July 2022 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Garante danese: Google Workspace (nelle scuole) non è compliant GDPR!

by Damiano Verzulli

"... Denmark is effectively banning Google’s services in schools, after officials in the municipality of Helsingør were last year ordered <https://www.datatilsynet.dk/afgoerelser/afgoerelser/2021/sep/afgoerelse-ved…> to carry out a risk assessment around the processing of personal data by Google. In a verdict published last week <https://www.datatilsynet.dk/afgoerelser/afgoerelser/2022/jul/datatilsynet-n…>, Denmark’s data protection agency, Datatilsynet, revealed that data processing involving students using Google’s cloud-based Workspace software suite <https://techcrunch.com/2021/06/14/google-opens-workspace-to-everyone/> — which includes Gmail, Google Docs, Calendar and Google Drive — “does not meet the requirements” of the European Union’s GDPR data privacy regulations <https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/20/wtf-is-gdpr/>." L'articolo completo è in: https://techcrunch.com/2022/07/18/denmark-bans-chromebooks-and-google-works… A scanso di equivoci, segnalo che la soluzione tecnologica di cui si parla è adottata da un buon 50% degli Atenei del Paese, e da un buon 70/80% di Istituzioni scolastiche... Quello che piu' mi amareggia, pero', non è tanto la notizia in sé... quanto il fatto che a piu' di due anni da inizio pandemia, non siamo (Italiani / Europei) stati in grado di sviluppare una soluzione che consentisse --esattamente in questa situazione-- di poter offrire una alternativa sensata a tutti coloro che vorranno valutarla. Tutto cio' è veramente triste... Bye, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

July 19, 2022

Mathew D. Rose – Uber Files: Another victory for EU corruption

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Mathew D. Rose – Uber Files: Another victory for EU corruption** * July 15, 2022 /The Uber Files have once again shown that mainstream media is not there to protect democracy, but to participate in its sell out.// //Mathew D. Rose is an Investigative Journalist specialised in Organised Political Crime in Germany and an editor of BRAVE NEW EUROPE// / The recent case of the Uber Files has reconfirmed my decision to leave investigative journalism. As one titillating scandal detail follows hot on the heels of the other, the big picture – the systemic picture – is suppressed or simply ignored as always. First of all, what were the strategic elements of Uber’s lobbying campaign? As far as we have seen up to now they were politicians at EU, national, and municipal level; corporate media; and academics. What they all have in common, maybe with exceptions, is that these people were bribed to act in the interests of Uber. However the words bribe and corruption have not appeared in a single article, NGO statement, or tweet. These were however quid pro quo deals, money for influence: business as usual in the EU. What one has to understand with corruption is that quid pro quo does not mean an immediate exchange. One can deliver one’s own part of the bargain and collect the reciprocal fee later. Former EU commissioner Neeli Kroes is a typical example. As she was EU commissioner Uber promised her a generously remunerated position on its board later. For her part, while in office and afterwards she used her power and influence to further the financial interests of Uber. Once she had left the EU she waited until the official so-called “cooling off period of 18 months (although during this period she was energetically active for Uber) before officially joining Uber’s advisory board. Records show Uber offered her $200,000 a year to chair the board. [...] continua qui: https://braveneweurope.com/mathew-d-rose-uber-files-another-victory-for-eu-…

