April 2026 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: Sam Altman

by Stefano Borroni Barale

Buonasera Antonio, i numeri della resistenza italiana al nazifascismo non arrivano al 7 per mille, altro che 7 per cento... E la narrazione di Thiel e Karp (vedasi manifesto Palantir) è sorprendentemente simile a quella dei loro epigoni dell'epoca... Stefano Sent from Proton Mail for Android. -------- Original Message -------- On Wednesday, 04/29/26 at 18:10 antonio via nexa <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> wrote: > We have to resist this. Resistere? Ma come si fa a resistere se il 93% della popolazione italiana dai 14 agli 80 anni frequenta i social (e, tra questi, non certo il Fediverso), quindi, più o meno manipolabile. Se il 34,8% si sentirebbe a suo agio a informarsi attraverso un media interamente generato dall'IA? Sono numeri da brivido questi ultimi del Censis: https://www.censis.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Sintesi-Rap-Com-2026.pdf A.

April 29, 2026

Re: Sam Altman

by antonio

> We have to resist this. Resistere? Ma come si fa a resistere se il 93% della popolazione italiana dai 14 agli 80 anni frequenta i social (e, tra questi, non certo il Fediverso), quindi, più o meno manipolabile. Se il 34,8% si sentirebbe a suo agio a informarsi attraverso un media interamente generato dall'IA? Sono numeri da brivido questi ultimi del Censis: https://www.censis.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Sintesi-Rap-Com-2026.pdf A.

April 29, 2026

Sam Altman

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Guy Holder https://www.linkedin.com/posts/guy-holder-4596854a_i-dont-think-i-have-hear… I don’t think I have heard such a naked exposition of the centrality of surveillance capitalism to the development of OpenAI than this 54 second clip from Sam Altman (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efSpDL0hZzM) “These models are still quite dumb, relative to what they will be, but, more than that, they have quite limited awareness of your life, you are still having to, like, massage them and cajole them, to try and get the thing that you want. We are no longer that far away from a model that just knows all of your contacts, it knows about you, it knows about your life, it knows what your doing, it knows what you care about, it knows about the people in your life, it has access to your computer and your browser (if you want, of course) and it has access, maybe increasingly over time, to what is going on in the real world around you. That is going to be a complete change to what it feels like to use a computer, and what it feels like to use AI, and I am tremendously excited about that. But I don’t think even we have a good intuition yet for what that’s really going to feel like” ......... To successfully develop their product, and to have it perform to its optimum potential, everything must be known. Everything. Virtually and ‘in real life’. Everything. It is there, above, in black and white. It is on the tape. As Shoshana Zuboff wrote in her seminal book 'Surveillance Capitalism, there is no end to the drive for data, other than totality. Where does this leave education, with regards to being protected from this vision of AI extractivism? Linked, and even more importantly, where does it leave the rights of children? Sitting ducks, I would say. As*Karen Hao* <https://www.linkedin.com/in/karendhao/>writes, the push for data disproportionately falls on “already vulnerable populations, including children”. We have to resist this.

April 29, 2026

Re: Google DeepMind Paper Argues LLMs Will Never Be Conscious

by Guido Vetere

Searle diceva: "la sintassi non è sufficiente per la semantica". Lerchner dice: "i simboli non hanno contenuto causale intrinseco senza un agente che li alfabetizzi". Entrambi danno per certo di sapere dove sta l'esperienza senza spiegare perché una specifica organizzazione fisica la possa produrre e un’altra invece non potrà mai. Lerchner costruisce una critica più sofisticata al funzionalismo, ma la premessa è la stessa di Searle e come hanno osservato in molti (es. Nagel col suo famoso pipistrello) si tratta di qualcosa di molto opinabile. Detto questo, un paper DeepMind che dice che i sistemi AI sono fuori dalla morale (in quanto pazienti, dunque anche in quanto agenti) a me pare un po’ sospetto. G. > Il giorno 28 apr 2026, alle ore 21:13, Giacomo Tesio via nexa <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> ha scritto: > > Ovvero la scoperta dell'acqua calda > > https://www.404media.co/google-deepmind-paper-argues-llms-will-never-be-con… > > > Giacomo

April 28, 2026

Google DeepMind Paper Argues LLMs Will Never Be Conscious

by Giacomo Tesio

Ovvero la scoperta dell'acqua calda https://www.404media.co/google-deepmind-paper-argues-llms-will-never-be-con… Giacomo

April 28, 2026

Cloud Defence, an exposed European flank

by antonio

Austria PrivateClouds, LibreOffice for productivity Belgium Microsoft Bulgaria ? Croatia Microsoft Cyprus ? Czech Republic Microsoft Denmark SitaWare, BattleCloud, Microsoft Estonia Microsoft Finland SitaWare, Mattermost, Microsoft France Thales originally developed on Microsoft Germany Google Cloud & VMware (through BWI), Microsoft Greece Microsoft Hungary Microsoft Ireland Oracle, Microsoft Italy Polo Strategico Nazionale (on Google Cloud and Oracle tech) Latvia Microsoft Lithuania Microsoft Luxembourg Clarence (on Google Cloud tech) Malta Microsoft, Amazon Poland Microsoft, Oracle Portugal Microsoft Romania Microsoft Slovakia Microsoft Slovenia SitaWare BattleCloud, Microsoft Spain Telefonica (backed by Oracle technology) Sweden ? UK Google Cloud, Oracle, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Qui https://futureinstitute.tech/assets/doc/FOTICloudDefenceReport26.pdf il rapporto completo. A.

April 28, 2026

Incontro "Computers, AI, and US Military Power: Revisiting 'The Closed World'" | 7 maggio 2026, ore 16.00

by Nexa - Media

Gentilissime, gentilissimi, Vi invitiamo a partecipare all’incontro dal titolo “Computers, AI, and US Military Power: Revisiting 'The Closed World’” che si terrà giovedì 7 maggio 2026 alle ore 16.00. Ospite dell’incontro il Prof. Paul N. Edwards (Stanford University and University of Michigan), che analizzerà, in chiave storica e contemporanea, il ruolo dell’IA militare dalle origini nella Guerra Fredda alle sue applicazioni nei conflitti attuali, esaminandone le possibili implicazioni per il futuro del potere globale. L’evento si terrà in IN PRESENZA e ONLINE, in lingua inglese. SEDE FISICA: Sala Conferenze “Luigi Ciminiera” del Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica - Politecnico di Torino (Corso Castelfidardo 34/D<https://www.google.com/maps/place//data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x47886d1904cc5627:0x570…>, 5° piano). STANZA VIRTUALE: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent Per maggiori informazioni è possibile consultare la pagina web dedicata all’incontro: https://nexa.polito.it/computers-ai-and-us-military-power/ Un saluto cordiale, -- Valeria Bergantino Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society<web:%20https://nexa.polito.it> DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino Via Pier Carlo Boggio, 65/a – Torino Digital Communication Assistant DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino<https://www.dauin.polito.it> Corso Castelfidardo 34/D - Torino mail: valeria.bergantino(a)polito.it<mailto:valeria.bergantino@polito.it> tel: 3473443585

April 28, 2026

Consultation on the proposed measures for Google Search data sharing (Article 6(11) of the DMA)

by J.C. DE MARTIN

https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/dma100209-consultation-proposed-me… *DMA.100209 – Consultation on the proposed measures for Google Search data sharing (Article 6(11) of the DMA)* Consultation on the proposed measures that Alphabet must implement to ensure effective sharing of Google Search data with third party undertakings providing online search engines, as required by Article 6(11) of the Digital Markets Act ("DMA"). Details Status Open Opening date 16 April 2026 Deadline 1 May 2026, 23:59 (CEST) Target audience All citizens, companies and organisations are welcome to contribute to this consultation. The Commission especially welcomes contributions from companies that are directly affected by the scope of these proceedings, namely those providing online search engine services including AI chatbots with search functionality. Why we are consulting The DMA is a European legislation that aims to make digital markets fairer and more open. The DMA applies to gatekeepers, which are companies operating large digital platforms that play an important role in the digital economy and act as gateways for other companies to access end users. Alphabet is one of such gatekeepers. Amongst others, the DMA requires gatekeepers that operate online search engine services to share anonymised ranking, query, click and view data with other search engines against fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. To assist Alphabet in sharing such data in an effective way, the Commission opened proceedings on 27 January 2026 to specify measures that Alphabet must implement to comply with its data sharing obligation under the DMA. The Commission’s case reference is DMA.100209 <https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/DMA.100209>. On 16 April 2026, the Commission addressed its preliminary findings to Alphabet, including the draft measures that Alphabet must take to ensure effective sharing of Google Search data with other search engines. A case summary and the proposed measures are available in the /Reference documents /section below. *The Commission is now seeking feedback from interested third parties on the proposed measures. *The Commission’s measures cover five areas: * *Eligibility:* Which third parties are eligible to receive data under Article 6(11) of the DMA? * *Data scope: *Which data must Alphabet share? * *Anonymisation*: How must Alphabet anonymise the data based on technical measures complemented by contractual measures, without unnecessarily degrading the quality and usefulness of the data? * *Pricing terms: *What pricing terms for the search data can be considered FRAND? * *Sharing process:* How must Alphabet share the data with third parties? *_In particular, the Commission seeks views on the technical aspects of the measures:_* * *The effectiveness of the measures in practice*: if implemented, will the proposed measures offer search data that is useful for third parties providing search engines to optimise their services while meeting the requirement that the shared data is anonymised? * *The completeness of the measures:* is anything else is needed to ensure effective sharing of search data? * *Timelines:* is the proposed timeline for Alphabet to implement the measures achievable? The Commission will carefully assess the feedback provided by interested parties and Alphabet. The input received may result in adjustments to the proposed measures and will feed in the Commission’s decision making the measures legally binding on Alphabet. The Commission will adopt a final decision by 27 July 2026 (within six months of opening the proceedings). Respond to the consultation /*This consultation concerns Google Search data sharing with third party undertakings providing search engines. The Commission is organising a separate consultation on Alphabet’s Android operating system interoperability with third-party AI services (case reference DMA.100220).*/ You can send your contributions through EU Survey <https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/DMA100209_Consultation_Proposed_Measur…>. The deadline to respond to this consultation is Friday 1 May 2026. *Your submission must be fully _non-confidential_*. *All contributions will be made available to Alphabet for comments*. Contributions will not be published. The Commission may contact you with follow-up questions on your feedback.

April 27, 2026

Programme Announced: 10th GIG-ARTS Conference, Dublin, 14–15 May 2026

by Mauro SANTANIELLO

Dear colleagues, We are pleased to announce that the programme for the **10th GIG-ARTS Conference** is now available. The **Tenth European Multidisciplinary Conference on Global Internet Governance Actors, Regulations, Transactions and Strategies** will take place on **14–15 May 2026** at **Dublin City University, All Hallows Campus**. This year’s theme, **“Digital Futures, Sustainable Freedoms: Rights, Responsibilities and Governance,”** will bring together scholars and practitioners to discuss key issues in global internet governance, including digital rights, sustainability, digital authoritarianism, digital sovereignty, AI governance, data centres, and the future of digital regulation. The programme includes keynote speeches, thematic panels, a poster session, and a roundtable on governing digital futures. The full programme is available here: https://gig-arts.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/10th-GIG-ARTS-Conference_Pro… **Please note that the registration deadline is 30 April 2026.** Participants can register via Eventbrite at the following link: https://www.eventbrite.ie/e/10th-gig-arts-conference-dublin-2026-tickets-19… We look forward to welcoming participants to Dublin for this special tenth edition of the GIG-ARTS Conference. Best regards, The GIG-ARTS Conference Organising Committee

April 26, 2026

Re: There is no AI race

by antonio

> https://open.substack.com/pub/arnaudbertrand/p/there-is-no-ai-race?r=y77av&… ... > V4 is open-source under an MIT license, meaning anyone anywhere can > download the weights, modify them, run them on whatever hardware they > choose. It's competitive with GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 on most AI > benchmarks, and priced at a small fraction - or even “free” if you choose > to download it and run it yourself. But the single most striking thing > about V4 isn't the benchmarks or even the price. It's that V4 has zero > dependency on Nvidia’s CUDA anywhere in its stack - it runs entirely on > Huawei Ascend chips via Huawei's own CANN framework. In other words: China > now not only has its own frontier AI models, it has its own domestic AI > stack, top to bottom. And it's giving the whole thing away to the world - > the exact opposite of the “hoard and dominate” posture of the U.S. labs. ... Questa parte non è chiarissima. Lungi da me difendere gli "accumulatori e dominatori" statunitensi ma in pratica la situazione è questa: Fino ad oggi chi voleva entrare nel campo dell'elaborazione AI aveva bisogno di un chip Nvidia e di un framework dal nome CUDA (in pratica un monopolio statunitense). Da adesso, a parità di potenza di calcolo, c'è l'alternativa cinese, chip Huawei Ascend e framework CANN. Il resto del mondo che farà? Continuerà a scegliere gli americani e quindi Nvidia o i cinesi e quindi Huawei? Usare il termine open-source, l'abbiamo detto tante volte, con l'AI è inappropriato. A.

