November 2014 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Webcast now: "Privacy, Surveillance, and Rebuilding Trust in Tech"

by J.C. DE MARTIN

Webcast live now: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/11/Smith [Today] Privacy, Surveillance, and Rebuilding Trust in Tech A Conversation with Microsoft GC Brad Smith and Professor Jonathan Zittrain Tuesday, November 4, 2014 at 12:00 pm Harvard Law School campus Wasserstein Hall, Room 1015 [Event at capacity] Please join the live webcast here at 12:00 pm. Co-sponsored by the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (JOLT) #TrustInTech

Nov. 4, 2014

Fwd: [governance] Two IETF Internet-Drafts about human rights and censorship

by J.C. DE MARTIN

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [governance] Two IETF Internet-Drafts about human rights and censorship Resent-Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 14:49:07 +0100 Resent-From: d004620(a)polito.it Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2014 14:47:59 +0100 From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer(a)internatif.org> Reply-To: governance(a)lists.igcaucus.org, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer(a)internatif.org> To: governance(a)lists.igcaucus.org Next week is the 91th IETF meeting and, at the security meeting, these two new Internet-Drafts will be discussed: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-doria-hrpc-proposal Work has been done on privacy issues that should be considered when creating an Internet protocol [see the excellent RFC 6973, or working groups like DPRIVE, for DNS privacy. S.B.]. This draft suggests that similar considerations may apply for other human rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of association. A proposal is made for initiating IRTF [Internet Research Task Force] work researching the possible connections between human rights and Internet standards and protocols. The goal would be to create an informational RFC concerning human rights protocol considerations. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hall-censorship-tech This document describes the technical mechanisms used by censorship regimes around the world to block or degrade internet traffic. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of the properties being exploited and mechanisms used to censor end-user access to information. This document makes no suggestions on individual protocol considerations, and is purely informational, intended to be a reference.

