- nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

How much energy can AI use? Breaking down the toll of each ChatGPT query - The Washington Post

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/09/18/energy-ai-use-electric…> A bottle of water per email: the hidden environmental costs of using AI chatbots AI bots generate a lot of heat, and keeping their computer servers running exacts a toll. [...]

Sept. 18, 2024

sulle SBOM aka Software Bill of Material.

by 380°

Buongiorno, Damiano Verzulli <damiano(a)verzulli.it> writes: > Il 18/09/24 12:52 PM, 380° via nexa ha scritto: >> [...] >> ...poi l'articolo si trasforma in uno SPROLOQUIO sulla "software supply >> chain" (con soluzioni ridicole tipo gli SBOM - Software Bill Of >> Material) > > Come tante medicine, la SBOM non è certamente la soluzione di tutti i > mali (del software). [...] > la SBOM ci porterebbe piu' in la. Sensibilmente. Non a 100... ma > almeno a 30/40 (che sarebbe gia' un risultato gigantesco, dato il > punto di partenza attuale) > > Quindi, IMO, ben vengano le SBOM... alcuni, tra cui me, sostengono invece che gli SBOM sono _ingannevoli_ esempi di implementazioni di sistemi SBOM: 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Package_Data_Exchange esempi: https://github.com/spdx/spdx-examples/tree/master/software 2. https://cyclonedx.org/ 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/products/swid le _etichette_ date al software in modo del tutto analogo ai codici dei componenti fisici che compongono la "bill of material" (BOM) degli artefatti _fisici_ sono *solo* fuorvianti; quelle etichette danno l'illusione di avere sotto controllo la supply chain del sofware e _quindi_ sono pericolose non si deve /ridurre/ la sicurezza della software supply chain a una FATICOSA operazione _burocratica_ di /compilazione/ di documenti (JSON, XML, YAML...) pieni di etichette... senza /ricadute pratiche/; tra l'altro solo per "star dietro" a uno SBOM ci vogliono un sacco di risorse (sprecate) i motivi per cui sostengo quanto sopra sono illustrati in un articolo che segnalai su questa lista nel Marzo scorso [1]: «Identifying software» Ludovic Courtès, Maxim Cournoyer, Jan Nieuwenhuizen, Simon Tournier — March 4, 2024 https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2024/identifying-software/ il nocciolo super-sintetico della critica agli SBOM è questo: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) standard has been designed to fill that role; it is used to identify software as part of the well-known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) process. But CPE is showing its limits as an extrinsic identification mechanism: the human-readable identifiers chosen by CPE fail to capture the complexity of what “software” is. [...] mere package name/version pairs such as gcc 11.3.0 fail to capture the breadth and depth elements that lead to a binary artifact. This is a shortcoming of systems such as the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) standard: it fails to express whether a vulnerability that applies to gcc 11.3.0 applies to it regardless of how it was built, patched, and configured, or whether certain conditions are required. [...] Again, a software bill of materials (SBOM) written as a mere list of package name/version pairs would fail to capture as much information. The Artifact Dependency Graph (ADG) of OmniBOR (https://omnibor.io/) while less ambiguous, falls short in two ways: it is too fine-grained for typical cybersecurity applications (at the level of individual source files), and it only captures the alleged source/binary correspondence of individual files but not the process to go from source to binary. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- l'articolo ricalca quanto gli autori hanno scritto in un loro commento a seguito di una RFC (request for comment) [2] della CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) in merito al loro documento intitolato «Software Identification Ecosystem Option Analysis» [3]; il commento non è arrivato in tempo per essere pubblicato, ma è disponibile negli archivi del progetto Guix in PDF [4]. detto in altre parole: un sistema /estrinseco/ (al processo di build) per (tentare di) identificare tutti i "componenti" di un software binario è inadatto allo scopo di garantire un «effective vulnerability management» (cit. da [3]); un «effective vulnerability management» è possibile solo utilizzando un sistema /intrinseco/ (al processo di build). Last BUT NOT least, il processo di build _deve_ includere il c.d. full-source bootstrap [5], altrimenti il «vulnerability management» è /ineffective/. --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- In other words, because Guix itself defines how artifacts are built, the revision of the Guix source coupled with the package name unambiguously identify the package’s binary artifact. As scientists, we build on this property to achieve reproducible research workflows, as explained in this 2022 article in Nature Scientific Data; as engineers, we value this property to analyze the systems we are running and determine which known vulnerabilities and bugs apply. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- (https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2024/identifying-software/) per approfondimenti segnalo il paper «Building a Secure Software Supply Chain with GNU Guix» pubblicato il 2022-06-15 su «The Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming, 2023, Vol. 7, Issue 1, Article 1» disponibile qui: https://programming-journal.org/2023/7/1/ saluti, 380° [1] Message-id: 87plvwsmkj.fsf(a)xelera.eu [2] https://www.regulations.gov/document/CISA-2023-0026-0001 [3] https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/software-identification-ecos… [4] https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/guix/maintenance.git/plain/doc/cisa-2023-… [5] https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2023/the-full-source-bootstrap-building-from-s… -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

