June 2020 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] Cloud act e sovranità dei dati

by Giacomo Tesio

Ma che bello pensare che lo zio Sam proteggerà gli interessi delle nazioni straniere dalla propria polizia! Non vi sentite già meglio? Viene quasi voglia di dimenticarsi di Echelon, del controllo statunitense sul sistema DNS rafforzato (in non della privacy!) dall'introduzione del DNS-over-HTTPS, al controllo statunitense degli exit mode Tor, alla profilazione psicologica tramite Analytics... Insomma, con il Cloud Act potrete dormire tutti tranquilli ed asciutti, che lo zio Sam vi protegge... da sé stesso! Peraltro propaganda come questa verrà accolta con favore e sollievo da moltissime aziende che la useranno per lavarsene le mani. Un po' come al Nord anni fa accoglievano con sollievo le aziende della Camorra che "smaltivano i rifiuti tossici" sotterrandoli sotto le scuole: sulla carta era tutto "CLEAN". Già oggi viene citata la locazione dei dati in Europa come garanzia di sicurezza e privacy. Quando leggo queste sciocchezze mi chiedo se chi le scrive è sommamente incompetente o in mala fede. Ed il fatto che talvolta sieda su cattedre universitarie non facilita la risposta. Quanti secondi ci vogliono a trasferire dati interessanti oltre oceano senza cancellarli dai server europei? E come potrebbe accorgersene u funzionario governativo? Affidarsi a leggi che impongono promesse da marinaio per tutelare i cittadini^W governi^W^W la libertà^W democrazia^W privacy è come scrivere una legge che impone ai fiumi di risalire le montagne. È ridicolo. Eppure è... la norma. Giacomo

June 8, 2020

Sono secoli che l'automazione bara

by Antonio Casilli

Articolo davvero ben fatto (si tratta in realtà di un book review essay) di Edward Jones-Imhotep apparso nella rivista universitaria History and Technology. Attraverso un'analisi della "metafisica della agency" degli automi del XVIII secolo, riesce a dire cose molto interessanti sui pretesi exploits dell'IA contemporanea e sul miraggio del lights-out manufacturing (o fabbrica senza operai). The ghost factories: histories of automata and artificial life Edward Jones-Imhotep 20 May 2020 https://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07341512.2020.1757972 Cheers, --a -- Antonio A. Casilli Professor, Telecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris Member, Interdisciplinary Institute for Innovation (i3 UMR 9217 CNRS) Associate Member, LACI-IIAC (EHESS) Faculty Fellow, Nexa Center for Internet & Society *We respect your right to disconnect. This email send time is due to my own workflow efficiency. You are in no obligation to take action or reply to it outside your office hours.*

June 8, 2020

Cloud act e sovranità dei dati

by Diego Giorio

https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-… Buona settimana a tutti [https://d110erj175o600.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/daskal-.jpg]<https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-…> Tutta la verità sul Cloud Act, la legge che solleva timori sulla sovranità dei dati - CorCom<https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-…> In un contributo esclusivo per CorCom, Jennifer Daskal, docente presso l'American University Washington College of Law spiega nel dettaglio ambiti di applicazioni e limiti della norma. "Non è ... www.corrierecomunicazioni.it

June 8, 2020

Re: [nexa] Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully - about:intel