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by Alessandro Mantelero

Scusa, forse mi è sfuggito, ma non mi pare che risulti chi sia l'autore del commento. Poichè vengono espressi giudizi, credo che conoscerne la fonte possa essere a tutti utile. AM On Tue, 04 Nov 2014 14:45:00 +0100 mutek <mutek(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 09:21:08 CEST, Fabio >Pietrosanti - lists ha scritto: >> Ciao a tutti, >> >> volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un >>paio d'anni fa >> sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto >>elettronico per >> l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per >>l'implementazione ed >> esecuzione. >> >> E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi >>limitato ma è stato un >> esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a >>qualcun'altro in > futuro: >> >> Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… >> >> Razionali di budget >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… >> > > con massimo rispetto questi due documenti non dicono >molto ed in particolare la parte numerica sintetica è di >impossibile accettazione da parte di qualsiasi scienziato >ai fini del proseguimento di questo tentativo. > > Pero trovo interessante aggiungere un elemento di >valutazione che potrebbe servire ad integrazione, in >particolare per chi non lo conoscesse c'è un ricercatore >David Bismark che ha prodotto un lavoro su un sistema di >voto elettronico verificabile: > > Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system > http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1720427&CFID=594648987&CFTOKEN=72520885&p… > > riferimento usabile: > http://www.pretavoter.com/ > > una spiegazione pratica qui: > http://evoting.bismark.se/verifiable-electronic-voting/ > > un sommario veloce: > > Prêt à Voter is a voting system that provides >verification of the ballot. It allows voters to verify >that their votes have been included in the count while >ensuring their vote remains secret. It also assures the >integrity of the election - that the final result >corresponds to the votes cast - and allows independent >verification of the count. Prêt à Voter provides voters >with a familiar voting experience, integrated with an >electronic system to process the votes and to provide the >security guarantees. The system supports elections >involving selection of a single candidate, selection of >multiple candidates, lists of preferences, and multiple >races on a single ballot. > Voting with Prêt à VoterA compted ballot > > Voters mark their selection on a paper ballot form in >the usual way against the candidates available. The key >novelty is that the candidates are listed in a random >order, which varies from ballot to ballot. > > When the vote has been written on the ballot paper, the >candidate list is detached and destroyed. The result is a >marked voting slip which indicates the position of the >vote, but not who it is for. The voting slip is read into >the system, and a receipt is returned to the voter. The >receipt records the position of the marked vote and the >voter retains the receipt for later confirmation of the >vote. > > The right hand side of a ballotAfter the poll, the >system publishes on a public web bulletin board the >receipts of all the votes it has accepted. Any voter can >confirm that their vote has been included in the ballot, >by looking up their receipt and checking that their >receipt matches what is published. This also provides >protection against fraud: if votes are not included, then >voters can use their receipts to challenge the process. > > The system works the same way if there are multiple >votes or preferences to be cast. > > How it works > > To be able to process the votes after they have been >cast, the voting slip includes a code (included as a 2-D >bar code) containing the candidate list in encrypted >form. The encryption means that the list cannot be >extracted without a threshold number of decryption keys, >and each of these keys is held by a different trusted >party within the system. > > A ballot form can be randomly audited and its code >decrypted to confirm that the candidate list has been >printed correctly. > > Once the votes have been cast, the system shuffles them >together and