August 2017 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Fwd: [netsociety] How significant is algorithmic personalization in searches for political parties and candidates?

by Alberto Cammozzo

Aug. 17, 2017

Re: [nexa] "Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance industry…"

by gabriele elia

non solo socia media, anche i wearable stile Apple Watch ... Apple and Aetna Secretly Met to Discuss Adding Apple Watches to Health Insurance John Patrick Pullen<http://fortune.com/author/john-patrick-pullen/> Aug 14, 2017 <http://fortune.com/2017/08/14/apple-aetna-apple-watches-health-insurance/?u…><http://fortune.com/2017/08/14/apple-aetna-apple-watches-health-insurance/?u…> With the popularity of Fitbit's devices dropping<http://fortune.com/2017/06/05/fitbit-apple-watch-xiaomi-idc/>, Intel abandoning wearables<http://fortune.com/2017/07/20/intel-chips-wearables/>, and Jawbone liquidating its business<http://fortune.com/2017/07/07/big-money-and-big-bluster-couldnt-save-jawbon…>, it's been a very unhealthy summer for the fitness tracking industry. Apple<http://fortune.com/fortune500/apple/>, on the other hand, is looking good. According to recent research by IDC, Apple is neck-and-neck in a race with low-cost wearable maker Xiaomi for first place in fitness tracking.<http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS42707517> And Apple may have found a partner to push it ahead in the health insurance giant Aetna<http://fortune.com/fortune500/aetna/>. Apple and Aetna reportedly met in secret<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/14/apple-aetna-secret-meetings-to-bring-apple-…> last week to discuss bringing Apple Watches to Aetna's 23 million customers, reports CNBC. In Sept. 2016, Fortunereported that Aetna had agreed to subsidize a portion of the Apple Watch's cost<http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/insurer-apple-watch-fitbit/>to promote health, manage care, and monitor use of medication. It's not clear how the two industry giants' agreement may change moving forward, but the "invitation-only meetings" spanned last Thursday and Friday, and "included executives from Aetna and Apple as well as hospital chief medical information officers across the country," says the CNBC report. Rumors abound about the next Apple Watch, which could be unveiled in September alongside new iPhone hardware. The presumed "Series 3" version of the wearable is said to come with an LTE chip<http://fortune.com/2017/08/04/apple-watch-cellular-network/> that would let users wear it untethered from an iPhone. Speculation is that the yet to be announced Apple Watch could provide diabetes monitoring<http://fortune.com/2017/04/12/apple-diabetes-biomedical-tech-treatment/>, but the need for regulatory approval<http://fortune.com/2017/04/24/apple-watch-diabetes-sensor-fda/>of such a device makes that less likely, say experts. As secretive as Apple is about its planned products, it's unlikely that we'll know Apple Watch Series 3's full capabilities until it is released<http://fortune.com/2017/04/05/apple-watch-series-3/>. http://fortune.com/2017/08/14/apple-aetna-apple-watches-health-insurance/?u… ________________________________ Da: nexa <nexa-bounces(a)server-nexa.polito.it> per conto di J.C. DE MARTIN <demartin(a)polito.it> Inviato: sabato 12 agosto 2017 16:03 A: Nexa Oggetto: [nexa] "Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance industry…" Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance industry… …it’s not only the price you pay that will be affected This piece was written by PI research officer Dr. Tom Fisher. The financial services industry is eager to gather more and more data about our lives. Apart from mining the data they have historically collected such as credit history, they are looking to use our social media profiles to reach into our friendships and social interactions. They are using these data in new and unexpected ways, including personality profiling to determine the risk of lending to you, and thus the price you will pay. Firstcarquote, a product from the car insurance company Admiral Insurance, is a leading example of such unexpected data exploitation. In a semi-aborted product launch in November 2016, the company proposed to use young drivers’ Facebook posts to determine their personality and use this information to offer discounts on car insurance. Not limited to causing damage to its own reputation, Admiral’s move raises serious questions about the future of the insurance industry. […] Continua qui: https://medium.com/privacy-international/social-media-intelligence-and-prof… [https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1600/1*YkfiKHdSjCAGUcYrwZYVKQ.jpeg]<https://medium.com/privacy-international/social-media-intelligence-and-prof…> Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance ...<https://medium.com/privacy-international/social-media-intelligence-and-prof…> medium.com The financial services industry is eager to gather more and more data about our lives. Apart from mining the data they have historically collected such as credit ...