by Giacomo Tesio

Articolo molto lucido. Ho letto molti "esperti" emozionarsi per la qualità della codebase di Immuni, confrontandola con il fallimento di StopCovid ma perdendo completamente di vista la questione complessiva. Le conclusioni però sono estremamente ingenue. Visto che non si può dimostrare che tutte le rappresentazioni di un'informazione sono state distrutte (ovvero tutte le copie dei dati che la rappresentano, cancellate), non c'è alcun modo di garantire che a fine epidemia verranno cancellati. Non è possibile alcuna supervisione reale dei processi. Non è possibile impedire che in futuro quei dati vengano de-anonimizzati. Non è nemmeno possibile garantire che rimangano esclusivamente nelle mani dello Stato, sia per la complessità della sua organizzazione (che, ad esempio, è notoriamente infiltrata dalla criminalità organizzata), sia talvolta per i limiti tecnologici. On Sunday, 7 June 2020, Alberto Cammozzo <ac+nexa(a)zeromx.net> wrote: > In Europe, it will be difficult to find > national solutions to limit the power of the transnational guild of > digital technology professionals. In Italia, ci abbiamo mai provato? > Our greatest hope may come from > listening seriously to the warnings of constitutional and human rights > lawyers Non me ne vogliano gli avvocati in lista, ma in questo caso hanno preso una enorme cantonata aprendo anche solo alla possibilità che un App di tracciamento automatico di massa potesse essere utile. D'altronde è stato un errore condiviso con molti tecnici. Per quel che conta, fu questa la ragione principale per cui scelsi di non firmare, a suo tempo, l'appello di Nexa, pur apprezzando moltissimo gli autori. L'informatica può fare molto per la medicina. Ma non così. Giacomo

