July 2023 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] (no subject)

by Giuseppe Attardi

Sono stato impreciso nel titolo, ma la sostanza era quella: Il Sistema Informatico di Ateneo è individuato quale struttura responsabile per la transizione al digitale e il prof. Antonio Cisternino, in quanto Presidente del Sistema Informatico di Ateneo, è nominato Responsabile per la Transizione al Digitale fino al 31 ottobre 2020. — Beppe > On 3 Jul 2023, at 12:46, nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it wrote: > Solo per la precisione, vsto che sono stata nominata: il dottor > Cisternino non è prorettore all'informatica. > https://unimap.unipi.it/organizzazione/organi.php?f=1CEN@F

July 13, 2023

To Help Cool a Hot Planet, the Whitest of White Coats

by Luigi Scorca

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/12/climate/white-paint-climate-cooling.html

July 13, 2023

Re: [nexa] Undone Computer Science conference

by 380°

Buongiorno, grazie _infinite_ per la segnalazione, non conoscevo gli studi sulla undone science [1], fantastico! "Norberto Patrignani" <norberto.patrignani(a)polito.it> writes: > Segnalo ... la call scade 10 Ottobre 2023 > > https://undonecs.sciencesconf.org/ la conferenza è tutto un programma: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- The goal of our conference is to provide an opportunity to pause and reflect on the epistemological and ethical aspects of computer science. We propose as a theme the concept of undone science [1,2]: the intriguing yet vital notion that areas of research may remain incomplete, overlooked, or unfunded despite being found worthy of exploration by some—and the exploration into the causes of these situations. Any discussion of systematic lack of production or dissemination of knowledge is welcome, whether in a specific area or in computer science in general, whether past or present; whether due to limitations of available methodologies, blind spots of dominant paradigms, institutional and industrial biases, lack of social representation, or other factors. Why an international conference on Undone Science in Computer Science Undone science offers a broad and open-ended line of inquiry capable of inspiring fascinating talks—yet sufficiently focused to bring together, around a common topic, computer scientists from across the field, but also philosophers of science, social scientists, etc., interested in discussing the ethical and epistemological dimensions of our field. [...] Topics welcomed Undone science encompasses many social aspects of research. Dominant paradigms, through “theoretical commitment” [1], influence within a domain what is deemed worthy or not of exploration. Yet accounts of paradigm shifts in our young science remain rare. Undone science also encompasses the influence of institutional and corporate biases, such as those that critical voices have recently highlighted with regard to AI ethics [3], which have been reminding us of the society-impacting case studies that motivated the concept of undone science in the first place. An example of institutional influence are the publishing practices of a field, which can have an impact on the choice of research questions and the way research is executed. The bias can also be methodological and technical, such as when the availability of certain software or hardware at the right time determines which research idea wins [4]. Interdisciplinary approaches can naturally suggest examples of undone science—for instance, when a point of view borrowed from another discipline changes how we perceive an object of study. As computers become more and more prominent in people's lives, studying interactions with, and impact on people is a central topic. How can ethical questioning—regarding social, economic, and environmental consequences—be integrated into our work? As the ACM recently updated its Code of Ethics to more broadly encompass the concerns of our profession, can such codes be leveraged to present some questions as worthy or not of exploration? Undone science also recognises, notably, the role of social movements and civil society in identifying new questions or questions not immediately deemed worthy of interest [1]—for computer science, one can think of the free software movement, the civil liberties organisations, and probably more. An admissible topic for discussion at our conference could be the analysis of an “elephant in the room” of your domain: a question which is never discussed in papers for various reasons—but perhaps occasionally and informally between sessions at conferences—yet that could be vital for the domain. Undone science must be contrasted with open questions that are well-recognised within a community, but that are believed to simply require a technical tour de force. We would like to welcome talks that inspire reflections about ethical or epistemological dimensions of computer science, whether the talk delves into these aspects or a problem is simply outlined based on an examination of actual practice. Researchers who are not specialists of ethics and epistemology, but who have encountered topics in their research that inspire such reflections, are encouraged to submit. Post-Proceedings Volume Depending upon the eventual number and quality of submissions, we intend to follow up the conference with a call for full papers to be published in a journal (TBD). It will not be necessary to submit a full paper to present at the conference; nor will it be necessary to present at the conference to answer the call for full papers. [...] References [1] Frickel, S., Gibbon, S., Howard, J., Kempner, J., Ottinger, G., & Hess, D. J. (2010). Undone Science: Charting Social Movement and Civil Society Challenges to Research Agenda Setting. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35(4), 444–473. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243909345836 (n.d.r.: _piratato_ qui https://sci-hub.st/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0162243909345836) [2] D. J. Hess (2016). Undone Science: Social Movements, Mobilized Publics, and Industrial Transitions. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262529495. [3] According to Green, tech ethics increasingly tends to be “subsumed into corporate logics and incentives”. According to Abdalla and Abdalla, actions of “Big Tech” to influence academic and public discourse are reminiscent of the tactics of Big Tobacco: * B. Green (2021). "The Contestation of Tech Ethics: A Sociotechnical Approach to Technology Ethics in Practice," in Journal of Social Computing, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 209-225, September 2021. https://doi.org/10.23919/JSC.2021.0018 * M. Abdalla & M. Abdalla (2021). The Grey Hoodie Project: Big Tobacco, Big Tech, and the Threat on Academic Integrity. In Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 287–297. https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462563 [4] Sara Hooker. 2021. The hardware lottery. Commun. ACM 64, 12 (December 2021), 58–65. https://doi.org/10.1145/3467017 --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- saluti, 380° -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

July 13, 2023

Re: [nexa] New Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework largely a copy of "Privacy Shield". noyb will challenge the decision.

by Stefano Quintarelli

afaik il GDPR e' una norma (regolamento) l'accordo no. On 13/07/23 12:13, Damiano Verzulli wrote: > Da quello che dici tu, Stefano, invece, ... sembrerebbe che ci siano "norme superiori" > (immagino tu ti riferisca al GDPR) che hanno "forza di legge" e che, conseguentemente, > "vincono" su 1), 3) e 5). Corretto?

