conceived of the idea of creating readable cards with standardized perforations, each representing specific individual traits such as gender, nationality, and occupation. The millions of punched cards created for the population counted in the national census could then be sorted on the basis of specific bits of information they contained—thereby providing a quantified portrait of the nation and its citizens.[2]: 25 A circuit-closing device was used to electromagnetically record the data represented by the perforations. The technology enabled searching for individuals using the traits as search terms.[3] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Tutto parte da un database centralizzato controllato da un complesso militare-indistriale nel quale sono raccolti "specific individual traits"... ve lo dice un fricchettone :-O Loving, 380° [2] Black, Edwin (2009) [2001]. IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation (Paperback) (Second ed.). Washington, DC: Dialog Press. OCLC 958727212. [3] Jefferson, Brian (2020). Digitize and Punish: Racial Criminalization in the Digital Age. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. p. 20. -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

April 6, 2024

Re: [nexa] "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by 380°

Buongiorno Claudio, Claudio Agosti <claudio.agosti(a)hermescenter.org> writes: [...] > Nel thread, mi sembra stiate considerando il prodotto come > l'innovazione, non capisco da cosa lo deduci, forse sarebbe più efficace se citassi qualche passo che ti fa sembrare così... forse sarebbe più efficace non usare il "top posting"? ;-) [...] > Tecnologicamente non credo sia diverso dalla guerra in Afghanistan e il > famoso "we kill based on metadata", alla fine sono stime, approssimazione, > e un misto di signal e human intelligence che va a creare la kill > list. dici bene, avevo i tuoi stessi argomenti sulla punta della lingua: grazie per averli espressi così chiaramente e in modo efficacemente sintetico! > Ma specialmente non c'è nessun incentivo a non commettere errori. Non > c'è una possibile misurazione del successo, e le stime date nel pezzo > (per ammazzare un low-ranking accettiamo fino a 15-20 innocenti, > sparando una bomba mentre dorme con la sua famiglia?) sono solo volte > a de-umanizzare le vittime. Non sono stime tollerabili da una corte, > da un programmatore, da un politico. ma soprattutto, con tutte queste informazioni in merito al contesto, che cavolo di differenza fa se la bomba la spara un drone in modo completamente automatico perché l'attuatore è controllato direttamente da una "AI" o se la spara un drone in modo completamente "manuale" perché l'attuatore è comandato da un militare in carne ed ossa, magari a 500Km di distanza? tra l'altro, il militare *comunque* sparerebbe "based on metadata"... un tanto al chilo oltretutto i parametri (il signal) per la "kill list" sono sostanzialmente _cercati_ e /conseguentemente/ raccolti in base al famosissimo problema del "individua _statisticamente_ lo sporco X", con il risultato che spesso succede che ricade nella definizione un significativo sottoinsieme del genere umano, senza manco essere "sporco X" [...] > 1) mi sembra tanto una storia volta a distaccare i militari dalla > partecipazione al genocidio. Una sorta di pallottola a salve usata dal > plotone di esecuzione interessante: potrebbe essere sì; una specie di "obbedivo agli ordini... anzi no, era la AI a obbedire agli ordini... anzi no, la AI gli ordini se li dava da sola" > 2) mi sembra pubblicità gratuita all'industria militare, che certamente > vorrà questo giocattolo, e un reminder ad ogni regolatore, che l'uso > dell'AI per applicazioni militari è tenuto escluso da ogni > regolamentazione ma perché l'uso di altro software per applicazioni militari come è incluso in qualche regolamentazione? cioè: l'uso di software per applicazioni militari in che modo dovrebbe essere regolamentato? ...se già NON si riesce a far applicare la regolamentazione di ben altre cose (tipo i genocidi), quando si fanno le guerre?!? tra l'altro, faccio sommessamente notare che purtroppo ci sono sofisticate (sofistiche?!?) discussioni ad altissimi livelli intellettuali sul fatto che si tratti *tecnicamente* di genocidio [1] piuttosto che crimine di guerra [2], oppure legittima lotta al terrorismo con spiacevoli ma inevitabili danni collaterali... e mi fermo qui perché passerei nel penale. > ¹ https://twitter.com/_vecna/status/1776317177135874371 La riporto ai fini archivistici: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Claudio Agosti @_vecna In addition to that (the responsibility is not being transferred to the AI to absolve the human user), I would like to debunk a false narrative that involves AI and whether it is important for us as consumers of AI. 🧵 Paul Biggar 🇵🇸🇮🇪 @paulbiggar Correct me if I'm wrong, but in occupied territory, you can't kill militants off the battle field, even if you identify them correctly. So every kill by Lavender/Where's Daddy is a war crime? --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- [...] [1] https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocidio#Definizione_ufficiale_delle_Nazioni… [2] https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimine_di_guerra#La_legislazione -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