decrypts them using the decryption keys to >identify the choices indicated on the marked voting >slips. The votes can then be tallied to obtain the >election result. > > The shuffling of all the votes means that no individual >voting slip or receipt can be linked to any particular >reconstructed vote. This protects the secrecy of the vote >even with the receipt. > > As well as publishing the accepted voting slips, the >bulletin board also lists all of the decrypted votes. The >shuffling and decryption is done in a verifiable way: >independent parties can confirm that the published list >of decrypted votes corresponds to the published list of >received voting slips. This means that the votes to be >counted are exactly the votes that were cast. However, >independent parties cannot link any particular voting >slip to any particular vote. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then >anyone can check that the counting has been done >correctly. > > Secret Ballot > > The system provides the same level of ballot secrecy as >systems currently in real use. Even though a receipt is >provided, it does not leak any information about the >voter's choice of candidate. > > The marked position on the receipt does not leak >information The receipt only contains the marked position >of the vote, and not who the vote was for. The fact that >the list of candidates was random means that the marked >position could correspond to any choice, and so the >chosen candidate cannot be identified from the position >of the vote cast. > The encrypted candidate order does not leak Although >the candidate order is included on the ballot slip to >allow the vote to be reconstructed, this is strongly >encrypted, and cannot be decrypted without all of the >decryption keys. These are distributed to trusted parties >across the election system, and no-one has more than one >key. > The bulletin board does not leak information The >shuffling of the votes before decryption ensures that the >receipt cannot be associated with its decrypted version. >An external party only knows that the receipt corresponds >to some decrypted vote on the list, but cannot know >which. > > These measures together ensure that the vote associated >with a receipt cannot leak. The system provides ballot >secrecy. > > Integrity: end-to-end verifiability > > The Prêt à Voter system provides transparent assurance >that the final result reflects the votes cast. > > Each stage that the votes go through in the system, from >vote casting, through to the election result itself, can >be independently verified. > > All cast votes are included Voters themselves confirm >that their votes have been included in the tally, by >checking their receipts on the web bulletin board. > All included votes are correctly decrypted Checking >that the shuffling and decryption have been done properly >can be carried out by independent parties. The way the >cryptography is used means that as well as decrypting the >votes, the system also publishes mathematical proofs that >the decrypted votes correspond to the collection of votes >that were included. These proofs can be independently >verified by anyone. > The decrypted votes are correctly counted Since the >decrypted votes are made public, anyone can independently >carry out the count and check the official result. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then >anyone can check that the counting has been done >correctly. The integrity of the election is ensured by >these checks, and does not need to rely on trust in the >voting equipment or the election officials. > > > buona lettura > > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa -- Avv. Alessandro Mantelero, PhD Aggregate Professor, Politecnico di Torino Director of Privacy and Faculty Fellow, Nexa Center for Internet and Society Research Consultant, Sino-Italian Research Center for Internet Torts at Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology Programme Coordinator, Double Degree program in Management and IP Law, Politecnico di TorinoTongji University of Shanghai http://staff.polito.it/alessandro.mantelero http://works.bepress.com/alessandro_mantelero/ Politecnico di Torino Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 10129 Torino - Italy in libertate fortitudo