Aug. 16, 2017

Digitalizzazione italica

by don Luca Peyron

Un articolo che ci racconta lo stato dell'arte in Italia. Buona lettura Dl http://www.ilfoglio.it/tecnologia/2017/08/13/news/sono-diego-risolvo-proble…

Aug. 16, 2017

"Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance industry…"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Social media intelligence and profiling in the insurance industry…* *…it’s not only the price you pay that will be affected* /This piece was written by PI research officer Dr. Tom Fisher./ The financial services industry is eager to gather more and more data about our lives. Apart from mining the data they have historically collected such as credit history, they are looking to use our social media profiles to reach into our friendships and social interactions. They are using these data in new and unexpected ways, including personality profiling to determine the risk of lending to you, and thus the price you will pay. Firstcarquote, a product from the car insurance company Admiral Insurance, is a leading example of such unexpected data exploitation. In a semi-aborted product launch in November 2016, the company proposed to use young drivers’ Facebook posts to determine their personality and use this information to offer discounts on car insurance. Not limited to causing damage to its own reputation, Admiral’s move raises serious questions about the future of the insurance industry. […] Continua qui: https://medium.com/privacy-international/social-media-intelligence-and-prof…

Aug. 12, 2017

Workers' Technology Bill of Rights (1983)

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Nel 1983 la International Association of Machinists USA pubblicava una "Workers' Technology Bill of Rights" (in allegato) Sono passati 34 anni ma è ancora interessante leggerla. Una traduzione in italiano è inclusa nel volume "La questione tecnologica" di David F. Noble (Bollati Boringhieri, 1993). Vale la pena segnalare che i Machinists pubblicarono la loro Bill of Rights sulla rivista "Democracy", diretta dal grande scienziato politico Sheldon Wolin. I (notevoli) annali dal 1981 al 1983 sono disponibili qui: https://dja8183.org/. juan carlos

Aug. 12, 2017

Cohem (Paper): "Law for the Platform Economy"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Law for the Platform Economy* UC Davis Law Review, Forthcoming 51 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2017 Julie E. Cohen Georgetown University Law Center Date Written: June 22, 2017 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991261 Abstract This article explores patterns of legal-institutional change in the emerging, platform-driven economy. Its starting premise is that the platform is not simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a new infrastructural formation (although it is also all of those things). Rather, it is the core organizational form of the emerging informational economy. Platforms do not enter or expand markets; they replace (and rematerialize) them. The article argues that legal institutions, including both entitlements and regulatory institutions, have systematically facilitated the platform economy’s emergence. It first describes the evolution of the platform as a mode of economic (re)organization and introduces the ways that platforms restructure both economic exchange and patterns of information flow more generally. It then explores some of the ways that actions and interventions by and on behalf of platform businesses are reshaping the landscape of legal entitlements and obligations. Finally, it describes challenges that platform-based intermediation of the information environment has posed for existing regulatory institutions and traces some of the emerging institutional responses. Keywords: platforms, data, algorithms, information, intermediation, institutions