April 6, 2024

difesa d'ufficio non richiesta dell'informatica (was Re: Re: "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza")

by 380°

Buongiorno Daniela, chiedo scusa se la faccio lunga, ma credo che un po' di contesto aiuti la discussione. Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> writes: > Caro Maurizio, > > Il 05/04/2024 19:29, maurizio lana ha scritto: [...] >> perché mi pare che questo libro porti il discorso sull'IA in >> territori a cui non avevamo mai pensato, tutti presi da altri aspetti >> più evidenti/appariscenti. Non ho letto il libro per cui non saprei proprio a quali territori a cui non avevamo mai pensato si riferisca: Maurizio ti andrebbe di specificare così magari possiamo meglio focalizzare l'eventuale discussione? [...] > lo sviluppo dei sistemi di apprendimento automatico ha luogo entro una > relazione, originaria e costitutiva, con l’apparato militare e i > sistemi statali di sorveglianza. Ci sono un'enormità di "cose" *mainstream* nel mondo, anche _culturali_, che hanno una relazione costitutiva con l'apparato militare e i sistemi di sorveglianza statali, i sistemi cosiddetti AI - compresi i dosiddetti sistemi di apprendimento automatico - sono solo l'ultima delle cose in ordine cronologico. L'attuale regime mondiale atoricamente conosciuto è stato _plasmato_ (corrotto?) dalla relazione (NON originaria nè costitutiva) con l'apparato milirare e i sistemi statali di sorveglianza, compresi _tutti_ i *codici* che definiscono i termini della cosiddetta convivenza sociale. Quindi, è fuori di dubbio che esiste una tale relazione tra le "cose" e come di _sviluppano_, ma credo che ben altra relazione esiste con come le "cose" vengono _concepite_ (ideate? progettate?) e perché, a quale scopo. Non voglio (e non possiamo, "statutariamente") approfondire _quel_ discorso, andremmo davvero /antropologicamente/, anzi /archetipamente/, troppo lontano, ma è giusto per dare il contesto nel quale queste "cose" si _sviluppano_ in un certo modo piuttosto che in un *altro* modo. > Su questa lista è stato segnalato un bel lavoro su questo tema: > https://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2023-47.pdf Ammetto di non aver letto (o semplicemente me lo sono dimenticato) il saggio, ma vorrei qui sommessamente /suggerire/ che lo _sviluppo_ del computer come lo conosciamo oggi ebbe un notevole impulso *solo* grazie alle ingenti risorse rese disponibili dai "military-industrial complex" dei regimi che si stavano preparando a confrontarsi nella seconda guerra mondiale: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_computing_hardware#Electromechanic… A tal proposito si veda anche: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konrad_Zuse#1939%E2%80%931945 --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- In 1939, Zuse was called to military service, where he was given the resources to ultimately build the Z2.[18] In September 1940 Zuse presented the Z2, covering several rooms in the parental flat, to experts of the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt (DVL; German Research Institute for Aviation).[22]: 424 The Z2 was a revised version of the Z1 using telephone relays. In 1940, the German government began funding him and his company through the Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt (AVA, Aerodynamic Research Institute, forerunner of the DLR),[24] which used his work for the production of glide bombs. Zuse built the S1 and S2 computing machines, which were special purpose devices which computed aerodynamic corrections to the wings of radio-controlled flying bombs. The S2 featured an integrated analog-to-digital converter under program control, making it the first process-controlled computer.[25]: 75 --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Per capirci, lo Z2 è il parente stretto dello Z1, considerato il primo computer programmabile elettromeccanico al mondo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z1_(computer) In realtà il primo "programmable general purpose computer" (meccanico) fu la "Analytical engine", che era Turing-complete [1] già nel 1837, ben 100 anni prima del _paper_ di Turing, che è del 1937. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytical_engine --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Babbage was never able to complete construction of any of his machines due to conflicts with his chief engineer and inadequate funding.[7][8] It was not until 1941 that Konrad Zuse built the first general-purpose computer, Z3, more than a century after Babbage had proposed the pioneering analytical engine in 1837. [...] Babbage had conflicts with his chief engineer, Joseph Clement, and ultimately the British government withdrew its funding for the project. [...] Babbage developed some two dozen programs for the analytical engine between 1837 and 1840, and one program later.[14][19] These programs treat polynomials, iterative formulas, Gaussian elimination, and Bernoulli numbers.[14][20] [...] Ada Lovelace, who had become interested in the engine eight years earlier.[13] In recognition of her additions to Menabrea's paper, which included a way to calculate Bernoulli numbers using the machine (widely considered to be the first complete computer program) (Babbage muore nel 1897, n.d.r.) In 1878, a committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science described the analytical engine as "a marvel of mechanical ingenuity", but recommended against constructing it. The committee acknowledged the usefulness and value of the machine, but could not estimate the cost of building it, and were unsure whether the machine would function correctly after being built. [...] As of May 2016, actual construction had not been attempted, since no consistent understanding could yet be obtained from Babbage's original design drawings. In particular it was unclear whether it could handle the indexed variables which were required for Lovelace's Bernoulli program.[34] By 2017, the "Plan 28" effort reported that a searchable database of all catalogued material was available, and an initial review of Babbage's voluminous Scribbling Books had been completed.[35] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- In pratica è dal 1837 che non ci sono abbastanza incentivi manco per /comprendere/ quella macchina :-); è evidente che lo sviluppo abortì subito perché di calcolare i numeri di Bernoulli per uso tecnico-scientifico non importava una mazza a coloro che avevano il potere di finanziarne lo _sviluppo_. Altro discorso, poi, è _per cosa_ vennero originariamente concepiti e costruiti i primi "computing device" e come e _perché_ vennero _sviluppati_: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_computing_hardware_before_1950 [...] > Esprimere tale relazione con l’espressione “dual use” è fuorviante: Eros contro Thanatos? [2] > i sistemi concepiti per fini militari conservano l’impostazione, la > concettualizzazione degli oggetti di interesse, gli assunti normativi > e la logica originari. Ho il serio dubbio che invece in moltissimi casi le "logiche originarie" di molti sistemi concepiti per fini civili/scientifici (liberatori?) siano state poi _corrotte_ quando potevano essere usate per fini militari, _soffocate_ quando invece non erano adatte a quesi fini, se non addirittura *in contrasto* con quei fini. Nell'articolo IT di Wikipedia sulla storia del computer, mi ha colpito la sezione dedicata al Memex [3], sezione non presente nella corrispettiva pagina EN. Esiste però un articolo EN sul Memex: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memex --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Memex is a hypothetical electromechanical device for interacting with microform documents and described in Vannevar Bush's 1945 article "As We May Think". Bush envisioned the memex as a device in which individuals would compress and store all of their books, records, and communications, "mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility". The individual was supposed to use the memex as an automatic personal filing system, making the memex "an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory".[1] The name memex is a portmanteau of memory and expansion. [...] According to Bush, memex could become "a sort of mechanized private file and library".[4] The memex device as described by Bush "would use microfilm storage, dry photography, and analog computing to give postwar scholars access to a huge, indexed repository of knowledge any section of which could be called up with a few keystrokes."[5] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Per chi se la fosse persa, "The mother of all demos" [4] dimostra piuttosto inequivocabilmente che dal 9 Dicembre 1968 ad oggi qualcosa è andato decisamente storto nello sviluppo dei sistemi informatici... *centralizzati* (per proteggerci da noi stessi, sia chiaro): --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- In Engelbart's view, in order to steer society into the right use of scientific knowledge derived from the war, that knowledge would need to be better managed and regulated. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Si veda anche: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Engelbart#Guiding_philosophy e https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Engelbart#Anecdotal_notes Come si può facilmente notare, quindi, nel corso della storia sono state _concepite_ molte tecnologie _liberatorie_: si sono poi sviluppate (quasi) solo quando utili per i fini dai complessi militari-industriali dei vari regimi, nel resto dei casi sono state ignorate o deliberatamente soffocate. Noi siamo storicamente ancora nel periodo post-bellico (o è eterno-bellico?!?) [...] Loving, 380° [1] cioè rispettava tutti i requisiti stabiliti per poter essere definita una Universal Turing Machine: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Turing_machine [2] sì, anche nell'informatica esiste da _sempre_ un conflitto psicanalitico, anzi filosofico, tra Eros e Thanatos https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond_the_Pleasure_Principle [3] https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storia_del_computer#Il_Memex_(1932) [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Mother_of_All_Demos -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

