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Call for clear rejection plans to break secure online encryption by EU governments.
by Giacomo Tesio Nov. 12, 2020

Nov. 12, 2020

On Monday the Austrian National Service Broadcaster (ORF) published a secret draft of a planned Council resolution seeking to undermine encryption. According to the resolution, messaging services such as Whatsapp are to allow governments to decrypt and intercept secure online communications. Pirates call on responsibility of representatives of the public services to uphold and protect the fundamental right to privacy as well as the security of our digital communications infrastructure. We also call on YOU, Internet users, to contact their governments in advance of tomorrow’s deadline (12:00) for input. https://european-pirateparty.eu/pirates-call-for-clear-rejection-plans-to-b… Per chi fosse interessato, qui la versione proposta dal Partito Pirata Europeo per i rappresentanti italiani, da inviare a rpue.rpue(a)esteri.it: https://publisher.pp-eu.eu/static/ViewerJS/#/tmp/assets/doc/Italian.pdf Giacomo In allegato una versione ODT per chi non si riconoscesse nel PP, ma condividesse la preoccupazione per le istanze emerse.

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bozza risoluzione consiglio EU: security despite encryption?
by Giovanni Biscuolo Nov. 12, 2020

Nov. 12, 2020

Buongiorno nexiane, scusate, sono prolisso oltre la mia media in questo messaggio, ma vorrei essere esaustivo. Insomma che intenzioni ha il consiglio europeo (e la commissione? e il parlamento?) in merito all'encryption E2E?!? Sono paranoie di qualcuno o si stanno preparando a smontare l'encryption E2E delle "piattaforme"? ... e del software in generale? Renderanno illegali i software di comunicazione decentralizzata con encryption E2E tipo Jami https://jami.net/ Delta.Chat https://delta.chat/it/ e simili? Perché ho letto tutto e seguo "da sempre" la cosa... e non capisco, anzi da quello che capisco mi preoccupo. Vogliono evitare che l'encryption E2E venga usata dai criminali senza che una autorità competente sia in grado di intercettare il contenuto: e quale sarebbe quindi il "balance" tra diritto alla riservatezza e lotta al crimine? Leggendo la bozza del consiglio, sostanzialmente il "balance" sarebbe quello di armonizzare il "legal framework" EU al fine di consentire alle autorità competenti di svolgere i propri compiti operativi (intercettazione) in modo efficace, OVVIAMENTE il tutto in modo legale, ça va sanse dire! Quindi?!? Le autorità competenti avranno accesso alle informazioni in chiaro perché c'è una backdoor nel software (e col software libero come la mettiamo?!?) o una "superchiave" in grado di decifrare tutto? Pare che le fonti ufficiali spergiurino non non pensare minimamente a un divieto della E2EE e nemmeno a una compromissione "stile backdoor"... ma allora cosa? Una "superchiave" iniettata ovunque? Un modesto suggerimento: che ne direste di smetterla di essere ossessionati dalla E2E encryption e di organizzarsi per *infiltrarsi* nelle organizzazioni criminali usando i loro stessi mezzi digitali, stando comodamente seduti alle scrivanie dei centri operativi delle autorità competenti? Ecco a cosa mi riferisco: In questo articolo del 9 Novembre scorso; https://stemcelllove.com/2020/11/eu-resolution-draft-seeks-to-bypass-encryp… «EU Resolution Draft Seeks to Bypass Encryption» viene fatto riferimento a un articolo https://fm4.orf.at/stories/3008930/ (in tedesco) dell'emittente radiofonica austriaca radioFM24, parte di ORF (radiotelevisione nazionale austriaca); ecco un estratto del succo del dicscorso che *farebbe* l'articolo di ORF: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- An Austrian news outlet reported that the Council of the European Union has nearly completed a resolution, “made ready within five days,” that would require applications such as WhatsApp and Signal to have a “master key” for monitoring end-to-end (E2E)-encrypted chats and messages. ORF.at claims to have received an internal document dated November, addressed from the German Presidency to the delegations of the member states in the Council. The alleged revised version of the Draft Council Resolution on Encryption argues that, while encryption is “a necessary means of protecting fundamental rights and the digital security of governments, industry and society,” which should be “promoted and developed,” the European Union also must “ensure the ability of competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice […] to exercise their lawful powers, both online and offline.” That said, an increasing number of communication channels, instant messaging apps, and other online platforms implementing E2E encryption has brought “great opportunities” and “considerable challenges” – namely “the potential for exploitation for criminal purposes,” stands in the draft. Therefore, law enforcement has to increasingly depend on access to individual electronic devices during their investigations of terrorism, organized crime, child sexual abuse, etc. However, sometimes doing this is “extremely challenging or practically impossible despite the fact that the access to such data would be lawful,” argues the draft. “Technical solutions for gaining access to encrypted data must comply with the principles of legality, transparency, necessity and proportionality,” it adds, inviting