July 13, 2023

Re: [nexa] New Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework largely a copy of "Privacy Shield". noyb will challenge the decision.

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 13/07/23 11:49, Stefano Quintarelli ha scritto: > [...] > il fatto che la commissione faccia un accordo non vuole dire che sia > legale. > (lo ha fatto in passato e due volte la corte europea di giustizia ha > detto "quello che hai fatto e' illegale".) > > adesso lo fa una terza volta, ma non vuol dire che sia legale > > un accordo illegale non rende legale il comportamento di chi si basa > su di esso > > quindi, da quanto capisco io, no, non sono "perfettamente utilizzabili". Interessante. Mi piacerebbe approfondire la questione, soprattutto per (cercare di) sgombrare il campo da equivoci. Avevo capito (io; probabilmente sbagliando) che con la ShremsII fosse diventato *ILLEGALE* il trasferimento dei dati negli USA. Ne deduco che *PRIMA* della Shrems II, tale trasferimento fosse "legale". Sbaglio? In altri termini, nella timeline: 1 - Primo tentativo: Safe Harbour 2 - KO via Shrems I 3 - Secondo tentativo: Privacy Shield 4 - KO via Shrems II 5 - Terzo tentativo: adequacy decision for safe and trusted EU-US data flows 6 - ??? Shrems III ? ??? io immaginavo che nei periodi 1<=>2 e 3<=>4 i servizi GAFAM potessero essere "tranquillamente utilizzati" (aka: senza timore di essere denunciati per trasferimento illecito dei dati) e che qui, per conseguenza, oggi (che siamo fra 5<=>6...) di nuovo l'utilizzo torni ad essere "compliant" Da quello che dici tu, Stefano, invece, ... sembrerebbe che ci siano "norme superiori" (immagino tu ti riferisca al GDPR) che hanno "forza di legge" e che, conseguentemente, "vincono" su 1), 3) e 5). Corretto? Mi rendo conto di muovermi lungo un sentiero che NON mi compete (non sono un esperto di diritto, ne tantomeno di normativa sulla privacy) ma... credo sia FONDAMENTALE cercare "di carpirci" (almeno fra noi; qui).... perché.... se non ci capiamo noi.... Grazie a tutti coloro che contribuiranno alla discussione. Saluti, DV > > estremizzo: se la commissione facesse un accordo che dicesse "si puo' > fare benzina senza pagarla", non vuol dire che puoi andare al > distributore, farti il piano e andartene... > > e' illecito, checche' ne dica la commissione > > almeno questo e' quello che credo di capire, > > ma i giuristi saranno piu' precisi... > > ciao!, s. > >> >> Quindi --ripeto; se capisco bene-- ora le PP.AA. possono "tornare a" >> / "continuare a" utilizzare i vari Google Analytics, Google >> Classroom, Microsoft Teams e/o tutti gli altri N-mila servizi cloud >> offerti dai GAFAM... senza alcun problema "giuridico". >> >> In molti evidenziano che tale decisione avra' vita breve, e dara' >> adito ad una Shrems III (ossia ad una "bocciatura" da parte della >> Corte di Giustizia Europea) ma... nel frattempo, la "legalita'" mi >> pare sia tornata a prevalere (con un adeguamento della norma, >> piuttosto che con un cambiamento negli utilizzi). >> >> Mi chiedo quali conseguenze produrra', tale "decisione", negli >> approcci dei vari manager pubblici (dai Dirigenti degli Istituti >> Comprensivi o delle Scuole Superiori... o anche degli Atenei) che, >> negli ultimi mesi/anno hanno dovuto "gestire" le richieste degli >> amici di Monitora-PA... >> >> Cosa fare, ora? Lo chiedo ai Nexiani di questa lista... >> >> Saluti, >> DV >> >> >> Il 11/07/23 11:03, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa ha scritto: >>> Conformità ottenuta tramite ingegneria semantica del termine >>> 'proportionate'. >>> >>> >>> >>> <https://noyb.eu/en/european-commission-gives-eu-us-data-transfers-third-rou…> >>> >>> >>> Third attempt of the European Commission to get a stable agreement >>> on EU-US data transfers will be likely back at the Court of Justice >>> (CJEU) in a matter of months. The allegedly "new" Trans-Atlantic >>> Data Privacy Framework is largely a copy of the failed "Privacy >>> Shield". Despite the European Commission's public relations efforts, >>> there is little change in US law or the approach taken by the EU. >>> The fundamental problem with FISA 702 was not addressed by the US, >>> as the US still takes the view that only US persons are worthy of >>> constitutional rights. >>> >>> Comparison of the change in US law since 2014: >>> >>> * >>> o "Old" PPD-28 (2014) >>> <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…> >>> o "New" EO 14086, replacing PPD-28 (2022) >>> <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> >>> * Comparison with previous public relation efforts: >>> o "Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows" and the "Umbrella" >>> from 2013 >>> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> >>> o Press Statement on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2461> >>> o Media FAQs on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> >>> o Single Page "Agreement in Principle" between Biden and von >>> der Leyen from 2022 >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…> >>> * European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision (December 2022) >>> <https://noyb.eu/en/European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision >>> (December 2022)> >>> >>> *Background.* In 2013 Edward Snowden disclosed that the US >>> government used "big tech" companies and programs like "PRISM >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM>" or "Upstream >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection>" under FISA 702 >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act_of_1978…> >>> and EO 12.333 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12333> >>> to spy on the rest of the world without the need for probable cause >>> or judicial approval. This was not limited to crime or terrorism, >>> but also included espionage on "partners" of the US. Since a 1995 EU >>> law, personal data may generally not be sent outside of the EU >>> unless there is a "essentially equivalent" protection in the >>> destination country. The US industry heavily relied on a European >>> Commission Decision called "Safe Harbor" that declared the US >>> "essentially equivalent" in 2000. The CJEU has annulled the >>> Commission Decision in C-362/14 ("Schrems I") >>> <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> >>> in 2015, given the vase US surveillance laws. In 2016 the European >>> Commission has passed largely the same Decision on EU-US Data >>> Transfers again, under the new name "Privacy Shield", which was >>> invalidated by the CJEU in C-311/18 ("Schrems II") >>> <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> >>> in 2020 largely on the same grounds. >>> >>> *Ursula's and Joe's "Magic" Tricks. *After the annulment of the >>> "Privacy Shield" the negotiations between the EU and the US saw >>> little progress. The US insisted that EU data would stay subject to >>> US mass surveillance and "non-US" persons will /not /have the same >>> protections as US persons. After little movement for more than 1.5 >>> years, the US has reportedly used the war in Ukraine to put pressure >>> on the EU on sharing personal data >>> <https://www.politico.eu/article/us-eyes-breakthrough-on-data-dispute-with-e…>. >>> Soon thereafter, Joe Biden and Ursula von der Leyen met on 25 March >>> 2022. The same day, the two have suddenly "solved" what the lawyers >>> were unable to solve and presented an "agreement in principle >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…>", >>> a one pager which in essence contained two "tricks" that should calm >>> the public: >>> >>> * /First/, the CJEU found that*FISA 702 bulk surveillance being >>> not "proportionate"* >>> within the meaning of Article 52 of the EU's Charter of >>> Fundamental Rights (CFR). >>> The "new" US Executive Order 14086 >>> <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> >>> (which is >>> largely equivalent to PPD-28 from 2014 >>> <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…>) >>> would now include the word "proportionate". The "trick" here: *the >>> US will attribute another meaning to the word "proportionate" than >>> the CJEU*. EO 14086 declares FISA 702 bulk surveillance to be >>> "proportionate" under an undisclosed "US understanding" of the word >>> and contrary to the two findings by the