Aug. 11, 2017

Fwd: [IP] re Apple refuses to override user location spying choices

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Controcanto su Apple e AML. juan carlos -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [IP] re Apple refuses to override user location spying choices Resent-Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 01:22:56 +0200 Resent-From: d004620(a)polito.it Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 19:21:51 -0400 From: Dave Farber <farber(a)gmail.com> Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net To: ip <ip(a)listbox.com> > Begin forwarded message: > > *From: *John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com <mailto:gnu@toad.com>> > *Subject: **Re: [IP] Apple refuses to override user location spying > choices* > *Date: *August 10, 2017 at 6:18:57 PM EDT > *To: *dave(a)farber.net <mailto:dave@farber.net> > *Cc: *"ip" <ip(a)listbox.com <mailto:ip@listbox.com>> > >> Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save >> countless lives >> >> https://thenextweb.com/apple/2017/08/10/apple-refuses-enable-iphone-setting… >> >>> OK why Apple are you refusing? Dfarber > > Because they've stopped beating their wives, of course. > > [first, note that the above URL contains covert tracking information, > that "#.tnw_O0GihW8u" on the end. Lauren, Dave, don't you strip that > stuff off before sending it to hundreds or thousands of friends? You > should!] > > I'm not a big Apple defender, but Apple is probably making the right > choice here. The extremely slanted article that Dave and Lauren > forwarded neglects to mention giving users real choice about their own > privacy. It also neglects the use of large-company Internet-based > physical tracking services that are required and used for this > supposedly "simple" AML (Advanced Mobile Location) feature. > > If users have location services turned off, they should stay off, even > for emergency calls. I don't want Apple (or Google especially) > overriding my choices about whether my phone is going to track me. > Especially not with the explicit connivance of government and > supranational eurocrats. These guys are famous for forcing stupid > privacy choices on the public (like the RFID chips in passports, > chosen because the immigration bureaucrats didn't consider merely > moving their OCR passport readers 20 feet back along the queue of > incoming people). > > On my own free software Android phone I enable the phone to find its > location via receive-only radio transmissions from GNSS satellites > (US's GPS, Europe's GLONASS, and China's Beidou satellites). This > enables my free software mapping application (OsmAnd, which uses the > free culture OpenStreetMap database, which is stored directly in my > phone) to help me navigate. Neither Android nor OsmAnd is reporting > either my general position or my specific location to ANY satellites > nor ANY servers anywhere. (Yes, Virginia, it is possible and easy to > use mapping applications that DO NOT report your location to Apple, > Google, Bing, NSA, or anybody else. Of course, Apple, Google, Bing, > and NSA don't tell you that.) > > I explicitly do not turn on "WiFi" or "GSM base station" location > services. That's because these services both require that the phone > first listen to the local radio environment, and then REPORT that > radio environment to servers run by large companies, via the Internet. > These servers, run by Apple or Google or their subcontractors, store > that information, and then reply to my phone with location information > about those specific WiFi access points and those specific GSM cell > towers. In both cases, some big company has silently collected a data > point about where my phone is, and thus where I am. And they are > under no obligation to me to use that information solely for my own > benefit; quite the opposite. They use it for their OWN benefit, and > even use it to build up their databases about WiFi access points they > haven't yet discovered. They use it to sell things to me. They use > it to report me to government agencies and civil suit opponents under > subpoenas, wiretap orders, or National Security Letters. Etc. > > The article about AML was closely cribbed from press releases and > other info published by EENA, the European Emergency Number > Association, a nonprofit funded by EU project funding and by commercial > vendors who sell to police agencies.(*) The article and the EENA press > release carefully neglect to point out how the government-requested > AML feature would both override the user's location privacy settings, > and would report the user's location to some large faceless > corporation: > > "The process is completely automated. ... turn[s] on GNSS (global > navigation satellite system) and Wi-Fi. The phone then automatically > sends an SMS to emergency services, detailing the location of the > caller." > > The "report my location to large corporation" step between "turn on > Wi-Fi" and "send an SMS to emergency services" has conveniently been > ignored by this slanted article. It's all about Saving the Children, > not about Government Mandated Citizen Tracking Via Megacorps. The > "ignore my privacy settings" step isn't mentioned either; instead, > EENA is quoted as saying "accurate location information should be sent > during ALL emergency calls (emphasis theirs)" -- regardless of the > user's privacy choices. After all, who's in charge here? The > police agencies, or the citizen? > > The article also doesn't report that a significant fraction of calls > to government emergency services (911 in the US; 112 in Europe) are > spurious, typically "pocket dials". AML would report your location to > a company and to the emergency bureau, not just for real 911 calls > that you make in an emergency, but for every 911 pocket dial as well. > Try a web search for "911 pocket dial" for tons of links like these: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pocket_dialing#Accidental_calling_of_emergenc… > https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/remember-to-lock-your-phone-91… > http://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/man-dies-911-dispatchers-mistake-call-for-p… > http://abcnews.go.com/US/911-pocket-dial-leads-arrest-burglary-charges/stor… > https://www.yahoo.com/gma/blogs/abc-news/apparent-butt-dial-oregon-police-l… > http://www.pennlive.com/nation-world/2014/12/woman_25_arrested_after_pocket… > > This vague ETSI tech report for AML is the best technical description > available of the service: > > http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103300_103399/103393/01.01.01_60/tr_103… > > It notes that if you're roaming in another country, either the SMS > containing your location will go to your home country (not to the > local emergency dispatcher -- another location information leak), or > the phone will need to contain a database of countries and their > dispatcher SMS numbers, plus a mechanism for regularly updating this > database. The report ignores the idea that the emergency dispatchers > in each country should be able to forward such information to the > right country's dispatchers; the standard tries to push all the > complication into the phone firmware. > > It also states that: > > "The use of AML software should be invisible to the user so > as not to confuse them when they are trying to get help. > > No record of the SMS message should be available to > the user either during or after the emergency call." > > In other words, don't tell the user that you spied on them, and don't > let them see any record of your spying. > > It also notes that turning on location services can drain the battery, > thus terminating the voice 911 call earlier. > > It also says that a Time of Positioning should be sent in the SMS > message; "the handset should attempt to use the time established by an > NTP server, this should be possible if a network connection is > available." So now there's a second access to an NTP server somewhere > on the Internet, that AML is requiring the handset to do, invisibly. > > It's getting less and less simple, the more we look into the details... > > Meanwhile, the proponents(*) have this to say: > > http://www.eena.org/download.asp?item_id=209 > > "Are there any privacy risks? > > No. ..." > > John > > (*) EENA says it's a nonprofit, not a regulator. But it lobbies for > and coordinates 1300 police agency bureaucrats from all over Europe > and the world. It's funded by ~400K euros of project funding from the > EU government, plus 90 corporate members each paying 10,000 euros a > year for the privilege of marketing their products to the 1300 "no > membership fee" bureaucrat members; total about 1.1M euros a year. We > are seeing more orgs like this, full of officials but exempt from FOIA > and sunshine laws, pushing totalitarian "solutions" that then their > members go back and mandate in their own jurisdictions. AAMVA is a > big one in the US, pushing the idea that to solve "terrorism", > everyone needs a government issued ID, tied to a national ID database, > just to exist or travel. Its membership: Heads of Departments of > Motor Vehicles in each state -- the ones who issue those ID cards. > They decline to allow privacy activists to join their membership, > conferences, or discussions; we tried.