Damiano Verzulli <damiano(a)verzulli.it> writes: [...] > rispetto al tema della sicurezza/controllo della "supply-chain", mi > sono _hardware_ supply chain, che diversa da quella software perché condizione sine qua non è avere accesso _fisico_ al device, in qualsiasi punto della supply chain (mentre inserirsi nella supply chain software è possibile anche via rete, da remoto). > tornati alla mente queste due episodi (il primo, suggeritomi da uno > studente): > > * 2014: "Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting > implant" > https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factor… > > * 2018 "The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. > Companies" > https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-u… ottimi riferimenti; a questo proposito cito un brano di questo articolo di Wikipedia: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Documents revealed from 2013 onwards during the surveillance disclosures initiated by Edward Snowden showed that the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees intercepted servers, routers, and other network gear being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance to install covert implant firmware onto them before delivery.[13][14] These tools include custom BIOS exploits that survive the reinstallation of operating systems and USB cables with spy hardware and radio transceiver packed inside.[15] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- quindi il /modus operandi/ è ben noto quello che non sono affatto noti sono /i dettagli/ di chi, come e perché utilizzava e utilizza questo modus operandi, considerato che una piccolissima percentuale dei documenti trafugati da Snowden è stata resa pubblica. [...] Saluti, 380° -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Can LLMs Generate Novel Research Ideas? A Large-Scale Human Study with 100+ NLP Researchers

by Fabio Alemagna

«By recruiting over 100 NLP researchers to write novel ideas and blind reviews of both LLM and human ideas, we obtain the first statistically significant conclusion on current LLM capabilities for research ideation: we find LLM-generated ideas are judged as more novel (p < 0.05) than human expert ideas while being judged slightly weaker on feasibility.» https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04109v1

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 18/09/24 12:52 PM, 380° via nexa ha scritto: > [...] > ...poi l'articolo si trasforma in uno SPROLOQUIO sulla "software supply > chain" (con soluzioni ridicole tipo gli SBOM - Software Bill Of > Material) Come tante medicine, la SBOM non è certamente la soluzione di tutti i mali (del software). Tuttavia, in una scala da: * "0" => nessuna idea sul software che si usa e si impianta nei propri prodotti/servizi, compresi quelli venduti a * "100" => controllo meticoloso e preliminare di ogni singola riga di codice utilizzato, incluse dinamiche di ripetibilita' delle build delle stesse e di tutti i tool utilizzati, anche a livello firmware ritengo che lo standard, oggi, da parte di chi utilizza, sviluppa o distribuisce software (in "media", nel nostro Paese) sia molto vicino a 0 (certamente inferiore a 5) e... la SBOM ci porterebbe piu' in la. Sensibilmente. Non a 100... ma almeno a 30/40 (che sarebbe gia' un risultato gigantesco, dato il punto di partenza attuale) Quindi, IMO, ben vengano le SBOM... Bye, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 18/09/24 12:52 PM, 380° via nexa ha scritto: > 380°<g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > >> siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli >> hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena >> analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. > mi stavo giusto chiedendo se ci fosse qualche precedente [...] rispetto al tema della sicurezza/controllo della "supply-chain", mi sono tornati alla mente queste due episodi (il primo, suggeritomi da uno studente): * 2014: "Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant" https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factor… * 2018 "The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies" https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-u… Bye, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