April 26, 2026

Re: There is no AI race

by de petra giulio

Grazie Maurizio, davvero molto interessante e utile. Giulio Il giorno sab 25 apr 2026 alle 02:20 Alfredo Bregni via nexa < nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> ha scritto: > It's a long, slightly boring story (I did not make to reach the end), > which reminds me the Vietnam times and the evergreen concept of > "imperialism". > Is there anything *really new *to say about USA...? > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Maurizio Borghi via nexa <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> > *To:* Nexa <nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> > *Sent:* Friday, April 24, 2026 1:30 PM > *Subject:* [nexa] There is no AI race > > There is no AI race > <https://substack.com/@arnaudbertrand> > Arnaud Bertrand <https://substack.com/@arnaudbertrand> > Substack - Apr 24, 2026 ∙ Paid > > > https://open.substack.com/pub/arnaudbertrand/p/there-is-no-ai-race?r=y77av&… > > The Chinese have this great principle: “Seek truth from facts” (实事求是). > It’s commonly associated with the Communist Party - because it’s indeed a > key slogan of theirs - but, as is often the case in China, it’s just a > modern usage of a much older idiom, first recorded in the Book of Han > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Han> (111 CE). > > What does it mean? Essentially, it’s an anti-ideology principle: rather > than starting with a doctrine and looking at facts through its lens, you > should go the other way round - “truth” is extracted from the world as it > is. It’s basically an ode to empirical pragmatism. > > “Seeking truth from facts” is precisely what’s missing in the conversation > on AI, which is stunningly doctrinal and ideological: apocalyptic doomers > on one end, deluded techno-utopians on the other, all of it made worse by > the great-power framing of the so-called “AI race.” Everyone is starting > with the conclusion - be it “China bad, so they must lose the AI race,” or > “AGI will kill us all,” or “AGI will herald a new era of abundance” - and > working backwards to find facts that fit. > > It’s interesting to contrast this with the early days of the internet, > which I’m sadly old enough to have witnessed as a late teenager and young > adult. There was also, at the time, some ideological dimensions and a lot > of naivety - we were definitely not “seeking truth from facts” either - but > the mood was fundamentally optimistic, universalist, and free-spirited. > These were doctrinal beliefs in the sense that nobody had actually checked > whether any of it was true, but it was a shared doctrine. Everyone globally > held roughly the same one, so there was no ideological battle to be had. > > For instance it’s pretty comical to look back at Bill Clinton’s famous > 2000 assertion that the internet would inevitably liberalize China and that > the government’s efforts to control it was "like trying to nail jello to > the wall > <https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_Ch…>" > - arguing that it was “an argument for accelerating the effort to bring > China into the world.” > > Compare and contrast this with the current AI framing about China: today > not only is there no talk of “bringing China in” - the entire policy > architecture, from export controls to chip bans, is explicitly designed to > keep China out. Nor is anybody expecting that AI will liberalize anyone: on > the contrary, each side is convinced the other will use it to further their > power with malign intent, surveil its population, and ultimately dominate > the world. > > And, to be fair, the Chinese side is right to be convinced about this > because that’s literally what the U.S. side is saying they’ll use AI for, > which is also a complete contrast with the early internet discourse. > > Back then, the early web was largely built by kids in dorm rooms and > garages who saw themselves as contributing to a global commons. Today the > people building AI in the U.S. - a handful of labs working hand-in-glove > with the national security state - are explicitly framing their work as an > instrument of U.S. dominance. > > Take Palantir’s recent manifesto, which they published on X > <https://x.com/PalantirTech/status/2045574398573453312?s=20>: it has zero > pretense of building for the world, instead arguing that the “engineering > elite of Silicon Valley has an affirmative obligation to participate in the > defense of the nation,” that Western civilization must “prevail,” that hard > power in this century "will be built on software" and “A.I. weapons,” and > that coexistence with others is, implicitly off the table > <https://x.com/RnaudBertrand/status/2045767857997484359?s=20>. > > And, just in case anyone hadn’t gotten the message, they recently changed > their tagline to “Software that dominates > <https://www.wired.com/story/palantir-what-the-company-does/>.” > > Looking back, it should have been obvious that a company that named itself > after the palantíri - the seeing-stones that Sauron, Tolkien’s > representation of absolute evil, used to corrupt and dominate the peoples > of Middle-earth - was probably not going to be building tools for human > flourishing… > > And it’s not just Palantir: it's pretty much the official position of the > entire frontier U.S. lab ecosystem. > > As another illustration, take Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (the > company behind Claude AI), who argues for an “entente strategy” > <https://www.darioamodei.com/essay/machines-of-loving-grace> in which the > West should use AI to achieve “robust military superiority (the stick) > while at the same time offering to distribute the benefits of powerful AI > (the carrot) to a wider and wider group of countries in exchange for > supporting the coalition’s strategy to promote democracy.” > > In essence, Amodei views AI as both a tool of military dominance and a > tool of blackmail to force countries to align themselves with the West > politically. Not exactly the open, universalist spirit of the early web, > and a position virtually indistinguishable from that of Palantir. > > If one adopts a “seek truth from facts” approach to Anthropic, the reality > of that company is a - very - stark contrast to their public image. > > Back in February, there was a huge media story around Anthropic refusing > the Pentagon's demand that Claude be made available for mass domestic > surveillance and fully autonomous weapons, and the subsequent (seeming) > power struggle between the company and Pete Hegseth. > > The story, as told by virtually every mainstream outlet, was unambiguous: > here was a responsible AI lab that had drawn an ethical line in the sand, > "trying to do their best to help us from ourselves" as a Republican > Senator put it > <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/anthropic-cannot-in-good-conscience-acc…>. > The National Catholic Register even reported > <https://www.ncregister.com/news/judge-sides-with-anthropic-2026-03-30-0cz4n…> > that a group of 14 Catholic moral theologians and ethicists had filed an > amicus brief in the case, stating that “the teaching of the Catholic Church > supports Anthropic’s decision”. > > What no-one spent too much time mentioning was the reason why the Pentagon > was negotiating these terms with Anthropic in the first place: it stemmed > from the fact that in January 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth had > issued a memorandum > <https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/12/2003855671/-1/-1/0/ARTIFICIAL-INTELLI…> > aimed at “accelerating America's military AI dominance” that directed all > Pentagon AI contracts to incorporate "any lawful use" language within 180 > days - basically allowing the Pentagon to use AI for any purpose the > Department considered lawful. > > Why did this matter for Anthropic specifically? Because Anthropic had > spent the previous year and a half aggressively working to become the > Pentagon's most deeply integrated frontier AI lab - and, at the time, its > only one. In November 2024 they partnered > <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/08/anthropic-palantir-amazon-claude-defense-ai> > with - of all companies - Palantir “to make Anthropic's models available to > U.S. intelligence and defense agencies.” In June 2025, they launched > Claude Gov > <https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-gov-models-for-u-s-national-security-…> > - a dedicated product line custom-built for U.S. national security > customers, already being deployed by agencies at the highest classification > levels. A month later, in July 2025, they won a $200 million Pentagon > contract > <https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropic-and-the-department-of-defense-to-a…>. > No other AI lab was remotely as deep as they were in the U.S. military and > defense apparatus. > > This all means that, contrary to the "principled holdout" story the media > ran with, Hegseth's memo didn't pull Anthropic into the war machine. It > affected them because they were already fully embedded in it, more than any > other player. > > Notably, Anthropic’s Claude was used by the Pentagon to capture Maduro, as > reported by the WSJ > <https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-used-anthropics-cla…>: > a story that came out less than 2 weeks before the whole media frenzy about > this supposed “clash” between Anthropic and the Pentagon over AI ethics. > Which really makes you wonder whether the "clash" was a genuine ethical > dispute at all, or a PR operation designed to distract from the fact that > Anthropic's AI had just been used by the U.S. military to illegally capture > a foreign head of state… > > It’s also interesting to look at what the “clash” was about. What > Anthropic said they refused was the use of their AI for “*mass* *domestic* > surveillance” (emphasis on both *mass* and *domestic*) and “*fully > autonomous* weapons” (emphasis on both *fully* and *autonomous*). That is their > exact wording <https://www.anthropic.com/news/statement-department-of-war> > . > > Which means, concretely, that AI surveillance is fine domestically as long > as it’s not “mass.” It also means, critically, that mass AI surveillance is > fine as long as it’s not domestic. > > So the rest of the world is on notice: Anthropic has absolutely no problem > with the U.S. military-industrial complex using their AI to surveil all 8 > billion inhabitants on Earth, provided it excludes the 340 million > Americans. And even the latter *can* be surveilled, just not in a “mass” > way (whatever that means). > > This, incidentally, is actually merely a restatement of U.S. law. Mass > domestic surveillance of Americans is prohibited anyhow by the Fourth > Amendment, and mass foreign surveillance is authorized under FISA Section > 702 and Executive Order 12333 - the legal architecture Edward Snowden > exposed in 2013. > > So Anthropic’s so-called “principled holdout” stance is them simply > restating the current US legal status-quo, rebranding it as a “red line,” > and being congratulated for “following the teaching of the Catholic Church” > by theologians for it. Even though that very same legal architecture > they’re defending, back when the Snowden revelations broke in 2013, was > rightly condemned as the most sweeping surveillance regime in the world > (which it factually is). > > In effect, when one “seeks truth from facts,” Anthropic realized the > pretty impressive PR feat of getting applauded - even getting virtually > sainted by Catholic theologians - for making the U.S. sweeping surveillance > apparatus more grimly powerful with frontier AI. In Tolkien’s terms: > sharpening the eye of Sauron. > > You have to hand it to them: impressive branding work, their PR folks > definitely deserve a raise over that one. > > Same story with the “*fully autonomous* weapons” aspect of their “ethical > stance.” > > First of all, what this concretely means is that if there was a situation > where the Pentagon decided to commit a Gaza-like genocide with AI, asking > it - hypothetically - to select targets, optimize timing, and execute the > operation, Anthropic’s red line would be fully honored provided Pete > Hegseth personally clicked the final “go.” That’s the “ethical” principle > at play here: not *whether* Claude helps plan awful deeds, only *whether > a human is in the loop when it happens*. > > And it goes further than this actually: in their statement on this matter > <https://www.anthropic.com/news/statement-department-of-war> Anthropic > specified that they don't even object to fully autonomous weapons as a > category. They specifically write that such weapons "may prove critical for > our national defense." Their only objection is that today's AI isn't > reliable enough yet. And they helpfully offer “to work directly with the > Department of War on R&D to improve the reliability of these systems.” > > In other words: Anthropic isn’t at all refusing to help build autonomous > killing machines. They just want them to be good before they’re deployed: > it’s an objection over the quality of the killing, not ethics. > > Again, what an extraordinary PR feat: getting Catholic theologians to > bless what is functionally a pitch for accurate autonomous killing machines. > > And while Anthropic makes for a particularly instructive case study - > given their near-saintly public image - they're really just one example > among many. I could have equally picked on OpenAI, who quietly deleted > <https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/16/openai-quietly-removes-ban-on-military-use-…> > the prohibition on military use from their policies in January 2024 and > then partnered with Anduril > <https://www.anduril.com/news/anduril-partners-with-openai-to-advance-u-s-ar…> > to build AI for battlefield systems, with Sam Altman writing Washington > Post op-eds > <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/07/25/sam-altman-ai-democracy-…> > about the need for “democratic AI” to prevail over “authoritarian AI” - a > framing indistinguishable from Amodei's or Palantir's, and laughable on its > face when you consider that this so-called “democratic AI” is built for the > global domination of others (the very opposite of democracy) and explicitly > set up, as we just saw, for mass surveillance and autonomous killings. Or > Google, which in February 2025 abandoned its long-standing pledge > <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/04/google-removes-pledge-to-not-use-ai-for-wea…> > not to develop AI for weapons or surveillance. Or Meta, which opened > Llama up for U.S. national security use > <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/nov/05/meta-allows-national-sec…> > in November 2024. > > This isn't a few bad apples, it’s virtually the entire ecosystem. > > So taking a step back, that's what you have on one side of the ledger: a > U.S. obviously dead set on using AI not as a global commons but as a tool > of submission and dominance for the United States. > > Now, smart readers (which is, of course, all of you) will think they know > how the rest of this article is going to go: “he’ll present the other side > of the ledger - i.e. China - with its open source models, say that’s the > way to go, that we all ought to cheer for the camp that does in fact value > some form of openness and universalism, bla bla bla”. > > Well… at the risk of disappointing you, I’m actually not going to do that, > because a) I like to surprise, and b) that’d be wrong. > > The point is that, if we do indeed believe that AI ought to be a global > commons, if we do believe in “seeking truth from