Aug. 11, 2017

"Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save countless lives"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save countless lives* by Már Másson Maack Despite being relatively easy, Apple keeps ignoring requests to enable a feature called Advanced Mobile Location (AML) in iOS. Enabling AML would give emergency services extremely accurate locations of emergency calls made from iPhones, dramatically decreasing response time. As TNW covered before, Google’s successful implementation of AML for Android is already saving lives. But where Android users have become safer, iPhone owners have been left behind. The European Emergency Number Association (EENA), the organization behind implementing AML for emergency services, released a statement today that pleads Apple to consider the safety of its customers and participate in the program: “As AML is being deployed in more and more countries, iPhone users are put at a disadvantage compared to Android users in the scenario that matters most: An emergency. EENA calls on Apple to integrate Advanced Mobile Location in their smartphones for the safety of their customers.” […] Continua qui: https://thenextweb.com/apple/2017/08/10/apple-refuses-enable-iphone-setting…

Aug. 10, 2017

Nuovi documenti GAO e Chatham House

by Diego Latella

Carissimi, Alla pagina Computers: National security, War, and Civil Rights <http://uspid.org/compwa.html> del sito web dell’USPID (www.uspid.org <http://www.uspid.org/>) ho appena inserito i link ai seguenti documenti che, spero, siano di vostro interesse: Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are Needed <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-614?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdeliv…> GAO-17-614 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 3, 2017 Defense Cybersecurity: DOD's Monitoring of Progress in Implementing Cyber Strategies Can Be Strengthened <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-512?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdeliv…> GAO-17-512 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 1, 2017 INTERNET OF THINGS: Enhanced Assessments and Guidance Are Needed to Address Security Risks in DOD <http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686204.pdf> GAO-17-668 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 1, 2017 How vulnerable are nuclear weapons to cyber-attacks? <https://www.facebook.com/ChathamHouse/videos/10154932955922689/?utm_source=…> Beyza Unal Chatam House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/> August 1, 2017 The Internet of Things Will Be Even More Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/internet-things-will-be-even-mo…> Hannah Bryce <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/hannah-bryce> Chatam House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/> May 18, 2017 Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat

Aug. 9, 2017

GAO Report on "Aviation Security : TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavior al Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities"

by Diego Latella

Maybe you might be interested in the GAO Report on "Aviation Security : TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavior al Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities”: This is what GAO faund: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not have valid evidence that most of the revised behavioral indicators (28 of 36) used in its behavior detection activities can be used to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security. GAO defined valid evidence as original research that meets generally accepted research standards and presents evidence that is applicable in supporting the specific behavioral indicators in TSA's revised list. Original research sources presenting valid evidence are important because the data and conclusions they present are derived from empirical research that can be replicated and evaluated. In GAO's review of all 178 sources TSA cited as support for its revised list, GAO found that 98 percent (175 of 178) of the sources do not provide valid evidence that is applicable to the specific behavioral indicators TSA cited them as supporting. Specifically, Seventy-seven percent of the sources TSA cited (137 of 178) are news articles, opinion pieces, presentations created by law enforcement entities and industry groups, and screen shots of online medical websites that do not meet GAO's definition of valid evidence. Twelve percent of the sources TSA cited (21 of 178) are journal articles, books reviewing existing literature, and other publications that may reference original research in the text, but do not themselves present original analysis, methods, or data whose reliability and validity can be assessed. Eleven percent of the sources TSA cited (20 of 178) are original research sources reporting original data and methods. However, 5 of these sources do not meet generally accepted research standards. Of the 15 sources that meet generally accepted research standards, 12 do not present information and conclusions that are applicable to the specific behavioral indicators TSA cited these sources as supporting. In total, GAO found that 3 of the 178 total sources cited could be used as valid evidence to support 8 of the 36 behavioral indicators in TSA's revised list. More specifically, TSA has one source of valid evidence to support each of 7 indicators, 2 sources of valid evidence to support 1 indicator, and does not have valid evidence to support 28 behavioral indicators. GAO makes no new recommendations in this report. The following is some context information (from the GAO report introduction): Over the past 10 years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has employed thousands of trained behavior detection officers (BDO) to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception at airport screening checkpoints. According to TSA, certain verbal and nonverbal cues and behaviors—TSA’s behavioral indicators—may indicate malintent, such as the intent to carry out a terrorist attack. These behavioral indicators include, for example, assessing the way an individual swallows or the degree to which an individual’s eyes are open. According to TSA, such indicators provide a means for identifying passengers who may pose a risk to aviation security and referring them for additional screening. Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat

Aug. 9, 2017

GDPR: ecco l'implementazione nel Regno Unito

by Guido Noto La Diega

Di ieri lo statement of intent inglese. Si segnalano, inter alia - new offence of altering records with intent to prevent disclosure following a subject access request <https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/dpa2018?source=feed_text&story_id=18077726…>- new criminal offence of intentionally or recklessly re-identifying individuals from anonymised or pseudonymised data <https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/dpa2018?source=feed_text&story_id=18077719…> V. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6… -- Guido Dr Guido Noto La Diega Lecturer in Law @ Northumbria University CEO @italiot | Fellow @ Nexa Center for Internet & Society | Founder @DPA2018 Northumbria Law School City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST noto.la.diega(a)gmail.com +44(0)191 349 5562 Twitter @guidonld You can access my papers on Academia.edu <http://northumbria.academia.edu/GuidoNotoLaDiega> and on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1794950>) This e-mail and any attachment hereto are strictly confidential and are exclusively intended for the person above identified. Without intended recipient’s entitlement, use, copy and dissemination of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received it in error, please advice us immediately by telephone and return the documents received to the above address, deleting the files. Thank you. Unless necessary, please do not print this e-mail.

Aug. 8, 2017

Global Network Initiative Releases 2016 Annual Report

by avv. Monica A. Senor

Press release: https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/global-network-initiative-rele… The full report: http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI-Annual-Report-20… Un caro saluto e buona estate a tutti, Monica

Aug. 8, 2017

Secrets of Silicon Valley review – are we sleepwalking towards a technological apocalypse?

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2017/aug/07/> The first of two episodes of Secrets of Silicon Valley (BBC2, Sunday) was a sobering look at how tech is going to change society quickly and dramatically. The presenter, technology writer Jamie Bartlett, with his scruffy beard and manbun, seems comfortingly analogue compared with the hoodied inventors and venture capitalists he meets. One tells him that anyone who questions the wisdom of where we are heading is “anti-progress”, and finishes with a long and chilling stare. It wasn’t all dystopia. Bartlett visited a Silicon Valley mansion, where young engineers mostly had idealistic visions – one was inventing a way to reverse climate change, another was coming up with a plant-based burger. They tell themselves what all Silicon Valley inhabitants do – that making the world better, and making billions of dollars in the process, are not mutually exclusive. Airbnb executives claim to be connecting people across the world and helping people earn money to pay the rent; the effect is to push up housing costs for locals in cities such as Barcelona. A man from Uber says something vague about how the app is changing the way we use cars to save the world. But the programme shows how it has affected the livelihoods of taxi drivers, and worse, it claimed that, in Hyderabad in India, three Uber drivers have killed themselves. Bartlett does an emotional interview with the widow of one of them ....

Aug. 7, 2017

Weinberger: "Pointing at the Wrong Villain: Cass Sunstein and Echo Chambers"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

*Pointing at the Wrong Villain: Cass Sunstein and Echo Chambers* By David Weinberger JULY 20, 2017 HARVARD LAW professor, member of President Obama’s White House, and the most-cited constitutional law professor in the country, Cass Sunstein first addressed the internet’s role in the polarization of our culture 15 years ago. His argument has become an accepted part of any discussion about the net’s failings. Yet, he has now written the same book about this issue for the third time. To be sure, his persistence is laudable, but the problems with his assumptions are only becoming more obvious. The first appearance of this book was as Republic.com in 2001, which Sunstein updated in 2007 as Republic.com 2.0. The latest version, #Republic, retains most of the text from these prior versions with a shift in evidence and examples from websites (2001) and blogs (2007) to social media (2017). The new edition includes elaborations inessential to his argument. Why three times? Perhaps Sunstein is the prophet still unheard in his own land — although, given the prominence of his views, that’s not very plausible. Or perhaps the sins he decries have not become dire enough for us to act. Or perhaps we have failed to achieve the old ideals of civil discourse that he espouses because our new network is exposing a weakness in them. […] Continua qui: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pointing-at-the-wrong-villain-cass-suns…

Aug. 7, 2017

Licenze open data: CC-BY 4.0 e sono compatibili? Per EDP si, per OSMF no.

by Maurizio Napolitano

European Data Portal ha pubblicato un sito con le licenze open data e relative compatibilità. https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license Si nota una compatibilità fra CC-BY 4.0 e ODbL https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license?license_id=CC-BY4… Cosa che, invece, la Open Street Map Foundation - dopo aver discusso con creative commons - dice non essere del tutto vera. https://blog.openstreetmap.org/2017/03/17/use-of-cc-by-data/ Mi viene confermato anche in questo thread da Simon Pool - coordinatore del Legal Working Group di OpenStreetMap Foundation https://lists.openstreetmap.org/pipermail/talk/2017-August/078385.html Cosa ne pensate? Addenda: EDP dichiara anche che la licenza ODC-BY è una licenza di tipo share alike e non di tipo attribuzione https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license?license_id=ODC-BY