CJEU. This way the EU and >>> the US were able to claim that they agreed on the same word >>> ("proportionate") - even when there is no agreement on the meaning >>> of the word. >>> * /Secondly/, the CJEU found that *redress via the Privacy Shield >>> "Ombudsperson"* was >>> not even remotely complying with Article 47 CFR**- even when the >>> Ombudsperson was >>> hailed by the Commission public relations in 2016 as an >>> "/independent/" form of >>> "/redress in the area of national security/" >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462>. >>> The "trick" on >>> redress: the Ombudsperson mechanism was*renamed and split to a >>> Civil Liberties >>> Protection Officer (CLPO) and a so-called "Court"* (which is not >>> a court, but a >>> partly independent executive body). While there are some minor >>> improvements over the >>> Ombudsperson, the individual will not have any direct >>> interaction with the new >>> bodies (they will have to send a complaint to an EU data >>> protection authority and >>> not be heard by the US) and they will give the exact same >>> response as the previous >>> "Ombudsperson". Under EO 14086 the CLPO and the Court must in >>> any case respond by >>> saying: "/Without confirming or denying that the complainant was >>> subject to United >>> States signals intelligence activities, the review either did >>> not identify any >>> covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court issued a >>> determination >>> requiring appropriate remediation/" (see here >>> <https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-22531/p-107>). The >>> "judgment" of this >>> "Court" is therefore known even before a case is brought. There >>> are many additional >>> problem with the mechanism, that will largely ensure that >>> complaints will not even >>> be admitted. It seems unthinkable that the Court of Justice >>> would accept this as >>> "judicial redress" under Article 47 CFR. >>> * /Finally/, the*US has refused to reform FISA 702* to give non-US >>> persons reasonable >>> privacy protections. There is agreement on both sides of the >>> Atlantic that FISA 702 >>> and EO 12.333 violate fundamental rights under the 4th Amendment >>> in the US and >>> Articles 7, 8 and 47 CFR in the EU - but the US continues to >>> insist that non-US >>> persons do not have constitutional rights in the US - hence a >>> violation of their >>> right to privacy is not covered by the 4th Amendment. >>> * *FISA 702 will have to be prolonged by the end of 2023*, given >>> that there is a >>> "sunset clause" in US law. This would have been the perfect >>> opportunity to improve >>> US law, but given the new deal with the EU, there will be little >>> reason for the US >>> to reform FISA 702. >>> >>> Overall the new "Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework" is a copy of >>> Privacy Shield (from 2016), which in turn was a copy of "Safe >>> Harbor" (from 2000). Given that this approach has failed twice >>> before, there was no legal basis for the change of course - only >>> logic of having a deal was political. >>> >>> Max Schrems, chair of /noyb/: "/They say the definition of insanity >>> is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a >>> different result. Just like 'Privacy Shield' the latest deal is not >>> based on material changes, but by political interests. Once again >>> the current Commission seems to think that the mess will be the next >>> Commission's problem. FISA 702 needs to be prolonged by the US this >>> year, but with the announcement of the new deal the EU has lost any >>> power to get a reform of FISA 702."/ >>> >>> *Fool me Thrice? *Already in the wake of the Snowden disclosures in >>> 2013, the European Commission announced that it will "rebuild" trust >>> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> >>> and "/make Safe Harbor safer/" and come up with an "/umbrella >>> agreement/".**In 2016 journalists were told that >>> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> >>> the "Privacy Shield" would mean that /"for the first time, the US >>> has given the EU written assurance",/ that there would be /"clear >>> limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms" /and even/"no >>> indiscriminate mass surveillance". /None of these claims and systems >>> has prove stable when put before the CJEU. In the current version of >>> the Commission's public relations efforts, the same (ever-repeating) >>> claims are entertained. >>> >>> Max Schrems: "/We now had 'Harbors', 'Umbrellas', 'Shields' and >>> 'Frameworks' - but no substantial change in US surveillance law. The >>> press statements of today are almost a literal copy of the once from >>> the past 23 years. Just announcing that something is 'new', 'robust' >>> or 'effective' does not cut it before the Court of Justice. We would >>> need changes in US surveillance law to make this work - and we >>> simply don't have it./" >>> >>> *CJEU challenge ready to be filed. *Anyone who's personal data will >>> be transferred under the new deal can bring a challenge with Data >>> Protection Authorities or Courts. /noyb /has prepared various >>> procedural options to bring the new deal back before the CJEU. We >>> expect the new system to be implemented by the first companies >>> within the next months, which will open the path towards a challenge >>> by a person who's data is transferred under the new instrument. It >>> is not unlikely that a challenge would reach the CJEU by the end of >>> 2023 or beginning of 2024. The CJEU would then even have the option >>> to suspend the "Framework" for the time of the procedure. A final >>> decision by the CJEU would be likely by 2024 or 2025. No matter if >>> such a challenge will be successful, this will bring clarity to the >>> "Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework" within about two years. >>> >>> Max Schrems:/"We have various options for a challenge already in the >>> drawer, although we are sick and tired of this legal ping-pong. We >>> currently expect this to be back at the Court of Justice by the >>> beginning of next year. The Court of Justice could then even suspend >>> the new deal while it is reviewing the substance of it. For the sake >>> of legal certainty and the rule of law we will then get an answer if >>> the Commission's tiny improvements were enough or not./ /For the >>> past 23 years all EU-US deals were declared invalid retroactively, >>> making all past data transfers by business illegal - we seem to just >>> add another two years of this ping-pong now./" >>> >>> *EU Commission shows little care for rule of law and citizens' >>> privacy. *This third attempt to pass largely the same unlawful >>> decision also raises questions as to the larger role of the European >>> Commission being the guardian of the EU treaties. Instead of >>> upholding the 'rule of law' the Commission simply passes an invalid >>> decision over and over again, despite clear rulings by the CJEU. >>> Despite large outrage after the Snowden disclosures in the EU and >>> repeated calls by the European Parliament to take action, the >>> Commission seems to give the diplomatic relations with the US and >>> business pressure on both side of the Atlantic the priority over the >>> rights of Europeans and the requirements of EU law. >>> >>> Max Schrems: "/The Commission is meant to be the 'guardian of the >>> treaties' and the defender or the 'rule of law'. It loves that role >>> when it comes to Member States violating EU law. Now the Commission >>> itself simply ignores the Court of Justice for the third time./" >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> nexa mailing list >>> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >>> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> -- >> Damiano Verzulli >> e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it >> --- >> possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} >> --- >> "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of >> income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able >> to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not >> here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 >> http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail: damiano(a)verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