governments, industry, research and academia to work together on creating a balance. “There is a clear need to review the effects arising from different regulatory frameworks in order to develop further a consistent regulatory framework across the EU that would allow competent authorities to carry out their operational tasks effectively.” The document makes no mention of either a master key or a ban. ORF.at stated that the topic will be discussed between the French President Emmanuel Macron and the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in a video conference at the beginning of the week, claiming that the resolution “has already been voted on in the Council,” and “has already been agreed to such an extent that it can be passed in the video conference of the interior and justice ministers at the beginning of December without further discussion.” What we know from the document is that, if there are no further objections or comments, this resolution will be adopted in the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) on November 19, and submitted to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (COREPER) six days later, “followed by adoption by the Council via written procedure.” ORF.at, however, argued that the decision will be made in a virtual meeting at the beginning of December, after which the Council will draw up a draft regulation and put it through the usual procedure by the European Parliament, though it might be possible “to implement the planned regulation in its core even without the involvement of the Parliament,” as has already happened in connection with surveillance, claimed the article. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Il documento trafugato è stato pubblicato qui: https://files.orf.at/vietnam2/files/fm4/202045/783284_fh_st12143-re01en20_7… (vietnam2?!?!? interessante sottocartella :-O ) Ecco il testo, trasportato dal PDF: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Brussels, 6 November 2020 (OR. en) 12143/1/20 REV 1 NOTE From: Presidency To: Delegations Subject: Draft Council Resolution on Encryption - Security through encryption and security despite encryption Delegations will find in attachment the revised version [1] of the Draft Council Resolution on Encryption. It reflects the comments received from the Member States before and during the informal VTC meeting of JHA Counsellors (Encryption) on 3 November 2020. Unless delegations send in further substantive comments, accompanied by concrete wording suggestions, by 12 November 2020 noon, to [OMISSIS, ndr], the Presidency intends to present this revised text for endorsement to COSI (VTC) on 19 November 2020, in view of further submission to COREPER (I-item) on 25 November 2020, followed by adoption by the Council via written procedure. Please be advised that the form of the document has been adjusted to a "Council resolution", so that the text could be processed for adoption via a written procedure by the Council in case it takes place in a VTC format. [1] Changes compared to the previous version are marked in *bold* and /strikethrough/ 1. Preamble: Security through encryption and security despite encryption The European Union fully supports the development, implementation and use of strong encryption. Encryption is a necessary means of protecting fundamental rights and the digital security of governments, industry and society. At the same time, the European Union needs to ensure the ability of *competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice, e.g.* law enforcement and judicial authorities, to exercise their lawful powers, both online and offline. According to the European Council conclusions of 1-2 October 2020 (EUCO 13/20), the EU will leverage its tools and regulatory powers to help shape global rules and standards. It was agreed that funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility would be used to advance objectives such as enhancing the EUʼs ability to protect itself against cyber threats, to provide for a secure communication environment, especially through quantum encryption, and to ensure access to data for judicial and law enforcement purposes. 2. Current use/state of encryption In today’s world, encryption technology is increasingly used in all areas of public and private life. It is a means to protect governments, *critical infrastructures*, civil society, citizens and industry by ensuring the privacy, *confidentiality* and *data integrity* of communications and personal data: it is evident that all parties benefit from high-performance encryption technology. Encryption has been identified by EU data protection authorities as an important tool contributing for instance to the protection of personal data transferred outside the EU *but subject to the requirement of an essentially equivalent level of protection*, which according to the Court of Justice is a legal requirement for data transfers [2]. Not only are electronic devices and applications increasingly programmed to encrypt stored user data by default, but more and more communication channels are also secured by end-to-end (E2E) encryption. This is positively reflected in an increasing response by the communication and application industry, where the majority of instant messaging apps and other online platforms have also implemented end-to-end encryption. [2] Judgment of 16 July 2020 in Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximillian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559: 3. Challenges for ensuring public *security* "Digital life’" and cyberspace not only present great opportunities, but also considerable challenges: the digitalisation of modern societies brings with it certain vulnerabilities and the potential for *exploitation for criminal purposes*. Thus criminals can include readily available, off-the-shelf encryption solutions designed for legitimate purposes in their modi operandi [3]. At the same time law enforcement is increasingly dependent on access to electronic evidence to effectively fight terrorism, organised crime, child sexual abuse (particularly its online aspects), as well as a variety of cyber-enabled crimes. *For competent authorities, access to electronic evidence is not only essential to conduct successful investigations and thereby* bring criminals to justice*, but also to protect victims and help ensure security*. However, there are instances where encryption renders analysis of the content of communications in the framework of access to electronic evidence extremely challenging *or practically impossible despite the fact that the access to such data would be lawful*. Independently of the technological environment of the day, it is therefore essential to preserve the powers of *competent* authorities *in the area of security and criminal justice* through lawful access to carry out their tasks, as prescribed and authorised by law. Such laws providing for the enforcement powers must always fully respect due process and other safeguards, as well as other freedoms and rights, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications and the right to the protection of personal data. [3] iOCTA 2020, p. 25 4. Creating a *better* balance The principle of security through encryption and security despite encryption must be upheld in its entirety. The European Union continues to support strong encryption. Encryption is an anchor of confidence in digitalisation and *in protection of fundamental rights and* should be promoted and developed. Protecting the privacy and security of communications through encryption and at the same time upholding the possibility for *competent* authorities *in the area of security and criminal justice* to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate, clearly defined purposes in fighting serious *and/or organized* crimes *and terrorism*, including in the digital world, are extremely important. Any actions taken have to balance these interests carefully. 5. Joining forces with the tech industry Moving forward, the European Union strives to establish an active discussion with the technology industry, *while associating research and academia,* to ensure the continued implementation and use of strong encryption technology. *Competent* authorities must be able to access data in a lawful and targeted manner, in full respect of fundamental rights and the data protection regime, while upholding cybersecurity. Technical solutions for gaining access to encrypted data must comply with the principles of legality, *transparency*, necessity and proportionality. Since there is no single way of achieving the set goals, governments, industry, *research and academia* need to work together to *strategically* create this balance. 6. Legal framework There is a *clear* need *to review the effects arising from different regulatory frameworks in order to develop further* a *consistent* regulatory framework *across the EU* that *would allow competent authorities to carry out their operational tasks effectively. Potential technical solutions will have to enable authorities to use their investigative powers which are subject to proportionality, necessity and judicial oversight under their domestic legislation, while upholding* fundamental rights and *preserving* the advantages of encryption. Possible solutions /may need the support of service providers/ should be developed in a transparent manner *in cooperation with communication service providers. Such technical solutions could also require* improving the technical and *operational* skills and *expertise of competent* authorities to *effectively address* the challenges of digitalisation in their work on a global scale. /In line with the principle of proportionality, such measures should be prioritised./ /Developing technical tools aimed at supporting criminal proceedings, could also be considered. Such technical tools should be subject to the principles outlined in this declaration./ 7. Innovative investigative capabilities Finally, it is of paramount importance to /improve the coordination/ at EU level /aimed at/: 1) combining the efforts of all Member States and EU institutions and bodies; 2) defining and establishing innovative approaches /in view of new technologies/; 3) /analysing appropriate technical/ and /operational solutions; and/ 4) /providing tailored high quality training/. Technical /and operational/ solutions anchored /in a legal framework built/ on the principles of /legality/, necessity and proportionality should be developed in close consultation with service providers and the relevant authorities, although there should be no single prescribed technical solution to provide access to encrypted data. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- Giovanni Biscuolo