April 6, 2024

Yossi Sariel and "The Human Machine Team"

by 380°

Buongiorno Maurizio, grazie delle segnalazioni. Chi ha fretta o è distratto, per favore *incornici* queste frasi (riferimenti più avanti) --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- he provides a template for how to construct an effective targets machine drawing on “big data” that a human brain could not process. “The machine needs enough data regarding the battlefield, the population, visual information, cellular data, social media connections, pictures, cellphone contacts,” he writes. “The more data and the more varied it is, the better.” --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Stiamo parlando di protezione dei dati personali e qui è evidente ogni oltre ragionevole ignoranza che è strettamente e inequivocabilmente connessa ai diritti umani. ...e cerchiamo di non fare i naive oltre ogni decenza: le attività di spionaggio sono una cosa, la _sorveglianza globale_ (anche di un sottoinsieme consistente del globo, neh) è tutta un'altra faccenda. I meno distratti tra i lettori non stenteranno a comprendere come la metafora del Panopticon sia _perfettamente_ calzante per internet: le "target machines" vanno dai sistemi di advertising mirato per i _consumatori_ ai sistemi di uccisione mirata dei _terroristi_, con un sacco di gradazioni dello stesso colore in mezzo (tipo quelle belle porcherie praticate quodidianamente dai social che /spacciano/ dati personali con nonchalance), e non potrebbero funzionare se le comunicazioni in rete fossero DI DEFAULT anonime. Punto. Quindi: senza anonimato in rete è impossibile poter esercitare i diritti umani. Punto. Ogni altro tentativo di "mitigare" gli effetti delle "target machines", a qualsiasi livello che non sia quello TECNICO (cioè delle tecniche di trasmissione dei dati), è una _perfetta_ perdita di tempo. Punto. maurizio lana <maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it> writes: [...] > sul tema dei sistemi di IA che guidano (? decidono!) le azioni militari > è uscito un libro anonimo a cura di un alto ufficiale israeliano: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes… «Top Israeli spy chief exposes his true identity in online security lapse» Harry Davies and Bethan McKernan Fri 5 Apr 2024 15.19 CEST --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- The identity of the commander of Israel's Unit 8200 is a closely guarded secret. He occupies one of the most sensitive roles in the military, leading one of the world's most powerful surveillance agencies, comparable to the US National Security Agency. Yet after spending more than two decades operating in the shadows, the Guardian can reveal how the controversial spy chief – whose name is Yossi Sariel – has left his identity exposed online. The embarrassing security lapse is linked to a book he published on Amazon, which left a digital trail to a private Google account created in his name, along with his unique ID and links to the account's maps and calendar profiles. The Guardian has confirmed with multiple sources that Sariel is the secret author of The Human Machine Team, a book in which he offers a radical vision for how artificial intelligence can transform the relationship between military personnel and machines. Published in 2021 using a pen name composed of his initials, Brigadier General YS, it provides a blueprint for the advanced AI-powered systems that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been pioneering during the six-month war in [Gaza]. An electronic version of the book included an anonymous email address that can easily be traced to Sariel's name and Google account. Contacted by the Guardian, an IDF spokesperson said the email address was not Sariel's personal one, but “dedicated specifically for issues to do with the book itself”. Later on Friday, in a statement to the Israeli media, the IDF described the book's exposure of Sariel's personal details as “a mistake”, adding: “The issue will be examined to prevent the recurrence of similar cases in the future.” The security blunder is likely to place further pressure on Sariel, who is said to “live and breathe” intelligence but whose tenure running the IDF's elite cyber intelligence division has become mired in controversy. Unit 8200, once revered within Israel and beyond for intelligence capabilities that rivalled those of the UK's GCHQ, is thought to have built a vast surveillance apparatus to closely monitor the [Palestinian territories]. However, it has been criticised over its failure to foresee and prevent Hamas's deadly 7 October assault last year on southern Israel, in which Palestinian militants killed nearly 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped about 240 people. Since the Hamas-led attacks, there have been accusations that Unit 8200's “technological hubris” came at the expense of more conventional intelligence-gathering techniques. In its war in Gaza, the IDF appears to have fully embraced Sariel's vision of the future, in which military technology represents a new frontier where AI is being used to fulfil increasingly complex tasks on the battlefield. Sariel argued in the published book three years ago that his ideas about using machine learning to transform modern warfare should become mainstream. “We just need to take them from the periphery and deliver them to the centre of the stage,” he wrote. One section of the book heralds the concept of an AI-powered “targets machine”, descriptions of which closely resemble the target recommendation systems the IDF is now known have been [relying upon in its bombardment of Gaza]. Over the last six months, the IDF has deployed multiple AI-powered decision support systems that have been rapidly developed and refined by Unit 8200 under Sariel's leadership. They include [the Gospel] and [Lavender], two target recommendation systems that have been revealed in reports by the Israeli-Palestinian publication [+972 magazine], its Hebrew-language outlet Local Call and the Guardian. The IDF says its AI systems are intended to assist human intelligence officers, who