- nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology

by Stefano Borroni Barale

Sembrerebbero quasi tesi lapalissiane, ma... non dopo uno scroll veloce degli ultimi 100 post su Linkedin. Grazie per la condivisione. Stefano Inviato con l'email sicura Proton Mail. martedì 6 maggio 2025 15:58, Daniela Tafani <daniela.tafani(a)unipi.it> ha scritto: > Ciao, Maurizio, > > riprendono alcune tesi che hanno già sostenuto altrove: > > - nel passaggio da ricerca a commercio, ossia da una scoperta o un'invenzione allo sviluppo di prodotti, è decisiva la distinzione tra capacità e affidabilità: > un sistema che effettui correttamente la prenotazione di un volo aereo 9 volte su 10 è definito, tecnicamente, come capace di farlo, > ma nessuno lo vorrebbe, come "agente" di viaggio. Ed è improbabile che le tecniche che consentono di arrivare al 90% di correttezza ci portino fino al 100%. > Per i prodotti, come le auto a guida autonoma, in cui quel 10% di errori è costoso, non sono accettabili sperimentazioni nel mondo reale; > > - i benchmark non misurano l'utilità nel mondo reale; > > - l'idea della superintelligenza su fonda su errori concettuali e logici: l'intelligenza non è né una caratteristica fissa e stabile né omogenea e misurabile su scala unidimensionale. Non esiste un'accezione utile del termine "intelligenza" in cui l'IA sia più intelligente delle persone che la usano. Le situazioni reali in cui siano necessarie capacità di computazione velocissima sono limitate; > > - la regolazione promuove, non ostacola, diffusione e innovazione; in ogni caso, la maggior parte dei settori in cui l'IA verrà usata è già regolata. Chi sostiene che manchi una regolazione dell'IA sostiene una regolazione modello-centrica, che non ha senso; > > - human-in-the-loop e allineamento dei modelli non sono soluzioni; > > - se consideriamo l'IA come una tecnologia normale, terremo presenti gli effetti più verosimili della sua introduzione, anziché quelli fantascientici. Ad esempio, l'aumento di pratiche estrattive e quindi di disuguaglianza. > > Un saluto, > Daniela > > > > > ________________________________________ > Da: nexa nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it per conto di maurizio lana maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it > > Inviato: martedì 6 maggio 2025 14:24 > A: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > Oggetto: Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology > > grazie della segnalazione. > il paper linkato è di 52 pagine quindi non azzardo commenti anche se le prime pagine che ho letto mi paiono sensate e centrate. > in ogni caso il tema che gli autori pongono mi pare rilevante: > The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. > ovvio che chi non ha mai visto un martello potrebbe decidere di vederci una rappresentazione del divino ma sappiamo che serve per piantare chiodi; e nel piantare chiodi è molto utile per tutti quelli che prima usavano pietre prese al fiume per piantare i chiodi; e così facendo spesso si schiacciavano le unghie o storcevano i chiodi. > > Maurizio > > > > Il 04/05/25 14:56, Daniela Tafani ha scritto: > > AI as Normal Technology > An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence > By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor > April 15, 2025 > > We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies > such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to > treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. > > The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: > a description of current AI, > a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and > a prescription about how we should treat it. > > We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not > think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. > The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. > It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as > the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and > the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. > > In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, > AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. > > In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. > > In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. > Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to > make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. > > In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. > > We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the > downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality > > https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technologyhttps://www.aisnakeoil.… > > > > > ________________________________ > > if we spent on prosecuting the rich > just one-tenth of the effort we spend prosecuting the poor > it would be a very different world > Bruce Schneier > > ________________________________ > Maurizio Lana > Università del Piemonte Orientale > Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici > Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

