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Jurix 2018 (proceedings)
by Ugo Pagallo Dec. 11, 2018

Dec. 11, 2018

Per chi fosse interessato, trova qui http://ebooks.iospress.nl/ISBN/978-1-61499-935-5 il link al PDF di Jurix 2018 http://jurix2018.ai.rug.nl/index.html#home Nel volume, insieme a Eleonora Bassi, Massimo Durante e Marco Crepaldi, mi sono occupato di uno dei temi discussi in lista ultimamente, ossia blockchain e il diritto alla cancellazione dei dati ex Art. 17 GDPR. Cheers, u.p.

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Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret - The New York Times
by J.C. DE MARTIN Dec. 11, 2018

Dec. 11, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-priva… Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They’re Not Keeping It Secret Dozens of companies use smartphone locations to help advertisers and even hedge funds. They say it’s anonymous, but the data shows how personal it is. (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Re: [nexa] Australia passes new law to thwart strong encryption
by Giacomo Tesio Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

Ulteriore effetto interessante: Atlassian ha sede a Syndey e BitBucket (maggior competitor di GitHub recentemente acquistato da Microsoft) è un prodotto di Atlassian. Diventa ancora più importante, per chiunque utilizzi BitBucket, firmare crittograficamente le commit per evitare che vengano manomesse. E probabilmente dovremmo pensare nuovi metodi per garantire che il primo scaricamento dei sorgenti non sia vulnerabile a manomissioni. Giacomo On Sun, 9 Dec 2018 at 13:38, Giacomo <giacomo(a)tesio.it> wrote: > > Il December 7, 2018 12:10:01 PM UTC, Alberto Cammozzo <ac+nexa(a)zeromx.net> ha scritto: > ><https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/12/australia-passes-new-law-to-thw…> > > > >On Thursday, the Australian parliament approved a measure that critics > >say will weaken encryption in favor of law enforcement and the demands > >of government. > > > >The new law, which has been pushed for since at least 2017, requires > >that companies provide a way to get at encrypted communications and > >data > >via a warrant process. It also imposes fines of up to A$10 million for > >companies that do not comply and A$50,000 for individuals who do not > >comply. In short, the law thwarts (or at least tries to thwart) strong > >encryption. > > > >Companies who receive one of these warrants have the option of either > >complying with the government or waiting for a court order. However, by > >default, the orders are secret, so companies would not be able to tell > >the public that they had received one. > > > >"It's a big deal," Adam Molnar, a lecturer in criminology at Deakin > >University in Australia, told Ars. > > > >However, the law as currently written seems to contain what some view > >as > >a loophole. The statute says that companies cannot be compelled to > >introduce a "systemic weakness" or a "systemic vulnerability" into > >their > >software or hardware to satisfy government demands. > > > >Those terms are not fully defined in the current law but are set to be > >added in the forthcoming amendments. > > > >Molnar pointed out that the new law not only implicates his home > >country > >but also the other four members of the so-called "Five Eyes" of > >English-speaking nations, which include New Zealand, Canada, the United > >Kingdom, and the United States. > > > >The US government (particularly the FBI and Department of Justice) has > >long complained of the "going dark" problem, but it has not managed to > >get any adequate federal legislation to address the issue since the > >failed "Clipper Chip" of the 1990s. > > > >Australian authorities are already known to cooperate with American law > >enforcement, notably as part of the investigations into the "Love Zone" > >child-porn website. > > > >"The Government is responding to the impediment that the increasing > >prevalence of encrypted data and communications represents to available > >investigative and interception capabilities," the Australian parliament > >wrote in its Bill Digest. > > > >"The Bill contains measures aimed at facilitating lawful access to > >communications and data through two avenues—decryption of encrypted > >technologies and access to communications and data at points where they > >are not encrypted." > > > >[...] > >_______________________________________________ > >nexa mailing list > >nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > >https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa > > Questa legge potrebbe avere interessanti effetti collaterali sul software libero. > > Anzitutto la possibilità di ispezionare il sorgente e compilarlo diventa più importante. > > D'altro canto sarà necessario porre maggiore attenzione al software libero guidato da team australiani, che potrebbero essere costretti ad introdurre vulnerabilità. > > Quanto ai contributi australiani a software libero internazionale, sarà necessario porre maggiore attenzione durante la revisione delle patch. Tale attenzione potrebbe però rendere i contributi australiani più sicuri degli altri. > > > Giacomo