are required to verify that military suspects are legitimate targets under international law. A spokesperson said the military used “various types of tools and methods”, adding: “Evidently, there are tools that exist in order to benefit intelligence researchers that are based on artificial intelligence.” [Gaza] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/gaza> [Palestinian territories] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/palestinian-territories> [relying upon in its bombardment of Gaza] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas…> [the Gospel] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai…> [Lavender] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas…> [+972 magazine] <https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/> *Targets machine* ───────────────── On Wednesday, +972 and Local Call placed the spotlight on the link between Unit 8200 and the book authored by [a mysteriously named Brigadier General YS]. Sariel is understood to have written the book with the IDF's permission after a year as a visiting researcher at the US National Defense University in Washington DC, where he made the case for using AI to transform modern warfare. Aimed at high-ranking military commanders and security officials, the book articulates a “human-machine teaming” concept that seeks to achieve synergy between humans and AI, rather than constructing fully autonomous systems. It reflects Sariel's ambition to become a “thought leader”, according to one former intelligence official. In the 2000s, he was a leading member of a group of academically minded spies known as “the Choir”, which agitated for an overhaul of Israeli intelligence practices. An Israeli press report suggests that by 2017 he was head of intelligence for the IDF's central command. His subsequent elevation to commander of Unit 8200 amounted to an endorsement by the military establishment of his technological vision for the future. Sariel refers in the book to “a revolution” in recent years within the IDF, which has “developed a new concept of intelligence centric warfare to connect intelligence to the fighters in the field”. He advocates going further still, fully merging intelligence and warfare, in particular when conducting lethal targeting operations. In one chapter of the book, he provides a template for how to construct an effective targets machine drawing on “big data” that a human brain could not process. “The machine needs enough data regarding the battlefield, the population, visual information, cellular data, social media connections, pictures, cellphone contacts,” he writes. “The more data and the more varied it is, the better.” Such a targets machine, he said, would draw on complex models that make predictions built “on lots of small, diverse features”, listing examples such as “people who are with a Hezbollah member in a WhatsApp group, people who get new cellphones every few months, those who change their addresses frequently”. He argues that using AI to create potential military targets can be more efficient and avoid “bottlenecks” created by intelligence officials or soldiers. “There is a human bottleneck for both locating the new targets and decision-making to approve the targets. There is also the bottleneck of how to process a great amount of data. Then there is the bottleneck of connecting the intelligence to the fire.” He adds: “A team consisting of machines and investigators can blast the bottleneck wide open.” [a mysteriously named Brigadier General YS] <https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/> *Intelligence divide* ───────────────────── Disclosure of Sariel's security lapse comes at a difficult time for the intelligence boss. In February, he came under public scrutiny in Israel when the Israeli newspaper Maariv published [an account] of recriminations within Unit 8200 after the 7 October attacks. Sariel was not named in the article, which referred to Unit 8200's commander only as “Y”. However, the rare public criticism brought into focus a divide within Israel's intelligence community over its biggest failure in a generation. Sariel's critics, the report said, believe Unit 8200's prioritisation of “addictive and exciting” technology over more old-fashioned intelligence methods had led to the disaster. One veteran official told the newspaper the unit under Sariel had “followed the new intelligence bubble”. For his part, Sariel is quoted as telling colleagues that 7 October will “haunt him” until his last day. “I accept responsibility for what happened in the most profound sense of the word,” he said. “We were defeated. I was defeated.” [an account] <https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-1078519> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Per la cronaca, l'indirizzo email in questione può banalmente essere letto nella seconda di copertina del libro in formato epub da chiunque sia in possesso del libro, e io sia perché me lo ha regalato mio cuggino :-D L'indirizzo è: Yossi.human.machine(a)gmail.com Ai fini della discussione in merito all'oggetto e alla _sostanza_ del libro è irrilevante (?), ma quello che sembra un patetico tentativo di rimanere anonimi da parte dell'ennesimo militare di altissimo grado la dice lunga sulle effettive competenze informatiche (o a 380°!?) delle elìtes dominanti. > Y.S., Brigadier General. /The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy > Between Human and Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our > World/. Independently Published, 2021. Giusto, per compredere l'abisso bisogna almeno ispezionarlo, o farselo raccontare da una persona che ci vuole davvero bene... Disponibile ai link pubblicati qui: https://annas-archive.org/md5/a7724b8032fe211e5f0a4e0d5cb0bb6f ad esempio: http://library.lol/main/a7724b8032fe211e5f0a4e0d5cb0bb6f [1] [...] Saluti, 380° [1] https://web.archive.org/web/20240406061751/http://library.lol/main/a7724b80… link diretto all'epub: https://web.archive.org/web/20240406061704/https://download.library.lol/mai… -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