May 6, 2025

Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology

by Daniela Tafani

Ciao, Maurizio, riprendono alcune tesi che hanno già sostenuto altrove: - nel passaggio da ricerca a commercio, ossia da una scoperta o un'invenzione allo sviluppo di prodotti, è decisiva la distinzione tra capacità e affidabilità: un sistema che effettui correttamente la prenotazione di un volo aereo 9 volte su 10 è definito, tecnicamente, come capace di farlo, ma nessuno lo vorrebbe, come "agente" di viaggio. Ed è improbabile che le tecniche che consentono di arrivare al 90% di correttezza ci portino fino al 100%. Per i prodotti, come le auto a guida autonoma, in cui quel 10% di errori è costoso, non sono accettabili sperimentazioni nel mondo reale; - i benchmark non misurano l'utilità nel mondo reale; - l'idea della superintelligenza su fonda su errori concettuali e logici: l'intelligenza non è né una caratteristica fissa e stabile né omogenea e misurabile su scala unidimensionale. Non esiste un'accezione utile del termine "intelligenza" in cui l'IA sia più intelligente delle persone che la usano. Le situazioni reali in cui siano necessarie capacità di computazione velocissima sono limitate; - la regolazione promuove, non ostacola, diffusione e innovazione; in ogni caso, la maggior parte dei settori in cui l'IA verrà usata è già regolata. Chi sostiene che manchi una regolazione dell'IA sostiene una regolazione modello-centrica, che non ha senso; - human-in-the-loop e allineamento dei modelli non sono soluzioni; - se consideriamo l'IA come una tecnologia normale, terremo presenti gli effetti più verosimili della sua introduzione, anziché quelli fantascientici. Ad esempio, l'aumento di pratiche estrattive e quindi di disuguaglianza. Un saluto, Daniela ________________________________________ Da: nexa <nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it> per conto di maurizio lana <maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it> Inviato: martedì 6 maggio 2025 14:24 A: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it Oggetto: Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology grazie della segnalazione. il paper linkato è di 52 pagine quindi non azzardo commenti anche se le prime pagine che ho letto mi paiono sensate e centrate. in ogni caso il tema che gli autori pongono mi pare rilevante: The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. ovvio che chi non ha mai visto un martello potrebbe decidere di vederci una rappresentazione del divino ma sappiamo che serve per piantare chiodi; e nel piantare chiodi è molto utile per tutti quelli che prima usavano pietre prese al fiume per piantare i chiodi; e così facendo spesso si schiacciavano le unghie o storcevano i chiodi. Maurizio Il 04/05/25 14:56, Daniela Tafani ha scritto: AI as Normal Technology An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor April 15, 2025 We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: a description of current AI, a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and a prescription about how we should treat it. We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality <https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology><https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology> ________________________________ if we spent on prosecuting the rich just one-tenth of the effort we spend prosecuting the poor it would be a very different world Bruce Schneier ________________________________ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

May 6, 2025

Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology

by maurizio lana

grazie della segnalazione. il paper linkato è di 52 pagine quindi non azzardo commenti anche se le prime pagine che ho letto mi paiono sensate e centrate. in ogni caso il tema che gli autori pongono mi pare rilevante: > The normal technology frame is about the relationship between > technology and society. It rejects technological determinism, > especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its > future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, > such as the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and > diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the > future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and the role of > institutions in shaping this trajectory. ovvio che chi non ha mai visto un martello potrebbe decidere di vederci una rappresentazione del divino ma sappiamo che serve per piantare chiodi; e nel piantare chiodi è molto utile per tutti quelli che prima usavano pietre prese al fiume per piantare i chiodi; e così facendo spesso si schiacciavano le unghie o storcevano i chiodi. Maurizio Il 04/05/25 14:56, Daniela Tafani ha scritto: > AI as Normal Technology > An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence > By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor > April 15, 2025 > > We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies > such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to > treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. > > The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: > a description of current AI, > a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and > a prescription about how we should treat it. > > We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not > think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. > The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. > It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as > the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and > the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. > > In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, > AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. > > In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. > > In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. > Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to > make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. > > In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. > > We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the > downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality > > <https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ if we spent on prosecuting the rich just one-tenth of the effort we spend prosecuting the poor it would be a very different world Bruce Schneier ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