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by mutek

addeundum: sto notando che non è possibile scaricare l'articolo su ACM che comunque è disponibile qui: http://www.pretavoter.com/publications/PretaVoter2010.pdf Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 14:45:00 CEST, mutek ha scritto: > Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 09:21:08 CEST, Fabio Pietrosanti - > lists ha scritto: >> Ciao a tutti, >> >> volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un paio d'anni fa >> sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto elettronico per >> l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per l'implementazione ed >> esecuzione. >> >> E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi limitato ma è stato un >> esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a qualcun'altro in > futuro: >> >> Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… >> >> Razionali di budget >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… >> > > con massimo rispetto questi due documenti non dicono molto ed > in particolare la parte numerica sintetica è di impossibile > accettazione da parte di qualsiasi scienziato ai fini del > proseguimento di questo tentativo. > > Pero trovo interessante aggiungere un elemento di valutazione > che potrebbe servire ad integrazione, in particolare per chi non > lo conoscesse c'è un ricercatore David Bismark che ha prodotto > un lavoro su un sistema di voto elettronico verificabile: > > Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system > http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1720427&CFID=594648987&CFTOKEN=72520885&p… > > riferimento usabile: > http://www.pretavoter.com/ > > una spiegazione pratica qui: > http://evoting.bismark.se/verifiable-electronic-voting/ > > un sommario veloce: > > Prêt à Voter is a voting system that provides verification of > the ballot. It allows voters to verify that their votes have > been included in the count while ensuring their vote remains > secret. It also assures the integrity of the election - that the > final result corresponds to the votes cast - and allows > independent verification of the count. Prêt à Voter provides > voters with a familiar voting experience, integrated with an > electronic system to process the votes and to provide the > security guarantees. The system supports elections involving > selection of a single candidate, selection of multiple > candidates, lists of preferences, and multiple races on a single > ballot. > Voting with Prêt à VoterA compted ballot > > Voters mark their selection on a paper ballot form in the usual > way against the candidates available. The key novelty is that > the candidates are listed in a random order, which varies from > ballot to ballot. > > When the vote has been written on the ballot paper, the > candidate list is detached and destroyed. The result is a marked > voting slip which indicates the position of the vote, but not > who it is for. The voting slip is read into the system, and a > receipt is returned to the voter. The receipt records the > position of the marked vote and the voter retains the receipt > for later confirmation of the vote. > > The right hand side of a ballotAfter the poll, the system > publishes on a public web bulletin board the receipts of all the > votes it has accepted. Any voter can confirm that their vote has > been included in the ballot, by looking up their receipt and > checking that their receipt matches what is published. This also > provides protection against fraud: if votes are not included, > then voters can use their receipts to challenge the process. > > The system works the same way if there are multiple votes or > preferences to be cast. > > How it works > > To be able to process the votes after they have been cast, the > voting slip includes a code (included as a 2-D bar code) > containing the candidate list in encrypted form. The encryption > means that the list cannot be extracted without a threshold > number of decryption keys, and each of these keys is held by a > different trusted party within the system. > > A ballot form can be randomly audited and its code decrypted to > confirm that the candidate list has been printed correctly. > > Once the votes have been cast, the system shuffles them > together and decrypts them using the decryption keys to identify > the choices indicated on the marked voting slips. The votes can > then be tallied to obtain the election result. > > The shuffling of all the votes means that no individual voting > slip or receipt can be linked to any particular reconstructed > vote. This protects the secrecy of the vote even with the > receipt. > > As well as publishing the accepted voting slips, the bulletin > board also lists all of the decrypted votes. The shuffling and > decryption is done in a verifiable way: independent parties can > confirm that the published list of decrypted votes corresponds > to the published list of received voting slips. This means that > the votes to be counted are exactly the votes that were cast. > However, independent parties cannot link any particular voting > slip to any particular vote. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can > check that the counting has been done correctly. > > Secret Ballot > > The system provides the same level of ballot secrecy as systems > currently in real use. Even though a receipt is provided, it > does not leak any information about the voter's choice of > candidate. > > The marked position on the receipt does not leak > information The receipt only contains the marked position of the > vote, and not who the vote was for. The fact that the list of > candidates was random means that the marked position could > correspond to any choice, and so the chosen candidate cannot be > identified from the position of the vote cast. > The encrypted candidate order does not leak Although the > candidate order is included on the ballot slip to allow the vote > to be reconstructed, this is strongly encrypted, and cannot be > decrypted without all of the decryption keys. These are > distributed to trusted parties across the election system, and > no-one has more than one key. > The bulletin board does not leak information The shuffling > of the votes before decryption ensures that the receipt cannot > be associated with its decrypted version. An external party only > knows that the receipt corresponds to some decrypted vote on the > list, but cannot know which. > > These measures together ensure that the vote associated with a > receipt cannot leak. The system provides ballot secrecy. > > Integrity: end-to-end verifiability > > The Prêt à Voter system provides transparent assurance that the > final result reflects the votes cast. > > Each stage that the votes go through in the system, from vote > casting, through to the election result itself, can be > independently verified. > > All cast votes are included Voters themselves confirm that > their votes have been included in the tally, by checking their > receipts on the web bulletin board. > All included votes are correctly decrypted Checking that > the shuffling and decryption have been done properly can be > carried out by independent parties. The way the cryptography is > used means that as well as decrypting the votes, the system also > publishes mathematical proofs that the decrypted votes > correspond to the collection of votes that were included. These > proofs can be independently verified by anyone. > The decrypted votes are correctly counted Since the > decrypted votes are made public, anyone can independently carry > out the count and check the official result. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can > check that the counting has been done correctly. The integrity > of the election is ensured by these checks, and does not need to > rely on trust in the voting equipment or the election officials. > > > buona lettura > >