July 19, 2022

I media digitali, un potente mezzo di dialogo da usare con senso critico

by Antonio Iacono

Venerdì scorso il Papa ha inviato un messaggio ai partecipanti al Congresso Mondiale di SIGNIS (Seoul, 15-18 agosto 2022). Il testo completo, poco meno di 4000 caratteri, è sul sito della sala stampa del Vaticano [1] Il messaggio è stato reso pubblico stamattina ed immediatamente riportato dalle varie agenzie di stampa e organi di informazione varia. Eccone una rassegna di ... titoli. "Il Papa: i media digitali, un potente mezzo per promuovere la pace" [2] Il Papa dice che i siti di alcuni media “sono diventati luoghi di tossicità e fake news” [3] Papa Francesco: “i media digitali possono unirci” [4] Il Papa: "Basta fake news e social media tossici, proteggiamo i più giovani" [5] Papa ai comunicatori cattolici: educate al senso critico contro chi inquina i media [6] Papa Francesco elogia i media digitali: ‘Uno strumento potente che può sostenere la pace’ [7] Il Papa: i media digitali, un potente mezzo di dialogo da usare con senso critico [8] "Luoghi di tossicità". Papa Francesco contro i siti web [9] Insomma, tutte le "echo chambers" sono accontentate. A. [1] https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2022/07/… [2] https://www.vaticannews.va/it/papa/news/2022-07/papa-messaggio-congresso-mo… [3] https://www.askanews.it/cronaca/2022/07/18/il-papa-dice-che-i-siti-di-alcun… [4] https://www.agensir.it/quotidiano/2022/7/18/papa-francesco-i-media-digitali… [5] https://www.ilgiorno.it/cronaca/papa-fake-news-social-1.7895219 [6] https://www.asianews.it/notizie-it/Papa-ai-comunicatori-cattolici:-educate-… [7] https://www.papaboys.org/papa-francesco-elogia-i-media-digitali-uno-strumen… [8] https://www.chiesa-cattolica.it/il-papa-i-media-digitali-un-potente-mezzo-d… [9] https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/tecnologia/luoghi-tossicit-papa-francesco-co…

July 18, 2022

Articolo di Romano Prodi su politica industriale da Il Messaggero di ieri, 17 luglio 2022