Aug. 4, 2017

Due recensioni di "Platform Capitalism" di Nick Srnicek

by J.C. DE MARTIN

(HT Antonio Aloisi) * Notes on Platform Capitalism** *By Mark Carrigan on February 16, 2017 http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/19138 *Book Review: Platform Capitalism by Nick Srnicek** *By Sin Yee Koh http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/06/05/book-review-platform-cap… /If you are interested in this book, you may also like to read Nick Srnicek’s short essay on Platform Capitalism, published on LSE RB on 24 February 2017, or listen to a recording of his LSE Lit Fest panel discussion with Luke Dormehl and Laurie Penny on ‘The Future of Humanity’ ./

Aug. 3, 2017

Paper: "Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City 58 Pages Posted: Robert Brauneis <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=329492> George Washington University - Law School Ellen P. Goodman <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=333377> Rutgers Law School Date Written: August 2, 2017 Abstract Emerging across many disciplines are questions about algorithmic ethics – about the values embedded in artificial intelligence and big data analytics that increasingly replace human decisionmaking. Many are concerned that an algorithmic society is too opaque to be accountable for its behavior. An individual can be denied parole or denied credit, fired or not hired for reasons she will never know and cannot be articulated. In the public sector, the opacity of algorithmic decisionmaking is particularly problematic both because governmental decisions may be especially weighty, and because democratically-elected governments bear special duties of accountability. Investigative journalists have recently exposed the dangerous impenetrability of algorithmic processes used in the criminal justice field – dangerous because the predictions they make can be both erroneous and unfair, with none the wiser. We set out to test the limits of transparency around governmental deployment of big data analytics, focusing our investigation on local and state government use of predictive algorithms. It is here, in local government, that algorithmically-determined decisions can be most directly impactful. And it is here that stretched agencies are most likely to hand over the analytics to private vendors, which may make design and policy choices out of the sight of the client agencies, the public, or both. To see just how impenetrable the resulting “black box” algorithms are, we filed 42 open records requests in 23 states seeking essential information about six predictive algorithm programs. We selected the most widely-used and well-reviewed programs, including those developed by for-profit companies, nonprofits, and academic/private sector partnerships. The goal was to see if, using the open records process, we could discover what policy judgments these algorithms embody, and could evaluate their utility and fairness. To do this work, we identified what meaningful “algorithmic transparency” entails. We found that in almost every case, it wasn’t provided. Over-broad assertions of trade secrecy were a problem. But contrary to conventional wisdom, they were not the biggest obstacle. It will not usually be necessary to release the code used to execute predictive models in order to dramatically increase transparency. We conclude that publicly-deployed algorithms will be sufficiently transparent only if (1) governments generate appropriate records about their objectives for algorithmic processes and subsequent implementation and validation; (2) government contractors reveal to the public agency sufficient information about how they developed the algorithm; and (3) public agencies and courts treat trade secrecy claims as the limited exception to public disclosure that the law requires. Although it would require a multi-stakeholder process to develop best practices for record generation and disclosure, we present what we believe are eight principal types of information that such records should ideally contain

Aug. 2, 2017

Sweden scrambles to tighten data security as scandal claims two ministers

by Alberto Cammozzo

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/01/sweden-scrambles-to-tigh…> Sweden’s government has sought urgent assurances on data security from national agencies including the health, education and pensions services after a huge leak of private and sensitive information that has cost two ministers their jobs. Amid reports by the Dagens Nyheter newspaper that confidential medical details were being handled by unscreened IT workers in Romania, the national broadcaster SVT said data outsourcing arrangements at six state agencies were being checked. ...

Aug. 2, 2017

Re: [nexa] Germania: "Center for Advanced Internet Studies"

by A Dicorinto

Per quello che conta, condivido la tua amarezza, JC. Siamo una nazione votata al declino con una classe politica incapace di pensare al futuro, un'imprenditoria assistita e miope, l'Università con poche punte d'eccellenza. Sono stato in Estonia a studiare come siano riusciti a digitalizzare così velocemente il paese dove TUTTO si fa con un'app e un ID Card per la firma digitale di contratti e prestazioni, mentre qui non riusciamo neppure a fare l'anagrafe dei comuni e il confronto è sconfortante. Se la commissione d'inchiesta sulla digitalizzazione della PA comndata da Paolo Coppola avesse potere sanzionatorio manderemmo a casa tanti dinosauri... 2017-07-31 8:46 GMT+02:00 J.C. DE MARTIN <demartin(a)polito.it>: > In UK e Germania si moltiplicano i centri > studi dedicati a Internet - l'ultimo di cui sono > venuto a conoscenza è questo: > > *Center for Advanced Internet Studies* > http://www.cais.nrw/ > > *Our goals* > > *The Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAIS) aims at playing an active > role in the shaping of the rapid social, political and economic changes > brought about by digitalization and is dedicated to promoting an ongoing > dialogue between science and society.* > > *CAIS sees itself as a place of innovative and interdisciplinary research > and as an initiator of critical public debate among stakeholders who face > the challenges and opportunities of digitalization and are committed to > developing a normative framework for life in a digital society.* > > Ma noi italiani stiamo a posto con il pistacchio di Bronte > e i ristoranti per turisti. > > juan carlos > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > -- Arturo Di Corinto www.dicorinto.it ---------------------------------> AVVERTENZE AI SENSI DEL D.Lgs. 196/2003 Le informazioni contenute in questo messaggio di posta elettronica e/o nel/i file/s allegato/i sono da considerarsi strettamente riservate. Il loro utilizzo è consentito esclusivamente al destinatario del messaggio, per le finalità indicate nel messaggio stesso. Qualora riceviate questo messaggio senza esserne il destinatario, Vi preghiamo cortesemente di darcene notizia via e-mail e di procedere alla distruzione del messaggio stesso, cancellandolo dal Vostro sistema. Conservare il messaggio stesso, divulgarlo anche in parte, distribuirlo ad altri soggetti, copiarlo, od utilizzarlo per finalità diverse, costituisce comportamento contrario ai principi dettati dal D.Lgs. 196/2003 -- ___________________________________________ *Il tuo 5 diventa 1000* Fai crescere la tua università Dona il 5 per mille alla Sapienza Codice fiscale: *80209930587*