June 7, 2020

Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully - about:intel

by Alberto Cammozzo

Red herring, anche per Didier Bigo. <https://aboutintel.eu/covid-digital-tracking/> [...] Unity in the folly of technological solutionism Despite the diversity of situations in Europe — we have clearly seen structural differences in terms of public health and economic robustness — a kind of consensus has emerged. It revolves around a form of “technological solutionism” and presents digital tracing applications as a way to overcome all the problems this pandemic has tossed at us. In his book on the moral consequences of digital technologies, Morozov already brought to light this shared “folly” of technological solutionism. This is the belief that the digital supersedes the physical and that you can solve every problem with a click. In the field of security, ranging from sanitary emergencies to defence and police, a similar belief has emerged. I have previously shown this to be a product of a transnational guild of digital technology professionals involved in security matters and of their influence over power circles to manage border controls, security, and interoperability. As this group — which includes strategic communications and advertising companies — is involved at the highest level of government in different EU countries, its influence on managing the crisis ends up superseding the influence of health professionals. In the absence of a vaccine, they turned social acceptance of the confinement measures (and their rebranding of it) into something radically new. The priority communicated in the media seemed to be that the positive news of a digital solution should make up for the bad news of high death tolls, and so the countries worst hit by the pandemic were most keen on counterbalancing their poor performance with a brand-new and ever-so promising app. A collective belief that the internet, algorithms, and artificial intelligence will beat the virus Hundreds of proposals came from all over the world. The computer industry — from the most powerful players (GAFAM in the lead, but also industries involved in cyber defence) to young “start-ups” — is now promising to be able to track individuals. They propose to do so by identifying and geolocalising them, tracking the actions of their data, reconstructing their past activities on the net and elsewhere, and especially by associating these data with health profiles. This might suggest whether these individuals were, or are, sick (declared or not) and if they are in low- or high-risk areas as the virus spreads, even if in such models there is hardly any area free of risk. Following the spread of the virus will therefore be based on data from multiple web servers, centralised or not, through the use of mapping tools and linking the status of a specific person with their travel via a specific application — either with a smartphone or an autonomous Bluetooth card, as considered in New Zealand. Some applications envisage to also have real-time “flags” about the status of individuals who are obliged to move and have contact with the public. While some countries are (considering) making participation mandatory, most democracies are pursuing voluntary applications based on “privacy by design” to respect the GDPR and more generally the privacy rights of its citizens. But the fact that they therefore choose to anonymise the data collected is not proof that privacy will not be affected or that discrimination will not occur. Notice how quickly policymakers have officially accepted and launched media campaigns that the internet, algorithms, and artificial intelligence can block the advance of the virus. Maybe they think that even if the selected apps will not really work in practice, they might nevertheless assuage the critics of severe confinement and create some hope in the public that it will recover (parts of) its mobility. Costs of compliance and other hidden motives Unfortunately, this mobility is not a sign of freedom of movement enjoyed as a right. Rather it comes with the cost of compliance, including the cost of providing personal data and accepting surveillance measures for the greater good. Tracing applications do not contribute much to public health, however, if they are not combined with widespread testing. Instead, they can also be seen as a building block in the management of public opinion, as if participating in the (voluntary) application was de facto a poll in favour of the government and an acceptance of its emergency powers. A ‘bio-digital-surveillance’ has emerged from the Covid-19 outbreak as the only political ‘option’ ostensibly suited to relax confinement, even in democratic settings. But this political thinking has simultaneously created confusion about the functions of the digital apps and the medical strategies they are supposed to implement. Their purposes are multifold and not always oriented towards health. Some of these surveillance tools are tracing and localising sick individuals, while others are preventing them from moving without warning. Some are also designed beyond the scope of individual movement to trace personal encounters, with the possibility of demanding that a visit be paid to the hospital, police station, or town hall to register as potentially sick. Some of the apps also intend to identify via algorithms all possible unexpected encounters with a sick person (still without symptoms) and to transform these different encounters into cases of “suspicion”, without the cooperation of the individuals. This digital tracing is presented as a great innovation, but in fact it is everything but new. Its digitality certainly conveys the image of instantaneity and efficiency, but the logic at work is old. Since the cholera epidemics of the 19th century, contact tracing has been considered a better, more targeted, and therefore more democratic practice than generalised confinement. It emerged from the production of specific knowledge about virus ecology and replaced the types of plague confinements we had before. In 1854, John Snow — one of the founders of modern epidemiology — established a cartography to validate his hypothesis of the role of water in the spread of cholera. But to track the virus, yesterday like today, it is necessary to collect much more data on the individuals who are infected. What drives this grand digital strategy? The key factor in discerning between the blind confinement of all people in a given area, be they sick or not, and the selective confinement of sick individuals is the visibility of transmission and its mechanisms. This is what eliminates false correlations and enables areas to “reopen”, at least for healthy individuals. Data collection, mapping, and population tracing are only meaningful if they are followed by a systematic screening through tests that are applied to everyone and periodically renewed. Without this two-step strategy, of which the second is crucial, there is no point to develop the first. As I have pointed out in my book “Data Politics”, raw data