May 6, 2025

183° Mercoledì di Nexa | 14 maggio 2025, ore 17.00

by Nexa - Media

Gentilissime, gentilissimi, Vi invitiamo a partecipare al 183° Mercoledì di Nexa, che si terrà mercoledì 14 maggio, alle ore 17.00, con un incontro dal titolo "I segni di Proteo". Ospite dell'incontro: Massimo Leone (Università degli Studi di Torino). L'incontro si terrà IN PRESENZA e ONLINE. SEDE FISICA Centro Nexa su Internet e Società, Politecnico di Torino, Via Boggio 65/a, Torino (1° piano). Per accedere alla sala si raccomanda di suonare al citofono Portineria e di seguire le indicazioni segnalate lungo il percorso. QUI<https://nexa.polito.it/contatti> maggiori informazioni su come raggiungerci. STANZA VIRTUALE dell'incontro: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent Di seguito maggiori dettagli: https://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi-183 Cordiali saluti, -- Valeria Bergantino Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino - DAUIN Via Pier Carlo Boggio, 65/A - 10138 Torino web: https://nexa.polito.it/ mail: valeria.bergantino(a)polito.it<mailto:valeria.bergantino@polito.it> tel: 3473443585

May 6, 2025

Fwd: Gazaweb, Aiuta a piantare gli "Alberi della Rete" a Gaza

by graffio

Cara lista, mi permetto di rimandare questa mail perché la mandai a ridosso del 25 aprile e probabilmente molte non hanno avuto modo di leggerla. Purtroppo la necessità di aiuto è ancora più urgente. Grazie per l'attenzione. -------- Messaggio Inoltrato -------- Oggetto: Gazaweb, Aiuta a piantare gli "Alberi della Rete" a Gaza Data: Wed, 23 Apr 2025 11:22:28 +0200 Mittente: graffio <graffio(a)autistici.org> A: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it Buongiorno lista. Invio questa richiesta di aiuto per un progetto di solidarietà con l'umanità intrappolata nella striscia di Gaza, in Palestina. Da inizio Ottobre 2023 il traffico internet a Gaza è diminuito di oltre l’80%. Le interruzioni sono state causate da una combinazione di attacchi diretti alle infrastrutture di telecomunicazione civili, restrizioni all’accesso all’elettricità e interruzioni tecniche dei servizi di telecomunicazione. L'ong ACS ha avviato da più di un anno il progetto "Gazaweb - Alberi della Rete", sistema internet alternativo per aggirare il blocco israeliano a Gaza. In un contesto devastato da bombardamenti e infrastrutture distrutte, questa rete consente alla popolazione di mantenere legami sociali, comunicare con affetti dispersi nella Striscia e condividere emergenze. L’intervento di emergenza più rapido sul quale *GazaWeb* si è impegnato sono gli eSIM-hotspots, ovvero gli *Alberi della Rete*. Una serie di cellulari di ultima generazione consentono il collegamento ai network internazionali anche con le *eSIM*, carte sim virtuali che (tramite l’attivazione di un codice) svolgono le stesse funzioni di una SIMcard tradizionale. Non potendo inviare materiale fisico all''interno della striscia, è sufficiente inviare il codice di attivazione eSIM (qrcode) a chi possiede uno di questi dispositivi per attivare collegamenti alle reti cellulari egiziane o israeliane dall’interno della striscia di Gaza. La ong *ACS* ha allestito, in coordinamento con i cooperanti presenti a Gaza, una serie di hot-spot via wi-fi connessi a internet tramite eSIM, ognuno dei quali permette la connessione a circa 50 ulteriori dispositivi. In questo modo anche chi non è in possesso di cellulari di ultima generazione può agganciarsi a internet tramite il segnale wi-fi irradiato dall’*Albero della Rete*. ACS ha intenzione di “piantare” un buon numero di Alberi della Rete nei campi profughi e nelle altre aree dove le reti telefoniche non sono accessibili o sono sotto lo stretto controllo delle autorità israeliane. Oltre a essere una soluzione tecnica, questa soluzione rappresenta un simbolo di resilienza collettiva, offrendo connessione umana e speranza in un territorio isolato dal conflitto. *Più eSIM si riescono ad attivare, più si infittisce il bosco degli Alberi della Rete e le relative connessioni.* *Sottoscrivi per far crescere gli alberi della rete: https://aiutagazaweb.vado.li* Per approfondire https://www.acs-italia.it/gazaweb-e-gli-alberi-della-rete/ https://peertube.mesnumeriques.fr/w/26vP1HYDgTgxcz6XMk9stJ Serve aiuto!! grazie -- Maurizio "Graffio" Pillole di informazione digitale - https://pillole.graffio.org/ "C.I.R.C.E. -https://circex.org" AvANa -https://avana.forteprenestino.net/