April 6, 2024

Re: [nexa] "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by Claudio Agosti

Questa notizia mi ha triggerato un piccolo rant¹ per una questione tangenziale al crimine di guerra, cioè che come consumatori di notizie c'è una mancanza di spirito critico nel giudicare la bontà dell'AI. Nel thread, mi sembra stiate considerando il prodotto come l'innovazione, ma secondo me l'unica cosa nuova qui è il racconto che se ne fa attorno. Il caso d'uso vede i militari avere bombe illimitate, non essere responsabili per gli innocenti uccisi, e avere il potere di dichiarare che ogni persona uccisa sia un terrorista e quindi target legittimo. Tecnologicamente non credo sia diverso dalla guerra in Afghanistan e il famoso "we kill based on metadata", alla fine sono stime, approssimazione, e un misto di signal e human intelligence che va a creare la kill list. Ma specialmente non c'è nessun incentivo a non commettere errori. Non c'è una possibile misurazione del successo, e le stime date nel pezzo (per ammazzare un low-ranking accettiamo fino a 15-20 innocenti, sparando una bomba mentre dorme con la sua famiglia?) sono solo volte a de-umanizzare le vittime. Non sono stime tollerabili da una corte, da un programmatore, da un politico. Io non so se questo Lavender sia diverso da un sistema che studia le heatmap da un drone, vede dove molte persone stanno ferme ( = stanno dormendo) e in quel momento spende la bomba per massimizzare le uccisioni. Oppure tira un dado e sceglie così i target. Non lo so io, non credo lo sappiano i militari che caricano i missili, e non credo lo sappiano neppure gli sviluppatori di Lavender perchè tanto, hai dati imprecisi in ogni anello della catena, e nessun incentivo a metterli in discussione. E, oltre che star cercar di legittimare, su grande scala, l'uso di armi automatiche e imprecise: 1) mi sembra tanto una storia volta a distaccare i militari dalla partecipazione al genocidio. Una sorta di pallottola a salve usata dal plotone di esecuzione 2) mi sembra pubblicità gratuita all'industria militare, che certamente vorrà questo giocattolo, e un reminder ad ogni regolatore, che l'uso dell'AI per applicazioni militari è tenuto escluso da ogni regolamentazione ¹ https://twitter.com/_vecna/status/1776317177135874371 On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 10:50 AM Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> wrote: > Caro Maurizio, > > Il 05/04/2024 19:29, maurizio lana ha scritto: > > il medesimo giornalista aveva già scritto su temi simili in novembre > 2023: > > Abraham, Yuval. «‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s > Calculated Bombing of Gaza». +972 Magazine, 30 novembre 2023. > https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing… > . > > +972 Magazine è un'iniziativa giornalistica congiunta > israelo-palestinese, che riporta alla mente Giancarlo Siani, quando parlava > di giornalisti giornalisti > > > > sul tema dei sistemi di IA che guidano (? decidono!) le azioni militari > è uscito un libro anonimo a cura di un alto ufficiale israeliano: > > Y.S., Brigadier General. The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy > Between Human and Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our > World. Independently Published, 2021. > > che in sostanza espone i presupposti teorici e progettuali di ciò che > gli articoli di Abraham descrivono. > > lo sto leggendo. se anche qualcun altro lo facesse, poi ne parliamo. > > perché mi pare che questo libro porti il discorso sull'IA in territori a > cui non avevamo mai pensato, tutti presi da altri aspetti più > evidenti/appariscenti. > > > > Non mi pare che siano territori nuovi: lo sviluppo dei sistemi di > apprendimento automatico ha luogo entro una relazione, originaria e > costitutiva, > con l’apparato militare e i sistemi statali di sorveglianza. > Su questa lista è stato segnalato un bel lavoro su questo tema: > https://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2023-47.pdf > > I primi sistemi di computer vision, del resto, sono stati realizzati per > automatizzare la fotointerpretazione delle immagini aeree, alla ricerca di > oggetti di interesse militare: > https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-birth-of-computer-vision > > e alla filiera della sorveglianza il settore resta intimamente legato: > https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.15084 > > Esprimere tale relazione con l’espressione “dual use” è fuorviante: i > sistemi concepiti per fini militari conservano l’impostazione, la > concettualizzazione degli oggetti di interesse, gli assunti normativi e > la logica originari. La polizia predittiva, ad esempio, trasforma la > totalità dei cittadini in persone oggetto di sorveglianza, estendendo > all’ambito civile la logica militare dell’intelligence e sopprimendo il > diritto individuale a non essere oggetto di sorveglianza senza fondate > ragioni. > E il dilemma del trolley applicato alle auto a presunta guida autonoma > concettualizza i veicoli civili come armi che selezionino gli obiettivi > umani da abbattere. > > Buona serata, > Daniela > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > -- Claudio Agosti - Hermes Center, AI Forensics, Reversing Works. Platform Auditor & Tech Researcher [ linktr.ee/claudio.agosti ]