380° <g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli > hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena > analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. mi stavo giusto chiedendo se ci fosse qualche precedente e a rispondermi è Christine Gadsbym, Cybersecurity CISO in BlackBerry. ...poi l'articolo si trasforma in uno SPROLOQUIO sulla "software supply chain" (con soluzioni ridicole tipo gli SBOM - Software Bill Of Material), quindi mi limito a citare le parti pertinenti al supply chain attack in oggetto. https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/09/pagers-explode-supply-chain-securit… «Supply Chain Lessons from Thousands of Exploding Pagers» 09.17.24, Christine Gadsby --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- But the conversation soon shifted to another possible scenario: the pagers must have been intercepted along the supply chain so someone could place explosives inside each pager with a method of remotely triggering the blasts. Attackers have utilized [[https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Ayyash][similar attacks]] before, although not to this scale. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- COMUNQUE: il precedente indicato è del 1996 e riguarda il sabotaggio di UN telefono cellulare nel quale furono introdotti 15 grammi di esplosivo con un sistema di detonazione remoto. --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Kamal Hamad asked his nephew for the phone, which he later returned. It was almost certainly at this moment that the 2oz radio-controlled bomb was inserted. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/how-the-phone-bomb-was-set-up-1323…) Quindi non certo un supply chain attack, ma la tecnica pare la stessa identica di circa 30 anni fa, non proprio una novità per le agenzie di "intelligence", insomma. Saluti, 380° -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Re: [nexa] explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

380° <g380(a)biscuolo.net> writes: > siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli > hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena > analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. altra fonte, France24: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240917-israeli-supply-chain-infiltr… «Israeli supply chain infiltration likely behind Hezbollah pager blasts: analysts» Issued on: 17/09/2024 - 20:51 Modified: 17/09/2024 - 20:49 --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Paris (AFP) – Israel has scored a major intelligence success by apparently infiltrating a supply chain to cause the simultaneous explosion of hundreds of Hezbollah pagers in a blow for the Lebanese militant group and its Iranian backers, analysts say. [...] With Hezbollah appearing to prefer the use of pagers for internal communications over smartphones for security reasons, analysts said it appeared Israel had corrupted the devices before delivery, allowing them to explode at a specific time. A source close to Hezbollah, asking not to be identified, told AFP that "the pagers that exploded concern a shipment recently imported by Hezbollah of 1,000 devices", which appear to have been "sabotaged at source". "For Israel to embed an explosive trigger within the new batch of pagers, they would have likely needed access to the supply chain of these devices," said Brussels-based military and security analyst Elijah Magnier. "Israeli intelligence has infiltrated the production process, adding an explosive component and remote triggering mechanism into the pagers without raising suspicion," he said, raising the prospect the third party which sold the devices could have been an "intelligence front" set up by Israel for the purpose. Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute said: "This was more than lithium batteries being forced into override. A small plastic explosive was almost certainly concealed alongside the battery, for remote detonation via a call or page." "Mossad infiltrated the supply chain," he concluded, referring to Israel's intelligence agency. 'Their big comeback' ───────────────────── The Wall Street Journal cited people familiar with the matter as saying the affected pagers were from a new shipment that the group received in recent days. [...] the images captured on camera of pagers exploding are a major security blow for Hezbollah and an illustration of Israel's reach even into its members' pockets. [...] French defence expert Pierre Servent said the latest action against Hezbollah would help Israeli intelligence services restore their reputation, which was badly dented by the October 7 attack. "The series of operations conducted over the past few months marks their big comeback, with a desire for deterrence and a message: 'we messed up but we're not dead,'" he told AFP. [...] 'Classic sabotage' ─────────────────── Former CIA analyst Mike Dimino of the US-based Defense Priorities think tank said that judging by images of the injuries a "very small explosive" implanted inside the devices was the most likely cause, rather than an overheating battery. "This was a classic sabotage operation," he said on X, adding such an operation takes "months if not years" to orchestrate. Dubai-based analyst Riad Kahwaji said that Israel had taken advantage of Hezbollah's move away from smartphones to pagers. Israel intelligence had conducted a "most professional operation", he said. "Without a doubt, one of the factories it (Israel) owns manufactured and shipped these explosive devices that exploded today," he said. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers.