facts” as opposed to > ideology, by definition there shouldn’t be sides of a ledger in the first > place: defaulting to “team China” is just the other side of the same > mistake we've spent this whole article documenting. The framing itself - AI > as a contest between civilizations, a race to be won - is the pathology. > You can't seek truth from facts while still holding on to the premise that > there must be a “winner”. > > Think back to, say, electricity: would it have been right to frame its > development as a race to be won by one civilization over another? To cheer > for whichever country happened to be ahead on transformers in 1890? To make > electricity a matter of national allegiance, something you rooted for the > way you’d root for a football team? It sounds absurd because it is absurd. > Electricity was a general-purpose technology destined to become part of the > shared operating system of human life, and the only sensible stance toward > it was to want it developed well and diffused widely for everyone’s > benefit, full stop. > > Sure, it’s absolutely true that China today has an infinitely better > posture towards AI than the U.S. does. Case in point, just as I was in the > process of writing this article Deepseek V4 was released > <https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro>, and it's hard to > imagine a more perfect illustration of the contrast. > > V4 is open-source under an MIT license, meaning anyone anywhere can > download the weights, modify them, run them on whatever hardware they > choose. It's competitive with GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 on most AI > benchmarks, and priced at a small fraction - or even “free” if you choose > to download it and run it yourself. But the single most striking thing > about V4 isn't the benchmarks or even the price. It's that V4 has zero > dependency on Nvidia’s CUDA anywhere in its stack - it runs entirely on > Huawei Ascend chips via Huawei's own CANN framework. In other words: China > now not only has its own frontier AI models, it has its own domestic AI > stack, top to bottom. And it's giving the whole thing away to the world - > the exact opposite of the “hoard and dominate” posture of the U.S. labs. > > This is China seeing AI as a general-purpose technology built into the > economy, shared across borders, and iterated on openly. And in fact one of > the DeepSeek researchers wrote this on X > <https://x.com/victor207755822/status/2047518146689732858?s=20> with the > release of V4: “we stay true to long-termism and open source for all. AGI > belongs to everyone.” > > When you cheer for this, you’re not cheering for the “China side” to win, > you’re cheering for the principle that there shouldn’t be any side: that > this technology - perhaps the most consequential general-purpose technology > humanity has ever developed - should belong to everyone, should be built in > the open, should be allowed to diffuse the way electricity or the internal > combustion engine or antibiotics diffused, imperfectly but broadly, across > the whole of human civilization. > > Let’s go back to electricity and look at what the world would have been > like had a country decided to take towards it the approach that the U.S. is > currently taking towards AI: imagine if, say, the United States in 1890 had > declared electricity a matter of national security, classified the designs > of Edison’s dynamos and Tesla’s induction motors as export-controlled, > integrated its electrical companies directly into the War Department, > framed the generator as a strategic weapon rather than a general-purpose > technology, and spent the following century building its foreign policy > around ensuring that only it, and politically-aligned nations, had access > to the light bulb. > > Batshit insane, right? Well that’s EXACTLY the posture it’s taking towards > AI. > > Had that happened, it’s painfully obvious we’d ALL have been immeasurably > poorer for it, materially and morally. And the United States first and > foremost, given that for electricity - as will undoubtedly be the case for > AI - the real value didn’t lie in control of the technology but in its > widespread diffusion and in what you built on top of it. Think about the > U.S.’s “electricity giants”: companies like GE, Whirlpool or RCA didn’t get > rich by “owning” electricity - they got rich by *selling what electricity > made possible* into a world that was electrifying as fast as it could. > The U.S.’s electrical fortune was built on the world electrifying alongside > it, not against it. > > Does the analogy hold for AI? Yes, surprisingly well. I like Jensen > Huang’s (Nvidia’s CEO) recent description of AI > <https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/jensen-huang> as a “5-layer cake” made of 1) > energy, 2) chips, 3) infrastructure, 4) models and lastly 5) applications. > > The implication of his point is that each layer save for the last one - > the application layer - will ultimately be largely commoditized, and as > such that’s where the real value lies: in the millions of specific > products, services, and industrial processes that get built on top of the > other 4 layers. > > It’s typical network building: the layers underneath eventually become > utilities, and utilities are low-margin commodity businesses. It happened > with electricity, it happened with phones, it happened with railroads, it > happened with the internet itself. The operators of each layer got > commoditized over time, while the durable, century-defining fortunes > accrued at the top of the stack: GE on top of electricity, Apple on top of > the mobile and telecom infrastructure, Amazon and Google on top of the > internet. The pattern is so consistent across technologies that it's > essentially a law of how general-purpose infrastructure creates value. > > There's no reason to think AI - a general-purpose technology of the same > order - will turn out any different. If anything, the pattern may be even > more pronounced, because the surface area of potential AI applications is > larger than any previous general-purpose technology: every industry, every > knowledge-work process, every product category can in principle be rebuilt > with AI inside it. > > As such, if that is correct, it means that the approach the U.S. is taking > is strategically incoherent on its own terms. Seeing AI diffusion as > something that ought to be resisted, slowed, and controlled gets the > economics exactly backwards: diffusion is *precisely* the thing that > enables value in the first place. Arguing against it is just as misguided > as if American legislators had argued for restrictions on global mobile > adoption in 2007, in the name of “winning” the mobile revolution: the $3 > trillion Apple of today exists precisely because it did the opposite. > Diffusion wasn't the threat to Apple's value - diffusion *was* Apple's > value. > > Now I can already hear you retort: “sure, but AI is different, what about > AGI, surely the country that reaches it first will have a tremendous > competitive advantage over everyone else, no?” > > Let’s look into this because it’s probably the main argument hawks are > making in favor of the current American approach. The claim being that AGI > is not like electricity. Electricity was a tool that humans used to do > things. AGI will be an agent - a system that can itself reason, plan, > conduct research, and improve itself. The moment a sufficiently capable AGI > comes online, the argument runs, it will be able to compound its own > advantages: designing better chips, writing its own successor systems, > solving the bottlenecks that currently constrain human science and > engineering. > > The country that controls that system will, in effect, have added a > superhuman research-and-development engine to its economy, its military, > and its intelligence apparatus. Rival countries will not be able to catch > up by copying, because the leader will be using AGI to move faster than > copying can achieve. By this logic, AGI is the last general-purpose > technology - the one that hands permanent advantage to whoever gets it > first - and treating it like “just another technology to diffuse” isn't > pragmatism, it's catastrophic strategic naïveté. > > First of all, note the implied assumption in this thinking: that it would > be acceptable - desirable, even - for one country to achieve permanent, > structural dominance over every other country on Earth - provided, of > course, that country is the United States. It’s presented as self-evident > and the natural order of things but let’s be very clear about what this > vision means when you strip away the techno-utopist language: the permanent > subjugation of every human being who doesn't happen to be American. > > If you’re based outside the U.S. and you’re deluded enough to go along > with this, let me suggest a thought experiment. Picture the current U.S. > administration and imagine it with ten times its current leverage over your > country. Because that's roughly what “permanent American AGI dominance” > actually means for you. Every tariff decision, every threat that you > already resent? Multiply it by an order of magnitude, make it permanent, > and make it enforced by a technology your country cannot meaningfully match > or resist. That is the future you quite literally cheer for if you happen > to reflexively root for the Palantir-Anthropic-OpenAI vision for AI. > > Thankfully though, this is purely theoretical because it has no chance of > happening anytime soon. Let’s come back down to earth: AI is at a stage > right now where it cannot even reliably perform tasks a competent > six-year-old can perform. Current frontier models still routinely > hallucinate facts, fail at basic arithmetic, lose track of long > conversations, and cannot navigate a physical world they have no experience > of. > > They are, to be clear, extraordinary tools - vastly more useful than what > existed even two years ago. But the leap from “extraordinary tool that > still can't multiply two four-digit numbers reliably” to “self-improving > superintelligence capable of reorganizing global power structures” is - at > this stage - a leap of religious faith. > > If you don’t believe me, go try to change your flight date by chatting > with any airline's AI customer service bot, and report back on how your > imminent civilizational transformation feels. Or try to resolve literally > *any* problem with the customer service bot of your bank or your telecom > provider. > > These systems are all powered by current frontier AI, deployed at scale, > by well-funded companies with every incentive to make them work. And yet > the universal experience of interacting with them is an exercise in immense > frustration as they fail to understand what you’re asking, misremember what > you said two messages ago, confidently invent policies that don’t exist, > and eventually escalate you to a human anyway. > > If this is what the technology can actually do when deployed in production > by companies that have spent millions on integration - if THIS is the state > of the art - the notion that it’s on the edge of becoming a self-improving > god-like intelligence capable of dominating geopolitics is, let’s be > charitable, difficult to reconcile with observable reality. > > The “seek truth from facts” reality is that model companies have an > inherent interest in making everyone believe that AGI is just around the > corner - because their entire business model, their valuations, and their > political influence depend on it being true. Strip away the AGI narrative > and the frontier U.S. labs are infrastructure providers in a brutally > commoditizing market. In a world where this commoditization is allowed to > run its course, the model labs become utilities - high fixed costs, eroding > pricing power, the AT&T of the AI century. Their trillion-dollar > valuations, their hundred-billion-dollar capital raises - all of it > evaporates. > > Unless, of course, AGI is imminent - which it isn’t ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ > > And, in any case, the point is moot because even if AGI were imminent, a > “seek truth from facts” look at the scoreboard tells you the hoarding > strategy has already failed. DeepSeek V4 matches U.S. frontier models on > most benchmarks that matter > <https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro>. Alibaba's Qwen, > Moonshot's Kimi, Zhipu's GLM are all at or near the frontier. The entire > architecture of export controls, chip bans, and military-industrial > integration was designed to prevent exactly this. It didn't work. Not > “might not work” - it has already factually failed, today, on April 24, > 2026. China has caught up, is releasing open-weight frontier models and > just demonstrated with DeepSeek V4 it can do so on entirely domestic > silicon. Continuing to act as if dominance is still achievable - as > Palantir, Anthropic, and OpenAI keep insisting in their strategy documents > - is just denial of reality. > > This is actually the main risk in AI right now. Not the superintelligence > scenario the labs keep warning us about. Instead, it’s the labs themselves, > or more precisely their lobbying power on the U.S. government, which has > quietly become one of the most successful regulatory capture operations in > history. A handful of companies - OpenAI, Anthropic, Palantir, their close > allies - have managed to make every piece of public discourse about AI > happen on their terms, which is factually leading the U.S. into concrete > policy choices that are not only bad for the world, but also for the U.S. > themselves. > > Bad for the U.S. because it systematically pours American capital into the > layers that are commoditizing - chips, infrastructure, models - while > actively shrinking the addressable market of the one layer where durable, > century-defining fortunes actually get built. And their policies > simultaneously encourage the exact outcome they’re designed to prevent: > they’ve empirically helped create a credible alternative AI that is just as > good, free, genuinely open and shipping on entirely non-American silicon - > thereby amplifying the very commoditization they’re trying to delay. > > Bad for the world because while the US spends its energy on export > controls, chip bans, and strategic denial, the actual work of figuring out > how humanity integrates a transformative new technology - the norms, the > institutions, the shared understanding of what AI should and shouldn’t do - > is being crowded out of the conversation entirely. Every minute of > political oxygen consumed by “how do we win” is a minute not spent on “how > do we do this well.” And the darkest irony is that “how do we win” isn’t > even a question the American public asked for - it’s a question > manufactured, funded, and amplified by the small cluster of labs - the > Anthropics, the OpenAIs, the Palantirs - whose business model depends on > humanity never getting around to asking the better one. > > Long story short, there is, in fact, no AI race: > > 1. > > It's a narrative manufactured and amplified by a handful of labs whose > valuations depend on it > 2. > > The economics of general-purpose technologies actively punish “race > winners” > 3. > > Even on the hawks' own terms - AGI - there's no race to win since it’s > already empirically been lost > > A hundred years from now, the idea that anyone seriously framed AI as a > race between nations will sound exactly as absurd as a race to “win” > electricity sounds to us today. The Book of Han had it right in 111 CE: > seek truth from facts. > > >