April 5, 2024

Re: [nexa] [Junk released by Allowed List] Re: "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by Daniela Tafani

Caro Maurizio, Il 05/04/2024 19:29, maurizio lana ha scritto: > il medesimo giornalista aveva già scritto su temi simili in novembre 2023: > Abraham, Yuval. «‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s Calculated Bombing of Gaza». +972 Magazine, 30 novembre 2023. https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing…. > +972 Magazine è un'iniziativa giornalistica congiunta israelo-palestinese, che riporta alla mente Giancarlo Siani, quando parlava di giornalisti giornalisti > > sul tema dei sistemi di IA che guidano (? decidono!) le azioni militari è uscito un libro anonimo a cura di un alto ufficiale israeliano: > Y.S., Brigadier General. The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy Between Human and Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our World. Independently Published, 2021. > che in sostanza espone i presupposti teorici e progettuali di ciò che gli articoli di Abraham descrivono. > lo sto leggendo. se anche qualcun altro lo facesse, poi ne parliamo. > perché mi pare che questo libro porti il discorso sull'IA in territori a cui non avevamo mai pensato, tutti presi da altri aspetti più evidenti/appariscenti. > Non mi pare che siano territori nuovi: lo sviluppo dei sistemi di apprendimento automatico ha luogo entro una relazione, originaria e costitutiva, con l’apparato militare e i sistemi statali di sorveglianza. Su questa lista è stato segnalato un bel lavoro su questo tema: https://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2023-47.pdf I primi sistemi di computer vision, del resto, sono stati realizzati per automatizzare la fotointerpretazione delle immagini aeree, alla ricerca di oggetti di interesse militare: https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-birth-of-computer-vision e alla filiera della sorveglianza il settore resta intimamente legato: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.15084 Esprimere tale relazione con l’espressione “dual use” è fuorviante: i sistemi concepiti per fini militari conservano l’impostazione, la concettualizzazione degli oggetti di interesse, gli assunti normativi e la logica originari. La polizia predittiva, ad esempio, trasforma la totalità dei cittadini in persone oggetto di sorveglianza, estendendo all’ambito civile la logica militare dell’intelligence e sopprimendo il diritto individuale a non essere oggetto di sorveglianza senza fondate ragioni. E il dilemma del trolley applicato alle auto a presunta guida autonoma concettualizza i veicoli civili come armi che selezionino gli obiettivi umani da abbattere. Buona serata, Daniela

April 5, 2024

Re: [nexa] "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by maurizio lana

nel controfrontespizio si legge: > The Human-Machine Team > Brigadier General Y.S > Copyright © 2021 Brigadier General Y.S > All rights reserved; No parts of this book may be reproduced or > transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, > including photocopying, recording, taping, or by any information > retrieval system, without the permission, in writing, of the author. > Contact: Yossi.human.machine(a)gmail.com mettere quell'indirizzo email in quel modo (poteva mettere un indirizzo email di un'altra persona) mi chiedo se sia stato più hybris o più trascuratezza Maurizio Il 05/04/24 19:31, J.C. DE MARTIN ha scritto: > L’autore non è più anonimo: > https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes… > > > > (messaggio spedito in movimento - scusate brevità ed eventuali refusi) > >> Il giorno 5 apr 2024, alle ore 19:29, maurizio lana >> <maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it> ha scritto: >> >> il medesimo giornalista aveva già scritto su temi simili in >> novembre 2023: >> Abraham, Yuval. «‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s >> Calculated Bombing of Gaza». /+972 Magazine/, 30 novembre 2023. >> https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing…. >> /+972 Magazine /è un'iniziativa giornalistica congiunta >> israelo-palestinese, che riporta alla mente Giancarlo Siani, quando >> parlava di giornalisti giornalisti >> >> sul tema dei sistemi di IA che guidano (? decidono!) le azioni >> militari è uscito un libro anonimo a cura di un alto ufficiale >> israeliano: >> Y.S., Brigadier General. /The Human-Machine Team: How to Create >> Synergy Between Human and Artificial Intelligence That Will >> Revolutionize Our World/. Independently Published, 2021. >> che in sostanza espone i presupposti teorici e progettuali di ciò che >> gli articoli di Abraham descrivono. >> lo sto leggendo. se anche qualcun altro lo facesse, poi ne parliamo. >> perché mi pare che questo libro porti il discorso sull'IA in >> territori a cui non avevamo mai pensato, tutti presi da altri aspetti >> più evidenti/appariscenti. >> >> Maurizio >> >> Il 03/04/24 17:47, J.C. DE MARTIN ha scritto: >>> *‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza* >>> >>> /The Israeli army has marked tens of thousands of Gazans as suspects >>> for assassination, using an AI targeting system with little human >>> oversight and a permissive policy for casualties, +972 and Local >>> Call reveal./ >>> >>> By Yuval Abraham >>> >>> April 3, 2024 >>> >>> In 2021, a book >>> <https://books.google.co.il/books/about/The_Human_Machine_Team_How_to_Create…>titled >>> “The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy Between Human and >>> Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our World” was >>> released in English under the pen name “Brigadier General Y.S.” In >>> it, the author — a man who we confirmed to be the current commander >>> of the elite Israeli intelligence unit 8200 — makes the case for >>> designing a special machine that could rapidly process massive >>> amounts of data to generate thousands of potential “targets” for >>> military strikes in the heat of a war. Such technology, he writes, >>> would resolve what he described as a “human bottleneck for both >>> locating the new targets and decision-making to approve the targets.” >>> >>> Such a machine, it turns out, actually exists. A new investigation >>> by +972 Magazine and Local Call reveals that the Israeli army has >>> developed an artificial intelligence-based program known as >>> “Lavender,” unveiled here for the first time. According to six >>> Israeli intelligence officers, who have all served in the army >>> during the current war on the Gaza Strip and had first-hand >>> involvement with the use of AI to generate targets for >>> assassination, Lavender has played a central role in the >>> unprecedented bombing of Palestinians, especially during the early >>> stages of the war. In fact, according to the sources, its influence >>> on the military’s operations was such that they essentially treated >>> the outputs of the AI machine “as if it were a human decision.” >>> >>> [...] >>> >>> continua qui: https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> nexa mailing list >>> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >>> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> felicità del poco >> edith bruck >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> Maurizio Lana >> Università del Piemonte Orientale >> Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici >> Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa ------------------------------------------------------------------------ many of us believe the EU remains the most extraordinary, ambitious, liberal political alliance in recorded history. where it needs reform, where it needs to evolve, we should be there to help turn that heavy wheel ian mcewan, the guardian, 2/6/2017 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