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Uomo e macchina: cosa cambia con la pandemia?
by don Luca Peyron Nov. 12, 2020

Nov. 12, 2020

Una psicologa e una storica a confronto sui rischi e sulle possibilità aperte dai nuovi strumenti digitali, per la prima volta utilizzati in massa. Il tema della prima Biennale Tecnologia Buona lettura dl https://www.avvenire.it/agora/pagine/quelle-macchine-tra-noi _________________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

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RESET Journal, Call for Contributions : Digital technologies and learning
by Francesca Musiani Nov. 12, 2020

Nov. 12, 2020

Buongiorno, mi permetto di inoltrare il recente call for papers della rivista RESET. Cari saluti, Francesca --- Dear colleagues, We are pleased to announce a call for papers on the theme "Digital technologies and learning" for the open access academic journal RESET. The issue is edited by Cédric Fluckiger and Vinciane Zabban. You will find here https://journals.openedition.org/reset/2418 and attached the complete English version of the call, and the French version here : https://journals.openedition.org/reset/2416 The abstracts (500 words maximum) are due by January 11, 2021. They should be sent to the following addresses: Revue RESET reset(a)openedition.org. Cédric Fluckiger: cedric.fluckiger(a)univ-lille.fr Vinciane Zabban vinciane.zabban(a)gmail.com The abstracts will be reviewed anonymously by the issue editors and the members of the editorial board. Authors of submissions selected at this stage will be asked to submit their full papers by May 17th. We remain available if you have any questions, Best regards, The RESET editorial board --- Chères et chers collègues, Nous avons le plaisir de vous faire suivre cet appel à articles sur le thème "Technologies numériques et apprentissages", de la revue RESET, dossier coordonné par Cédric Fluckiger et Vinciane Zabban. Vous trouverez ici https://journals.openedition.org/reset/2416 et en pj la version française complète de l'appel, et la version en anglais ici : https://journals.openedition.org/reset/2418 Les propositions de contributions, sous la forme de résumés (3000 signes) sont attendues pour le 11 janvier, et les articles complets en première version pour le 17 mai. Nous restons disponibles si vous avez des questions, Les coordinateurs du dossier : Cédric Fluckiger : cedric.fluckiger(a)univ-lille.fr Vinciane Zabban vinciane.zabban(a)gmail.com Bien cordialement, Le comité de rédaction de RESET envoyer -- Francesca Musiani, Ph.D. Chargée de recherche | Associate Research Professor, CNRS <http://www.cnrs.fr> Directrice adjointe | Deputy Director, Centre for Internet and Society <https://cis.cnrs.fr> (UPR 2000 & GDR 2091 CNRS) Chercheuse associée | Associate Researcher, i3-CSI <http://www.csi.ensmp.fr/>, MINES ParisTech Global Fellow, Internet Governance Lab <https://internetgovernancelab.org>, American University I'm involved in: CPT-IAMCR <https://iamcr.org/s-wg/section/cpt> | Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info> | RESET <https://journals.openedition.org/reset/> | ISOC France <https://www.isoc.fr> | ResisTIC <https://www.resistic.org> On the Web <https://cis.cnrs.fr/francesca-musiani/> | On Twitter <https://twitter.com/franmusiani>

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Biennale Tecnologia, 12-15 novembre, online
by J.C. DE MARTIN Nov. 11, 2020