April 25, 2026

Re: There is no AI race

by Alfredo Bregni

It's a long, slightly boring story (I did not make to reach the end), which reminds me the Vietnam times and the evergreen concept of "imperialism". Is there anything really new to say about USA...? ----- Original Message ----- From: Maurizio Borghi via nexa To: Nexa Sent: Friday, April 24, 2026 1:30 PM Subject: [nexa] There is no AI race There is no AI race Arnaud Bertrand Substack - Apr 24, 2026 ∙ Paid https://open.substack.com/pub/arnaudbertrand/p/there-is-no-ai-race?r=y77av&… The Chinese have this great principle: “Seek truth from facts” (实事求是). It’s commonly associated with the Communist Party - because it’s indeed a key slogan of theirs - but, as is often the case in China, it’s just a modern usage of a much older idiom, first recorded in the Book of Han (111 CE). What does it mean? Essentially, it’s an anti-ideology principle: rather than starting with a doctrine and looking at facts through its lens, you should go the other way round - “truth” is extracted from the world as it is. It’s basically an ode to empirical pragmatism. “Seeking truth from facts” is precisely what’s missing in the conversation on AI, which is stunningly doctrinal and ideological: apocalyptic doomers on one end, deluded techno-utopians on the other, all of it made worse by the great-power framing of the so-called “AI race.” Everyone is starting with the conclusion - be it “China bad, so they must lose the AI race,” or “AGI will kill us all,” or “AGI will herald a new era of abundance” - and working backwards to find facts that fit. It’s interesting to contrast this with the early days of the internet, which I’m sadly old enough to have witnessed as a late teenager and young adult. There was also, at the time, some ideological dimensions and a lot of naivety - we were definitely not “seeking truth from facts” either - but the mood was fundamentally optimistic, universalist, and free-spirited. These were doctrinal beliefs in the sense that nobody had actually checked whether any of it was true, but it was a shared doctrine. Everyone globally held roughly the same one, so there was no ideological battle to be had. For instance it’s pretty comical to look back at Bill Clinton’s famous 2000 assertion that the internet would inevitably liberalize China and that the government’s efforts to control it was "like trying to nail jello to the wall" - arguing that it was “an argument for accelerating the effort to bring China into the world.” Compare and contrast this with the current AI framing about China: today not only is there no talk of “bringing China in” - the entire policy architecture, from export controls to chip bans, is explicitly designed to keep China out. Nor is anybody expecting that AI will liberalize anyone: on the contrary, each side is convinced the other will use it to further their power with malign intent, surveil its population, and ultimately dominate the world. And, to be fair, the Chinese side is right to be convinced about this because that’s literally what the U.S. side is saying they’ll use AI for, which is also a complete contrast with the early internet discourse. Back then, the early web was largely built by kids in dorm rooms and garages who saw themselves as contributing to a global commons. Today the people building AI in the U.S. - a handful of labs working hand-in-glove with the national security state - are explicitly framing their work as an instrument of U.S. dominance. Take Palantir’s recent manifesto, which they published on X: it has zero pretense of building for the world, instead arguing that the “engineering elite of Silicon Valley has an affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation,” that Western civilization must “prevail,” that hard power in this century "will be built on software" and “A.I. weapons,” and that coexistence with others is, implicitly off the table. And, just in case anyone hadn’t gotten the message, they recently changed their tagline to “Software that dominates.” Looking back, it should have been obvious that a company that named itself after the palantíri - the seeing-stones that Sauron, Tolkien’s representation of absolute evil, used to corrupt and dominate the peoples of Middle-earth - was probably not going to be building tools for human flourishing… And it’s not just Palantir: it's pretty much the official position of the entire frontier U.S. lab ecosystem. As another illustration, take Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (the company behind Claude AI), who argues for an “entente strategy” in which the West should use AI to achieve “robust military superiority (the stick) while at the same time offering to distribute the benefits of powerful AI (the carrot) to a wider and wider group of countries in exchange for supporting the coalition’s strategy to promote democracy.” In essence, Amodei views AI as both a tool of military dominance and a tool of blackmail to force countries to align themselves with the West politically. Not exactly the open, universalist spirit of the early web, and a position virtually indistinguishable from that of Palantir. If one adopts a “seek truth from facts” approach to Anthropic, the reality of that company is a - very - stark contrast to their public image. Back in February, there was a huge media story around Anthropic refusing the Pentagon's demand that Claude be made available for mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons, and the subsequent (seeming) power struggle between the company and Pete Hegseth. The story, as told by virtually every mainstream outlet, was unambiguous: here was a responsible AI lab that had drawn an ethical line in the sand, "trying to do their best to help us from ourselves" as a Republican Senator put it. The National Catholic Register even reported that a group of 14 Catholic moral theologians and ethicists had filed an amicus brief in the case, stating that “the teaching of the Catholic Church supports Anthropic’s decision”. What no-one spent too much time mentioning was the reason why the Pentagon was negotiating these terms with Anthropic in the first place: it stemmed from the fact that in January 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth had issued a memorandum aimed at “accelerating America's military AI dominance” that directed all Pentagon AI contracts to incorporate "any lawful use" language within 180 days - basically allowing the Pentagon to use AI for any purpose the Department considered lawful. Why did this matter for Anthropic specifically? Because Anthropic had spent the previous year and a half aggressively working to become the Pentagon's most deeply integrated frontier AI lab - and, at the time, its only one. In November 2024 they partnered with - of all companies - Palantir “to make Anthropic's models available to U.S. intelligence and defense agencies.” In June 2025, they launched Claude Gov - a dedicated product line custom-built for U.S. national security customers, already being deployed by agencies at the highest classification levels. A month later, in July 2025, they won a $200 million Pentagon contract. No other AI lab was remotely as deep as they were in the U.S. military and defense apparatus. This all means that, contrary to the "principled holdout" story the media ran with, Hegseth's memo didn't pull Anthropic into the war machine. It affected them because they were already fully embedded in it, more than any other player. Notably, Anthropic’s Claude was used by the Pentagon to capture Maduro, as reported by the WSJ: a story that came out less than 2 weeks before the whole media frenzy about this supposed “clash” between Anthropic and the Pentagon over AI ethics. Which really makes you wonder whether the "clash" was a genuine ethical dispute at all, or a PR operation designed to distract from the fact that Anthropic's AI had just been used by the U.S. military to illegally capture a foreign head of state… It’s also interesting to look at what the “clash” was about. What Anthropic said they refused was the use of their AI for “mass domestic surveillance” (emphasis on both mass and domestic) and “fully autonomous weapons” (emphasis on both fully and autonomous). That is their exact wording. Which means, concretely, that AI surveillance is fine domestically as long as it’s not “mass.” It also means, critically, that mass AI surveillance is fine as long as it’s not domestic. So the rest of the world is on notice: Anthropic has absolutely no problem with the U.S. military-industrial complex using their AI to surveil all 8 billion inhabitants on Earth, provided it excludes the 340 million Americans. And even the latter can be surveilled, just not in a “mass” way (whatever that means). This, incidentally, is actually merely a restatement of U.S. law. Mass domestic surveillance of Americans is prohibited anyhow by the Fourth Amendment, and mass foreign surveillance is authorized under FISA Section 702 and Executive Order 12333 - the legal architecture Edward Snowden exposed in 2013. So Anthropic’s so-called “principled holdout” stance is them simply restating the current US legal status-quo, rebranding it as a “red line,” and being congratulated for “following the teaching of the Catholic Church” by theologians for it. Even though that very same legal architecture they’re defending, back when the Snowden revelations broke in 2013, was rightly condemned as the most sweeping surveillance regime in the world (which it factually is). In effect, when one “seeks truth from facts,” Anthropic realized the pretty impressive PR feat of getting applauded - even getting virtually sainted by Catholic theologians - for making the U.S. sweeping surveillance apparatus more grimly powerful with frontier AI. In Tolkien’s terms: sharpening the eye of Sauron. You have to hand it to them: impressive branding work, their PR folks definitely deserve a raise over that one. Same story with the “fully autonomous weapons” aspect of their “ethical stance.” First of all, what this concretely means is that if there was a situation where the Pentagon decided to commit a Gaza-like genocide with AI, asking it - hypothetically - to select targets, optimize timing, and execute the operation, Anthropic’s red line would be fully honored provided Pete Hegseth personally clicked the final “go.” That’s the “ethical” principle at play here: not whether Claude helps plan awful deeds, only whether a human is in the loop when it happens. And it goes further than this actually: in their statement on this matter Anthropic specified that they don't even object to fully autonomous weapons as a category. They specifically write that such weapons "may prove critical for our national defense." Their only objection is that today's AI isn't reliable enough yet. And they helpfully offer “to work directly with the Department of War on R&D to improve the reliability of these systems.” In other words: Anthropic isn’t at all refusing to help build autonomous killing machines. They just want them to be good before they’re deployed: it’s an objection over the quality of the killing, not ethics. Again, what an extraordinary PR feat: getting Catholic theologians to bless what is functionally a pitch for accurate autonomous killing machines. And while Anthropic makes for a particularly instructive case study - given their near-saintly public image - they're really just one example among many. I could have equally picked on OpenAI, who quietly deleted the prohibition on military use from their policies in January 2024 and then partnered with Anduril to build AI for battlefield systems, with Sam Altman writing Washington Post op-eds about the need for “democratic AI” to prevail over “authoritarian AI” - a framing indistinguishable from Amodei's or Palantir's, and laughable on its face when you consider that this so-called “democratic AI” is built for the global domination of others (the very opposite of democracy) and explicitly set up, as we just saw, for mass surveillance and autonomous killings. Or Google, which in February 2025 abandoned its long-standing pledge not to develop AI for weapons or surveillance. Or Meta, which opened Llama up for U.S. national security use in November 2024. This isn't a few bad apples, it’s virtually the entire ecosystem. So taking a step back, that's what you have on one side of the ledger: a U.S. obviously dead set on using AI not as a global commons but as a tool of submission and dominance for the United States. Now, smart readers (which is, of course, all of you) will think they know how the rest of this article is going to go: “he’ll present the other side of the ledger - i.e. China - with its open source models, say that’s the way to go, that we all ought to cheer for the camp that does in fact value some form of openness and universalism, bla bla bla”. Well… at the risk of disappointing you, I’m actually not going to do that, because a) I like to surprise, and b) that’d be wrong. The point is that, if we do indeed believe that AI ought to be a global commons, if we do believe in “seeking truth from facts” as opposed to ideology, by definition there shouldn’t be sides of a ledger in the first place: defaulting to “team China” is just the other side of the same mistake we've spent this whole article documenting. The framing itself - AI as a contest between civilizations, a race to be won - is the pathology. You can't seek truth from facts while still holding on to the premise that there must be a “winner”. Think back to, say, electricity: would it have been right to frame its development as a race to be won by one civilization over another? To cheer for whichever country happened to be ahead on transformers in 1890? To make electricity a matter of national allegiance, something you rooted for the way you’d root for a football team? It sounds absurd because it is absurd. Electricity was a general-purpose technology destined to become part of the shared operating system of human life, and the only sensible stance toward it was to want it developed well and diffused widely for everyone’s benefit, full stop. Sure, it’s absolutely true that China today has an infinitely better posture towards AI than the U.S. does. Case in point, just as I was in the process of writing this article Deepseek V4 was released, and it's hard to imagine a more perfect illustration of the contrast. V4 is open-source under an MIT license, meaning anyone anywhere can download the weights, modify them, run them on whatever hardware they choose. It's competitive with GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 on most AI benchmarks, and priced at a small fraction - or even “free” if you choose to download it and run it yourself. But the single most striking thing about V4 isn't the benchmarks or even the price. It's that V4 has zero dependency on Nvidia’s CUDA anywhere in its stack - it runs entirely on Huawei Ascend chips via Huawei's own CANN framework. In other words: China now not only has its own frontier AI models, it has its own domestic AI stack, top to bottom. And it's giving the whole thing away to the world - the exact opposite of the “hoard and dominate” posture of the U.S. labs. This is China seeing AI as a general-purpose technology built into the economy, shared across borders, and iterated on openly. And in fact one of the DeepSeek researchers wrote this on X with the release of V4: “we stay true to long-termism and open source for all. AGI belongs to everyone.” When you cheer for this, you’re not cheering for the “China side” to win, you’re cheering for the principle that there shouldn’t be any side: that this technology - perhaps the most consequential general-purpose technology humanity has ever developed - should belong to everyone, should be built in the open, should be allowed to diffuse the way electricity or the internal combustion engine or antibiotics diffused, imperfectly but broadly, across the whole of human civilization. Let’s go back to electricity and look at what the world would have been like had a country decided to take towards it the approach that the U.S. is currently taking towards AI: imagine if, say, the United States in 1890 had declared electricity a matter of national security, classified the designs of Edison’s dynamos and Tesla’s induction motors as export-controlled, integrated its electrical companies directly into the War Department, framed the generator as a strategic weapon rather than a general-purpose technology, and spent the following century building its foreign policy around ensuring that only it, and politically-aligned nations, had access to the light bulb. Batshit insane, right? Well that’s EXACTLY the posture it’s taking towards AI. Had that happened, it’s painfully obvious we’d ALL have been immeasurably poorer for it, materially and morally. And the United States first and foremost, given that for electricity - as will undoubtedly be the case for AI - the real value didn’t lie in control of the technology but in its widespread diffusion and in what you built on top of it. Think about the U.S.’s “electricity giants”: companies like GE, Whirlpool or RCA didn’t get rich by “owning” electricity - they got rich by selling what electricity made possible into a world that was electrifying as fast as it could. The U.S.’s electrical fortune was built on the world electrifying alongside it, not against it. Does the analogy hold for AI? Yes, surprisingly well. I like Jensen Huang’s (Nvidia’s CEO) recent description of AI as a “5-layer cake” made of 1) energy, 2) chips, 3) infrastructure, 4) models and lastly 5) applications. The implication of his point is that each layer save for the last one - the application layer - will ultimately be largely commoditized, and as such that’s where the real value lies: in the millions of specific products, services, and industrial processes that get built on top of the other 4 layers. It’s typical network building: the layers underneath eventually become utilities, and utilities are low-margin commodity businesses. It happened with electricity, it happened with phones, it happened with railroads, it happened with the internet itself. The operators of each layer got commoditized over time, while the durable, century-defining fortunes accrued at the top of the stack: GE on top of electricity, Apple on top of the mobile and telecom infrastructure, Amazon and Google on top of the internet. The pattern is so consistent across technologies that it's essentially a law of how general-purpose infrastructure creates value. There's no reason to think AI - a general-purpose technology of the same order - will turn out any different. If anything, the pattern may be even more pronounced, because the surface area of potential AI applications is larger than any previous general-purpose technology: every industry, every knowledge-work process, every product category can in principle be rebuilt with AI inside it. As such, if that is correct, it means that the approach the U.S. is taking is strategically incoherent on its own terms. Seeing AI diffusion as something that ought to be resisted, slowed, and controlled gets the economics exactly backwards: diffusion is precisely the thing that enables value in the first place. Arguing against it is just as misguided as if American legislators had argued for restrictions on global mobile adoption in 2007, in the name of “winning” the mobile revolution: the $3 trillion Apple of today exists precisely because it did the opposite. Diffusion wasn't the threat to Apple's value - diffusion was Apple's value. Now I can already hear you retort: “sure, but AI is different, what about AGI, surely the country that reaches it first will have a tremendous competitive advantage over everyone else, no?” Let’s look into this because it’s probably the main argument hawks are making in favor of the current American approach. The claim being that AGI is not like electricity. Electricity was a tool that humans used to do things. AGI will be an agent - a system that can itself reason, plan, conduct research, and improve itself. The moment a sufficiently capable AGI comes online, the argument runs, it will be able to compound its own advantages: designing better chips, writing its own successor systems, solving the bottlenecks that currently constrain human science and engineering. The country that controls that system will, in effect, have added a superhuman research-and-development engine to its economy, its military, and its intelligence apparatus. Rival countries will not be able to catch up by copying, because the leader will be using AGI to move faster than copying can achieve. By this logic, AGI is the last general-purpose technology - the one that hands permanent advantage to whoever gets it first - and treating it like “just another technology to diffuse” isn't pragmatism, it's catastrophic strategic naïveté. First of all, note the implied assumption in this thinking: that it would be acceptable - desirable, even - for one country to achieve permanent, structural dominance over every other country on Earth - provided, of course, that country is the United States. It’s presented as self-evident and the natural order of things but let’s be very clear about what this vision means when you strip away the techno-utopist language: the permanent subjugation of every human being who doesn't happen to be American. If you’re based outside the U.S. and you’re deluded enough to go along with this, let me suggest a thought experiment. Picture the current U.S. administration and imagine it with ten times its current leverage over your country. Because that's roughly what “permanent American AGI dominance” actually means for you. Every tariff decision, every threat that you already resent? Multiply it by an order of magnitude, make it permanent, and make it enforced by a technology your country cannot meaningfully match or resist. That is the future you quite literally cheer for if you happen to reflexively root for the Palantir-Anthropic-OpenAI vision for AI. Thankfully though, this is purely theoretical because it has no chance of happening anytime soon. Let’s come back down to earth: AI is at a stage right now where it cannot even reliably perform tasks a competent six-year-old can perform. Current frontier models still routinely hallucinate facts, fail at basic arithmetic, lose track of long conversations, and cannot navigate a physical world they have no experience of. They are, to be clear, extraordinary tools - vastly more useful than what existed even two years ago. But the leap from “extraordinary tool that still can't multiply two four-digit numbers reliably” to “self-improving superintelligence capable of reorganizing global power structures” is - at this stage - a leap of religious faith. If you don’t believe me, go try to change your flight date by chatting with any airline's AI customer service bot, and report back on how your imminent civilizational transformation feels. Or try to resolve literally any problem with the customer service bot of your bank or your telecom provider. These systems are all powered by current frontier AI, deployed at scale, by well-funded companies with every incentive to make them work. And yet the universal experience of interacting with them is an exercise in immense frustration as they fail to understand what you’re asking, misremember what you said two messages ago, confidently invent policies that don’t exist, and eventually escalate you to a human anyway. If this is what the technology can actually do when deployed in production by companies that have spent millions on integration - if THIS is the state of the art - the notion that it’s on the edge of becoming a self-improving god-like intelligence capable of dominating geopolitics is, let’s be charitable, difficult to reconcile with observable reality. The “seek truth from facts” reality is that model companies have an inherent interest in making everyone believe that AGI is just around the corner - because their entire business model, their valuations, and their political influence depend on it being true. Strip away the AGI narrative and the frontier U.S. labs are infrastructure providers in a brutally commoditizing market. In a world where this commoditization is allowed to run its course, the model labs become utilities - high fixed costs, eroding pricing power, the AT&T of the AI century. Their trillion-dollar valuations, their hundred-billion-dollar capital raises - all of it evaporates. Unless, of course, AGI is imminent - which it isn’t ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ And, in any case, the point is moot because even if AGI were imminent, a “seek truth from facts” look at the scoreboard tells you the hoarding strategy has already failed. DeepSeek V4 matches U.S. frontier models on most benchmarks that matter. Alibaba's Qwen, Moonshot's Kimi, Zhipu's GLM are all at or near the frontier. The entire architecture of export controls, chip bans, and military-industrial integration was designed to prevent exactly this. It didn't work. Not “might not work” - it has already factually failed, today, on April 24, 2026. China has caught up, is releasing open-weight frontier models and just demonstrated with DeepSeek V4 it can do so on entirely domestic silicon. Continuing to act as if dominance is still achievable - as Palantir, Anthropic, and OpenAI keep insisting in their strategy documents - is just denial of reality. This is actually the main risk in AI right now. Not the superintelligence scenario the labs keep warning us about. Instead, it’s the labs themselves, or more precisely their lobbying power on the U.S. government, which has quietly become one of the most successful regulatory capture operations in history. A handful of companies - OpenAI, Anthropic, Palantir, their close allies - have managed to make every piece of public discourse about AI happen on their terms, which is factually leading the U.S. into concrete policy choices that are not only bad for the world, but also for the U.S. themselves. Bad for the U.S. because it systematically pours American capital into the layers that are commoditizing - chips, infrastructure, models - while actively shrinking the addressable market of the one layer where durable, century-defining fortunes actually get built. And their policies simultaneously encourage the exact outcome they’re designed to prevent: they’ve empirically helped create a credible alternative AI that is just as good, free, genuinely open and shipping on entirely non-American silicon - thereby amplifying the very commoditization they’re trying to delay. Bad for the world because while the US spends its energy on export controls, chip bans, and strategic denial, the actual work of figuring out how humanity integrates a transformative new technology - the norms, the institutions, the shared understanding of what AI should and shouldn’t do - is being crowded out of the conversation entirely. Every minute of political oxygen consumed by “how do we win” is a minute not spent on “how do we do this well.” And the darkest irony is that “how do we win” isn’t even a question the American public asked for - it’s a question manufactured, funded, and amplified by the small cluster of labs - the Anthropics, the OpenAIs, the Palantirs - whose business model depends on humanity never getting around to asking the better one. Long story short, there is, in fact, no AI race: 1.. It's a narrative manufactured and amplified by a handful of labs whose valuations depend on it 2.. The economics of general-purpose technologies actively punish “race winners” 3.. Even on the hawks' own terms - AGI - there's no race to win since it’s already empirically been lost A hundred years from now, the idea that anyone seriously framed AI as a race between nations will sound exactly as absurd as a race to “win” electricity sounds to us today. The Book of Han had it right in 111 CE: seek truth from facts.