by Luigi Scorca

July 18, 2022

Facial Recognition Search Engine Pulls Up “Potentially Explicit” Photos of Kids

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://theintercept.com/2022/07/16/facial-recognition-search-children-phot…> Abusive parents searching for kids who have fled to shelters. Governments targeting the sons and daughters of political dissidents. Pedophiles stalking the victims they encounter in illicit child sexual abuse material. The online facial recognition search engine PimEyes allows anyone to search for images of children scraped from across the internet, raising a host of alarming possible uses, an Intercept investigation has found. Often called the Google of facial recognition, PimEyes search results include images that the site labels as “potentially explicit,” which could lead to further exploitation of children at a time when the dark web has sparked an explosion of images of abuse. “There are privacy issues raised by the use of facial recognition technology writ large,” said Jeramie Scott, director of the Surveillance Oversight Project at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. “But it’s particularly dangerous when we’re talking about children, when someone may use that to identify a child and to track them down.” Over the past few years, several child victim advocacy groups have pushed for police use of surveillance technologies to fight trafficking, arguing that facial recognition can help authorities locate victims. One child abuse prevention nonprofit, Ashton Kutcher and Demi Moore’s Thorn, has even developed its own facial recognition tool. But searches on PimEyes for 30 AI-generated children’s faces yielded dozens of pages of results, showing how easily those same tools can be turned against the people they’re designed to help. While The Intercept searched for fake faces due to privacy concerns, the results contained many images of actual children pulled from a wide range of sources, including charity groups and educational sites. PimEyes previously came under fire for including photos scraped from major social media platforms. It no longer includes those images in search results. Instead, searches churn up a welter of images that feel plucked from the depths of the internet. Some come from personal websites that parents created anonymously or semi-anonymously to feature photos of their children, likely not anticipating that they could one day be pulled up by strangers taking snapshots of kids on the street. One search for an AI-generated child turned up images of a real boy in Delaware, where a photographer had taken portraits of his family on a sunny spring day. When she posted the portraits in her online portfolio, the photographer omitted the boy’s name and other identifying details. But a determined person might theoretically be able to find such information. (The photographer did not respond to requests to comment for this article.) Another search turned up a girl displaying a craft project at an after-school program in Kyiv, Ukraine, in a photo taken just before the war. A second page on the same website showed the girl at home this spring; by then, Kyiv was under siege, the program had gone remote, and teachers were assigning kids craft projects to complete from their kitchen tables. A third search turned up a photo of a 14-year-old British boy that had been featured in a video about the U.K. educational system. The commentator gave the boy’s first name and details about the school he attended. Still another search turned up a photo of a toddler from an American home-schooling blog, where the girl’s mother had revealed her first name and, when the family was traveling, rough whereabouts. PimEyes is the brainchild of two Polish developers who created the site in 2017 on a whim. It reportedly passed through the hands of an anonymous owner who moved the headquarters to the Seychelles and then in December 2021 was purchased by Georgian international relations scholar Giorgi Gobronidze, who had met the site’s creators while lecturing in Poland. In a wide-ranging video interview that stretched to nearly two hours, Gobronidze offered a vague and sometimes contradictory account of the site’s privacy protections. He said that PimEyes was working to develop better safeguards for children, though he offered varying responses when asked what those might entail. “It’s a task that was given already to our technical group, and they have to bring me a solution,” he said. “I gave them several options.” At the same time, he dismissed the argument that parents who post anonymous photos of their children have any expectation of privacy. “Parents should be more responsible,” he said. “I have never posted a photo of my child on social media or on a public website.” “Designed for Stalkers” On its website, PimEyes maintains that people should only use the tool to search for their own faces, claiming that the service is “not intended for the surveillance of others and is not designed for that purpose.” But the company offers subscriptions that allow people to perform dozens of unique searches a day; the least expensive package, at $29.99 a month, offers 25 daily searches. People who shell out for the premium service can set alerts for up to 500 different images or combinations of images, so that they are notified when a particular face shows up on a new site. Gobronidze claimed that many of PimEyes’s subscribers are women and girls searching for revenge porn images of themselves, and that the site allows multiple searches so that such users can get more robust results. “With one photo, you can get one set of results, and with another photo you can get a totally different set of results, because the index combination is different on every photo,” he said. Sometimes, he added, people find new illicit images of themselves and need to set additional alerts to search for those images. He acknowledged that 500 unique alerts is a lot, though he said that, as of Thursday, 97.7 percent of PimEyes subscribers had a lighter account. Following criticism, the company pivoted to claiming that the search engine was a privacy tool. PimEyes’s previous owners marketed it as a way to pry into celebrities’ lives, the German digital rights site Netzpolitik reported in 2020. Following criticism, the company pivoted to claiming that the search engine was a privacy tool. Gobronidze said that fraught features were being overhauled under his ownership. “Previously, I can say that PimEyes was tailor-designed for stalkers, [in that] it used to crawl social media,” he said. “Once you dropped a photo, you could find the social media profiles for everyone. Now it is limited only to public searches.” But many people clearly do not see PimEyes as an aid to privacy. The site has already been used to identify adults in a wide variety of cases, from so-called sedition hunters working to find perpetrators after the January 6 insurrection, to users of the notorious site 4chan seeking to harass women. Nor do PimEyes’s marketing materials suggest much concern for privacy or ethics. In a version of the “people kill people” argument favored by the U.S. gun lobby, a blog post on the site blithely alludes to its many uses: “PimEyes just provides a tool, and the user is obliged to use the tool with responsibility. Everyone can buy a hammer, and everyone can either craft with this tool, or kill.” “These things should only be instrumentalized with the clear and knowledgeable consent of users,” said Daly Barnett, a staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “This is just another example of the large overarching problem within technology, surveillance-built or not. There isn’t privacy built from the get-go with it, and users have to opt out of having their privacy compromised.” “We Do Not Want to Be a Monster Machine” Alarmingly, search results for AI-generated kids also