May 5, 2025

Argomentazione morale e biomedicina nell’era dell’AI

by Cristiano Cali'

Carissimi, mi permetto di ricordare il Workshop su Argomentazione morale e biomedicina nell’era dell’AI, che si terrà questa settima, l’8 e il 9 maggio, presso l’Università degli Studi di Torino. In allegato il programma. Un cordiale saluto. Cristiano Calì, PhD Research Fellow in Moral Philosophy Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze Dell'Educazione - Università degli Studi di Torino Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies - Boston Via Sant'Ottavio, 20 - 10124 Turin, Piedmont, Italy +39 3491489788 <tel:+393491489788> cristianocali30(a)gmail.com <mailto:cristianocali30@gmail.com> <https://unict.academia.edu/CristianoCali> <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=zRTES68AAAAJ&hl=it> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristianocal> <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cristiano-Cali> <https://philpeople.org/profiles/cristiano-cali> <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5235-2177>

May 5, 2025

Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology

by Italo Vignoli

Scusate, Thunderbird è impazzito all'improvviso e ha risposto a questa lista invece che alla richiesta di supporto per LibreOffice On 5/4/25 21:03, Italo Vignoli wrote: > > Unfortunately, in today's work environment - where many people are at > home and rely on network-based services not only for work but also for > entertainment (Netflix and the like) - the infrastructure is under > stress and the download may fail several times. > > When you click the yellow DOWNLOAD button, the download starts in the > background without any visible activity on your screen. We suggest you > open the DOWNLOAD page in your browser to check the status. Please do > not close the browser until you are sure the download is complete. > > If the download does not start, please try a different server. To > change servers, click on the INFO link just below the yellow DOWNLOAD > button and select a server from the list that appears on the page that > opens when you click on the INFO link. > > Please note that you can retry the download as many times as you like, > as long as you do not close the browser window before the download is > complete. You can ignore the donation request, as donations are > optional and help us keep the project alive. > > If all goes well, when the download is complete, a window will open > asking you to choose whether to run the installer or save the file to > your hard drive. Please choose the second option and save the file to > your DOWNLOADS folder. > > Then open the DOWNLOADS folder and double-click on the file (the name > starts with LibreOffice and ends with .MSI on Windows and .DMG on > MacOS). Follow the on-screen instructions carefully until the end of > the installation process. > > If everything goes well, LibreOffice will be installed correctly and > will appear in your menu (for Windows) or in your Applications folder > (for MacOS). > > Please do not use torrents as they are not reliable (as of today). > > Sorry for the long message. I hope this helps. Best regards. > > On 5/4/25 14:56, Daniela Tafani wrote: >> AI as Normal Technology >> An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence >> By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor >> April 15, 2025 >> >> We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies >> such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to >> treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. >> >> The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: >> a description of current AI, >> a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and >> a prescription about how we should treat it. >> >> We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not >> think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. >> The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. >> It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as >> the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and >> the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. >> >> In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, >> AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. >> >> In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. >> >> In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. >> Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to >> make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. >> >> In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. >> >> We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the >> downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality >> >> <https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology> > -- > Italo Vignoli -italo(a)vignoli.org > mobile/signal/telegram +39.348.5653829 -- Italo Vignoli -italo(a)vignoli.org mobile/signal/telegram +39.348.5653829