April 25, 2026

There is no AI race

by Maurizio Borghi

There is no AI race <https://substack.com/@arnaudbertrand> Arnaud Bertrand <https://substack.com/@arnaudbertrand> Substack - Apr 24, 2026 ∙ Paid https://open.substack.com/pub/arnaudbertrand/p/there-is-no-ai-race?r=y77av&… The Chinese have this great principle: “Seek truth from facts” (实事求是). It’s commonly associated with the Communist Party - because it’s indeed a key slogan of theirs - but, as is often the case in China, it’s just a modern usage of a much older idiom, first recorded in the Book of Han <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Han> (111 CE). What does it mean? Essentially, it’s an anti-ideology principle: rather than starting with a doctrine and looking at facts through its lens, you should go the other way round - “truth” is extracted from the world as it is. It’s basically an ode to empirical pragmatism. “Seeking truth from facts” is precisely what’s missing in the conversation on AI, which is stunningly doctrinal and ideological: apocalyptic doomers on one end, deluded techno-utopians on the other, all of it made worse by the great-power framing of the so-called “AI race.” Everyone is starting with the conclusion - be it “China bad, so they must lose the AI race,” or “AGI will kill us all,” or “AGI will herald a new era of abundance” - and working backwards to find facts that fit. It’s interesting to contrast this with the early days of the internet, which I’m sadly old enough to have witnessed as a late teenager and young adult. There was also, at the time, some ideological dimensions and a lot of naivety - we were definitely not “seeking truth from facts” either - but the mood was fundamentally optimistic, universalist, and free-spirited. These were doctrinal beliefs in the sense that nobody had actually checked whether any of it was true, but it was a shared doctrine. Everyone globally held roughly the same one, so there was no ideological battle to be had. For instance it’s pretty comical to look back at Bill Clinton’s famous 2000 assertion that the internet would inevitably liberalize China and that the government’s efforts to control it was "like trying to nail jello to the wall <https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_Ch…>" - arguing that it was “an argument for accelerating the effort to bring China into the world.” Compare and contrast this with the current AI framing about China: today not only is there no talk of “bringing China in” - the entire policy architecture, from export controls to chip bans, is explicitly designed to keep China out. Nor is anybody expecting that AI will liberalize anyone: on the contrary, each side is convinced the other will use it to further their power with malign intent, surveil its population, and ultimately dominate the world. And, to be fair, the Chinese side is right to be convinced about this because that’s literally what the U.S. side is saying they’ll use AI for, which is also a complete contrast with the early internet discourse. Back then, the early web was largely built by kids in dorm rooms and garages who saw themselves as contributing to a global commons. Today the people building AI in the U.S. - a handful of labs working hand-in-glove with the national security state - are explicitly framing their work as an instrument of U.S. dominance. Take Palantir’s recent manifesto, which they published on X <https://x.com/PalantirTech/status/2045574398573453312?s=20>: it has zero pretense of building for the world, instead arguing that the “engineering elite of Silicon Valley has an affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation,” that Western civilization must “prevail,” that hard power in this century "will be built on software" and “A.I. weapons,” and that coexistence with others is, implicitly off the table <https://x.com/RnaudBertrand/status/2045767857997484359?s=20>. And, just in case anyone hadn’t gotten the message, they recently changed their tagline to “Software that dominates <https://www.wired.com/story/palantir-what-the-company-does/>.” Looking back, it should have been obvious that a company that named itself after the palantíri - the seeing-stones that Sauron, Tolkien’s representation of absolute evil, used to corrupt and dominate the peoples of Middle-earth - was probably not going to be building tools for human flourishing… And it’s not just Palantir: it's pretty much the official position of the entire frontier U.S. lab ecosystem. As another illustration, take Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (the company behind Claude AI), who argues for an “entente strategy” <https://www.darioamodei.com/essay/machines-of-loving-grace> in which the West should use AI to achieve “robust military superiority (the stick) while at the same time offering to distribute the benefits of powerful AI (the carrot) to a wider and wider group of countries in exchange for supporting the coalition’s strategy to promote democracy.” In essence, Amodei views AI as both a tool of military dominance and a tool of blackmail to force countries to align themselves with the West politically. Not exactly the open, universalist spirit of the early web, and a position virtually indistinguishable from that of Palantir. If one adopts a “seek truth from facts” approach to Anthropic, the reality of that company is a - very - stark contrast to their public image. Back in February, there was a huge media story around Anthropic refusing the Pentagon's demand that Claude be made available for mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons, and the subsequent (seeming) power struggle between the company and Pete Hegseth. The story, as told by virtually every mainstream outlet, was unambiguous: here was a responsible AI lab that had drawn an ethical line in the sand, "trying to do their best to help us from ourselves" as a Republican Senator put it <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/anthropic-cannot-in-good-conscience-acc…>. The National Catholic Register even reported <https://www.ncregister.com/news/judge-sides-with-anthropic-2026-03-30-0cz4n…> that a group of 14 Catholic moral theologians and ethicists had filed an amicus brief in the case, stating that “the teaching of the Catholic Church supports Anthropic’s decision”. What no-one spent too much time mentioning was the reason why the Pentagon was negotiating these terms with Anthropic in the first place: it stemmed from the fact that in January 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth had issued a memorandum <https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/12/2003855671/-1/-1/0/ARTIFICIAL-INTELLI…> aimed at “accelerating America's military AI dominance” that directed all Pentagon AI contracts to incorporate "any lawful use" language within 180 days - basically allowing the Pentagon to use AI for any purpose the Department considered lawful. Why did this matter for Anthropic specifically? Because Anthropic had spent the previous year and a half aggressively working to become the Pentagon's most deeply integrated frontier AI lab - and, at the time, its only one. In November 2024 they partnered <https://www.axios.com/2024/11/08/anthropic-palantir-amazon-claude-defense-ai> with - of all companies - Palantir “to make Anthropic's models available to U.S. intelligence and defense agencies.” In June 2025, they launched Claude Gov <https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-gov-models-for-u-s-national-security-…> - a dedicated product line custom-built for U.S. national security customers, already being deployed by agencies at the highest classification levels. A month later, in July 2025, they won a $200 million Pentagon contract <https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropic-and-the-department-of-defense-to-a…>. No other AI lab was remotely as deep as they were in the U.S. military and defense apparatus. This all means that, contrary to the "principled holdout" story the media ran with, Hegseth's memo didn't pull Anthropic into the war machine. It affected them because they were already fully embedded in it, more than any other player. Notably, Anthropic’s Claude was used by the Pentagon to capture Maduro, as reported by the WSJ <https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-used-anthropics-cla…>: a story that came out less than 2 weeks before the whole media frenzy about this supposed “clash” between Anthropic and the Pentagon over AI ethics. Which really makes you wonder whether the "clash" was a genuine ethical dispute at all, or a PR operation designed to distract from the fact that Anthropic's AI had just been used by the U.S. military to illegally capture a foreign head of state… It’s also interesting to look at what the “clash” was about. What Anthropic said they refused was the use of their AI for “*mass* *domestic* surveillance” (emphasis on both *mass* and *domestic*) and “*fully autonomous* weapons” (emphasis on both *fully* and *autonomous*). That is their exact wording <https://www.anthropic.com/news/statement-department-of-war>. Which means, concretely, that AI surveillance is fine domestically as long as it’s not “mass.” It also means, critically, that mass AI surveillance is fine as long as it’s not domestic. So the rest of the world is on notice: Anthropic has absolutely no problem with the U.S. military-industrial complex using their AI to surveil all 8 billion inhabitants on Earth, provided it excludes the 340 million Americans. And even the latter *can* be surveilled, just not in a “mass” way (whatever that means). This, incidentally, is actually merely a restatement of U.S. law. Mass domestic surveillance of Americans is prohibited anyhow by the Fourth Amendment, and mass foreign surveillance is authorized under FISA Section 702 and Executive Order 12333 - the legal architecture Edward Snowden exposed in 2013. So Anthropic’s so-called “principled holdout” stance is them simply restating the current US legal status-quo, rebranding it as a “red line,” and being congratulated for “following the teaching of the Catholic Church” by theologians for it. Even though that very same legal architecture they’re defending, back when the Snowden revelations broke in 2013, was rightly condemned as the most sweeping surveillance regime in the world (which it factually is). In effect, when one “seeks truth from facts,” Anthropic realized the pretty impressive PR feat of getting applauded - even getting virtually sainted by Catholic theologians - for making the U.S. sweeping surveillance apparatus more grimly powerful with frontier AI. In Tolkien’s terms: sharpening the eye of Sauron. You have to hand it to them: impressive branding work, their PR folks definitely deserve a raise over that one. Same story with the “*fully autonomous* weapons” aspect of their “ethical stance.” First of all, what this concretely means is that if there was a situation where the Pentagon decided to commit a Gaza-like genocide with AI, asking it - hypothetically - to select targets, optimize timing, and execute the operation, Anthropic’s red line would be fully honored provided Pete Hegseth personally clicked the final “go.” That’s the “ethical” principle at play here: not *whether* Claude helps plan awful deeds, only *whether a human is in the loop when it happens*. And it goes further than this actually: in their statement on this matter <https://www.anthropic.com/news/statement-department-of-war> Anthropic specified that they don't even object to fully autonomous weapons as a category. They specifically write that such weapons "may prove critical for our national defense." Their only objection is that today's AI isn't reliable enough yet. And they helpfully offer “to work directly with the Department of War on R&D to improve the reliability of these systems.” In other words: Anthropic isn’t at all refusing to help build autonomous killing machines. They just want them to be good before they’re deployed: it’s an objection over the quality of the killing, not ethics. Again, what an extraordinary PR feat: getting Catholic theologians to bless what is functionally a pitch for accurate autonomous killing machines. And while Anthropic makes for a particularly instructive case study - given their near-saintly public image - they're really just one example among many. I could have equally picked on OpenAI, who quietly deleted <https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/16/openai-quietly-removes-ban-on-military-use-…> the prohibition on military use from their policies in January 2024 and then partnered with Anduril <https://www.anduril.com/news/anduril-partners-with-openai-to-advance-u-s-ar…> to build AI for battlefield systems, with Sam Altman writing Washington Post op-eds <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/07/25/sam-altman-ai-democracy-…> about the need for “democratic AI” to prevail over “authoritarian AI” - a framing indistinguishable from Amodei's or Palantir's, and laughable on its face when you consider that this so-called “democratic AI” is built for the global domination of others (the very opposite of democracy) and explicitly set up, as we just saw, for mass surveillance and autonomous killings. Or Google, which in February 2025 abandoned its long-standing pledge <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/04/google-removes-pledge-to-not-use-ai-for-wea…> not to develop AI for weapons or surveillance. Or Meta, which opened Llama up for U.S. national security use <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/nov/05/meta-allows-national-sec…> in November 2024. This isn't a few bad apples, it’s virtually the entire ecosystem. So taking a step back, that's what you have on one side of the ledger: a U.S. obviously dead set on using AI not as a global commons but as a tool of submission and dominance for the United States. Now, smart readers (which is, of course, all of you) will think they know how the rest of this article is going to go: “he’ll present the other side of the ledger - i.e. China - with its open source models, say that’s the way to go, that we all ought to cheer for the camp that does in fact value some form of openness and universalism, bla bla bla”. Well… at the risk of disappointing you, I’m actually not going to do that, because a) I like to surprise, and b) that’d be wrong. The point is that, if we do indeed believe that AI ought to be a global commons, if we do believe in “seeking truth from facts” as opposed to ideology, by definition there shouldn’t be sides of a ledger in the first place: defaulting to “team China” is just the other side of the same mistake we've spent this whole article documenting. The framing itself - AI as a contest between civilizations, a race to be won - is the pathology. You can't seek truth from facts while