include images that PimEyes labels as “potentially explicit.” The backgrounds in the labeled images are blurred, and since clicking through to the source URLs could contribute to the exploitation of children, The Intercept could not confirm whether they are, in fact, explicit. Gobronidze said that the labels are assigned in part based on images’ source URLs, and that often the photos are harmless. When PimEyes representatives do run across child sexual abuse images, he said, representatives report it to law enforcement. But one example he gave shows how easily the site can be used to unearth abusive or illegal content. A 16-year-old girl had used her parents’ credit card to open an account, Gobronidze said. She soon found revenge porn videos that had been uploaded by an ex-boyfriend — images that likely fit the legal definition of child pornography. (He said PimEyes issued takedown notices for the websites and advised the girl to talk with authorities, her parents, and psychologists.) Gobronidze was vague on how he might limit abuse of children on the site. Subscribing requires a credit card, PayPal, or Amazon Pay account, and users upload their IDs only when asking PimEyes to perform takedown notices on their behalf. By design, he said, the search engine only seeks matches in photos and does not guess at age, gender, race, or ethnicity. “We do not want to be a monster machine,” he said, dubbing a more heavy-handed approach “Big Brother.” But at another point in the interview, he said he was planning to exclude images of children from search results. Still later, he said that his technical team was figuring out how to balance these two conflicting goals. PimEyes flags people who “systematically” use the engine to search for children’s faces, he said. Users who plug in one or two faces of children are typically assumed to be family members. If a PimEyes representative gets suspicious, he said, they might ask a subscriber for a document like a birth certificate that would prove that a user is a parent. When asked how a birth certificate would rule out abuse or stalking by noncustodial parents, Gobronidze said that PimEyes might instead request a signed form, similar to what parents and legal guardians provide in some countries when crossing borders with a child, to show they have any other parent’s consent. In a later email, he said that PimEyes had twice asked for “documents + verbal explanation” for people who uploaded images of children, and that the site had subsequently banned one of the accounts. “The fact that PimEyes doesn’t have safeguards in place for children and apparently is not sure how to provide safeguards for children only underlines the risks of this kind of facial recognition service,” said Scott, of EPIC. “Participating in public, whether online or offline, should not mean subjecting yourself to privacy-invasive services like PimEyes.” The inclusion of children’s faces in PimEyes search results underscores just how fraught the facial recognition landscape has become. The inclusion of children’s faces in PimEyes search results underscores just how fraught the facial recognition landscape has become. For years, victim advocacy groups have pushed for expanded use of the technology by law enforcement. The Kutcher-Moore nonprofit, Thorn, has developed a facial recognition tool called Spotlight that it provides to investigators working on sex trafficking cases, as well as to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. In a recent report, the center said that in 2021, Spotlight helped it identify over 400 missing children in online sex trafficking advertisements. Commercial providers of facial recognition have also gotten into trafficking prevention. The controversial facial recognition company Clearview AI sells its tools to police for identifying child victims. But those same tools can also be used to target the vulnerable. Clearview AI promoted the use of its database for child trafficking after being sued by the American Civil Liberties Union for endangering survivors of domestic violence and undocumented immigrants, among others. Prostasia Foundation, a child protection group that supports sex workers rights and internet freedom, contends that an earlier Thorn tool sometimes flagged images of adults, leading to the arrest of sex workers. This tension is even more extreme with PimEyes, which has virtually no guardrails and smashes long-standing expectations of privacy for both adults and children. Gobronidze said that PimEyes had talked to Thorn about using its tool Safer to detect child sexual abuse material using image hashing technology — a potentially odd relationship given that PimEyes makes images of children searchable to the general public, while Thorn aims to protect children from stalkers and abusers. “There has been one exploratory call between our Safer team and PimEyes to show how Safer helps platforms detect, report and remove CSAM,” a Thorn spokesperson said, using the acronym for child sexual abuse material. “No partnership materialized after that single call and they are not users of Safer or any tools built by Thorn.” When asked about concerns about its facial recognition tool, Thorn sent a statement through a spokesperson. “Spotlight is a highly targeted tool that was built specifically to identify child victims of sex trafficking and is only available to law enforcement officers who investigate child sex trafficking.” In the United States, PimEyes could run up against a 1998 law requiring the Federal Trade Commission to protect children’s online privacy. But so far, U.S. regulators have homed in on sites that store images or information, said Emma Llansó, director of the Free Expression Project at the Center for Democracy and Technology. PimEyes crawls images hosted on other sites. “PimEyes is just scraping whatever they can get their hands on on the web and isn’t making promises to users about what it will and won’t do with that data,” Llansó said. “So it’s something of a gray area.” Gobronidze is keenly aware of the distinction. “We don’t store any photos,” he claimed. “We don’t have any.” That is not entirely true. PimEyes’s privacy policy holds that for unregistered users — anyone who uses the site without a paid account — it retains facial images, along with the “fingerprint” of a face, for 48 hours and that data from the photos indexed in results is stored for two years. A sample PimEyes search showed thumbnail images of faces — photos returned in search queries that the site has edited to blur their backgrounds. A network traffic analysis showed that those photos are hosted on a PimEyes subdomain called “collectors.” In an email, Gobronidze said he had not previously heard or read about that subdomain and was “intrigued” to learn of it. He noted that he had forwarded the results of The Intercept’s analysis to PimEyes’s tech and data security units, adding that he could not “disclose [the] full technological cycle” because it is proprietary. Scott, of EPIC, would rather not wait around for courts and regulators to consider the storage question. “Congress needs to act to not only protect our children, but all of us from the dangers of facial recognition technology,” he said. “Services like this should be banned. That’s how you should regulate it.” -- PimEyes è interessante perché sfida le attuali regolazioni: non memorizza foto, ma è solo un crawler che indicizza le URL pubbliche alle quali trova i volti. E' quanto avevo in mente nel 2012 scrivendo "Do we need an open face recognition search engine?" <http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/23870> L'unica differenza è che PimEyes è a pagamento ed è pensato per volumi di ricerche superiori a un solo volto, mentre io immaginavo un servizio pubblico eventualmente collegato a una procedura di take-down nel caso le immagini siano pubblicate illegittimamente.