May 4, 2025

Re: [nexa] AI as Normal Technology

by Italo Vignoli

Unfortunately, in today's work environment - where many people are at home and rely on network-based services not only for work but also for entertainment (Netflix and the like) - the infrastructure is under stress and the download may fail several times. When you click the yellow DOWNLOAD button, the download starts in the background without any visible activity on your screen. We suggest you open the DOWNLOAD page in your browser to check the status. Please do not close the browser until you are sure the download is complete. If the download does not start, please try a different server. To change servers, click on the INFO link just below the yellow DOWNLOAD button and select a server from the list that appears on the page that opens when you click on the INFO link. Please note that you can retry the download as many times as you like, as long as you do not close the browser window before the download is complete. You can ignore the donation request, as donations are optional and help us keep the project alive. If all goes well, when the download is complete, a window will open asking you to choose whether to run the installer or save the file to your hard drive. Please choose the second option and save the file to your DOWNLOADS folder. Then open the DOWNLOADS folder and double-click on the file (the name starts with LibreOffice and ends with .MSI on Windows and .DMG on MacOS). Follow the on-screen instructions carefully until the end of the installation process. If everything goes well, LibreOffice will be installed correctly and will appear in your menu (for Windows) or in your Applications folder (for MacOS). Please do not use torrents as they are not reliable (as of today). Sorry for the long message. I hope this helps. Best regards. On 5/4/25 14:56, Daniela Tafani wrote: > AI as Normal Technology > An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence > By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor > April 15, 2025 > > We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies > such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to > treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. > > The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: > a description of current AI, > a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and > a prescription about how we should treat it. > > We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not > think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. > The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. > It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as > the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and > the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. > > In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, > AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. > > In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. > > In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. > Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to > make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. > > In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. > > We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the > downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality > > <https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology> -- Italo Vignoli -italo(a)vignoli.org mobile/signal/telegram +39.348.5653829

May 4, 2025

AI as Normal Technology

by Daniela Tafani

AI as Normal Technology An alternative to the vision of AI as a potential superintelligence By Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor April 15, 2025 We articulate a vision of artificial intelligence (AI) as normal technology. To view AI as normal is not to understate its impact—even transformative, general-purpose technologies such as electricity and the internet are “normal” in our conception. But it is in contrast to both utopian and dystopian visions of the future of AI which have a common tendency to treat it akin to a separate species, a highly autonomous, potentially superintelligent entity. The statement “AI is normal technology” is three things: a description of current AI, a prediction about the foreseeable future of AI, and a prescription about how we should treat it. We view AI as a tool that we can and should remain in control of, and we argue that this goal does not require drastic policy interventions or technical breakthroughs. We do not think that viewing AI as a humanlike intelligence is currently accurate or useful for understanding its societal impacts, nor is it likely to be in our vision of the future. The normal technology frame is about the relationship between technology and society. It rejects technological determinism, especially the notion of AI itself as an agent in determining its future. It is guided by lessons from past technological revolutions, such as the slow and uncertain nature of technology adoption and diffusion. It also emphasizes continuity between the past and the future trajectory of AI in terms of societal impact and the role of institutions in shaping this trajectory. In Part I, we explain why we think that transformative economic and societal impacts will be slow (on the timescale of decades), making a critical distinction between AI methods, AI applications, and AI adoption, arguing that the three happen at different timescales. In Part II, we discuss a potential division of labor between humans and AI in a world with advanced AI (but not “superintelligent” AI, which we view as incoherent as usually conceptualized). In this world, control is primarily in the hands of people and organizations; indeed, a greater and greater proportion of what people do in their jobs is AI control. In Part III, we examine the implications of AI as normal technology for AI risks. We analyze accidents, arms races, misuse, and misalignment, and argue that viewing AI as normal technology leads to fundamentally different conclusions about mitigations compared to viewing AI as being humanlike. Of course, we cannot be certain of our predictions, but we aim to describe what we view as the median outcome. We have not tried to quantify probabilities, but we have tried to make predictions that can tell us whether or not AI is behaving like normal technology. In Part IV, we discuss the implications for AI policy. We advocate for reducing uncertainty as a first-rate policy goal and resilience as the overarching approach to catastrophic risks. We argue that drastic interventions premised on the difficulty of controlling superintelligent AI will, in fact, make things much worse if AI turns out to be normal technology— the downsides of which will be likely to mirror those of previous technologies that are deployed in capitalistic societies, such as inequality <https://www.aisnakeoil.com/p/ai-as-normal-technology>