still holding on to the premise that there must be a “winner”. Think back to, say, electricity: would it have been right to frame its development as a race to be won by one civilization over another? To cheer for whichever country happened to be ahead on transformers in 1890? To make electricity a matter of national allegiance, something you rooted for the way you’d root for a football team? It sounds absurd because it is absurd. Electricity was a general-purpose technology destined to become part of the shared operating system of human life, and the only sensible stance toward it was to want it developed well and diffused widely for everyone’s benefit, full stop. Sure, it’s absolutely true that China today has an infinitely better posture towards AI than the U.S. does. Case in point, just as I was in the process of writing this article Deepseek V4 was released <https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro>, and it's hard to imagine a more perfect illustration of the contrast. V4 is open-source under an MIT license, meaning anyone anywhere can download the weights, modify them, run them on whatever hardware they choose. It's competitive with GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 on most AI benchmarks, and priced at a small fraction - or even “free” if you choose to download it and run it yourself. But the single most striking thing about V4 isn't the benchmarks or even the price. It's that V4 has zero dependency on Nvidia’s CUDA anywhere in its stack - it runs entirely on Huawei Ascend chips via Huawei's own CANN framework. In other words: China now not only has its own frontier AI models, it has its own domestic AI stack, top to bottom. And it's giving the whole thing away to the world - the exact opposite of the “hoard and dominate” posture of the U.S. labs. This is China seeing AI as a general-purpose technology built into the economy, shared across borders, and iterated on openly. And in fact one of the DeepSeek researchers wrote this on X <https://x.com/victor207755822/status/2047518146689732858?s=20> with the release of V4: “we stay true to long-termism and open source for all. AGI belongs to everyone.” When you cheer for this, you’re not cheering for the “China side” to win, you’re cheering for the principle that there shouldn’t be any side: that this technology - perhaps the most consequential general-purpose technology humanity has ever developed - should belong to everyone, should be built in the open, should be allowed to diffuse the way electricity or the internal combustion engine or antibiotics diffused, imperfectly but broadly, across the whole of human civilization. Let’s go back to electricity and look at what the world would have been like had a country decided to take towards it the approach that the U.S. is currently taking towards AI: imagine if, say, the United States in 1890 had declared electricity a matter of national security, classified the designs of Edison’s dynamos and Tesla’s induction motors as export-controlled, integrated its electrical companies directly into the War Department, framed the generator as a strategic weapon rather than a general-purpose technology, and spent the following century building its foreign policy around ensuring that only it, and politically-aligned nations, had access to the light bulb. Batshit insane, right? Well that’s EXACTLY the posture it’s taking towards AI. Had that happened, it’s painfully obvious we’d ALL have been immeasurably poorer for it, materially and morally. And the United States first and foremost, given that for electricity - as will undoubtedly be the case for AI - the real value didn’t lie in control of the technology but in its widespread diffusion and in what you built on top of it. Think about the U.S.’s “electricity giants”: companies like GE, Whirlpool or RCA didn’t get rich by “owning” electricity - they got rich by *selling what electricity made possible* into a world that was electrifying as fast as it could. The U.S.’s electrical fortune was built on the world electrifying alongside it, not against it. Does the analogy hold for AI? Yes, surprisingly well. I like Jensen Huang’s (Nvidia’s CEO) recent description of AI <https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/jensen-huang> as a “5-layer cake” made of 1) energy, 2) chips, 3) infrastructure, 4) models and lastly 5) applications. The implication of his point is that each layer save for the last one - the application layer - will ultimately be largely commoditized, and as such that’s where the real value lies: in the millions of specific products, services, and industrial processes that get built on top of the other 4 layers. It’s typical network building: the layers underneath eventually become utilities, and utilities are low-margin commodity businesses. It happened with electricity, it happened with phones, it happened with railroads, it happened with the internet itself. The operators of each layer got commoditized over time, while the durable, century-defining fortunes accrued at the top of the stack: GE on top of electricity, Apple on top of the mobile and telecom infrastructure, Amazon and Google on top of the internet. The pattern is so consistent across technologies that it's essentially a law of how general-purpose infrastructure creates value. There's no reason to think AI - a general-purpose technology of the same order - will turn out any different. If anything, the pattern may be even more pronounced, because the surface area of potential AI applications is larger than any previous general-purpose technology: every industry, every knowledge-work process, every product category can in principle be rebuilt with AI inside it. As such, if that is correct, it means that the approach the U.S. is taking is strategically incoherent on its own terms. Seeing AI diffusion as something that ought to be resisted, slowed, and controlled gets the economics exactly backwards: diffusion is *precisely* the thing that enables value in the first place. Arguing against it is just as misguided as if American legislators had argued for restrictions on global mobile adoption in 2007, in the name of “winning” the mobile revolution: the $3 trillion Apple of today exists precisely because it did the opposite. Diffusion wasn't the threat to Apple's value - diffusion *was* Apple's value. Now I can already hear you retort: “sure, but AI is different, what about AGI, surely the country that reaches it first will have a tremendous competitive advantage over everyone else, no?” Let’s look into this because it’s probably the main argument hawks are making in favor of the current American approach. The claim being that AGI is not like electricity. Electricity was a tool that humans used to do things. AGI will be an agent - a system that can itself reason, plan, conduct research, and improve itself. The moment a sufficiently capable AGI comes online, the argument runs, it will be able to compound its own advantages: designing better chips, writing its own successor systems, solving the bottlenecks that currently constrain human science and engineering. The country that controls that system will, in effect, have added a superhuman research-and-development engine to its economy, its military, and its intelligence apparatus. Rival countries will not be able to catch up by copying, because the leader will be using AGI to move faster than copying can achieve. By this logic, AGI is the last general-purpose technology - the one that hands permanent advantage to whoever gets it first - and treating it like “just another technology to diffuse” isn't pragmatism, it's catastrophic strategic naïveté. First of all, note the implied assumption in this thinking: that it would be acceptable - desirable, even - for one country to achieve permanent, structural dominance over every other country on Earth - provided, of course, that country is the United States. It’s presented as self-evident and the natural order of things but let’s be very clear about what this vision means when you strip away the techno-utopist language: the permanent subjugation of every human being who doesn't happen to be American. If you’re based outside the U.S. and you’re deluded enough to go along with this, let me suggest a thought experiment. Picture the current U.S. administration and imagine it with ten times its current leverage over your country. Because that's roughly what “permanent American AGI dominance” actually means for you. Every tariff decision, every threat that you already resent? Multiply it by an order of magnitude, make it permanent, and make it enforced by a technology your country cannot meaningfully match or resist. That is the future you quite literally cheer for if you happen to reflexively root for the Palantir-Anthropic-OpenAI vision for AI. Thankfully though, this is purely theoretical because it has no chance of happening anytime soon. Let’s come back down to earth: AI is at a stage right now where it cannot even reliably perform tasks a competent six-year-old can perform. Current frontier models still routinely hallucinate facts, fail at basic arithmetic, lose track of long conversations, and cannot navigate a physical world they have no experience of. They are, to be clear, extraordinary tools - vastly more useful than what existed even two years ago. But the leap from “extraordinary tool that still can't multiply two four-digit numbers reliably” to “self-improving superintelligence capable of reorganizing global power structures” is - at this stage - a leap of religious faith. If you don’t believe me, go try to change your flight date by chatting with any airline's AI customer service bot, and report back on how your imminent civilizational transformation feels. Or try to resolve literally *any* problem with the customer service bot of your bank or your telecom provider. These systems are all powered by current frontier AI, deployed at scale, by well-funded companies with every incentive to make them work. And yet the universal experience of interacting with them is an exercise in immense frustration as they fail to understand what you’re asking, misremember what you said two messages ago, confidently invent policies that don’t exist, and eventually escalate you to a human anyway. If this is what the technology can actually do when deployed in production by companies that have spent millions on integration - if THIS is the state of the art - the notion that it’s on the edge of becoming a self-improving god-like intelligence capable of dominating geopolitics is, let’s be charitable, difficult to reconcile with observable reality. The “seek truth from facts” reality is that model companies have an inherent interest in making everyone believe that AGI is just around the corner - because their entire business model, their valuations, and their political influence depend on it being true. Strip away the AGI narrative and the frontier U.S. labs are infrastructure providers in a brutally commoditizing market. In a world where this commoditization is allowed to run its course, the model labs become utilities - high fixed costs, eroding pricing power, the AT&T of the AI century. Their trillion-dollar valuations, their hundred-billion-dollar capital raises - all of it evaporates. Unless, of course, AGI is imminent - which it isn’t ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ And, in any case, the point is moot because even if AGI were imminent, a “seek truth from facts” look at the scoreboard tells you the hoarding strategy has already failed. DeepSeek V4 matches U.S. frontier models on most benchmarks that matter <https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Pro>. Alibaba's Qwen, Moonshot's Kimi, Zhipu's GLM are all at or near the frontier. The entire architecture of export controls, chip bans, and military-industrial integration was designed to prevent exactly this. It didn't work. Not “might not work” - it has already factually failed, today, on April 24, 2026. China has caught up, is releasing open-weight frontier models and just demonstrated with DeepSeek V4 it can do so on entirely domestic silicon. Continuing to act as if dominance is still achievable - as Palantir, Anthropic, and OpenAI keep insisting in their strategy documents - is just denial of reality. This is actually the main risk in AI right now. Not the superintelligence scenario the labs keep warning us about. Instead, it’s the labs themselves, or more precisely their lobbying power on the U.S. government, which has quietly become one of the most successful regulatory capture operations in history. A handful of companies - OpenAI, Anthropic, Palantir, their close allies - have managed to make every piece of public discourse about AI happen on their terms, which is factually leading the U.S. into concrete policy choices that are not only bad for the world, but also for the U.S. themselves. Bad for the U.S. because it systematically pours American capital into the layers that are commoditizing - chips, infrastructure, models - while actively shrinking the addressable market of the one layer where durable, century-defining fortunes actually get built. And their policies simultaneously encourage the exact outcome they’re designed to prevent: they’ve empirically helped create a credible alternative AI that is just as good, free, genuinely open and shipping on entirely non-American silicon - thereby amplifying the very commoditization they’re trying to delay. Bad for the world because while the US spends its energy on export controls, chip bans, and strategic denial, the actual work of figuring out how humanity integrates a transformative new technology - the norms, the institutions, the shared understanding of what AI should and shouldn’t do - is being crowded out of the conversation entirely. Every minute of political oxygen consumed by “how do we win” is a minute not spent on “how do we do this well.” And the darkest irony is that “how do we win” isn’t even a question the American public asked for - it’s a question manufactured, funded, and amplified by the small cluster of labs - the Anthropics, the OpenAIs, the Palantirs - whose business model depends on humanity never getting around to asking the better one. Long story short, there is, in fact, no AI race: 1. It's a narrative manufactured and amplified by a handful of labs whose valuations depend on it 2. The economics of general-purpose technologies actively punish “race winners” 3. Even on the hawks' own terms - AGI - there's no race to win since it’s already empirically been lost A hundred years from now, the idea that anyone seriously framed AI as a race between nations will sound exactly as absurd as a race to “win” electricity sounds to us today. The Book of Han had it right in 111 CE: seek truth from facts.