July 13, 2023

Re: [nexa] New Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework largely a copy of "Privacy Shield". noyb will challenge the decision.

by Stefano Quintarelli

mi pare non sia preciso, ma chiedo ai giusristi... On 13/07/23 11:33, Damiano Verzulli wrote: > Riprendo questo thread, perché temo la cosa sia "sottovalutata". > > Di fatto --se capisco bene-- il nuovo "framework" approvato tre giorni fa: > > https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_3721 > > rende _PERFETTAMENTE_ utilizzabili _TUTTI_ i servizi "cloud" erogati dai GAFAM, senza > problema alcuno. il fatto che la commissione faccia un accordo non vuole dire che sia legale. (lo ha fatto in passato e due volte la corte europea di giustizia ha detto "quello che hai fatto e' illegale".) adesso lo fa una terza volta, ma non vuol dire che sia legale un accordo illegale non rende legale il comportamento di chi si basa su di esso quindi, da quanto capisco io, no, non sono "perfettamente utilizzabili". estremizzo: se la commissione facesse un accordo che dicesse "si puo' fare benzina senza pagarla", non vuol dire che puoi andare al distributore, farti il piano e andartene... e' illecito, checche' ne dica la commissione almeno questo e' quello che credo di capire, ma i giuristi saranno piu' precisi... ciao!, s. > > Quindi --ripeto; se capisco bene-- ora le PP.AA. possono "tornare a" / "continuare a" > utilizzare i vari Google Analytics, Google Classroom, Microsoft Teams e/o tutti gli altri > N-mila servizi cloud offerti dai GAFAM... senza alcun problema "giuridico". > > In molti evidenziano che tale decisione avra' vita breve, e dara' adito ad una Shrems III > (ossia ad una "bocciatura" da parte della Corte di Giustizia Europea) ma... nel frattempo, > la "legalita'" mi pare sia tornata a prevalere (con un adeguamento della norma, piuttosto > che con un cambiamento negli utilizzi). > > Mi chiedo quali conseguenze produrra', tale "decisione", negli approcci dei vari manager > pubblici (dai Dirigenti degli Istituti Comprensivi o delle Scuole Superiori... o anche > degli Atenei) che, negli ultimi mesi/anno hanno dovuto "gestire" le richieste degli amici > di Monitora-PA... > > Cosa fare, ora? Lo chiedo ai Nexiani di questa lista... > > Saluti, > DV > > > Il 11/07/23 11:03, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa ha scritto: >> Conformità ottenuta tramite ingegneria semantica del termine 'proportionate'. >> >> >> >> <https://noyb.eu/en/european-commission-gives-eu-us-data-transfers-third-rou…> >> >> Third attempt of the European Commission to get a stable agreement on EU-US data >> transfers will be likely back at the Court of Justice (CJEU) in a matter of months. The >> allegedly "new" Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework is largely a copy of the failed >> "Privacy Shield". Despite the European Commission's public relations efforts, there is >> little change in US law or the approach taken by the EU. The fundamental problem with >> FISA 702 was not addressed by the US, as the US still takes the view that only US >> persons are worthy of constitutional rights. >> >> Comparison of the change in US law since 2014: >> >> * >> o "Old" PPD-28 (2014) >> <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…> >> o "New" EO 14086, replacing PPD-28 (2022) >> <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> >> * Comparison with previous public relation efforts: >> o "Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows" and the "Umbrella" from 2013 >> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> >> o Press Statement on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 >> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2461> >> o Media FAQs on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 >> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> >> o Single Page "Agreement in Principle" between Biden and von der Leyen from 2022 >> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…> >> * European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision (December 2022) >> <https://noyb.eu/en/European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision (December 2022)> >> >> *Background.* In 2013 Edward Snowden disclosed that the US government used "big tech" >> companies and programs like "PRISM <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM>" or "Upstream >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection>" under FISA 702 >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act_of_1978…> and EO 12.333 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12333> to spy on the rest of the world without the need for probable cause or judicial approval. This was not limited to crime or terrorism, but also included espionage on "partners" of the US. Since a 1995 EU law, personal data may generally not be sent outside of the EU unless there is a "essentially equivalent" protection in the destination country. The US industry heavily relied on a European Commission Decision called "Safe Harbor" that declared the US "essentially equivalent" in 2000. The CJEU has annulled the Commission Decision in C-362/14 ("Schrems I") <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> in 2015, given the vase US surveillance laws. In 2016 the European Commission has passed largely the same Decision on EU-US Data Transfers again, under the new name "Privacy Shield", which was invalidated by the CJEU in C-311/18 ("Schrems II") <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> in 2020 largely on the same grounds. >> >> *Ursula's and Joe's "Magic" Tricks. *After the annulment of the "Privacy Shield" the >> negotiations between the EU and the US saw little progress. The US insisted that EU data >> would stay subject to US mass surveillance and "non-US" persons will /not /have the same >> protections as US persons. After little movement for more than 1.5 years, the US has >> reportedly used the war in Ukraine to put pressure on the EU on sharing personal data >> <https://www.politico.eu/article/us-eyes-breakthrough-on-data-dispute-with-e…>. Soon thereafter, Joe Biden and Ursula von der Leyen met on 25 March 2022. The same day, the two have suddenly "solved" what the lawyers were unable to solve and presented an "agreement in principle <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…>", a one pager which in essence contained two "tricks" that should calm the public: >> >> * /First/, the CJEU found that*FISA 702 bulk surveillance being not "proportionate"* >> within the meaning of Article 52 of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). >> The "new" US Executive Order 14086 >> <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> (which is >> largely equivalent to PPD-28 from 2014 >> <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…>) would now include the word "proportionate". The "trick" here: *the US will attribute another meaning to the word "proportionate" than the CJEU*. EO 14086 declares FISA 702 bulk surveillance to be "proportionate" under an undisclosed "US understanding" of the word and contrary to the two findings by the CJEU. This way the EU and the US were able to claim that they agreed on the same word ("proportionate") - even when there is no agreement on the meaning of the word. >> * /Secondly/, the CJEU found that *redress via the Privacy Shield "Ombudsperson"* was >> not even remotely complying with Article 47 CFR**- even when the Ombudsperson was >> hailed by the