July 17, 2022

China's Surveillance State Hits Rare Resistance From Its Own Subjects - Forbes India

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.forbesindia.com/article/news/chinas-surveillance-state-hits-rar…> Chinese artists have staged performances to highlight the ubiquity of surveillance cameras. Privacy activists have filed lawsuits against the collection of facial recognition data. Ordinary citizens and establishment intellectuals alike have pushed back against the abuse of COVID tracking apps by authorities to curb protests. Internet users have shared tips on how to evade digital monitoring. As China builds up its vast surveillance and security apparatus, it is running up against growing public unease about the lack of safeguards to prevent the theft or misuse of personal data. The ruling Communist Party is keenly aware of the cost to its credibility of any major security lapses: Last week, it moved systematically to squelch news about what was probably the largest known breach of a Chinese government computer system, involving the personal information of as many as 1 billion citizens. The breach dealt a blow to Beijing, exposing the risks of its expansive efforts to vacuum up enormous amounts of digital and biological information on the daily activities and social connections of its people from social media posts, biometric data, phone records and surveillance videos. The government says these efforts are necessary for public safety: to limit the spread of COVID, for instance, or to catch criminals. But its failure to protect the data exposes citizens to problems like fraud and extortion and threatens to erode people’s willingness to comply with surveillance. “You never know who is going to sell or leak your information,” said Jewel Liao, a Shanghai resident whose details were among those released in the leak. “It’s just a bit unusual to see that even the police are vulnerable too.” China, which has been racing to implement one of the world’s toughest data privacy regimes, frequently excoriates companies for mishandling data. But authorities rarely point fingers at the country’s other top collector of personal information: the government itself. Security researchers say the leaked database, apparently used by the police in Shanghai, had been left online and unsecured for months. It was exposed after an anonymous user posted in an online forum offering to sell the vast trove of data for 10 Bitcoin, or about $200,000. The New York Times confirmed parts of a sample of the database released by the anonymous user, who posted under the name ChinaDan. The government’s efforts to institute safeguards have lagged behind its own push to collect information. In recent years, The Times has reviewed other leaked databases used by the police in China that were left online with little to no protection; some contained facial recognition records and ID scans of people in a Muslim ethnic minority region. Now there are signs that people are growing wary of the government and public institutions, too, as they see how their own data is being used against them. Last month, a nationwide outcry erupted over the apparent abuse of COVID-19 tracking technology by local authorities. Protesters fighting to recover their savings from four rural banks in the central Chinese city of Zhengzhou found that the mobile apps used to identify and isolate people who might be spreading COVID-19 had turned from green — meaning safe — to red, a designation that would prevent them from moving freely. “There is no privacy in China,” said Silvia Si, 30, a protester whose health code had turned red. Authorities in Zhengzhou, under pressure to account for the episode, later punished five officials for changing the codes of more than 1,300 customers. Even when the COVID-19 tracking technologies are used for their stated purpose, more people seem willing to ask if the surveillance is excessive. On Wednesday, a blogger in Beijing posted on Weibo that he was refusing to wear an electronic bracelet to track his movements while in isolation, saying that the device was an “electronic shackle” and an infringement on his privacy. The post was liked around 60,000 times, and users flooded his post with responses. Many said it reminded them of the treatment of criminals; others called it a ploy to surreptitiously collect personal information. The post was later taken down by censors, the blogger said. In recent years, individuals have sought to draw attention to privacy concerns. In 2019, a law professor in Hangzhou, a prominent tech hub in eastern China, sued a local zoo for forcing him to submit facial recognition data to enter, the first such lawsuit in China. He won the case. Starting in late 2020, several Chinese cities began banning neighborhood committees from forcing residents to undergo biometric monitoring to enter their compounds. Around the same time, toilet paper dispensers using facial recognition were removed from public bathrooms in the southern Chinese city of Dongguan following public outrage. In online forums like Zhihu, a Quora-like platform, Chinese users trade advice on how to evade surveillance (tips include wearing hats and masks and pointing flashlights at security cameras). More than 60% of Chinese people say facial recognition technology has been abused, according to a study of more than 20,000 Chinese jointly conducted in late 2020 by a Chinese think tank and a government task force. More than 80% expressed concern about whether and how facial recognition data would be stored. “The rise of the public’s awareness of data privacy is an inevitable trend,” said Dragon Zheng, an artist based in the southern province of Guangxi whose practice explores the interaction of technology and governance. In 2016, Zheng installed security cameras inside a large exhibition hall, which streamed live footage to a monitoring room set up in the center of the hall. Visitors were invited to enter the room, where they could manipulate the cameras and experience what Zheng called the feeling of “monitoring and being monitored, controlling and being controlled.” Still, he emphasized that the risks and advantages of technology were not unique to China. “Technology is like Pandora’s box,” Zheng said. “Once it’s open, how it is used depends on whose hands it falls into.” Few Chinese citizens have publicly questioned the government about its collection of personal data. Part of that could be a result of the government’s thorough censorship and the threats to personal safety of criticizing the government. But many residents also see the handover of data as a necessary trade-off for security and convenience. “There’s always been this split identity when it comes to privacy awareness in China,” said Samm Sacks, a researcher on technology policy at Yale Law School and New America. “People are far more trusting overall in how government entities handle their personal information and far more suspicious about the corporate sector.”