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Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Humans | Pew Research Center
by J.C. DE MARTIN Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/12/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-futur… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Grindr Is Letting Other Companies See User HIV Status And Location Data
by Luigi Scorca Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

A data analysis conducted by an outside research firm, and independently verified by BuzzFeed News, shows that a popular gay dating app is sharing its users’ HIV status with two other companies. *(Update: Late on Monday Grindr said it would stop sharing this information.)* https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/azeenghorayshi/grindr-hiv-status-priva…

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Facebook Censors at Random
by Alberto Cammozzo Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

Ammesso che FB sia ancora una piattaforma rilevante a maggio 2019 per le elezioni Europee, la censura (o assenza di essa) avrà un ruolo importante. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-censors-at-random-1544395970> Facebook Censors at Random The social network’s rules on political advertising burden nonprofits and are impossible to understand. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-censors-at-random-1544395970#comments…> ByDaniel Gallant Dec. 9, 2018 5:52 p.m. ET If you used Facebook <https://quotes.wsj.com/FB> in late November, you probably saw a stream of fundraising campaigns for charities and cultural organizations. That’s because Facebook offered up to $7 million in matching donations for nonprofits that used its platform to raise funds on Giving Tuesday. But this gesture masks the negative impact Facebook’s newly adopted advertising policies have had on nonprofit organizations that rely on social media. In response to public scrutiny stemming from the Cambridge Analytica scandal this year, Facebook has implemented enforcement measures aimed at improving election security and discouraging anonymous political messages. These measures have been poorly executed and inconsistently applied. They unfairly burden charitable organizations and small businesses, yet are easy for organized or well-funded actors to circumvent. Several paid advertising campaigns run by my colleagues and clients have been inexplicably obstructed by Facebook’s policing in the past several months. Facebook refused to allow my New York cultural nonprofit, the Nuyorican Poets Cafe, to pay to promote a post encouraging people to vote in the midterms because our page was not “authorized to run ads related to politics.” A campaign promoting a lecture about sculpture at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts was blocked because Facebook’s censors mistakenly believed it was intended to influence an election in Ireland. Similarly, Arts Japan 2020, an entity that highlights Japan-related cultural programs in the U.S., was unable to promote a post celebrating an award given by the emperor of Japan to an American arts curator. Facebook claimed the topic was of “national importance.” These harmless posts remain on Facebook in unpromoted form, but unpromoted content has a limited reach. The problem is widespread. The Atlantic reported on Nov. 2 that Facebook’s election-security policies have caused it to block advertising campaigns from organizations including community centers, national parks and charities that serve wounded veterans. Representatives of charities are often reluctant to register as political advertisers on Facebook because of privacy concerns. Facebook requires users to disclose significant personal information before promoting posts about politics or national issues. To be authorized to run such advertisements on behalf of my nonprofit organization, I would have to send Facebook my residential address, my Social Security number, and a photo of myself holding my passport or driver’s license. I’m loath to entrust any entity with all of that sensitive information—especially Facebook, which could use its facial-recognition software to match my personal information with photos of me that might appear online. But suppose I did submit those items and was therefore allowed to promote political content. If I subsequently broke the rules, Facebook wouldn’t necessarily hold the nonprofit I represent responsible. Under Facebook’s policies, the person who operates an ad account is accountable for any ads placed by that account. The only real protection Facebook’s identification requirements might provide is a guarantee that Facebook users can determine the true identity of the marketer responsible for a political advertisement. Or can they? A well-resourced advertiser with nefarious intent could simply hire a patsy (or use fake credentials) to pass Facebook’s screening process and establish a nominal presence at an American address. As several reporters have recently discovered, Facebook allows many advertisers who pass its invasive screening process to run political ads under any identity they choose. A recent Vice article describes how Facebook approved political ads by reporters who pretended to be 100 different senators. And Business Insider was able to post political Facebook ads that purported to be from Cambridge Analytica. In the name of election security, Facebook has implemented an opaque and shape-shifting definition of “issues of national importance” and an intrusive vetting process that is poorly enforced. These don’t protect users or the American public. Unless Facebook offers more transparency and accountability, determined marketers will remain able to circumvent the process. And despite benevolent gestures on Giving Tuesday, nonprofits and small businesses will continue to suffer under Facebook’s arbitrary restrictions.