Nov. 11, 2020

Carissimi, domani 12 novembre il Politecnico di Torino, insieme a 50 partner, inaugura *la prima edizione di Biennale Tecnologia*, una ampia manifestazione culturale dedicata ad esplorare il rapporto tra tecnologia e società. Le due lezioni magistrali inaugurali saranno tenute da Francesca Bria e Bruce Sterling. Parleremo molto di digitale, ma anche di energia, trasporti, città, e di tanti altri temi legati alla tecnologia e lo faremo in maniera fortemente interdisciplinare (à la Nexa, potremmo dire ;-)). Si tratta di circa 140 incontri, 260 relatori, per un mix di lezioni, dialoghi, panel, concerti, spettacoli, letture di poesia, mostre, ecc., il tutto gratuitamente e liberamente fruibile online a www.biennaletecnologia.it. Giusto per fare qualche nome (davvero i primi che mi vengono in mente, i molti non inclusi in questa sede per favore non si adontino!): David Weinberger, Frank Pasquale, Manuel Castells, Jeffrey Sachs, David Lyon, Alessandro Vespignani, Richard Baldwin, David Quammen, Malavika Jayaram, David Gruber, Carmela Troncoso, Stefano Quintarelli, Ciro Cattuto, Angelo Raffaele Meo, Guido Scorza, Fabrizio Barca, Christian Greco, Anna Masera, Alexander Sokurov. Oltre al programma principale ci sono anche Biennale OFF, "Politecnico Aperto", e tanto altro; se siete curiosi, trovate tutto sul sito. Vi aspettiamo numerosi! juan carlos

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Fwd: Invitation to a Pugwash Netherlands Webinar on AI, Drones and Cyberwarfare, 17 Novermber 2020
by Diego.Latella Nov. 11, 2020

Nov. 11, 2020

FYI Da: e.ferguson(a)antenna.nl [mailto:e.ferguson@antenna.nl] Inviato: martedì 10 novembre 2020 03:01 Oggetto: Invitation to a Pugwash Netherlands Webinar on AI, Drones and Cyberwarfare, 17 Novermber 2020 Pugwash Netherlands Invitation to a Webinar on AI, Drones and Cyberwarfare Tuesday, November 17th, 19:00 to 20:30 Amsterdam Time In this first Webinar by Pugwash Netherlands on contemporary developments in weapons and warfare, we have invited two experts to share their insights on the usage and future development in the relatively new technologies of AI, Drones and Cyberwarfare. Drs. Sico van der Meer is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on non-conventional weapons such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and cyber weapons, from a strategic policy perspective. Dr Elke Schwarz of the University of London. Her research focuses on the political and ethical implications of new technologies, in particular digital technologies and autonomous systems. In 2018, she published her monograph "Death Machines: The Ethics of Violent Technologies".' The two speakers will give relatively short introductions. The participants can then use the Chat function of MEET to make comments or ask questions, which the moderator will pass on to the speakers. The meeting will be held in English using MEET. Any browser can be used. Those who turn on their webcam will be visible to the others on screen. We are sending this invitation to individuals, European Pugwash Groups and other groups that we know, both in the Netherlands and abroad. _REQUEST: Please forward this invitation to colleagues and others who could be interested, especially if you are receiving this as a representative of a group. Please avoid delays, as the invitees must have time to register for the webinar. _ If you wish to participate, please send an e-mail to bestuur(a)pugwash.nl. We will mail the E-webinar link to the address from which you apply. Eric Ferguson, secretary bestuur(a)pugwash.nl [1] Mail priva di virus. www.avast.com [1] _______________________________________________ Associati mailing list Associati(a)uspid.org http://uspid.org/mailman/listinfo/associati_uspid.org -- Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it [2]) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat I don't quite know whether it is especially computer science or its subdiscipline Artificial Intelligence that has such an enormous affection for euphemism. We speak so spectacularly and so readily of computer systems that understand, that see, decide, make judgments, and so on, without ourselves recognizing our own superficiality and immeasurable naivete with respect to these concepts. And, in the process of so speaking, we anesthetise our ability to evaluate the quality of our work and, what is more important, to identify and become conscious of its end use. […] One can't escape this state without asking, again and again: "What do I actually do? What is the final application and use of the products of my work?" and ultimately, "am I content or ashamed to have contributed to this use?" -- Prof. Joseph Weizenbaum ["Not without us", ACM SIGCAS 16(2-3) 2--7 - Aug. 1986] Links: ------ [1] https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&ut… [2] http://www.isti.cnr.it