July 16, 2022

Borse di partecipazione per studenti al Festival di Informatici Senza Frontiere (Rovereto, 20-22 Ottobre 2022)

by Patrignani Norberto

Carissim*, segnalo e invito a far circolare il bando in allegato per 15 borse di partecipazione per altrettanti studenti e studentesse delle scuole superiori, studenti e studentesse universitarie e dottorandi/e, le borse coprono le spese di viaggio, vitto ed alloggio a Rovereto durante il periodo di svolgimento del Festival di Informatici Senza Frontiere (Rovereto, 20-22 ottobre 2022). Grazie! Norberto Le borse copriranno le spese di viaggio, vitto ed alloggio a Roveretodurante il periodo di svolgimento del Festival.

July 15, 2022

A proposito del SSN [era: Google Analytics 4, GDPR...]

by Damiano Verzulli

Il 14/07/22 16:40, vincenzo.giorgino ha scritto: > [...] > Aggiungo una nota di colore. Partendo dal presupposto che i dati > sanitari sono dei singoli cittadini, - si, mi son dato una risposta > provvisoria - mi sono chiesto quanti erano gli iscritti al SSN per > fare due conti grezzi sulla scia di un Rapporto di E&Y sul NHS > inglese. Nn trovando la risposta sui siti del Minisan e di > epidemiologia ho scritto all'URP del Minisan che mi ha risposto > girandola all'ufficio competente. Da esso mi han risposto di guardare > nella pagina Open Data del MiniSan ... in cui però nn c'è alcun dato. Morso (io) dalla curiosità, sono andato a spulciare. Il punto di partenza è stato questo: https://www.dati.salute.gov.it/dati/homeDataset.jsp non il migliore dei siti del mondo, ma comunque meglio di un pugno nello stomaco. Un click su "> vai all'elenco" e si presenta una pagina con sopra scritto: "Sono disponibili 60 dataset". Non sapendo cosa cercare, ho preferito fare una scansione sequenziale (leggerli tutti, uno per uno). Dopo pochi minuti, sono arrivato qui: => "Corrispondenze ASL-Comuni e popolazione residente - anno 2020" https://www.dati.salute.gov.it/dati/dettaglioDataset.jsp?menu=dati&idPag=3 "Per ciascuna ASL è riportato l’elenco dei comuni che afferiscono alla ASL; inoltre per ogni comune viene fornita la popolazione residente distinta per genere. Per i comuni articolati su più ASL, sono riportati gli ambiti territoriali subcomunali (circoscrizioni/municipi) che afferiscono alla ASL. Dall’anno 2017, la stima della popolazione residente delle ASL del comune di Roma è più accurata rispetto a quella fornita per gli anni precedenti. I dettagli relativi alla nuova procedura di stima sono riportati nel dizionario. Per le informazioni sul dataset è possibile far riferimento al dizionario <https://www.dati.salute.gov.it/dati/documenti/Dataset_ASL_comuni_popolazion…>." L'ho scaricato, aperto e... visionato. Contiene 7905 righe, relative (credo!) a tutti i comuni italiani, classificati per ASL e per Regione. Per ogni Comune c'e' il numero di MASCHI e di FEMMINE. Il totale, rispettivamente, somma 28.866.226 (maschi) e 30.369.987 (femmine). Dato che parliamo di un totale complessivo di 59.236.213 (ossia in linea alla popolazione italiana residente), mi sorge il dubbio di non aver capito bene la domanda :-( Un saluto, DV -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail:damiano@verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