May 4, 2025

Re: [nexa] A weird phrase is plaguing scientific papers – and we traced it back to a glitch in AI training data

by maurizio lana

il tema era comparso anche in Gerard, David. «How AI slop generators started talking about ‘vegetative electron microscopy’». /Pivot to AI/ (blog), 15 febbraio 2025. https://pivot-to-ai.com/2025/02/15/how-ai-slop-generators-started-talking-a…. con una linea di discorso differente. questa e quella si integrano bene a dare una visione ampia del problema. alcuni degli articoli che contengono questa chimera della “vegetative electron microscopy” hanno centinaia di citazioni. occorrerebbe capire se si tratta di fake-citazioni come per un caso precedente si è discusso qui: Besançon, Lonni, Guillaume Cabanac, Cyril Labbé, e Alexander Magazinov. «Sneaked references: Fabricated reference metadata distort citation counts». /Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology/ n/a, fasc. n/a. Consultato 16 agosto 2024. https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.24896. Cabanac, Guillaume, e Lonni Besançon. «When scientific citations go rogue: Uncovering ‘sneaked references’». The Conversation, 9 luglio 2024. http://theconversation.com/when-scientific-citations-go-rogue-uncovering-sn…. Ibrahim, Hazem, Fengyuan Liu, Yasir Zaki, e Talal Rahwan. «Citation manipulation through citation mills and pre-print servers». /Scientific Reports/ 15, fasc. 1 (14 febbraio 2025): 5480. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-88709-7. per altro verso, di alcuni di questi articoli anche se non hanno centinaia di citazioni ci sono sono decine di versioni identiche per titolo e per dominio internet della pubblicazione. Maurizio Il 03/05/25 18:48, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa ha scritto: > <https://theconversation.com/a-weird-phrase-is-plaguing-scientific-papers-an…> > > theconversation.com > > A weird phrase is plaguing scientific papers – and we traced it back > to a glitch in AI training data > > Rayane El Masri > > Earlier this year, scientists discovered a peculiar term appearing in > published papers: “vegetative electron microscopy”. > > This phrase, which sounds technical but is actually nonsense, has > become a “digital fossil” – an error preserved and reinforced in > artificial intelligence (AI) systems that is nearly impossible to > remove from our knowledge repositories. > > Like biological fossils trapped in rock, these digital artefacts may > become permanent fixtures in our information ecosystem. > > The case of vegetative electron microscopy offers a troubling glimpse > into how AI systems can perpetuate and amplify errors throughout our > collective knowledge. > > A bad scan and an error in translation > > Vegetative electron microscopy appears to have originated through a > remarkable coincidence of unrelated errors. > > First, two papers from the 1950s, published in the journal > Bacteriological Reviews, were scanned and digitised. > > However, the digitising process erroneously combined “vegetative” from > one column of text with “electron” from another. As a result, the > phantom term was created. > > > Decades later, “vegetative electron microscopy” turned up in some > Iranian scientific papers. In 2017 and 2019, two papers used the term > in English captions and abstracts. > > This appears to be due to a translation error. In Farsi, the words for > “vegetative” and “scanning” differ by only a single dot. > > An error on the rise > > The upshot? As of today, “vegetative electron microscopy” appears in > 22 papers, according to Google Scholar. One was the subject of a > contested retraction from a Springer Nature journal, and Elsevier > issued a correction for another. > > The term also appears in news articles discussing subsequent integrity > investigations. > > Vegetative electron microscopy began to appear more frequently in the > 2020s. To find out why, we had to peer inside modern AI models – and > do some archaeological digging through the vast layers of data they > were trained on. > > Empirical evidence of AI contamination > > The large language models behind modern AI chatbots such as ChatGPT > are “trained” on huge amounts of text to predict the likely next