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RoscomSvoboda e youtube-dl: sillogismo?!?
by Giovanni Biscuolo Nov. 10, 2020

Nov. 10, 2020

Buongiorno nexiane, sono "inciampato" in questo articolo del 26 Giugno 2020 di Guido Scorza, intitolato «La tecnologia non è mai, di per sé, lecita o illecita. E adesso lo sa anche la Russia»; lo trovate sotto. Nell'articolo si celebra la vittoria dello stato di diritto europeo sulla barbarie di un regime totalitario come quello russo che ha osato oscurare RoscomSvoboda perché diffondeva informazioni **e strumenti** per accedere a internet aggirando la censura. Adesso lo sa anche la Russia. Anche noi lo sappiamo nel caso di youtube-dl?!? ... o forse la differenza è che RoscomSvoboda è stata oscurata da quei totalitari dei russi mentre youtube-dl è stata oscurata da quei liberali USA (e lo sarebbe COMUNQUE anche con una analoga richiesta in EU)? Non è forse applicabile anche per youtube-dl il principio secondo il quale «Sopprimere le informazioni sulle tecnologie per accedere alle informazioni online per il motivo che potrebbero accidentalmente facilitare l’accesso a materiale estremista (o illegale, N.d.r.) non è diverso dal cercare di limitare l’accesso a stampanti e fotocopiatrici perché possono essere utilizzate per riprodurre tale materiale.»? Dobbiamo fare istanza davanti alla corte EU per i diritti umani? :-O https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/06/26/la-tecnologia-non-e-mai-di-per-… --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] Nei giorni scorsi la decisione dei giudici di Strasburgo. Bloccando l’accesso al sito del progetto RoscomSvoboda la Russia ha violato i diritti dell’uomo e, in particolare la libertà di comunicazione che garantisce a chiunque il diritto di diffondere e accedere a ogni genere di informazioni al riparo da censure come quella disposta dalle Autorità russe. Roscomsvoboda non diffondeva contenuti illeciti, scrivono i giudici, e diffondere contenuti e strumenti su come godere appieno di Internet e accedere, tra l’altro, anche a contenuti illeciti non è illecito, neppure in Russia. La semplice eventualità che quelle istruzioni e quelli strumenti siano usati anche per l’accesso a contenuti illeciti non basta per censurare delle pagine di informazione. “Proprio come una macchina da stampa può essere utilizzata per stampare qualsiasi cosa, da un libro di testo scolastico a un opuscolo estremista, Internet conserva e mette a disposizione una vasta gamma di informazioni, alcune parti delle quali possono essere vietate per una serie di motivi specifici per giurisdizioni specifiche. […] Sopprimere le informazioni sulle tecnologie per accedere alle informazioni online per il motivo che potrebbero accidentalmente facilitare l’accesso a materiale estremista non è diverso dal cercare di limitare l’accesso a stampanti e fotocopiatrici perché possono essere utilizzate per riprodurre tale materiale. Il blocco delle informazioni su tali tecnologie interferisce con l’accesso a tutti i contenuti a cui è possibile accedere utilizzando tali tecnologie”. È semplice, lineare, va dritta al punto in maniera quasi sillogistica la decisione dei giudici della Corte europea dei diritti. Ogni parola in più è di troppo. Una cosa è ordinare di rimuovere un contenuto perché illecito o, eventualmente, anche bloccare l’accesso a un contenuto perché illecito e una cosa completamente diversa è bloccare l’accesso a delle informazioni o a degli strumenti perché potrebbero essere, tra l’altro, utilizzati per accedere a contenuti illeciti. Nel primo caso, la decisione può essere lecita, nel secondo non lo è mai perché la tecnologia non è mai, di per sé, lecita o illecita, buona o cattiva ma tutto dipende sempre da come la si usa. Una bella lezione di civiltà giuridica e libertà. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- La sentenza "CASE OF ENGELS v. RUSSIA" della corte EU per i diritti umani sintetizza i fatti così: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-203180%22]} --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- 5. One page of the RosKomSvoboda website (rublacklist.net/bypass) provided a list and a short description of tools and software for bypassing restrictions on private communications and content filters on the Internet, such as virtual private networks (VPN), the Tor browser, the “invisible Internet” (I2P) technology, the “turbo” mode in web browsers, and the use of online translation engines for accessing content. 6. In 2015, a district prosecutor in the Krasnodar Region lodged a public-interest claim with the Anapa Town Court, seeking a decision that information on the rublacklist.net/bypass page should be prohibited from dissemination in Russia. The prosecutor submitted that the anonymising tools available from that page enabled users to access extremist material on another, unrelated website. On 13 April 2015 the Anapa Town Court, without informing the applicant about the proceedings, granted the prosecutor’s application. It noted that the information on the rublacklist.net/bypass page had been made freely available without a password or registration to any user who wished to read or copy it. The Town Court declared illegal the content of the rublacklist.net/bypass page and ordered Roskomnadzor to enforce the decision immediately by blocking access to the applicant’s website. 7. Roskomnadzor asked the applicant to take down the webpage rublacklist.net/bypass, otherwise the website would be blocked. The applicant complied with the request and deleted the offending information. 8. Counsel for the applicant lodged an appeal. He pointed out that the applicant’s full contact details were listed on the website and that the examination of the prosecutor’s claim in his absence had breached the principle of fairness. He also submitted that providing information about tools and software for the protection of the privacy of browsing was not contrary to any Russian law. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Saluti, Giovanni. -- Giovanni Biscuolo