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How to Stop Apps From Tracking Your Location
by gianlucaquaglia＠gmail.com Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

How to Stop Apps From Tracking Your Location Hundreds of apps can follow your movements and share the details with advertisers, retailers and even hedge funds. Here’s how to limit the snooping. By Jennifer Valentino-DeVries and Natasha Singer Dec. 10, 2018 At least 75 companies receive people’s precise location data from hundreds of apps whose users enable location services for benefits such as weather alerts, The New York Times found. The companies use, store or sell the information to help advertisers, investment firms and others. You can head off much of the tracking on your own device by spending a few minutes changing settings. The information below applies primarily to people in the United States. [..] by now.. continua qui https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/technology/prevent-location-data-sharing…

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114° Mercoledì di Nexa | 12 dicembre 2018
by Nexa Media Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

Nexa Center for Internet and Society Newsletter Se non visualizzi correttamente questo messaggio clicca qui <http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi-114> NEXA 114° Mercoledì di Nexa Mercoledì 12 dicembre 2018, ore 18.00 - 20.00 Politecnico di Torino http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi-114 Alienazione e rivoluzione (digitale) Speaker Enrico Donaggio (Università degli Studi di Torino) This event will be webcast live: http://nexa.polito.it/upcoming-events Il concetto di "alienazione" è forse il più famoso tra quelli inventati da Karl Marx. Lo scopo in fondo era semplice: *criticare l'idea che nella società capitalistica il lavoro nobiliti l'uomo e lo renda libero*. La verità per il "giovane Marx" - l'autore dei Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844, il libro di culto di un sacco di eretici - era semmai il contrario: il lavoro capitalistico disumanizza e schiavizza sempre più chi lo compie, riducendolo inesorabilmente a merce tra le merci. Dopo essere stato di moda nella seconda metà del Novecento, il concetto di alienazione è finito - insieme a un sacco di orrori e speranze - in una fossa comune ai piedi del muro di Berlino. Negli ultimi anni diversi teorici sociali hanno deciso di riesumarlo per descrivere la condizione contemporanea. A loro avviso, debitamente rivisitato e corretto, un concetto creato per descrivere*quel che accadeva in una fabbrica dell'Ottocento può descrivere il modo oggi più diffuso di stare al mondo* tra i membri della tribù occidentale: a testa bassa, con uno smartphone tra le mani. BIOGRAFIE - e informazioni supplementari [DONAGGIO] *Enrico DONAGGIO * insegna Filosofia della storia all'Università di Torino ed è Fellow del Centro Nexa. Di recente ha scritto:/Direi di no. Desideri di migliori libertà/ (Feltrinelli 2016) e ha tradotto e curato: /K. Marx - F. Engels, Manifesto del partito comunista /(Feltrinelli 2017) e /K. Marx, Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844 /(Feltrinelli 2018). *Letture consigliate e link utili:* * K. Marx, /Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844/, Feltrinelli, 