do not exist. Instead, politicians construct how to collect and organise data and the data in turn construct policies on knowledge foundations that are being built up and based on differentiated premises (data politics). This is true also for health. Tracing apps do not directly oppose the free movement of individuals and are not based on their absolute confinement; they aim to create personal security belts around each circulating individual to avoid contamination. But they are a question of temporality as much as of space. If there is one characteristic of modern pandemics, it is that in the absence of a vaccine, it is now instead possible — thanks to the speed of digital technology and data networking — to know more or less in real time the “channels” of viral propagation. These can be correlated with modes of transmission, identifying risk populations in real time and thus avoiding bureaucratic slowness (as Google Flu did, but unsuccessfully so). In theory, this enables authorities to anticipate the spread so that medical infrastructure is there when it’s needed, or at least faster than before (although, in the case of the Ebola epidemic, big data was actually of no help at all). It is therefore not surprising that all states with tech industry capabilities are seeking to combine digital traceability with the imperatives of non-contamination in order to restore a degree of conditional freedom of movement. The freedom to work is deemed to be of particular importance in that regard, in order to limit the economic effects of containment. It can also be argued that the focus on the digital is all the more emphasised since the resilience of the hospital sector has previously been so weakened by austerity policies (a card France and the UK seem to be playing). The focus on the digital becomes a “mask” for past failures and risks being a pure simulation policy if digital tracing is not linked to a generalised testing policy. This is because digital data are not capable of detecting anything if they are not accompanied by concrete and widespread measures, such as the test booths used in South Korea. Urgent need for a citizen design protocol to prevent a control society As Dominique Boullier has forcefully pointed out in his comparison of the citizen-centred design in different applications: What is crucial to understand is that digital applications are therefore not a solution to the pandemic in and of themselves, but rather need to be connected with a health strategy of testing and a citizen-oriented design. If not, the applications may create a whole series of additional problems in addition to the lack of free movement by depriving citizens of other liberties, as well as by contributing to the progressive installation (by ratchet effect) of a control society that jeopardises privacy and fundamental rights by default. That is why it must be stressed that current proposals for tracing applications must in no way be judged on their technical performances (including privacy design only). They must be judged by following a “citizen design” protocol, which in this case must start from a genuine clinical definition of health objectives. If we are not careful, Covid-19 applications could become routine surveillance measures for the purpose of overseeing compliance with the rules, including progressive deconfinement of a part of the population, as well as punishment for patients who do not declare themselves. This would be a most successfully failed ultra-solution in the sense that Watzlawick has proposed. In this case, these ultra-solutions would add mass surveillance of populations and discrimination to the suppression of individual freedom of movement. Conclusions Those countries which were least prepared for the pandemic have sought the most refuge in digital techno-solutionism, trying to divert attention from the catastrophe they failed to prevent. Tracing applications have also become quite popular in countries which hope to step up their digital sovereignty by propping up their own technological industry. Strategic communications companies have instrumentalised these sentiments in order to help governments convince the public to participate in the collection of their health data in the name of national health. To slow the pace of, or to prevent, a control society, it would be necessary to at least create strong sunset clauses and oversight mechanisms for the entire process, with the possibility to stop the collection of data after the emergency. We must order the destruction of sensitive data that are stored during the pandemic and refuse that the process is repurposed for other reasons. The laws and decrees which are legitimating these applications certainly have to rely on existing oversight mechanisms: data protection, ethics guidelines, sanitary codes, and/or ombudspersons. This is badly needed to avoid having only ad hoc technical oversight. The various governments genuinely ready to pursue a citizen-centred design and to safeguard privacy must also enhance the collaboration between these oversight structures and reinforce their powers, including, for example, sanctions against data brokers should they be using these data for commercial interests. Therefore, what matters in the long-term is which digital platforms will manage the applications after the pandemic has been brought under medical control, which public-private assemblages will have consolidated their power and profits, and which uses of health data will continue after the crisis. There is every reason to believe that the implementation of applications whose data are certainly anonymised during the process, but are later sent to interoperable systems, will finally connect the health data of individuals with police and border-crossing data identification systems. This is likely to integrate different spaces, from the most local (municipalities) to the transnational spaces of the global North (airports, train stations, etc.). This dystopian scenario needs to be rejected without ambiguity by organising a reinforcement of human rights legislation both internally and at the EU level. De-anonymisation mechanisms through cross-referencing of data are increasingly effective, and data brokerage companies have shown that they can already know our private information and personal thoughts without necessarily needing our name (Cambridge Analytica). If sensitive health data is circulating and is a source of profit, then it is likely that the routine use of such applications for surveillance purposes, and the dependence of free movement on authorisation, is a serious risk for democratic societies as a whole. In Europe, it will be difficult to find national solutions to limit the power of the transnational guild of digital technology professionals. Our greatest hope may come from listening seriously to the warnings of constitutional and human rights lawyers, as well as pushing the European courts via strong civic mobilisation to have their say in this debate. After all, it concerns the very core of our democratic societies. [...]