by 380°

Buongiorno, siccome ne ho lette di tutti i colori in merito a "hanno stati gli hacker col MALWARE" (anche da presunti espertoni), vale la pena analizzare i fatti cum granu salis e smetterla con la SUPERSTIZIONE. https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/8-dead-2700-injured-after-simultan… «11 dead, thousands injured in explosive supply chain attack on Hezbollah pagers. - Supply chain attack may be to blame.» [Nate Anderson] - Updated Sep 18, 2024 2:00 am UTC --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- A massive wave of pager explosions across Lebanon and Syria beginning at 3:30 pm local time today killed at least 11 people and injured more than 2,700, according to local officials. Many of the injured appear to be Hezbollah members, although a young girl is said to be among the dead. Anonymous officials briefed on the matter are now describing it as a supply chain attack in which Israel was able to hide small amounts of explosives inside Taiwanese pagers shipped to Lebanon. The explosive was allegedly triggered by a small switch inside the pagers that would be activated upon receiving a specific code. Once that code was received, the pagers beeped for several seconds—and then detonated. [...] The shocking—and novel—attack appears to have relied on a wave of recently imported Hezbollah pagers, according to [reporting in The Wall Street Journal]. (The group had already warned its members to avoid using cell phones due to both tracking and assassination concerns.) [...] (An [early story from a local media outlet] claimed that "the pager server was compromised, leading to the installation of a script that caused an overload. This likely resulted in the overheating of the lithium battery, which then exploded.") The WSJ quoted regional security analyst Michael Horowitz as suggesting the attack was likely caused by either 1) malware triggering the batteries to overheat/explode or 2) an actual explosive charge inserted in the devices at some point in the supply chain and then detonated remotely. [...] Late in the day, US and other officials anonymously [told the New York Times] that the attack was, in fact, caused by explosives. Israel managed to insert "as little as one or two ounces" of explosive material next to the battery inside each pager, officials said. [...] Reuters has a [similar report], using different sources, but it also notes that the president of Gold Apollo emphatically claimed today that the pagers were not made by his company in Taiwan. Rather, he said, they were made under license by a company called BAC, which then put Gold Apollo's branding on them. [...] /This breaking news story has been rewritten to incorporate updates added throughout the day./ [Nate Anderson] <https://arstechnica.com/author/nate-anderson/> [reporting in The Wall Street Journal] <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/hundreds-of-hezbollah-operatives-pager…> [early story from a local media outlet] <https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/lebanon-news/796406/understanding-the-pager-an…> [told the New York Times] <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/17/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-pagers…> [similar report] <https://news.sky.com/story/explosive-pagers-used-by-hezbollah-had-been-modi…> --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