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by mutek

addeundum: sto notando che non è possibile scaricare l'articolo su ACM che comunque è disponibile qui: Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 14:45:00 CEST, mutek ha scritto: > Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 09:21:08 CEST, Fabio Pietrosanti - > lists ha scritto: >> Ciao a tutti, >> >> volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un paio d'anni fa >> sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto elettronico per >> l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per l'implementazione ed >> esecuzione. >> >> E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi limitato ma è stato un >> esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a qualcun'altro in > futuro: >> >> Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… >> >> Razionali di budget >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… >> > > con massimo rispetto questi due documenti non dicono molto ed > in particolare la parte numerica sintetica è di impossibile > accettazione da parte di qualsiasi scienziato ai fini del > proseguimento di questo tentativo. > > Pero trovo interessante aggiungere un elemento di valutazione > che potrebbe servire ad integrazione, in particolare per chi non > lo conoscesse c'è un ricercatore David Bismark che ha prodotto > un lavoro su un sistema di voto elettronico verificabile: > > Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system > http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1720427&CFID=594648987&CFTOKEN=72520885&p… > > riferimento usabile: > http://www.pretavoter.com/ > > una spiegazione pratica qui: > http://evoting.bismark.se/verifiable-electronic-voting/ > > un sommario veloce: > > Prêt à Voter is a voting system that provides verification of > the ballot. It allows voters to verify that their votes have > been included in the count while ensuring their vote remains > secret. It also assures the integrity of the election - that the > final result corresponds to the votes cast - and allows > independent verification of the count. Prêt à Voter provides > voters with a familiar voting experience, integrated with an > electronic system to process the votes and to provide the > security guarantees. The system supports elections involving > selection of a single candidate, selection of multiple > candidates, lists of preferences, and multiple races on a single > ballot. > Voting with Prêt à VoterA compted ballot > > Voters mark their selection on a paper ballot form in the usual > way against the candidates available. The key novelty is that > the candidates are listed in a random order, which varies from > ballot to ballot. > > When the vote has been written on the ballot paper, the > candidate list is detached and destroyed. The result is a marked > voting slip which indicates the position of the vote, but not > who it is for. The voting slip is read into the system, and a > receipt is returned to the voter. The receipt records the > position of the marked vote and the voter retains the receipt > for later confirmation of the vote. > > The right hand side of a ballotAfter the poll, the system > publishes on a public web bulletin board the receipts of all the > votes it has accepted. Any voter can confirm that their vote has > been included in the ballot, by looking up their receipt and > checking that their receipt matches what is published. This also > provides protection against fraud: if votes are not included, > then voters can use their receipts to challenge the process. > > The system works the same way if there are multiple votes or > preferences to be cast. > > How it works > > To be able to process the votes after they have been cast, the > voting slip includes a code (included as a 2-D bar code) > containing the candidate list in encrypted form. The encryption > means that the list cannot be extracted without a threshold > number of decryption keys, and each of these keys is held by a > different trusted party within the system. > > A ballot form can be randomly audited and its code decrypted to > confirm that the candidate list has been printed correctly. > > Once the votes have been cast, the system shuffles them > together and decrypts them using the decryption keys to identify > the choices indicated on the marked voting slips. The votes can > then be tallied to obtain the election result. > > The shuffling of all the votes means that no individual voting > slip or receipt can be linked to any particular reconstructed > vote. This protects the secrecy of the vote even with the > receipt. > > As well as publishing the accepted voting slips, the bulletin > board also lists all of the decrypted votes. The shuffling and > decryption is done in a verifiable way: independent parties can > confirm that the published list of decrypted votes corresponds > to the published list of received voting slips. This means that > the votes to be counted are exactly the votes that were cast. > However, independent parties cannot link any particular voting > slip to any particular vote. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can > check that the counting has been done correctly. > > Secret Ballot > > The system provides the same level of ballot secrecy as systems > currently in real use. Even though a receipt is provided, it > does not leak any information about the voter's choice of > candidate. > > The marked position on the receipt does not leak > information The receipt only contains the marked position of the > vote, and not who the vote was for. The fact that the list of > candidates was random means that the marked position could > correspond to any choice, and so the chosen candidate cannot be > identified from the position of the vote cast. > The encrypted candidate order does not leak Although the > candidate order is included on the ballot slip to allow the vote > to be reconstructed, this is strongly encrypted, and cannot be > decrypted without all of the decryption keys. These are > distributed to trusted parties across the election system, and > no-one has more than one key. > The bulletin board does not leak information The shuffling > of the votes before decryption ensures that the receipt cannot > be associated with its decrypted version. An external party only > knows that the receipt corresponds to some decrypted vote on the > list, but cannot know which. > > These measures together ensure that the vote associated with a > receipt cannot leak. The system provides ballot secrecy. > > Integrity: end-to-end verifiability > > The Prêt à Voter system provides transparent assurance that the > final result reflects the votes cast. > > Each stage that the votes go through in the system, from vote > casting, through to the election result itself, can be > independently verified. > > All cast votes are included Voters themselves confirm that > their votes have been included in the tally, by checking their > receipts on the web bulletin board. > All included votes are correctly decrypted Checking that > the shuffling and decryption have been done properly can be > carried out by independent parties. The way the cryptography is > used means that as well as decrypting the votes, the system also > publishes mathematical proofs that the decrypted votes > correspond to the collection of votes that were included. These > proofs can be independently verified by anyone. > The decrypted votes are correctly counted Since the > decrypted votes are made public, anyone can independently carry > out the count and check the official result. > > Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can > check that the counting has been done correctly. The integrity > of the election is ensured by these checks, and does not need to > rely on trust in the voting equipment or the election officials. > > > buona lettura > >