April 5, 2024

Re: [nexa] "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

April 5, 2024

Re: [nexa] "‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza"

by maurizio lana

il medesimo giornalista aveva già scritto su temi simili in novembre 2023: Abraham, Yuval. «‘A Mass Assassination Factory’: Inside Israel’s Calculated Bombing of Gaza». /+972 Magazine/, 30 novembre 2023. https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing…. /+972 Magazine /è un'iniziativa giornalistica congiunta israelo-palestinese, che riporta alla mente Giancarlo Siani, quando parlava di giornalisti giornalisti sul tema dei sistemi di IA che guidano (? decidono!) le azioni militari è uscito un libro anonimo a cura di un alto ufficiale israeliano: Y.S., Brigadier General. /The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy Between Human and Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our World/. Independently Published, 2021. che in sostanza espone i presupposti teorici e progettuali di ciò che gli articoli di Abraham descrivono. lo sto leggendo. se anche qualcun altro lo facesse, poi ne parliamo. perché mi pare che questo libro porti il discorso sull'IA in territori a cui non avevamo mai pensato, tutti presi da altri aspetti più evidenti/appariscenti. Maurizio Il 03/04/24 17:47, J.C. DE MARTIN ha scritto: > *‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree in Gaza* > > /The Israeli army has marked tens of thousands of Gazans as suspects > for assassination, using an AI targeting system with little human > oversight and a permissive policy for casualties, +972 and Local Call > reveal./ > > By Yuval Abraham > > April 3, 2024 > > In 2021, a book > <https://books.google.co.il/books/about/The_Human_Machine_Team_How_to_Create…>titled > “The Human-Machine Team: How to Create Synergy Between Human and > Artificial Intelligence That Will Revolutionize Our World” was > released in English under the pen name “Brigadier General Y.S.” In it, > the author — a man who we confirmed to be the current commander of the > elite Israeli intelligence unit 8200 — makes the case for designing a > special machine that could rapidly process massive amounts of data to > generate thousands of potential “targets” for military strikes in the > heat of a war. Such technology, he writes, would resolve what he > described as a “human bottleneck for both locating the new targets and > decision-making to approve the targets.” > > Such a machine, it turns out, actually exists. A new investigation by > +972 Magazine and Local Call reveals that the Israeli army has > developed an artificial intelligence-based program known as > “Lavender,” unveiled here for the first time. According to six Israeli > intelligence officers, who have all served in the army during the > current war on the Gaza Strip and had first-hand involvement with the > use of AI to generate targets for assassination, Lavender has played a > central role in the unprecedented bombing of Palestinians, especially > during the early stages of the war. In fact, according to the sources, > its influence on the military’s operations was such that they > essentially treated the outputs of the AI machine “as if it were a > human decision.” > > [...] > > continua qui: https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/ > > > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa ------------------------------------------------------------------------ felicità del poco edith bruck ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

April 5, 2024

Top Israeli spy chief exposes his true identity in online security lapse | Israel | The Guardian