June 7, 2020

Re: [nexa] in browser port scanning... altro?

by Giacomo Tesio

Aggiungo una nota Giovanni, anche se so che a te sembrerà scontata. L'aspetto più grave di questa classe di attacchi via JavaScript è che ovviamente sono personalizzabili se si è in condizione di indentificare l'utente. Ed in un Web come quello mainstream, in cui ogni sito Web integra script provenienti da decine di sorgenti (e CDN) è possibile attaccare un visitatore di un sito completamente ignaro. E naturalmente, con un header HTTP di Cache-Control appropriato, puoi cancellare qualsiasi traccia dell'attacco dal PC della vittima ricaricando i file dell'attacco con versioni innocue. Se fai attenzione a preservare la dimensione dei file, nemmeno negli eventuali log del proxy HTTP rimarrà alcuna anomalia osservabile. Giacomo On Sunday, 7 June 2020, Giacomo Tesio <giacomo(a)tesio.it> wrote: > Lo fa anche il governo Russo. > E sì permette anche di mappare una rete interna. > > Si tratta di un attacco che ho ideato 2 anni fa, come esempio di una > vasta classe di attacchi possibili su un browser, visto che mi si > chiedeva un Proof-of-concept. > O meglio, qui si fanno le cose complicate: basta cercare di caricare > una GIF e misurare il tempo in cui ricevi l'errore. > > La segnalazione a Mozilla (e successivamente a Chrome) è qui: > > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1487081 > > L'attacco in questione fu uno dei primi che mi venne in mente e lo > descrissi qui: > > https://dev.to/shamar/the-meltdown-of-the-web-4p1m > > Successivamente, uno dei miei tanti detrattori inziali si accorse che > ci si poteva appunto mappare l'intera rete > > https://rain-1.github.io/in-browser-localhostdiscovery > > Ma in realtà, in un mondo di IoT con telecamere accessibili via HTTP, > ci si può fare molto di più! ;-) > > D'altronde è solo uno dei possibili attacchi che appartengono a quella classe. > Ne descrissi altri, in varie sedi, ma sembrava che a nessuno fregasse niente. > > Peraltro, se è venuto in mente a me due anni fa, probabilmente era già > molto diffuso in rete perché io sono solo un programmatore competente, > non un ethical hacker esperto in penetration tests! > Non sono mica un "esperto", io... ;-) > > > DUE anni dopo questi attacchi sono ancora possibili. > D'altronde, come mi risposero da Mozilla nella issue, > > "this is the Web functioning as designed" > > > E vedrai quando tutti useranno il DNS-over-HTTPS di Cloudflare! > Avremo un canale cifrato ed insospettabile per inviare ad un server > DNS tutti i dati sottratti attraverso questi trucchetti! > > > > Giacomo >

June 7, 2020

Re: [nexa] in browser port scanning... altro?

by Giacomo Tesio

Lo fa anche il governo Russo. E sì permette anche di mappare una rete interna. Si tratta di un attacco che ho ideato 2 anni fa, come esempio di una vasta classe di attacchi possibili su un browser, visto che mi si chiedeva un Proof-of-concept. O meglio, qui si fanno le cose complicate: basta cercare di caricare una GIF e misurare il tempo in cui ricevi l'errore. La segnalazione a Mozilla (e successivamente a Chrome) è qui: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1487081 L'attacco in questione fu uno dei primi che mi venne in mente e lo descrissi qui: https://dev.to/shamar/the-meltdown-of-the-web-4p1m Successivamente, uno dei miei tanti detrattori inziali si accorse che ci si poteva appunto mappare l'intera rete https://rain-1.github.io/in-browser-localhostdiscovery Ma in realtà, in un mondo di IoT con telecamere accessibili via HTTP, ci si può fare molto di più! ;-) D'altronde è solo uno dei possibili attacchi che appartengono a quella classe. Ne descrissi altri, in varie sedi, ma sembrava che a nessuno fregasse niente. Peraltro, se è venuto in mente a me due anni fa, probabilmente era già molto diffuso in rete perché io sono solo un programmatore competente, non un ethical hacker esperto in penetration tests! Non sono mica un "esperto", io... ;-) DUE anni dopo questi attacchi sono ancora possibili. D'altronde, come mi risposero da Mozilla nella issue, "this is the Web functioning as designed" E vedrai quando tutti useranno il DNS-over-HTTPS di Cloudflare! Avremo un canale cifrato ed insospettabile per inviare ad un server DNS tutti i dati sottratti attraverso questi trucchetti! Giacomo