Sept. 18, 2024

Larry Ellison's AI-Powered Surveillance Dystopia Is Already Here

by Daniela Tafani

Larry Ellison's AI-Powered Surveillance Dystopia Is Already Here Jason Koebler Sep 17, 2024 There’s a comment that’s become very popular on social media whenever a new, horrifying surveillance practice is revealed: “1984 was supposed to be a warning, not an instruction manual!” This sentiment has become a bit tiresome, in part because saying it doesn’t really mean anything, and our real world has long since surpassed George Orwell’s dystopian nightmare in a few ways. But invoking 1984 as warning, not instruction manual feels appropriate here, with Oracle CEO Larry Ellison, the fifth-richest person in the world, pitching his exciting vision for an always-on, 1984-style, AI-powered surveillance fever dream to an audience of investors. In the remarks, which were first reported by Business Insider, Ellison said police body cameras, car cameras, drones, and other cameras will be always on and streaming to Oracle data centers, where AI will constantly be monitoring the feeds. “The police would be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly watching and recording everything that’s going on,” Ellison said. “Citizens will be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on. It’s unimpeachable. The cars have cameras on them.” Ellison’s entire remarks are worth reading, because what he is pitching is a comprehensive surveillance apparatus that touches most parts of being in public. More importantly, every idea he is pitching currently exists in some form, and each has massive privacy, bias, legal, or societal issues that have prevented them from being the game-changing technology that somehow makes us all safer. Ellison: “Securing schools: We think we can absolutely lock down schools so that dramatically reduce the case of anyone being on campus that doesn’t belong on campus, and immediately alert someone, use AI cameras to immediately recognize that.” The idea that schools can be made safe with technology (or armed teachers, or more police) rather than, say, making guns harder to access, has become a cash cow for surveillance tech companies in the age of near-constant school shootings. Many schools have begun to implement AI-powered weapon detectors, which are notoriously inaccurate and which have, for example, detected notebooks as “weapons,” missed actual weapons, and led to what one administrator called “the least safe day” because of mass confusion associated with the scanners. Students are also being monitored in the hallways, in the bathroom, on social media, and on their school-issued devices. It’s unclear that any of this has made schools any safer. Axon, meanwhile, pitched the idea of taser-equipped drones that patrol schools, an idea that was quickly shelved after widespread public outrage and its own ethics board resigning over the idea. Ellison: “We completely redesigned body cameras. Our body cameras cost $70, normal body camera costs, I don’t know, $7,000. Our body cameras are simply lenses, two lenses attached to a vest attached to the smartphone you’re wearing. We take the video of the police officer. And the camera is always on. You don’t turn it on and off. [A police officer can say], ‘Oracle, I need two minutes to take a bathroom break,’ and we’ll turn it off. The truth is, we don’t really turn it off. What we do is, we record it, so no one can see it, so no one can get into that recording without a court order. So you get the privacy you requested, but court order, we will—a judge will order, that so-called bathroom break. Something comes up, I’m going to lunch with my friends. ‘Oracle, I need an hour of privacy for lunch with my friends.’ God bless. We won’t listen in, unless there’s a court order. But we transmit the video back to headquarters, and AI is constantly monitoring video.” Ellison is correct that police turning off their body cameras is a well-documented problem. Intuitively, you would also think that body cameras would improve police behavior. But the evidence for this is actually not that strong. Academics have shown that having a body camera on does not make a statistical or consistent difference in police behavior in part because there are many cases of police being filmed committing acts of brutality where the officer in question does not face severe consequences. Public access to body camera footage is also incredibly uneven; public records laws differ in each state about whether that footage can be obtained by journalists and police accountability organizations. Ellison is proposing a situation here where the footage would be held and analyzed not by a public police department but by Oracle and Oracle’s AI systems. “We won’t listen in, unless there’s a court order” means, of course, that it is listening in, and has all sorts of implications for who can access this sort of footage, when, and under what circumstances. Ellison: “Remember this terrible case in Memphis where the five police officers basically beat to death another citizen in Memphis? Well, that can’t happen because it’d be on TV at headquarters. Everyone would see it. Your body cameras would be transmitting that. The police would be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly watching and recording everything that’s going on. Citizens will be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on. It’s unimpeachable. The cars have cameras on them. I think we have a squad car someplace. Those applications—we’re using AI to monitor the video. So that altercation that occurred in Memphis, the chief of police would be immediately notified. It’s not people that are looking at those cameras, it’s AI that’s looking at the camera, [saying] ‘No, no no, you can’t do this. That’s an event.’ An alarm is going to go off and we’re going to have supervision. Every police officer is going to be supervised at all times. And if there’s a problem, AI will report it to the appropriate person, whether it’s the sheriff or the chief or whoever we need to take control of the situation.” AI-powered and connected smart cameras are already in use in the United States and across the world. So are automated license plate readers, AI-powered gunshot detecting microphones, connected home security cameras, facial recognition tech, etc. Tesla footage is being subpoenaed and used in police investigations. Crime still exists, and false positives and cases of mistaken identities are common across most of these technologies. Companies like Predpol, Shotspotter, Flock, Fusus, Axon, and many others have been pitching the idea of predictive and instantly-reactive policing as a deterrent for many years. These technologies are anything but “unimpeachable.” There have been numerous incidents of Black men being misidentified by facial recognition technology, instances of police automatically responding to a supposed gunshot that was not a gunshot, and cases of over-policing for minor crimes or minor disturbances. In South Africa, for example, AI-connected smart surveillance cameras have been accused of creating a “new Apartheid” because of bias within its systems. Ellison: “We have drones. A drone gets out there way faster than a police car. You shouldn’t have high-speed chases with cars. You just have the drone follow a car, it’s very simple. A new generation of autonomous drones. A forest fire—the drone spots a forest fire and then the drone drops down and looks around to see if there’s a human being near that heat bloom, and someone else either had an unattended campfire that caught fire, or it’s arson. We can do all of that. It’s all done autonomously with AI.” This system is called “drones as first responders,” it also already exists, and there are problems with this, too. Drones are being used to automatically surveil homeless encampments, house parties, teens being loud, and a person “bouncing a ball against a garage.” AI and drone tech to prevent forest fires is also something that has had millions of dollars poured into it, with underwhelming results so far. This is all to say that Larry Ellison’s surveillance fever dream isn’t actually a fever dream: All of these are technologies that already exist in some form, many of which have not measurably driven down crime or solved the complicated societal, political, and economic problems that lead to crime in the first place or the societal power structures that protect police at every turn. These technologies have collectively cost billions of dollars, made surveillance companies very rich, and have created new privacy problems. Big Brother is here, and, surprise, having AI “supervision” has not created a crimeless utopia. <https://www.404media.co/larry-ellisons-ai-powered-surveillance-dystopia-is-…>

Sept. 17, 2024