2018. * S. Haber,/La reinvenzione dell’alienazione nell’epoca della rivoluzione digitale / <http://www.consecutio.org/2014/12/la-reinvenzione-dellalienazione-nellepoca…>, in "Consecutio temporum". * R. Jaeggi, /Alienazione/, Castelvecchi, 2017. * H. Rosa, /Accelerazione e alienazione. Per una teoria critica nella tarda modernità/, Einaudi, 2015. Che cosa sono il Centro Nexa e i cicli di incontri “Mercoledì di Nexa” e “Nexa Lunch Seminar” #mercoledì114 <https://twitter.com/search?f=tweets&q=%23mercoled%C3%AC114&src=typd> #RivoluzDigitale <https://twitter.com/hashtag/RivoluzDigitale?src=hash> #nexawednesday <https://twitter.com/search?q=%23nexawednesday&src=typd> Il Centro Nexa su Internet & Società del Politecnico di Torino (Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica) è un centro di ricerca indipendente e interdisciplinare che studia Internet e il suo effetto sulla società. Maggiori informazioni all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/about. Durante i “*Mercoledì di Nexa*”, che si tengono *ogni 2° mercoledì del mese* alle *ore 18 in punto*, il Centro Nexa su Internet e Società apre le sue porte non solo agli esperti e a tutti coloro i quali lavorano con Internet, ma anche a semplici appassionati e cittadini. Il ciclo di incontri intende approfondire, con un linguaggio preciso ma divulgativo, i temi legati alla Rete: motori di ricerca, Creative Commons, social networks, open source/software libero, neutralità della rete, libertà di espressione, privacy, file sharing, big e open data, smart cities e molto altro. Al centro di quasi tutti gli incontri un ospite pronto a dialogare con i direttori del Centro Nexa, il Prof. Juan Carlos De Martin del Politecnico di Torino e il Prof. Marco Ricolfi dell'Università di Torino, nonché lo staff e i Fellows del Centro Nexa. Maggiori informazioni sui Mercoledì di Nexa, incluso un elenco di tutti i “Mercoledì” passati, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi. Si segnala inoltre che dal maggio 2012 *ogni 4° mercoledì* del mese *dalle ore 13 alle ore 14* il Centro Nexa organizza anche i "*Nexa Lunch Seminar*". Una lista di tutti i “Lunch Seminar” passati è disponibile all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-seminars. See our events calendar <http://nexa.polito.it/events> if you're curious about future luncheons, discussions, lectures, and conferences not listed in this email. Our events are free and open to the public, unless otherwise noted. Responsabile Comunicazione Centro Nexa su Internet & Società: *Francesco Ruggiero*, tel: +39 011 090 7219, Mob: +39 349 1335082, francesco.ruggiero(a)polito.it <mailto:francesco.ruggiero@polito.it>. Maggiori informazioni sui Mercoledì di Nexa e i Nexa Lunch Seminar, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/events. Weekly Events Newsletter. Sign up <http://nexa.polito.it/mailing-lists> to receive this newsletter if this email was forwarded to you. To manage your subscription preferences, please click here <https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa>. Connect & get involved: Jobs, internships, and more <http://nexa.polito.it/get-involved>.

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Australia passes new law to thwart strong encryption
by Alberto Cammozzo Dec. 10, 2018