June 7, 2020

in browser port scanning... altro?

by Giovanni Biscuolo

Cari nexiani, un amico molto tecnico mi segnala questo articolo molto tecnico, che in buona sostanza rivela come Ebay e molti altri clienti di LexisNexis utilizzino *anche* la tecnica del port scanning del PC sul quale funziona il browser (via Javascript) per profilare i visitatori. Il port scanning è una tecnica che serve per sapere quali porte sono "aperte" su un host e di conseguenza stabilire quali servizi sono in funzione sul quell'host. Siamo sicuri che una tecnica analoga non possa essere usata anche per **esporre** un'intera rete locale attraverso un reverse tunnell "in browser" sfruttando questa tecnica: https://github.com/MDSLab/wstun?!? (chiedo scusa se ai non addetti ai lavori sembra arabo) Qualche esperto websocket/Javascript in lista può dirmi se sono eccessivamente paranoico? «Ebay is port scanning visitors to their website - and they aren't the only ones», by Dan Nemec, 24 May 2020 https://blog.nem.ec/2020/05/24/ebay-port-scanning/ --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] actually discussing a different type of port scanning, one initiated directly by a website the target loads in their browser. It’s an ingenius, if not insidious, technique that allows would-be port scanners to paradrop straight into an internal network and scan it using Javascript from within the browser context. As an aside, this is something that a browser extension could block, however the company behind the port scanning uses techniques to prevent widespread blocking of their trackers, as we’ll see later. How Browser Port Scanning Works While modern browsers allow Javascript to make requests to other domain names than the one you’re currently visiting (e.g. www.ebay.com) they layer on security controls to ensure the target data allows the calling website to access it. This prevents, for example, a malicious website from requesting the account details from you bank’s website. However, even without knowing the contents of the remote site, details about the connection itself (such as the time it takes to connect or time out) can be used to infer whether or not a website exists at the given host and port. A bit of Javascript code can wrap that into a package and allow any site to scan a user’s internal network, determining which IP addresses and ports have services running. Further, because many well-known services are commonly available on the same port (there is a registration page, but it’s more of a guideline than a hard and fast rule), it’s possible to also infer some programs that a user may be running on their network depending on whether the port is open or not. [...] In trying to load Ebay locally I found that I couldn’t replicate the behavior in Linux even after spoofing a Windows User Agent and disabling all of my extensions. There must be some check hidden in the Javascript, but as of yet I haven’t found one. After that, I loaded a Windows VM, installed the latest Edge, fired up https://www.ebay.com, and I finally replicated the port scanning behavior. However, I had some trouble replicating the behavior reliably, and after some trial and error I found that https://signin.ebay.com/ was far more reliable for triggering the port scanning. [...] To summarize what we’ve found so far: * Ebay collects data on whether certain ports are open on your local PC * This data is shipped to an Ebay domain, but does not seem to be used * otherwise Additional data like User Agent and IP are also sent [...] the domain where data is exfiltrated is not a subdomain of ebay.com - it’s ebay-us.com. Still, a quick check shows that it’s owned by somebody at Ebay, so at the very least it isn’t phishing malware. Twitter user Armchair IR pointed out that similar behavior has been seen by Facebook and it traced to a company called ThreatMetrix, an identity tracking/anti-fraud company. Checking the DNS records for src.ebay-us.com, sure enough it’s a CNAME to h-ebay.online-metrix.net, a domain owned by ThreatMetrix Inc. [...] It’s not just Ebay scanning your ports, there is allegedly a network of 30,000 websites out there all working for the common aim of harvesting open ports, collecting IP addresses, and User Agents in an attempt to track users all across the web. And this isn’t some rogue team within Ebay setting out to skirt the law, you can bet that LexisNexis lawyers have thoroughly covered their bases when extending this service to their customers (at least in the U.S.). --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Saluti, Giovanni. -- Giovanni Biscuolo