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by mutek

Il martedì 4 novembre 2014 09:21:08 CEST, Fabio Pietrosanti - lists ha scritto: > Ciao a tutti, > > volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un paio d'anni fa > sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto elettronico per > l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per l'implementazione ed > esecuzione. > > E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi limitato ma è stato un > esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a qualcun'altro in futuro: > > Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… > > Razionali di budget > https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… > con massimo rispetto questi due documenti non dicono molto ed in particolare la parte numerica sintetica è di impossibile accettazione da parte di qualsiasi scienziato ai fini del proseguimento di questo tentativo. Pero trovo interessante aggiungere un elemento di valutazione che potrebbe servire ad integrazione, in particolare per chi non lo conoscesse c'è un ricercatore David Bismark che ha prodotto un lavoro su un sistema di voto elettronico verificabile: Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1720427&CFID=594648987&CFTOKEN=72520885&p… riferimento usabile: http://www.pretavoter.com/ una spiegazione pratica qui: http://evoting.bismark.se/verifiable-electronic-voting/ un sommario veloce: Prêt à Voter is a voting system that provides verification of the ballot. It allows voters to verify that their votes have been included in the count while ensuring their vote remains secret. It also assures the integrity of the election - that the final result corresponds to the votes cast - and allows independent verification of the count. Prêt à Voter provides voters with a familiar voting experience, integrated with an electronic system to process the votes and to provide the security guarantees. The system supports elections involving selection of a single candidate, selection of multiple candidates, lists of preferences, and multiple races on a single ballot. Voting with Prêt à VoterA compted ballot Voters mark their selection on a paper ballot form in the usual way against the candidates available. The key novelty is that the candidates are listed in a random order, which varies from ballot to ballot. When the vote has been written on the ballot paper, the candidate list is detached and destroyed. The result is a marked voting slip which indicates the position of the vote, but not who it is for. The voting slip is read into the system, and a receipt is returned to the voter. The receipt records the position of the marked vote and the voter retains the receipt for later confirmation of the vote. The right hand side of a ballotAfter the poll, the system publishes on a public web bulletin board the receipts of all the votes it has accepted. Any voter can confirm that their vote has been included in the ballot, by looking up their receipt and checking that their receipt matches what is published. This also provides protection against fraud: if votes are not included, then voters can use their receipts to challenge the process. The system works the same way if there are multiple votes or preferences to be cast. How it works To be able to process the votes after they have been cast, the voting slip includes a code (included as a 2-D bar code) containing the candidate list in encrypted form. The encryption means that the list cannot be extracted without a threshold number of decryption keys, and each of these keys is held by a different trusted party within the system. A ballot form can be randomly audited and its code decrypted to confirm that the candidate list has been printed correctly. Once the votes have been cast, the system shuffles them together and decrypts them using the decryption keys to identify the choices indicated on the marked voting slips. The votes can then be tallied to obtain the election result. The shuffling of all the votes means that no individual voting slip or receipt can be linked to any particular reconstructed vote. This protects the secrecy of the vote even with the receipt. As well as publishing the accepted voting slips, the bulletin board also lists all of the decrypted votes. The shuffling and decryption is done in a verifiable way: independent parties can confirm that the published list of decrypted votes corresponds to the published list of received voting slips. This means that the votes to be counted are exactly the votes that were cast. However, independent parties cannot link any particular voting slip to any particular vote. Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can check that the counting has been done correctly. Secret Ballot The system provides the same level of ballot secrecy as systems currently in real use. Even though a receipt is provided, it does not leak any information about the voter's choice of candidate. The marked position on the receipt does not leak information The receipt only contains the marked position of the vote, and not who the vote was for. The fact that the list of candidates was random means that the marked position could correspond to any choice, and so the chosen candidate cannot be identified from the position of the vote cast. The encrypted candidate order does not leak Although the candidate order is included on the ballot slip to allow the vote to be reconstructed, this is strongly encrypted, and cannot be decrypted without all of the decryption keys. These are distributed to trusted parties across the election system, and no-one has more than one key. The bulletin board does not leak information The shuffling of the votes before decryption ensures that the receipt cannot be associated with its decrypted version. An external party only knows that the receipt corresponds to some decrypted vote on the list, but cannot know which. These measures together ensure that the vote associated with a receipt cannot leak. The system provides ballot secrecy. Integrity: end-to-end verifiability The Prêt à Voter system provides transparent assurance that the final result reflects the votes cast. Each stage that the votes go through in the system, from vote casting, through to the election result itself, can be independently verified. All cast votes are included Voters themselves confirm that their votes have been included in the tally, by checking their receipts on the web bulletin board. All included votes are correctly decrypted Checking that the shuffling and decryption have been done properly can be carried out by independent parties. The way the cryptography is used means that as well as decrypting the votes, the system also publishes mathematical proofs that the decrypted votes correspond to the collection of votes that were included. These proofs can be independently verified by anyone. The decrypted votes are correctly counted Since the decrypted votes are made public, anyone can independently carry out the count and check the official result. Once all the reconstructed votes are published, then anyone can check that the counting has been done correctly. The integrity of the election is ensured by these checks, and does not need to rely on trust in the voting equipment or the election officials. buona lettura