Aug. 2, 2017

Italy plans to extend telecoms data retention and increase censorship powers

by Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists

Una sintesi in inglese di quanto è stato inserito nella "Legge europea 2017" che ha un impatto sui digital rights https://edri.org/italy-plans-extend-telecoms-data-retention-increase-censor… (Our first contribution as EDRi Observer) Fabio

Aug. 1, 2017

Re: [nexa] R: Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google

by Carlo Blengino

Sono già tra di noi... Buonevacanze Carlo Blengino In mobilità > Il giorno 01 ago 2017, alle ore 11:24, Federico Morando <federico.morando(a)gmail.com> ha scritto: > > Nel nostro piccolo, in Italia qualche esperimento con Palantir l'abbiamo già fatto senz'altro: non so se la cosa abbia avuto un seguito. Apparentemente, no. > In ogni caso, nel 2013 Sogei ha comprato da loro "apparecchiature hardware finalizzate alla sperimentazione di prodotti sw": > https://contrattipubblici.org/id/contracts/487783659A > > Documento originale Sogei (versione PDF per facilità di consultazione, ma hanno regolarmente pubblicato anche l'XML): > http://www.sogei.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/IT/D/e%252Fc%252F1%… > > Federico > > >> On 01/08/2017 08:32, Aldo Pedico wrote: >> Non sono un legale. Ma se ho capito bene il principio del Gdpr, secondo me, sì. Perché decade il principio della tutela dei diritti delle persone fisiche. >> Aldo Pedico >> >> >> Inviato da Samsung Mobile >> >> >> -------- Messaggio originale -------- >> Da: Marco Ciurcina >> Data:31/07/2017 23:03 (GMT+01:00) >> A: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> Oggetto: Re: [nexa] Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google >> >> In data lunedì 31 luglio 2017 20:44:06 CEST, Claudio Agosti ha scritto: >> > Effetto collaterale: i dati delle organizzazioni che usano palanthir sono >> > posseduti da palathir nel suo cloud "per ragioni tecniche" ti trovi a >> > cedere assetts a un sistema di data mininig i quali legami con la CIA non >> > sono manco nascosti. >> Una domanda ai penalisti in lista. >> Sulla base di questo presupposto, se il funzionario d'una pubblica >> amministrazione italiana (chesso': un funzionario di Equitalia) acquistasse da >> Palantir dei servizi (mettendo a rischio i dati dei cittadini italiani), si >> potrebbe configurare un reato? >> m.c. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> nexa mailing list >> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Aug. 1, 2017

Re: [nexa] R: Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google

by lilo

Il 01/08/2017 11:24, Federico Morando ha scritto: > Nel nostro piccolo, in Italia qualche esperimento con Palantir l'abbiamo > già fatto senz'altro: non so se la cosa abbia avuto un seguito. > Apparentemente, no. > In ogni caso, nel 2013 Sogei ha comprato da loro "apparecchiature > hardware finalizzate alla sperimentazione di prodotti sw": > https://contrattipubblici.org/id/contracts/487783659A > > Documento originale Sogei (versione PDF per facilità di consultazione, > ma hanno regolarmente pubblicato anche l'XML): > http://www.sogei.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/IT/D/e%252Fc%252F1%… > > > Federico ussignur. Sogei. ettepareva. -- -e' tutto calcolato, ma non funziona niente- X-LiLo /Informatica /Senior tester Python OSint Research N@onis Team /Consulenza del Lavoro, Telematica, Fiscale. Ordine Consulenti del Lavoro n. 2586 centro autorizzato CAF CDL srl 00067 Uff. Periferico 1300E ScosseCAF Scosse.org @Casa Internazionale delle Donne Via della Lungara 19 - Roma - 1°piano, stanza 106 martedi e giovedi 16.30 - 21.00 o su appuntamento. PEC x-lilo(a)legalmail.it /// bit in rebels => devuan.org *nuova* PGP-KEY-ID [RSA4096]: 0x0A0E6F2A FINGERPRINT: 0CDE C1F3 4961 0B26 5B7A 3F1E 7033 7472 0A0E 6F2A server: hkp pool.sks-keyservers.net