April 24, 2026

Irene Doda: "Onnipotenti - i tecnofascisti che stanno plasmando il nostro futuro"

by Norberto Patrignani

segnalo: https://www.fuoriscenalibri.it/libri/onnipotenti/ Norberto

April 23, 2026

AI as a Fascist Artifact

by Giacomo Tesio

“AI” needs an acceptance of endless amounts of violence (I will not be able to list all forms of it, this is just a selection). In order to train “AI” systems you need data. Lots of it. And then some more. That’s really hard to get legally, especially when a large part of the population does not want their creative works or the data about them to be fed into those machines. The first form of violence “AI” depends on is the violence of data acquisition: “AI” depends on scraping and accumulating all you can get – including taking against people’s explicit will and without their consent. I run iocaine on my server and it’s absolutely crazy to see how many AI scrapers do ignore my stated preferences and just try to take all I have ever written to train their systems. And I am not alone of course. “AI” Labs keep downloading unlicensed works like books, keep digitizing anything they can find in order to feed their data hunger. They know it’s illegal and unethical but that’s irrelevant. “AI” systems exist because of the belief that “if you can download it, you can use it”. It’s the belief that might makes right. The second form of violence happens during data labeling and cleaning. Workers mostly in the global south have to spend their days looking at the worst shit you can imagine to try to keep torture content or depictions of sexualized violence against people out of the training data. This is not only economic exploitation (they get paid very little for that mentally and psychologically immensely hard job) but also a violence done to their psyche and mental health. Because we are too lazy to look for stock photos some mother in Kenya can no longer sleep due to nightmares. The third violence we already alluded to: It’s the colonialist, western view to declare whatever the west thought was “worth” digitizing or whatever submits to those logic “all the world’s knowledge”. This is not just lack of representation but a forceful othering of large parts of the population of this planet. If you are not useful to western, capitalist readings of the world then you, your history, your experiences are not part of “all the world’s knowledge”. You are being declared a lesser human being. The fourth violence is the violence done against marginalized groups using “AI” tools that we are just demanded to accept. This starts with the Trump administration creating racist propaganda using “AI” but it doesn’t end there. The amount of abuse and sexual violence that especially women are constantly being exposed to is staggering. “Nudify” apps, “grok, put her into a bikini” are just the most obvious of those tools. It’s not that most “AI” labs explicitly support those kinds of usage but they are also not limiting usage: It’s just “bad guys” or “usage violating our terms of service” but that’s just a legal defense not taking responsibility for enabling that kind of abuse. Using “AI” requires normalizing these forms of violence. You need to accept them in order to be able to live with yourself integrating those tools into your workflows. And this is the connection to fascism. [...] I am a big believer in Stafford Beer’s principle that “the purpose of a system is what it does”, that when evaluating systems one needs to look at the actual effects that system has on the world and not its manual or the sales pitch. From that we can pretty easily determine the short-term purpose of “AI”: The destruction of labor power. Continua su https://tante.cc/2026/04/21/ai-as-a-fascist-artifact/

April 23, 2026

Un Papa, un presidente e l’intelligenza artificiale.

by don Luca Peyron

Un secondo pezzo che mi pare interessante e lucido Buona lettura dl https://michelekettmaier.nova100.ilsole24ore.com/2026/04/22/un-papa-un-pres… _________________________ don Luca Peyron Pastorale della Cultura tecno scientifica - Apostolato Digitale Arcidiocesi di Torino apostolatodigitale.it <https://www.apostolatodigitale.it/>

April 23, 2026

Due cosette su Palantir

by don Luca Peyron

Buona lettura per chi lo desidera dl https://www.agensir.it/mondo/2026/04/22/palantir-e-la-repubblica-tecnologic… _________________________ don Luca Peyron Pastorale della Cultura tecno scientifica - Apostolato Digitale Arcidiocesi di Torino apostolatodigitale.it <https://www.apostolatodigitale.it/>

April 23, 2026

Digital omnibus e GDPR

by de petra giulio

*Brussels, 21/04/2026 (Agence Europe)* – In their second compromise on the ‘GDPR’ component of the digital simplification package* (see EUROPE **13813/8* <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13813/8>*)*, dated 15 April and available to *Agence Europe*, the EU27 continue to dismantle the European Commission’s proposals. *Member States are taking an explicit stance against the addition of the new Article 88c to the GDPR, which would authorise the use of personal data to train artificial intelligence models on the grounds of “legitimate interest”.* This stance goes beyond the opinion published by the two European data protection authorities, the EDPB and the EDPS, last February. These bodies had said they were in favour, provided that safeguards were put in place *(see EUROPE **13806/17* <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13806/17>*).* Article 88a regarding the processing of personal data stored on or originating from end-user devices has been deleted. As for Article 88b, which relates to “*consent fatigue*” and revises the rules on cookies, it has been amended. The possibility of making consent automatic has been somewhat modified by the EU27, who specify that this would only apply “*for specific categories of purposes*”. On the sensitive issue of data pseudonymisation *(see EUROPE **13702/24* <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13702/24>*)*, the EU Council has added an article, replacing Article 41(a), stating that “*personal data that has undergone pseudonymisation, but which could be attributed to a natural person through the use of additional information, must be considered as information relating to an identifiable natural person*”. They also task the EDPB with issuing an opinion, no later than twelve months after the regulation’s entry into force, on “*the application of pseudonymisation and anonymisation, including related technical and organisational measures, and specifying the means and criteria for determining whether the application of pseudonymisation to personal data is such as to effectively prevent persons other than the controller from identifying a data subject in such a way that, for those persons, the data subject is not or is no longer identifiable*”. *Once again, the Commission’s legal justifications on this issue (see EUROPE**13702/24* <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13702/24>*) do not appear to have convinced the Member States.* *(Original version in French by Isalia Stieffatre)*

April 22, 2026

[Responsible AI] Anticipatory Learning and AI - Working with AI to Reinvent Futures and Foresight

by Daniele Quercia

Anticipatory Learning and AI - Working with AI to Reinvent Futures and Foresight Nicklas Berild Lundblad Join MS Teams<https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/323685154621920?p=uI8oRHMydVoHTSwfwl> Format: 35 min talk + 25 min Q&A Artificial intelligence is more than anything a technology that augments learning of all kinds, including learning about the future. By exploring how we can update old techniques like scenario plannings, predictions, premortems and narrative futures we can make foresight both more accessible and useful. Nicklas Berild Lundblad is an independent writer, researcher and public policy expert, with 20 years experience of leading, building and developing policy functions at companies like Google, Stripe and DeepMind. My interests include foresight, technology, politics, philosophy and science. Subscribe to future talk announcements: Anyone outside Bell Labs can receive talk announcements by subscribing to the mailing list. To subscribe, send an empty email with the subject line "Subscribe RAI” to daniele.quercia(a)polito.it