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by M. Fioretti

On 2014-11-04 09:21, Fabio Pietrosanti - lists wrote: > Ciao a tutti, > > volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un paio d'anni fa > sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto elettronico per > l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per l'implementazione ed > esecuzione. > > E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi limitato ma è stato un > esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a qualcun'altro in > futuro: > > Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… Cito dal documento: ############################################################################## E’ fondamentale sottolineare come le operazioni di voto e scrutinio debbano continuare ad essere eseguibili e verificabili senza l’ausilio di alcuna tipologia di strumento tecnologico o competenza particolare. Le operazioni di voto, cioè la primaria modalità con cui il cittadino esprime la propria intenzione, non possono essere gestite per tramite di macchinari di votazione elettronici ma devono rimanere basate sull’utilizzo di carta e penna. Le operazioni di scrutinio possono essere coadiuvate dalla tecnologia (scansione ottica digitale) per aumentarne l’efficienza ma deve essere sempre mantenuta la possibilità di verifica manuale, da parte di cittadini privi di strumenti o competenze particolari. Si dovrà valutare l’adozione di soluzioni di verifica che consentono al cittadino di verificare in modo sicuro e segreto l’esito dello scrutinio del proprio voto tramite internet. [8] ############################################################################## Il mio commento: BENE, grazie! Concordo pienamente su voto che deve rimanere con carta e penna e scrutinio manuale o quasi. Finalmente un discorso serio, basato sulla realtà. Però, proprio per questo: il titolo di quel documento fa danno al suo contenuto, che non se lo merita! Chiamarlo "votazioni elettroniche" lo accomuna a tutta la fuffa di voto effettivamente con computer, in seggio o da casa, di cui invece il documento stesso dimostra i limiti. Il titolo giusto secondo me dovrebbe essere "Gestione digitale dei risultati del voto" o qualcosa del genere a parte questo, mi sembra che l'ultima frase "soluzioni di verifica che consentono al cittadino di verificare" sia in contraddizione insanabile con la concretezza del resto del documento. Come aggiungere una funzione del genere senza compromettere la segretezza del voto? "Permettere di verificare il proprio voto da casa" a gente che nell'80% dei casi ancora usa "123456" come password, ha modem e pc non aggiornati eccetera... mi sembra condizione necessaria e SUFFICIENTE per ritrovarsi con N malware, impossibili da fermare in tempo utile, che comunicano a chi li diffonde come hanno votato tutti quelli che se li sono beccati. Per la cronaca, queste mie considerazioni vengono dalle mie posizioni generali sul voto elettronico che ho riassunto qui: http://stop.zona-m.net/it/2014/06/voto-online-o-elettronico-ancora-no-grazi… http://www.pionero.it/2013/02/25/voto-elettronico-o-elezioni-digitali-la-se… Marco -- http://mfioretti.com

Nov. 4, 2014

Re: [nexa] Sistemi di voto elettronico

by Alessandro Mantelero

Ciao Fabio, A prima lettura mi pare un buon punto di partenza, soprattutto perché si fa carico del problema della verifica democratica del foto. Per esperienza in gruppi di ricerca sul tema, solitamente i tecnici si entusiasmano per il voto elettronico e trascurano la parte delle garanzie democratiche. Tra i casi di studio aggiungerei l'Estonia, con i limiti emersi. A presto, A. On Tue, 04 Nov 2014 09:21:08 +0100 Fabio Pietrosanti - lists <lists(a)infosecurity.ch> wrote: > Ciao a tutti, > > volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un >paio d'anni fa > sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto >elettronico per > l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per >l'implementazione ed > esecuzione. > > E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi >limitato ma è stato un > esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a >qualcun'altro in futuro: > > Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… > > Razionali di budget > https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… > > -- >Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) > HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human >Rights > http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - >http://tor2web.org - http://ahmia.fi > > _______________________________________________ > nexa mailing list > nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa -- Avv. Alessandro Mantelero, PhD Aggregate Professor, Politecnico di Torino Director of Privacy and Faculty Fellow, Nexa Center for Internet and Society Research Consultant, Sino-Italian Research Center for Internet Torts at Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology Programme Coordinator, Double Degree program in Management and IP Law, Politecnico di TorinoTongji University of Shanghai http://staff.polito.it/alessandro.mantelero http://works.bepress.com/alessandro_mantelero/ Politecnico di Torino Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 10129 Torino - Italy in libertate fortitudo