July 14, 2022

Re: [nexa] Google Analytics 4, GDPR... e la società cibernetica che vogliamo costruire.

by Giacomo Tesio

Ciao Alberto, sottoscrivo la tua domanda, ma nell'attesa che Diego risponda mi permetto di aggiungerne una un po' meno ingenua. Nella documentazione di supporto che Diego ha condiviso [1] Google dichiara: ``` When collecting data, Google Analytics 4 does not log or store IP addresses. Analytics drops any IP addresses that it collects from EU users before logging that data via EU domains and servers. ``` La mia domanda è: se Google riceve l'IP e lo scarta, cosa le impedisce tecnicamente di inviarlo prima segretamente ad agenzie USA nei termini della normativa applicabile? Può sembrare un dettaglio tecnico di poco conto, ma in realtà è il cuore del problema: è questa possibilità tecnica a rendere un qualsiasi servizio fornito da aziende statunitensi incompatibile con i diritti dei cittadini europei riconosciuti dal GDPR. Giacomo [1] https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/12017362 On Thu, 14 Jul 2022 15:19:28 +0200 Alberto Cammozzo via nexa wrote: > Grazie a Diego Ciulli per la pronta risposta. > > Non sono un esperto di analytics ma se ho compreso bene ci sono dei > parametri da configurare per chi usa GA, che richiedono competenze > esperte, che renderebbero l'impiego sicuramente compatibile con il > GDPR anche in assenza di accordi specifici. > > Mi sorge una domanda ingenua: per quale motivo dunque Google non > protegge i propri clienti e gli utenti UE offrendo questi parametri > come attivi di default ovunque siano investiti clienti ed utenti > soggetti al GDPR e potenzialmente oggetto di una violazione? > > Questo consentirebbe di rispettare la legge in attesa di un nuovo > accordo UE/US, o perlomeno obbligherebbe chi raccoglie dati in > violazione a farlo scientemente, allontanandosi dai parametri di > default sicuri. > > La configurazione attuale mi pare di "violation by default". > > Grazie, un saluto > > Alberto > > > On 14/07/22 12:50, Diego Ciulli via nexa wrote: > > Eccomi! > > Presente, e leggo pure con interesse. > > > > In estrema sintesi, GA4 ha introdotto strumenti per gestire e > > minimizzare i dati degli utenti raccolti - e lo abbiamo fatto per > > andare incontro alle preoccupazioni sollevate. Dettagli qui > > <https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/12017362> e qui > > <https://blog.google/intl/it-it/notizie-aziendali/tecnologia/alcune-risposte…> > > Dopodichè, è evidente che un quadro certo è possibile solo con la > > definizione di un nuovo accordo per il trasferimento dati tra UE e > > USA > > - vedi qui > > <https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/its-time-for-a-new-eu-us…>. > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 11:44 AM Damiano Verzulli > > <damiano(a)verzulli.it> wrote: > > > > Il 14/07/22 11:29, Alberto Cammozzo via nexa ha scritto: > > > [...] > > > Sarebbe interessante sentire il parere, anche personale, dei > > > dipendenti di Google presenti in lista. > > > > Esistono "dipendenti" di Google Italia, o di qualche branch > > Google, iscritti a questa lista? > > > > ...per certi aspetti, mi meraviglierebbe molto. Per gli altri, > > mi meraviglierebbe ancora di piu'. > > > > Bye, > > DV > > > > -- > > Damiano Verzulli > > e-mail: damiano(a)verzulli.it > > --- > > possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} > > --- > > "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of > > income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able > > to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not > > here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 > > http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html > > > > _______________________________________________ > > nexa mailing list > > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > nexa mailing list > > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