by Alberto Cammozzo

Nell'articolo sono interessanti ed agghiaccianti i link ad articoli sull'impiego di due /target recomendation systems/ nell'industrializzazione del massacro. Uno dei due è passato in lista se ricordo bene. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes…> Top Israeli spy chief exposes his true identity in online security lapse The identity of the commander of Israel’s Unit 8200 is a closely guarded secret. He occupies one of the most sensitive roles in the military, leading one of the world’s most powerful surveillance agencies, comparable to the US National Security Agency. Yet after spending more than two decades operating in the shadows, the Guardian can reveal how the controversial spy chief – whose name is Yossi Sariel – has left his identity exposed online. The embarrassing security lapse is linked to a book he published on Amazon, which left a digital trail to a private Google account created in his name, along with his unique ID and links to the account’s maps and calendar profiles. The Guardian has confirmed with multiple sources that Sariel is the secret author of The Human Machine Team, a book in which he offers a radical vision for how artificial intelligence can transform the relationship between military personnel and machines. Published in 2021 using a pen name composed of his initials, Brigadier General YS, it provides a blueprint for the advanced AI-powered systems that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been pioneering during the six-month war in Gaza. An electronic version of the book included an anonymous email address that can easily be traced to Sariel’s name and Google account. Contacted by the Guardian, an IDF spokesperson said the email address was not Sariel’s personal one, but “dedicated specifically for issues to do with the book itself”. Do you have information about this story? Email harry.davies(a)theguardian.com, or (using a non-work phone) use Signal or WhatsApp to message +44 7721 857348. The security blunder is likely to place further pressure on Sariel, who is said to “live and breathe” intelligence but whose tenure running the IDF’s elite cyber intelligence division has become mired in controversy. Unit 8200, once revered within Israel and beyond for intelligence capabilities that rivalled those of the UK’s GCHQ, is thought to have built a vast surveillance apparatus to closely monitor the Palestinian territories. However, it has been criticised over its failure to foresee and prevent Hamas’s deadly 7 October assault last year on southern Israel, in which Palestinian militants killed nearly 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped about 240 people. Since the Hamas-led attacks, there have been accusations that Unit 8200’s “technological hubris” came at the expense of more conventional intelligence-gathering techniques. In its war in Gaza, the IDF appears to have fully embraced Sariel’s vision of the future, in which military technology represents a new frontier where AI is being used to fulfil increasingly complex tasks on the battlefield. Sariel argued in the published book three years ago that his ideas about using machine learning to transform modern warfare should become mainstream. “We just need to take them from the periphery and deliver them to the centre of the stage,” he wrote. One section of the book heralds the concept of an AI-powered “targets machine”, descriptions of which closely resemble the target recommendation systems the IDF is now known have been relying upon in its bombardment of Gaza. Over the last six months, the IDF has deployed multiple AI-powered decision support systems that have been rapidly developed and refined by Unit 8200 under Sariel’s leadership. They include the Gospel and Lavender, two target recommendation systems that have been revealed in reports by the Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 magazine, its Hebrew-language outlet Local Call and the Guardian. The IDF says its AI systems are intended to assist human intelligence officers, who are required to verify that military suspects are legitimate targets under international law. A spokesperson said the military used “various types of tools and methods”, adding: “Evidently, there are tools that exist in order to benefit intelligence researchers that are based on artificial intelligence.” Targets machine On Wednesday, +972 and Local Call placed the spotlight on the link between Unit 8200 and the book authored by a mysteriously named Brigadier General YS. Sariel is understood to have written the book with the IDF’s permission after a year as a visiting researcher at the US National Defense University in Washington DC, where he made the case for using AI to transform modern warfare. Aimed at high-ranking military commanders and security officials, the book articulates a “human-machine teaming” concept that seeks to achieve synergy between humans and AI, rather than constructing fully autonomous systems. It reflects Sariel’s ambition to become a “thought leader”, according to one former intelligence official. In the 2000s, he was a leading member of a group of academically minded spies known as “the Choir”, which agitated for an overhaul of Israeli intelligence practices. An Israeli press report suggests that by 2017 he was head of intelligence for the IDF’s central command. His subsequent elevation to commander of Unit 8200 amounted to an endorsement by the military establishment of his technological vision for the future. Sariel refers in the book to “a revolution” in recent years within the IDF, which has “developed a new concept of intelligence centric warfare to connect intelligence to the fighters in the field”. He advocates going further still, fully merging intelligence and warfare, in particular when conducting lethal targeting operations. In one chapter of the book, he provides a template for how to construct an effective targets machine drawing on “big data” that a human brain could not process. “The machine needs enough data regarding the battlefield, the population, visual information, cellular data, social media connections, pictures, cellphone contacts,” he writes. “The more data and the more varied it is, the better.” Such a targets machine, he said, would draw on complex models that make predictions built “on lots of small, diverse features”, listing examples such as “people who are with a Hezbollah member in a WhatsApp group, people who get new cellphones every few months, those who change their addresses frequently”. He argues that using AI to create potential military targets can be more efficient and avoid “bottlenecks” created by intelligence officials or soldiers. “There is a human bottleneck for both locating the new targets and decision-making to approve the targets. There is also the bottleneck of how to process a great amount of data. Then there is the bottleneck of connecting the intelligence to the fire.” He adds: “A team consisting of machines and investigators can blast the bottleneck wide open.” Intelligence divide Disclosure of Sariel’s security lapse comes at a difficult time for the intelligence boss. In February, he came under public scrutiny in Israel when the Israeli newspaper Maariv published an account of recriminations within Unit 8200 after the 7 October attacks. Sariel was not named in the article, which referred to Unit 8200’s commander only as “Y”. However, the rare public criticism brought into focus a divide within Israel’s intelligence community over its biggest failure in a generation. Sariel’s critics, the report said, believe Unit 8200’s prioritisation of “addictive and exciting” technology over more old-fashioned intelligence methods had led to the disaster. One veteran official told the newspaper the unit under Sariel had “followed the new intelligence bubble”. For his part, Sariel is quoted as telling colleagues that 7 October will “haunt him” until his last day. “I accept responsibility for what happened in the most profound sense of the word,” he said. “We were defeated. I was defeated.”

April 5, 2024