Nov. 4, 2014

Sistemi di voto elettronico

by Fabio Pietrosanti - lists

Ciao a tutti, volevo condividere un piccolo esercizio che realizzai un paio d'anni fa sull'analisi ed elaborazione di un sistema di voto elettronico per l'italia, inclusivo di una stima di budget per l'implementazione ed esecuzione. E' frutto di un paio di giorni di lavoro, quindi limitato ma è stato un esercizio stimolante che magari può essere utile a qualcun'altro in futuro: Innovazione ed efficienza del sistemi di voto https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xutcvqEwe2tvcUhTh7eSEyf3_CS_sv4-saC8RlK… Razionali di budget https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ak268BK3W4GVdGUyMXhsNjhBdDVTN1… -- Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org - http://ahmia.fi

Nov. 4, 2014

Berkman Center Webcast live oggi ore 18 - Privacy, Surveillance, and Rebuilding Trust in Tech

by Giuseppe Futia

Privacy, Surveillance, and Rebuilding Trust in Tech http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/11/Smith <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/06/sigal> <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/06/sigal> *A Conversation with Microsoft GC Brad Smith and Professor Jonathan Zittrain* Today, 6.00 pm Webcast live: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interactive/webcast http://nexa.polito.it/berkman-webcast-live One of the enduring issues in cyberspace is which laws apply to online activities. We see this most clearly today in the reaction to revelations about government surveillance: on one hand, individuals are increasingly seeking assurances that their content is protected from government overreach, while governments want to ensure they have access to information to enforce their laws, even if that content is stored outside their borders. We see this same tension in debates over privacy protection for data placed on line by consumers. This discussion will explore the role of law in protecting our rights in the physical world online, the complementary roles of law and technology in achieving this protection, and the need for governments to come together so that companies (and customers) don't face conflicting legal obligations. About Brad Brad Smith is Microsoft's general counsel and executive vice president of Legal and Corporate Affairs. He leads approximately 1,100 legal, business and corporate affairs professionals spanning 55 countries and is responsible for the company's legal work, its intellectual property portfolio, patent licensing business, and the company's government affairs, public policy, corporate citizenship and philanthropic work. He also serves as Microsoft's corporate secretary and its chief compliance officer. Brad joined Microsoft in 1993, and before becoming general counsel in 2002 he spent three years leading the LCA team in Europe, then five years serving as the deputy general counsel responsible for LCA's teams outside the United States. About Jonathan Jonathan Zittrain is the George Bemis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Professor of Computer Science at the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Vice Dean for Library and Information Resources at the Harvard Law School Library, and co-founder of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. His research interests include battles for control of digital property and content, cryptography, electronic privacy, the roles of intermediaries within Internet architecture, human computing, and the useful and unobtrusive deployment of technology in education. He performed the first large-scale tests of Internet filtering in China and Saudi Arabia, and as part of the OpenNet Initiative co-edited a series of studies of Internet filtering by national governments: /Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering/; /Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace/; and /Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace/. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Board of Advisors for /Scientific American/. He has served as a Trustee of the Internet Society and as a Forum Fellow of the World Economic Forum, which named him a Young Global Leader. He was a Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at the Federal Communications Commission, and previously chaired the FCC's Open Internet Advisory Committee. His book /The Future of the Internet -- And How to Stop It/ predicted the end of general purpose client computing and the corresponding rise of new gatekeepers. That and other works may be found at <http://www.jz.org>.

Nov. 4, 2014