Aug. 1, 2017

GPL e` un contratto

by Guido Noto La Diega

"Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on the unsigned GNU GPL fails to plausibly demonstrate mutual assent, that is, the existence of a contract. Not so. The GNU GPL, which is attached to the complaint, provides that the Ghostscript user agrees to its terms if the user does not obtain a commercial license. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial license, and represented publicly that its use of Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a contract.” Un commento qua http://www.technollama.co.uk/us-court-declares-gpl-is-a-contract -- Guido Dr Guido Noto La Diega Lecturer in Law @ Northumbria University CEO @italiot | Fellow @ Nexa Center for Internet & Society | Founder @DPA2018 Northumbria Law School City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST noto.la.diega(a)gmail.com +44(0)191 349 5562 Twitter @guidonld You can access my papers on Academia.edu <http://northumbria.academia.edu/GuidoNotoLaDiega> and on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1794950>) This e-mail and any attachment hereto are strictly confidential and are exclusively intended for the person above identified. Without intended recipient’s entitlement, use, copy and dissemination of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received it in error, please advice us immediately by telephone and return the documents received to the above address, deleting the files. Thank you. Unless necessary, please do not print this e-mail.

Aug. 1, 2017

Re: [nexa] R: Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google

by Federico Morando

Nel nostro piccolo, in Italia qualche esperimento con Palantir l'abbiamo già fatto senz'altro: non so se la cosa abbia avuto un seguito. Apparentemente, no. In ogni caso, nel 2013 Sogei ha comprato da loro "apparecchiature hardware finalizzate alla sperimentazione di prodotti sw": https://contrattipubblici.org/id/contracts/487783659A Documento originale Sogei (versione PDF per facilità di consultazione, ma hanno regolarmente pubblicato anche l'XML): http://www.sogei.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeAttachment.php/L/IT/D/e%252Fc%252F1%… Federico On 01/08/2017 08:32, Aldo Pedico wrote: > Non sono un legale. Ma se ho capito bene il principio del Gdpr, > secondo me, sì. Perché decade il principio della tutela dei diritti > delle persone fisiche. > Aldo Pedico > > > Inviato da Samsung Mobile > > > -------- Messaggio originale -------- > Da: Marco Ciurcina > Data:31/07/2017 23:03 (GMT+01:00) > A: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > Oggetto: Re: [nexa] Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields > as much real-world power as Google > > In data lunedì 31 luglio 2017 20:44:06 CEST, Claudio Agosti ha scritto: > > Effetto collaterale: i dati delle organizzazioni che usano palanthir > sono > > posseduti da palathir nel suo cloud "per ragioni tecniche" ti trovi a > > cedere assetts a un sistema di data mininig i quali legami con la > CIA non > > sono manco nascosti. > Una domanda ai penalisti in lista. > Sulla base di questo presupposto, se il funzionario d'una pubblica > amministrazione italiana (chesso': un funzionario di Equitalia) > acquistasse da > Palantir dei servizi (mettendo a rischio i dati dei cittadini > italiani), si > potrebbe configurare un reato? > m.c. > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Aug. 1, 2017

Re: [nexa] The chiefs of Facebook, Google and other tech giants aren’t committing to testify to the U.S. Congress on net neutrality

by Stefano Quintarelli

appero' peggio mi sento. On 01/08/2017 10:43, J.C. DE MARTIN wrote: > In realtà la notizia negli USA viene letta come > crescentre disinteresse delle tech companies nei confronti > della neutralità della rete. > > jc > > > > On 01/08/2017 09:41, Stefano Quintarelli wrote: >> sono strenui sostenitori di una regolamentazione che assicuri che chi >> gestisce la risorsa da cui essi dipendono, non possano usare il loro >> potere di gestione della risorsa stessa per condizionare la concorrenza. >> >> bravi. >> >> sarebbe bello se fossero altrettanto strenui sostenitori di una >> regolamentazione che assicuri che loro, che gestiscono una risorsa da >> cui molti dipendono, non possano usare il loro potere di gestione >> della risorsa stessa per condizionare la concorrenza. >> >> sono tutti pro-neutralita' con la concorrenza degli altri... >> >> On 01/08/2017 09:01, J.C. DE MARTIN wrote: >>> >>> They had until today to tell a key House committee, which is >>> extending its deadline. >>> >>> * BY TONY ROMM <http://www.recode.net/authors/tony-romm> >>> * ON JULY 31, 2017 3:17 PM >>> >>> https://www.recode.net/platform/amp/2017/7/31/16070176/amazon-facebook-goog… >>> >>> >>> >>> (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any)) >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> nexa mailing list >>> nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it >>> https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa >>> > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa

Aug. 1, 2017