July 14, 2022

Re: [nexa] Google Analytics 4, GDPR... e la società cibernetica che vogliamo costruire.

by Vincenzo Mario Bruno Giorgino

Ciao Giacomo, sono d'accordo su cosa sono i dati personali e su come dovrebbe essere una società futura, ma la domanda resta... E nn riguarda solo GAFAM ma anche lo stato. Le GAFAM non sono onnipotenti. A loro servono dei politici, degli studiosi e dei professionisti che sostengano il loro potere. Vedi il caso Uberleaks rivelato dal Guardian in questi giorni. BTW, In sociologia, qualcuno definisce l'insieme dei rapporti economici come lavoro relazionale, senza separare i rapporti sociali o le relazioni personali dal calcolo economico.... Tout se tient. Tornando ai dati sanitari, essi hanno un alto valore conoscitivo (vedi pandemia) ed economico, e sono in possesso del SSN - nn delle GAFAM. Va riconosciuta la proprietà ai singoli iscritti al SSN? Se sì, tecnicamente, come? Ad es. Alex Pentland offre una risposta. È percorribile in Italia e in Europa? Mi pongo domande pragmatiche, vale a dire che vanno idealmente nella direzione da te auspicata, ma che possono avere una risposta ora, nella sfera d'azione collettiva in cui abbiamo potere d'influenza. E non è affatto piccola, secondo me. Molto dipende da dove ci porta la nostra attenzione. ... Soprattutto se guardiamo un po' ai dati e abbandoniamo questa dominante visione capitalocentrica... Dal 30 al 50% del PIL è prodotto dall'economia familiare non dal mercato capitalista: ciò include i Paesi più "sviluppati" ed oscilla in base ai vari criteri di calcolo. Un saluto. Vincenzo Il Gio 14 Lug 2022, 17:41 Giacomo Tesio <giacomo(a)tesio.it> ha scritto: > Ciao Vincenzo, > > On Thu, 14 Jul 2022 16:40:31 +0200 vincenzo.giorgino wrote: > > > I dati sono dunque di chi li possiede, un dato di fatto intoccabile, > > per cui al massimo si proteggono i danneggiati? > > ragionando al di là della normativa presente ed in ottica di una piena > emancipazione cibernetica futura dobbiamo distinguere i dati personali > (emessi da persone fisiche) e tutti gli altri. [1] > > Sugli altri si potrebbe discutere anni su come riscrivere la normativa > esistente per massimizzare il progresso dell'umanità invece che il > profitto di pochi. > > > Ma i dati personali sono qualcosa di completamente diverso: descrivono > la persona ed il loro accumulo abilita una terribile riduzione della > sua autonomia, la sua riduzione ad ingranaggio inconsapevole. > > > I dati personali andranno dunque protetti in modo molto più efficace > della normativa attuale. L'unico ad avere diritto di raccoglierli, > elaborarli, persino alterarli ed eventualmente condividerli (in parte) > con terzi per finalità specifiche, deve essere il soggetto cui > riguardano. > > Solo quando tutti potranno elaborare autonomamente e liberamente i > propri dati personali, saremo entrati finalmente in una società > cibernetica civile. > > > Quando ognuno di noi potrà decidere puntualmente quali dati personali > (veri o falsi) condividere con la società, allora tale condivisione > trasformerà quei dati da emissione inconsapevole abusata da terzi, in > espressione consapevole della propria libertà. > > > Ma siamo ancora lontani dalla consapevolezza necessaria. > E purtroppo, la narrazione dei GAFAM è egemonica. > > Nessuno mette in discussione l'uso dei dati personali che di fatto è > uso delle persone che li hanno emesse, ma solo le finalità o le modalità > del loro utilizzo. > > L'idea che la persona abbia una propria sacralità, una dignità ed una > unicità che vanno protette dagli smodati appetiti dell'economia > capitalista è inconcepibile per moltissime persone. > > Ed anche quelle in buona fede, sono state convinte di poter usare i > dati personali (aka le persone cui si riferiscono) a fin di bene. > > Mala tempora currunt. > > > Giacomo > > [1] > https://video.linuxtrent.it/w/p/ih87E19VKKsSTxAJYL6QhR?playlistPosition=2 > > [2] > https://video.linuxtrent.it/w/p/ih87E19VKKsSTxAJYL6QhR?playlistPosition=1 >

July 14, 2022