Commission public relations in 2016 as an "/independent/" form of >> "/redress in the area of national security/" >> <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462>. The "trick" on >> redress: the Ombudsperson mechanism was*renamed and split to a Civil Liberties >> Protection Officer (CLPO) and a so-called "Court"* (which is not a court, but a >> partly independent executive body). While there are some minor improvements over the >> Ombudsperson, the individual will not have any direct interaction with the new >> bodies (they will have to send a complaint to an EU data protection authority and >> not be heard by the US) and they will give the exact same response as the previous >> "Ombudsperson". Under EO 14086 the CLPO and the Court must in any case respond by >> saying: "/Without confirming or denying that the complainant was subject to United >> States signals intelligence activities, the review either did not identify any >> covered violations or the Data Protection Review Court issued a determination >> requiring appropriate remediation/" (see here >> <https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-22531/p-107>). The "judgment" of this >> "Court" is therefore known even before a case is brought. There are many additional >> problem with the mechanism, that will largely ensure that complaints will not even >> be admitted. It seems unthinkable that the Court of Justice would accept this as >> "judicial redress" under Article 47 CFR. >> * /Finally/, the*US has refused to reform FISA 702* to give non-US persons reasonable >> privacy protections. There is agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that FISA 702 >> and EO 12.333 violate fundamental rights under the 4th Amendment in the US and >> Articles 7, 8 and 47 CFR in the EU - but the US continues to insist that non-US >> persons do not have constitutional rights in the US - hence a violation of their >> right to privacy is not covered by the 4th Amendment. >> * *FISA 702 will have to be prolonged by the end of 2023*, given that there is a >> "sunset clause" in US law. This would have been the perfect opportunity to improve >> US law, but given the new deal with the EU, there will be little reason for the US >> to reform FISA 702. >> >> Overall the new "Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework" is a copy of Privacy Shield >> (from 2016), which in turn was a copy of "Safe Harbor" (from 2000). Given that this >> approach has failed twice before, there was no legal basis for the change of course - >> only logic of having a deal was political. >> >> Max Schrems, chair of /noyb/: "/They say the definition of insanity is doing the same >> thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Just like 'Privacy Shield' >> the latest deal is not based on material changes, but by political interests. Once again >> the current Commission seems to think that the mess will be the next Commission's >> problem. FISA 702 needs to be prolonged by the US this year, but with the announcement >> of the new deal the EU has lost any power to get a reform of FISA 702."/ >> >> *Fool me Thrice? *Already in the wake of the Snowden disclosures in 2013, the European >> Commission announced that it will "rebuild" trust >> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> and "/make Safe Harbor safer/" and come up with an "/umbrella agreement/".**In 2016 journalists were told that <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> the "Privacy Shield" would mean that /"for the first time, the US has given the EU written assurance",/ that there would be /"clear limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms" /and even/"no indiscriminate mass surveillance". /None of these claims and systems has prove stable when put before the CJEU. In the current version of the Commission's public relations efforts, the same (ever-repeating) claims are entertained. >> >> Max Schrems: "/We now had 'Harbors', 'Umbrellas', 'Shields' and 'Frameworks' - but no >> substantial change in US surveillance law. The press statements of today are almost a >> literal copy of the once from the past 23 years. Just announcing that something is >> 'new', 'robust' or 'effective' does not cut it before the Court of Justice. We would >> need changes in US surveillance law to make this work - and we simply don't have it./" >> >> *CJEU challenge ready to be filed. *Anyone who's personal data will be transferred under >> the new deal can bring a challenge with Data Protection Authorities or Courts. /noyb >> /has prepared various procedural options to bring the new deal back before the CJEU. We >> expect the new system to be implemented by the first companies within the next months, >> which will open the path towards a challenge by a person who's data is transferred under >> the new instrument. It is not unlikely that a challenge would reach the CJEU by the end >> of 2023 or beginning of 2024. The CJEU would then even have the option to suspend the >> "Framework" for the time of the procedure. A final decision by the CJEU would be likely >> by 2024 or 2025. No matter if such a challenge will be successful, this will bring >> clarity to the "Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework" within about two years. >> >> Max Schrems:/"We have various options for a challenge already in the drawer, although we >> are sick and tired of this legal ping-pong. We currently expect this to be back at the >> Court of Justice by the beginning of next year. The Court of Justice could then even >> suspend the new deal while it is reviewing the substance of it. For the sake of legal >> certainty and the rule of law we will then get an answer if the Commission's tiny >> improvements were enough or not./ /For the past 23 years all EU-US deals were declared >> invalid retroactively, making all past data transfers by business illegal - we seem to >> just add another two years of this ping-pong now./" >> >> *EU Commission shows little care for rule of law and citizens' privacy. *This third >> attempt to pass largely the same unlawful decision also raises questions as to the >> larger role of the European Commission being the guardian of the EU treaties. Instead of >> upholding the 'rule of law' the Commission simply passes an invalid decision over and >> over again, despite clear rulings by the CJEU. Despite large outrage after the Snowden >> disclosures in the EU and repeated calls by the European Parliament to take action, the >> Commission seems to give the diplomatic relations with the US and business pressure on >> both side of the Atlantic the priority over the rights of Europeans and the requirements >> of EU law. >> >> Max Schrems: "/The Commission is meant to be the 'guardian of the treaties' and the >> defender or the 'rule of law'. It loves that role when it comes to Member States >> violating EU law. Now the Commission itself simply ignores the Court of Justice for the >> third time./" >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > -- > Damiano Verzulli > e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it > --- > possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} > --- > "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of > income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able > to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not > here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 > http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 13, 2023