April 21, 2026

Peter Thiel is building a parallel justice system — Powered by AI

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.codastory.com/polarization/can-we-trust-an-ai-jury-to-judge-jou…> Peter Thiel is building a parallel justice system — Powered by AI ------------------------------------------------------------------------ In 2016, when Peter Thiel killed Gawker, he insisted that he wasn’t attacking journalism writ large. On the contrary, he told <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/peter-thiel-tech-billi…> the New York Times, he’d spent $10 million secretly backing Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against the news outlet because: “I saw Gawker pioneer a unique and incredibly damaging way of getting attention by bullying people even when there was no connection with the public interest… if I didn’t think Gawker was unique, I wouldn’t have done any of this. If the entire media was more or less like this, this would be like trying to boil the ocean.” 10 years later with the aid of an “AI tribunal,” a team of intelligence and law enforcement veterans, and a political climate vastly more hostile to press freedom, he is trying to do exactly that, bypassing the courts, short-circuiting the first amendment, and making it much, much cheaper to indulge in the quasi legal harassment of journalists. Objection.ai <http://objection.ai/> is a new startup funded by Thiel, and cofounded by Aron D’Souza, who worked closely with him on the Gawker case. It promises “a fast affordable way to challenge statements in the media.” Anyone can file an objection, which will trigger an investigation by a team hired, the company says, from the CIA, FBI, and British intelligence agencies. Targeted outlets and reporters will have an opportunity to respond, and the results will be fed to an AI model, which will render a verdict. The complainant, and the target, are asked to agree to binding arbitration, with an unspecified range of potential consequences. Financial details are vague, but the company has said the process will cost around $2,000 — far less than the retainer of a crisis communications expert. An initial slate of cases includes objections against the New York Times, for reporting on how Thiel’s fellow traveller David Sacks, former PayPal chief operating officer and Donald Trump’s former “AI and Crypto Czar,” uses <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/30/technology/david-sacks-white-house-profi…> his White House position to benefit Silicon Valley connections; The Wall Street Journal for its revelations about the doodle contributed <https://www.wsj.com/politics/trump-jeffrey-epstein-birthday-letter-we-have-…> by Donald Trump to Jeffrey Epstein’s birthday book (a case recently dismissed <https://www.wsj.com/business/media/trump-lawsuit-murdoch-dow-jones-epstein-…> by a federal judge); and British reporter Hannah Broughton for an aggregated story in the UK tabloid the Mirror about allegations that Amazon workers were told to continue working while a colleague lay dead on the warehouse floor. A smattering of social media provocateurs (Candace Owens) and politicians (Bernie Sanders) round out the roster, but the aggregate effect is indisputable: Thiel’s animus was about journalism all along. Indeed, the Objection.ai team couldn’t be clearer about that. “Gawker was not unique,” writes <https://objection.ai/about> D’Souza on the company’s website. “It was simply the first large media company to be tested against reality in the age of clicks, outrage, and algorithmic amplification. Since then, the same structural failure has spread everywhere.” “Peter Thiel and I … did not just fight Gawker,” he goes on. “ — We demonstrated that facts still mattered if someone was willing to enforce them.” This is worse than revisionism. D’Souza is banking on everyone having forgotten that the Hulk Hogan case had nothing to do with “reality.” It was undisputed that the sex tape published by Gawker was real. The original suit, which failed, was for copyright infringement and the ultimate $140 million award that bankrupted the company was for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional harm. This foundational lie is important, because it is a warning against the temptation to engage Objection.ai on the merits. It would be easy enough to conduct a good faith debate to take at face value D’Souza’s argument that tech platforms and algorithms amplify false claims to millions, that courts are expensive and slow, media ombuds toothless, and fact-checkers partisan. And it would not be hard to demonstrate that he is harnessing widely shared concerns about a disordered information environment to mobilize support for an AI powered justice system controlled by a hyperpartisan private company with a track record of attacking the very institutions that are holding the line on consensus reality. It would also be a mistake. There is nothing good faith about this effort. Rather, it is classic Thiel: an attempt to hack the principles of accountability, and turn them against journalism. Leave it to his less sophisticated Silicon Valley peers to rail <https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/nyt-david-sacks-anger-allies-21217312.p…> against the media, create <https://www.businessinsider.com/andreessen-horowitz-expands-its-in-houses-m…> in house news outlets or buy <https://www.wired.com/story/openai-acquires-tbpn-buys-positive-news-coverag…> them. The PayPal co-founder is going for the heart of the system, and financing infrastructure that will enable anyone who can afford a used Honda Civic to launch a harassment campaign, cloaked in the language of legitimate investigation. James O’Keefe <https://x.com/JamesOKeefeIII>, but with the judicial rather than journalistic process as its governing metaphor. It will be tempting, too, to question the likely financial sustainability of Objection. That will be the least of its founders’ concerns. The for-profit structure supports a story about the company’s purpose. It may work, or not, but its goals are nonfinancial. We reached out to Thiel for comment on Objection.ai before publication and will update this article as soon as he responds. Providing funding <https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/15/can-ai-judge-journalism-a-thiel-backed-st…>, alongside Thiel, is Balaji Srinivasan, the investor and author of “The Network State,” a book about social networks with “a sense of national consciousness” replacing the nation state. He once outlined <https://www.businessinsider.com/venture-capitalist-balaji-srinivasan-sugges…> an early version of the Objection.ai model in an email to the far right theorist Curtis Yarvin about dealing with critical coverage. “If things get hot,” he suggested “it may be interesting to sic the Dark Enlightenment audience on a single vulnerable hostile reporter to dox them and turn them inside out with hostile reporting sent to *their* advertisers/friends/contacts.” These men understand the limits of the Gawker verdict’s impact. It bankrupted the company, a personal victory for Thiel, but perhaps the least important outcome of the case. At a more systemic level, it struck fear into the hearts of media insurers and newsroom counsel, focusing attention on third party litigation finance as potential threat. If people with limitless resources could sponsor litigation against news organizations they disliked, constitutional protections would be no match for the sheer cost and complexity of defense. Now, they’ve found an AI-assisted way to supercharge those effects. The Gawker case routed around the First Amendment by relying on a privacy claim. Objection.ai does so by building a hallucination of the legal process. Any journalist foolish enough to agree to binding arbitration by the company probably deserves what they get, but that will be a vanishingly small minority. For those who don’t, a phone call, or a knock on the door from a former FBI agent, or defense intelligence operative, will be chilling, and an ex-parte verdict rendered by Thiel’s custom-tuned AI will act as a cudgel on social media and via traditional PR. Journalists will be assigned a “trust score” to act as an additional goad. In an environment of less peril for press freedom, it might be easy to laugh off Objection.ai as the confection of a thin-skinned millenarian. Right now, with the crony capture of broadcast news far advanced, swathes of the tech community openly hostile to journalism, and the White House onside, it would be wise to take it seriously. That starts with seeing it for what it is, and refusing to engage with a process which, unlike the real courts, Peter Thiel has no legal power to compel.

April 21, 2026

Fwd: PhD Supervision

by maurizio lana

sono stato contattato da Tumpale Mwakasangula, assistant lecturer of Information Studies at the Water Institute, in Dar Es Salaam Tanzania. mi ha chiesto se sono disposto ad essere il suo PhD research supervisor, e chiede se sarei disposto ad accoglierla come visiting researcher per una Scholarship grant del MAECI (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale). il periodo dentro cui si deve collocare il MAECI grant è fra Novembre 2026 e Luglio 2027. mi ha cercato perché insegno scienza della biblioteca e dell'informazione, in cui pure lei è laureata, ma il tema della ricerca che vorrebbe sviluppare, come si vede qui sotto, non è da scienza della biblioteca e io tra qualche mese vado in pensione. qualcuno che legge il messaggio potrebbe essere interessata/o e disponibile a raccogliere la richiesta/proposta? Maurizio -------- Messaggio Inoltrato -------- Oggetto: PhD Supervision Data: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 17:51:16 +0300 Mittente: Tumpale Mwakasangula <tumpalemwakasangula(a)gmail.com> A: maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it <maurizio.lana(a)uniupo.it> Dear professor, Greetings from Tanzania Thank you so much for answering my yesterday email on time. I sincerely understand the fact that you will be retiring later this year. Congratulations Professor. Following your previous reply and after further reflection on the scope of my research, I am writing to share a revised research focus and hereby kindly request you (If possible) to give me your suggestions and direct me to a new professor who will guide me on the new title and focus. My research will now focus on: *Designing an Integrated Information Management Framework to Link Health Records and Water/Sanitation Infrastructure Data for Enhanced Cholera Outbreak Control in Vingunguti Ward, Dar es Salaam * The core problem identified is the fragmentation of critical information. Health facilities hold patient data, while municipal offices and DAWASA hold separate data on water and sanitation infrastructure. These datasets currently exist in isolation, resulting in delayed response and poor preventive planning. My study will therefore design an administrative framework to link these existing datasets for timely and targeted cholera control. Vingunguti area is characterized as a low -income informal urban settlement and is documented as recurrent cholera hotspot This approach is firmly grounded in Library and Information Science, as it addresses a systemic information management problem the broken flow of information between units The study will not develop software or provide treatment, but will produce a validated protocol for routine, evidence-based decision making. Thank you for your continued mentorship. Regards, Tumpale Alfred Mwakasangula Assistant Lecturer- Information Studies Water Institute-Dar Es Salaam ------------------------------------------------------------------------ if we spent on prosecuting the rich just one-tenth of the effort we spend prosecuting the poor it would be a very different world bruce schneier ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

April 20, 2026

Segnalazioni: Fondazione Basso (le guerre e noi) e Sapienza-Economia

by Dario Guarascio

Cari Nexiani (soprattutto romani), segnalo il ciclo 'Le guerre e noi' co-organizzato dalla Fondazione Basso e dalla Sapienza - programma molto ricco con interventi, tra gli altri, di Betti, Cruciati, De Petra, Foa, Pianta, Rivetti, Strazzari e molti altri - e la presentazioni di imperialismo digitale il 5 maggio (ore 17) alla Sapienza con interventi di Diletti, Franzini, Pieranni e Rosselli. Diffondete pure! A presto, Dario -- *Dario Guarascio* Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto, Sapienza Università di Roma <http://www.uniroma1.it/strutture/dipartimenti> Via del Castro Laurenziano n° 9, 00161 Roma Edificio A (6° piano) -ala B, stanza n° 606 E-mail: dario.guarascio(a)uniroma1.it <nome.cognome(a)uniroma1.it> *Sito web* italiano - https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/darioguarascio/ inglese - https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/darioguarascio-eng/ -- *Fai crescere le giovani ricercatrici e i giovani ricercatori*** *con il 5 per mille alla Sapienza* Scrivi il codice fiscale dell'Università *80209930587 **Cinque per mille <https://www.uniroma1.it/it/node/23149>*

April 20, 2026

[ERRATA CORRIGE] MEMENTO | 130° Nexa Lunch Seminar | 29 aprile 2026

by Nexa - Media

Gentilissime, gentilissimi, Vi ricordiamo che mercoledì 29 aprile, dalle ore 13.00 alle ore 14.00, si terrà il 130° Nexa Lunch Seminar con un incontro dal titolo "Cloud pubblici e stack sovrani? Gli sviluppi della sovranità digitale in America Latina". Ospite dell'incontro: Gianmarco Cristofari (Università di Amsterdam). L'incontro si terrà IN PRESENZA e ONLINE. SEDE FISICA dell'incontro: Centro Nexa su Internet e Società, Politecnico di Torino, Via Boggio 65/a, Torino (1° piano). Per accedere alla sala si raccomanda di suonare al citofono Portineria e di seguire le indicazioni segnalate lungo il percorso. QUI<https://nexa.polito.it/contatti> maggiori informazioni su come raggiungerci. STANZA VIRTUALE dell'incontro: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent Maggiori informazioni alla pagina: https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-130 Un saluto cordiale, -- Valeria Bergantino Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society<web:%20https://nexa.polito.it> DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino Via Pier Carlo Boggio, 65/a – Torino Digital Communication Assistant DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino<https://www.dauin.polito.it> Corso Castelfidardo 34/D - Torino mail: valeria.bergantino(a)polito.it<mailto:valeria.bergantino@polito.it> tel: 3473443585

April 20, 2026

MEMENTO | 130° Nexa Lunch Seminar | 22 aprile 2026, ore 13.00

by Nexa - Media

Gentilissime, gentilissimi, Vi ricordiamo che mercoledì 22 aprile, dalle ore 13.00 alle ore 14.00, si terrà il 130° Nexa Lunch Seminar con un incontro dal titolo "Cloud pubblici e stack sovrani? Gli sviluppi della sovranità digitale in America Latina". Ospite dell'incontro: Gianmarco Cristofari (Università di Amsterdam). L'incontro si terrà IN PRESENZA e ONLINE. SEDE FISICA dell'incontro: Centro Nexa su Internet e Società, Politecnico di Torino, Via Boggio 65/a, Torino (1° piano). Per accedere alla sala si raccomanda di suonare al citofono Portineria e di seguire le indicazioni segnalate lungo il percorso. QUI<https://nexa.polito.it/contatti> maggiori informazioni su come raggiungerci. STANZA VIRTUALE dell'incontro: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent Maggiori informazioni alla pagina: https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-130 Un saluto cordiale, -- Valeria Bergantino Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society<web:%20https://nexa.polito.it> DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino Via Pier Carlo Boggio, 65/a – Torino Digital Communication Assistant DAUIN - Politecnico di Torino<https://www.dauin.polito.it> Corso Castelfidardo 34/D - Torino mail: valeria.bergantino(a)polito.it<mailto:valeria.bergantino@polito.it> tel: 3473443585

April 20, 2026

PRIN 2026, call for interessati

by Andrea Trentini

Ciao, stiamo (unimi, unilink, forse unimore) valutando di partecipare al PRIN 2026 con un progetto che dovrebbe collegare i seguenti: - cittadinanza digitale - relatività della rete - fake news - deep fake - manipolazione dell'informazione - uso politico della religione e della storia (es. motivare guerre) - teorie cospirazioniste - (ovviamente) IA C'è in lista qualcuno di altre università o centri di ricerca (eligible) che voglia provare a partecipare al progetto? Grazie -- Andrea Trentini ⠠⠵ - http://atrent.it - public key ID: 0xA7A91E3B - Dip.to di Informatica - Università degli Studi di Milano Cittadinanza Digitale e Tecnocivismo: 1) https://www.ledizioni.it/prodotto/cittadinanza-digitale-tecnocivismo 2) https://edizionithemis.it/catalogo/digitale-e-societa/dal-tecnocivismo-alla…

April 18, 2026