word > in a sequence. The exact contents of a model’s training data are often > a closely guarded secret. > > To test whether a model “knew” about vegetative electron microscopy, > we input snippets of the original papers to find out if the model > would complete them with the nonsense term or more sensible alternatives. > > The results were revealing. OpenAI’s GPT-3 consistently completed > phrases with “vegetative electron microscopy”. Earlier models such as > GPT-2 and BERT did not. This pattern helped us isolate when and where > the contamination occurred. > > We also found the error persists in later models including GPT-4o and > Anthropic’s Claude 3.5. This suggests the nonsense term may now be > permanently embedded in AI knowledge bases. > > > By comparing what we know about the training datasets of different > models, we identified the CommonCrawl dataset of scraped internet > pages as the most likely vector where AI models first learned this term. > > The scale problem > > Finding errors of this sort is not easy. Fixing them may be almost > impossible. > > One reason is scale. The CommonCrawl dataset, for example, is millions > of gigabytes in size. For most researchers outside large tech > companies, the computing resources required to work at this scale are > inaccessible. > > Another reason is a lack of transparency in commercial AI models. > OpenAI and many other developers refuse to provide precise details > about the training data for their models. Research efforts to reverse > engineer some of these datasets have also been stymied by copyright > takedowns. > > When errors are found, there is no easy fix. Simple keyword filtering > could deal with specific terms such as vegetative electron microscopy. > However, it would also eliminate legitimate references (such as this > article). > > More fundamentally, the case raises an unsettling question. How many > other nonsensical terms exist in AI systems, waiting to be discovered? > > Implications for science and publishing > > This “digital fossil” also raises important questions about knowledge > integrity as AI-assisted research and writing become more common. > > Publishers have responded inconsistently when notified of papers > including vegetative electron microscopy. Some have retracted affected > papers, while others defended them. Elsevier notably attempted to > justify the term’s validity before eventually issuing a correction. > > We do not yet know if other such quirks plague large language models, > but it is highly likely. Either way, the use of AI systems has already > created problems for the peer-review process. > > For instance, observers have noted the rise of “tortured phrases” used > to evade automated integrity software, such as “counterfeit > consciousness” instead of “artificial intelligence”. Additionally, > phrases such as “I am an AI language model” have been found in other > retracted papers. > > Some automatic screening tools such as Problematic Paper Screener now > flag vegetative electron microscopy as a warning sign of possible > AI-generated content. However, such approaches can only address known > errors, not undiscovered ones. > > Living with digital fossils > > The rise of AI creates opportunities for errors to become permanently > embedded in our knowledge systems, through processes no single actor > controls. This presents challenges for tech companies, researchers, > and publishers alike. > > Tech companies must be more transparent about training data and > methods. Researchers must find new ways to evaluate information in the > face of AI-generated convincing nonsense. Scientific publishers must > improve their peer review processes to spot both human and > AI-generated errors. > > Digital fossils reveal not just the technical challenge of monitoring > massive datasets, but the fundamental challenge of maintaining > reliable knowledge in systems where errors can become self-perpetuating. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ citazioni come briganti ai bordi della strada che balzano fuori armati e strappano l’assenso all’ozioso viandante walter benjamin, strada a senso unico ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

May 4, 2025