China finalizes first-of-its-kind rules governing generative A.I. services like ChatGPT

by Zulu

Di solito leggo i digest quotidiani, ma per la prima volta contribuisco anche io. Giusto scrivendo una parte su due casi di copyright infringement in Cina, notizie su generative AI! https://www.cnbc.com/2023/07/13/china-introduces-rules-governing-generative… Buona giornata! Francesco M. -- *Francesco Mittica* Future Graduate, Global Law and Transnational Legal Studies MSOI Member AI Aficionado

July 13, 2023

Re: [nexa] New Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework largely a copy of "Privacy Shield". noyb will challenge the decision.

by Damiano Verzulli

Riprendo questo thread, perché temo la cosa sia "sottovalutata". Di fatto --se capisco bene-- il nuovo "framework" approvato tre giorni fa: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_3721 rende _PERFETTAMENTE_ utilizzabili _TUTTI_ i servizi "cloud" erogati dai GAFAM, senza problema alcuno. Quindi --ripeto; se capisco bene-- ora le PP.AA. possono "tornare a" / "continuare a" utilizzare i vari Google Analytics, Google Classroom, Microsoft Teams e/o tutti gli altri N-mila servizi cloud offerti dai GAFAM... senza alcun problema "giuridico". In molti evidenziano che tale decisione avra' vita breve, e dara' adito ad una Shrems III (ossia ad una "bocciatura" da parte della Corte di Giustizia Europea) ma... nel frattempo, la "legalita'" mi pare sia tornata a prevalere (con un adeguamento della norma, piuttosto che con un cambiamento negli utilizzi). Mi chiedo quali conseguenze produrra', tale "decisione", negli approcci dei vari manager pubblici (dai Dirigenti degli Istituti Comprensivi o delle Scuole Superiori... o anche degli Atenei) che, negli ultimi mesi/anno hanno dovuto "gestire" le richieste degli amici di Monitora-PA... Cosa fare, ora? Lo chiedo ai Nexiani di questa lista... Saluti, DV Il 11/07/23 11:03, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa ha scritto: > Conformità ottenuta tramite ingegneria semantica del termine > 'proportionate'. > > > > <https://noyb.eu/en/european-commission-gives-eu-us-data-transfers-third-rou…> > > Third attempt of the European Commission to get a stable agreement on > EU-US data transfers will be likely back at the Court of Justice > (CJEU) in a matter of months. The allegedly "new" Trans-Atlantic Data > Privacy Framework is largely a copy of the failed "Privacy Shield". > Despite the European Commission's public relations efforts, there is > little change in US law or the approach taken by the EU. The > fundamental problem with FISA 702 was not addressed by the US, as the > US still takes the view that only US persons are worthy of > constitutional rights. > > Comparison of the change in US law since 2014: > > * > o "Old" PPD-28 (2014) > <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…> > o "New" EO 14086, replacing PPD-28 (2022) > <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> > * Comparison with previous public relation efforts: > o "Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows" and the "Umbrella" from > 2013 > <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> > o Press Statement on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_2461> > o Media FAQs on the "Privacy Shield" from 2016 > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> > o Single Page "Agreement in Principle" between Biden and von der > Leyen from 2022 > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…> > * European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision (December 2022) > <https://noyb.eu/en/European Commission Draft Adequacy Decision > (December 2022)> > > *Background.* In 2013 Edward Snowden disclosed that the US government > used "big tech" companies and programs like "PRISM > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM>" or "Upstream > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection>" under FISA 702 > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act_of_1978…> > and EO 12.333 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12333> to > spy on the rest of the world without the need for probable cause or > judicial approval. This was not limited to crime or terrorism, but > also included espionage on "partners" of the US. Since a 1995 EU law, > personal data may generally not be sent outside of the EU unless there > is a "essentially equivalent" protection in the destination country. > The US industry heavily relied on a European Commission Decision > called "Safe Harbor" that declared the US "essentially equivalent" in > 2000. The CJEU has annulled the Commission Decision in C-362/14 > ("Schrems I") > <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> > in 2015, given the vase US surveillance laws. In 2016 the European > Commission has passed largely the same Decision on EU-US Data > Transfers again, under the new name "Privacy Shield", which was > invalidated by the CJEU in C-311/18 ("Schrems II") > <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF…> > in 2020 largely on the same grounds. > > *Ursula's and Joe's "Magic" Tricks. *After the annulment of the > "Privacy Shield" the negotiations between the EU and the US saw little > progress. The US insisted that EU data would stay subject to US mass > surveillance and "non-US" persons will /not /have the same protections > as US persons. After little movement for more than 1.5 years, the US > has reportedly used the war in Ukraine to put pressure on the EU on > sharing personal data > <https://www.politico.eu/article/us-eyes-breakthrough-on-data-dispute-with-e…>. > Soon thereafter, Joe Biden and Ursula von der Leyen met on 25 March > 2022. The same day, the two have suddenly "solved" what the lawyers > were unable to solve and presented an "agreement in principle > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/872132/Tra…>", > a one pager which in essence contained two "tricks" that should calm > the public: > > * /First/, the CJEU found that*FISA 702 bulk surveillance being not > "proportionate"* within the meaning of Article 52 of the EU's > Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). The "new" US Executive Order > 14086 > <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-10-14/pdf/2022-22531.pdf> > (which is largely equivalent to PPD-28 from 2014 > <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidenti…>) > would now include the word "proportionate". The "trick" here: *the > US will attribute another meaning to the word "proportionate" than > the CJEU*. EO 14086 declares FISA 702 bulk surveillance to be > "proportionate" under an undisclosed "US understanding" of the > word and contrary to the two findings by the CJEU. This way the EU > and the US were able to claim that they agreed on the same word > ("proportionate") - even when there is no agreement on the meaning > of the word. > * /Secondly/, the CJEU found that *redress via the Privacy Shield > "Ombudsperson"* was not even remotely complying with Article 47 > CFR**- even when the