June 7, 2020

COMMUNIA Copyright Directive Webinars

by Federico Leva (Nemo)

Penso che questo possa interessare a molti da queste parti. Secondo me è particolarmente utile per quei "copyright geek" che hanno seguito la direttiva copyright ma non hanno avuto tempo di (ri)leggere tutto il testo della direttiva e le migliaia di pagine di studi connessi. Iscrivetevi: <https://centrumcyfrowe.pl/en/communia-copyright-directive-webinars/> Ricordo che abbiamo anche una sintesi della situazione in Italia: https://www.notion.so/Italy-ef314e69e7ef42d1893efe5ef0ee39f8 Federico -------- Messaggio inoltrato -------- Oggetto: [Implementation] COMMUNIA Copyright Directive Webinars Dear All, The process of implementation of the new Copyright Directive is speeding up in various countries (see our Implementation Tracker <https://www.notion.so/communia/DSM-Directive-Implementation-Tracker-361cfae…>). Therefore, COMMUNIA has decided to organize a series of webinars aimed at explaining the different provisions of the new Copyright Directive and making suggestions on what to advocate for during the implementation process of those provisions at the national level, to expand and strengthen user rights. The Copyright Directive Webinars are aimed at local advocates and national policymakers and will be conducted by COMMUNIA members and experts that were involved in preparing our Implementation Guidelines <https://www.notion.so/DSM-Directive-Implementation-Guidelines-45233be9c0e14…> . We will hold four webinars of one hour each, as follows: 16/06 (Tuesday) – Press Publishers’ Right (Art. 15): Dimitar Dimitrov 17/06 (Wednesday) – Text and Data Mining and Education Exceptions (Arts. 3-5): Benjamin White and Teresa Nobre 23/06 (Tuesday) – Use of Content by Online Platforms (Art. 17): Teresa Nobre and Paul Keller 24/06 (Wednesday) – Cultural Heritage Provisions (Arts. 6, 8-11, 14): Stephen Wyber, Ariadna Matas and Paul Keller *All webinars will take place from 10.00am to 11.00am CET. You can register for the webinars of your choice here <https://centrumcyfrowe.pl/en/communia-copyright-directive-webinars/>. Remember to register for the seminar up to 24 hours before it starts. We have a limit of 30 participants at each seminar, so please don’t register if you don’t plan to show up. The access info will be shared with those who signed up.* Have a nice day, Natalia Mileszyk Centrum Cyfrowe

June 7, 2020

More than 140 Zuckerberg-funded scientists call on Facebook to rein in Trump | Technology | The Guardian

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/06/mark-zuckerberg-facebook…> More than 140 scientists funded by Mark Zuckerberg have said Facebook should not be letting Donald Trump use the social media platform to “spread both misinformation and incendiary statements”. The researchers, who include more than 60 professors at leading US research institutions and one Nobel laureate, sent the Facebook CEO a letter on Saturday asking him to “consider stricter policies on misinformation and incendiary language that harms people”, especially during the current turmoil over racial injustice. The letter calls the spread of “deliberate misinformation and divisive language” contrary to the researchers’ goals of using technology to prevent and eradicate disease, improve childhood education and reform the criminal justice system. Their mission “is antithetical to some of the stances that Facebook has been taking, so we’re encouraging them to be more on the side of truth and on the right side of history, as we’ve said in the letter”, said Debora Marks of Harvard Medical School, one of three professors who organized it. The others are Martin Kampmann of the University of California, San Francisco, and Jason Shepherd of the University of Utah. All have grants from a Chan Zuckerberg Initiative program working to prevent, cure and treat neurodegenerative disorders including Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease. They said the letter had more than 160 signatories. Shepherd said about 10% were employees of foundations run by Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan. The letter objects specifically to Zuckerberg’s decision not to act on a post by Trump that stated “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”. The letter’s authors called the post “a clear statement of inciting violence”. [...]

June 7, 2020