Dec. 10, 2018

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/12/australia-passes-new-law-to-thw…> On Thursday, the Australian parliament approved a measure that critics say will weaken encryption in favor of law enforcement and the demands of government. The new law, which has been pushed for since at least 2017, requires that companies provide a way to get at encrypted communications and data via a warrant process. It also imposes fines of up to A$10 million for companies that do not comply and A$50,000 for individuals who do not comply. In short, the law thwarts (or at least tries to thwart) strong encryption. Companies who receive one of these warrants have the option of either complying with the government or waiting for a court order. However, by default, the orders are secret, so companies would not be able to tell the public that they had received one. "It's a big deal," Adam Molnar, a lecturer in criminology at Deakin University in Australia, told Ars. However, the law as currently written seems to contain what some view as a loophole. The statute says that companies cannot be compelled to introduce a "systemic weakness" or a "systemic vulnerability" into their software or hardware to satisfy government demands. Those terms are not fully defined in the current law but are set to be added in the forthcoming amendments. Molnar pointed out that the new law not only implicates his home country but also the other four members of the so-called "Five Eyes" of English-speaking nations, which include New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The US government (particularly the FBI and Department of Justice) has long complained of the "going dark" problem, but it has not managed to get any adequate federal legislation to address the issue since the failed "Clipper Chip" of the 1990s. Australian authorities are already known to cooperate with American law enforcement, notably as part of the investigations into the "Love Zone" child-porn website. "The Government is responding to the impediment that the increasing prevalence of encrypted data and communications represents to available investigative and interception capabilities," the Australian parliament wrote in its Bill Digest. "The Bill contains measures aimed at facilitating lawful access to communications and data through two avenues—decryption of encrypted technologies and access to communications and data at points where they are not encrypted." [...]

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Risposta del Garante su quesito su "GDPR - Blockchain"
by Aldo Pedico Dec. 9, 2018

Dec. 9, 2018

Ciao a tutti. Mi hanno telefonato dall’ufficio delle relazioni col pubblico del Garante, in risposta al messaggio che ho inviato ieri pomeriggio, e di seguito riportato. La risposta in sintesi è stata: l’Autorità mi fornirà un chiarimento scritto dopo aver superato l’attuale situazione di eccessivo carico di richieste di segnalazioni, nel frattempo rimane attendibile l’azione del CNIL ovvero quella di riconoscere come “cancellazione” l’azione di cifratura dei dati all’interno delle transazioni blockchain. Quindi, se la cancellazione fisica non è possibile, rimane valida la cancellazione logica. Aldo Da: Aldo Pedico Inviato: mercoledì 21 novembre 2018 15:16 A: 'garante(a)gpdp.it' <garante(a)gpdp.it<mailto:garante@gpdp.it>> Oggetto: quesito su "GDPR - Blockchain" Spettabile Autorità, per esigenze di studio professionali, sto affrontando l’argomento della protezione dei dati personali all’interno della rete blockchain. In particolare, sto esaminando gli aspetti tecnici e organizzativi inerenti il diritto alla rettifica ed alla cancellazione dei dati personali, richiamati dagli articoli 16 e 17 del Reg. (UE) 2016/679, all’interno della rete blockchain. A causa della distribuzione dei log in server fisici nella rete, blockchain pone grosse difficoltà organizzative e tecniche, e di conseguenza anche costi elevati, per rettificare o cancellare i dati all’interno delle transazioni, non escludendo l’ipotesi che tali azioni non siano fattibili. Ora, CNIL suggerisce: “In questo contesto, CNIL riconosce che alcune tecniche di crittografia, associate alla distruzione delle chiavi, possono essere considerate come una cancellazione anche se non è una cancellazione nel senso più stretto”. Tale suggerimento è descritto nel documento “Blockchain Observatory and Forum - Blockchain e GDPR”, capitolo “Blockchain e diritti e obblighi del GDPR”, nel punto “2. Minimizzazione dei dati e diritto di cancellazione e rettifica”. Domanda: è possibile considerare rettifica o cancellazione dei dati personali quanto suggerito da CNIL ? In attesa di un suo gentile riscontro, Le porgo i migliori saluti. Grazie Aldo Pedico Consultant for GDPR (UE) 2016/679 TELEION S.r.l. Mobile +39.3482244924 a.pedico(a)teleion.it<mailto:a.pedico@teleion.it> TELEION s.r.l. Via Ferrero 31 – 10098 Rivoli (TO) www.teleion.it<http://www.teleion.it/>

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