Ombudsperson was hailed by the Commission > public relations in 2016 as an "/independent/" form of "/redress > in the area of national security/" > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462>. > The "trick" on redress: the Ombudsperson mechanism was*renamed and > split to a Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO) and a > so-called "Court"* (which is not a court, but a partly independent > executive body). While there are some minor improvements over the > Ombudsperson, the individual will not have any direct interaction > with the new bodies (they will have to send a complaint to an EU > data protection authority and not be heard by the US) and they > will give the exact same response as the previous "Ombudsperson". > Under EO 14086 the CLPO and the Court must in any case respond by > saying: "/Without confirming or denying that the complainant was > subject to United States signals intelligence activities, the > review either did not identify any covered violations or the Data > Protection Review Court issued a determination requiring > appropriate remediation/" (see here > <https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-22531/p-107>). The > "judgment" of this "Court" is therefore known even before a case > is brought. There are many additional problem with the mechanism, > that will largely ensure that complaints will not even be > admitted. It seems unthinkable that the Court of Justice would > accept this as "judicial redress" under Article 47 CFR. > * /Finally/, the*US has refused to reform FISA 702* to give non-US > persons reasonable privacy protections. There is agreement on both > sides of the Atlantic that FISA 702 and EO 12.333 violate > fundamental rights under the 4th Amendment in the US and Articles > 7, 8 and 47 CFR in the EU - but the US continues to insist that > non-US persons do not have constitutional rights in the US - hence > a violation of their right to privacy is not covered by the 4th > Amendment. > * *FISA 702 will have to be prolonged by the end of 2023*, given > that there is a "sunset clause" in US law. This would have been > the perfect opportunity to improve US law, but given the new deal > with the EU, there will be little reason for the US to reform FISA > 702. > > Overall the new "Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework" is a copy of > Privacy Shield (from 2016), which in turn was a copy of "Safe Harbor" > (from 2000). Given that this approach has failed twice before, there > was no legal basis for the change of course - only logic of having a > deal was political. > > Max Schrems, chair of /noyb/: "/They say the definition of insanity is > doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different > result. Just like 'Privacy Shield' the latest deal is not based on > material changes, but by political interests. Once again the current > Commission seems to think that the mess will be the next Commission's > problem. FISA 702 needs to be prolonged by the US this year, but with > the announcement of the new deal the EU has lost any power to get a > reform of FISA 702."/ > > *Fool me Thrice? *Already in the wake of the Snowden disclosures in > 2013, the European Commission announced that it will "rebuild" trust > <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4d874331-784a-11e3-b889-…> > and "/make Safe Harbor safer/" and come up with an "/umbrella > agreement/".**In 2016 journalists were told that > <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2462> > the "Privacy Shield" would mean that /"for the first time, the US has > given the EU written assurance",/ that there would be /"clear > limitations, safeguards and oversight mechanisms" /and even/"no > indiscriminate mass surveillance". /None of these claims and systems > has prove stable when put before the CJEU. In the current version of > the Commission's public relations efforts, the same (ever-repeating) > claims are entertained. > > Max Schrems: "/We now had 'Harbors', 'Umbrellas', 'Shields' and > 'Frameworks' - but no substantial change in US surveillance law. The > press statements of today are almost a literal copy of the once from > the past 23 years. Just announcing that something is 'new', 'robust' > or 'effective' does not cut it before the Court of Justice. We would > need changes in US surveillance law to make this work - and we simply > don't have it./" > > *CJEU challenge ready to be filed. *Anyone who's personal data will be > transferred under the new deal can bring a challenge with Data > Protection Authorities or Courts. /noyb /has prepared various > procedural options to bring the new deal back before the CJEU. We > expect the new system to be implemented by the first companies within > the next months, which will open the path towards a challenge by a > person who's data is transferred under the new instrument. It is not > unlikely that a challenge would reach the CJEU by the end of 2023 or > beginning of 2024. The CJEU would then even have the option to suspend > the "Framework" for the time of the procedure. A final decision by the > CJEU would be likely by 2024 or 2025. No matter if such a challenge > will be successful, this will bring clarity to the "Trans-Atlantic > Data Privacy Framework" within about two years. > > Max Schrems:/"We have various options for a challenge already in the > drawer, although we are sick and tired of this legal ping-pong. We > currently expect this to be back at the Court of Justice by the > beginning of next year. The Court of Justice could then even suspend > the new deal while it is reviewing the substance of it. For the sake > of legal certainty and the rule of law we will then get an answer if > the Commission's tiny improvements were enough or not./ /For the past > 23 years all EU-US deals were declared invalid retroactively, making > all past data transfers by business illegal - we seem to just add > another two years of this ping-pong now./" > > *EU Commission shows little care for rule of law and citizens' > privacy. *This third attempt to pass largely the same unlawful > decision also raises questions as to the larger role of the European > Commission being the guardian of the EU treaties. Instead of upholding > the 'rule of law' the Commission simply passes an invalid decision > over and over again, despite clear rulings by the CJEU. Despite large > outrage after the Snowden disclosures in the EU and repeated calls by > the European Parliament to take action, the Commission seems to give > the diplomatic relations with the US and business pressure on both > side of the Atlantic the priority over the rights of Europeans and the > requirements of EU law. > > Max Schrems: "/The Commission is meant to be the 'guardian of the > treaties' and the defender or the 'rule of law'. It loves that role > when it comes to Member States violating EU law. Now the Commission > itself simply ignores the Court of Justice for the third time./" > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

July 13, 2023

A proposito dell'IA/ML c/o UniPI (...e del realtivo budget IT) [Era: relatività della rete in azione...]

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 10/07/23 17:14, Antonio ha scritto: >> Non mi è chiara la "fonte" dell'informazione sui € 330.000 + IVA. >> Qual'e'? E' "ufficiale"? > https://www.unipi.it/index.php/gare/item/24390-procedura-negoziata-ai-sensi… Riprendo questo thread, che scaturiva dai documenti ufficiali del bilancio UniPI 2022, dai quali si desumevano alcuni aspetti legati alla gestione dell'IT (nel 2022). Fra l'altro, è stato evidenziato che nel 2022 sono stati spesi € 402.600 (ossia: 330.00 + IVA 22%) per l'acquisto di un "box" [1] che fa HPC/AI. Dopo una (mia) attenta analisi di tale documentazione, ho capito che lo stesso "box", **IDENTICO** sia nella sostanza (modello specifico), che nel costo (altri € 402.600), che, soprattutto, del fornitore, è stato **RI**comprato una seconda volta ad inizio 2023. Quindi... CE NE SONO DUE! 1 - https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/contratti/caricaDettaglioAtto/origina… 2 - https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/contratti/caricaDettaglioAtto/origina… Mi chiedo se il fatto che uno dei due sia in quota PNRR sia una feature... o un bug... (non ho la risposta). In ogni caso, mi associo all'aspettativa di Antonio, che in [2] ricordava di un messaggio di Attardi dello scorso febbraio 2022 [3] (quindi PRIMA che tali acquisti venissero concretizzati) che segnalava che "Tuttavia queste tecnologie rimangono appannaggio di pochi e rendono più difficile ad altri ricercatori di restare al passo." Ecco: UniPI... ci ha messo sopra 805.000 euro... OTTOCENTOCINQUEMILA euro. Vorrei scrivere un sacco di cose, tutte relative al fatto che 800k € *PUBBLICI* sono una MALEDETTAMENTE GRANDE quantita' di denaro.... e che con quello stesso denaro, si potevano pagare una decine di stipendi per un paio d'anni... ma non lo faccio. Ci terrei, pero', a sentire l'opinione dei Pisani, qui in lista. Saluti, DV P.S.: A latere: al prossimo che mi dice che in UNIV servono piu' risorse.... lo vengo a trovare e gli rigo la macchina... [1] I piu' curiosi possono "vederlo" dalla pagina del produttore: https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/data-center/dgx-h100/ [2] https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2023-July/051259.html [3] https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2022-February/048692.html -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail: damiano(a)verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

July 12, 2023

Undone Computer Science conference

by Norberto Patrignani

Segnalo ... la call scade 10 Ottobre 2023 https://undonecs.sciencesconf.org/ buona estate Norberto

July 12, 2023