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youtube-dl DMCA takedown
by Giacomo Tesio Nov. 10, 2020

Nov. 10, 2020

Dear Sir or Madam: I am contacting you on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (RIAA) and its member record companies. The RIAA is a trade association whose member companies create, manufacture or distribute sound recordings representing approximately eighty-five (85) percent of all legitimate recorded music consumption in the United States. Under penalty of perjury, we submit that the RIAA is authorized to act on behalf of its member companies on matters involving the infringement of their sound recordings, audiovisual works and images, including enforcing their copyrights and common law rights on the Internet. Copyright Violations. We have learned that your service is hosting the youtube-dl source code on its network at the following locations, among others: https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/tree/gh-pages http://ytdl-org.github.io/youtube-dl/ [...] The above list includes a representative sample of the youtube-dl forks of the youtube-dl source code being hosted on GitHub. Based on our review of the representative sample noted above, we have a good faith belief that most of the youtube-dl forks are infringing to the same extent as the parent repository. The clear purpose of this source code is to (i) circumvent the technological protection measures used by authorized streaming services such as YouTube, and (ii) reproduce and distribute music videos and sound recordings owned by our member companies without authorization for such use. We note that the source code is described on GitHub as “a command-line program to download videos from YouTube.com and a few more sites.” Continua su https://github.com/github/dmca/blob/master/2020/10/2020-10-23-RIAA.md Il repository principale era https://github.com/ytdl-org/youtube-dl/ Qui un mirror https://gitee.com/mirrors/youtube-downloader $ git clone https://gitee.com/mirrors/youtube-downloader.git (la ridondanza è una chiave della libertà... ;-) Qui invece è possibile scaricare copie del master https://web.archive.org/web/20201018130325/https://codeload.github.com/ytdl… https://pypi.org/project/youtube_dl/ Comunque, se non ricordo male, youtube-downloader evita accuratamente di aggirare le protezioni DRM. Dunque è un bene che Microsoft abbia prontamente nascosto il repository. Sia mai che qualcuno inizi a porsi qualche domanda su cosa significhi dipendere da società statunitensi! Giacomo

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L'altra faccia dello smart working
by Luigi Scorca Nov. 10, 2020

Nov. 10, 2020

https://www.eticaeconomia.it/laltra-faccia-dello-smart-working/ Luigi

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NYTimes: All Hail the Un-Tech Election
by J.C DEMARTIN Nov. 10, 2020

Nov. 10, 2020

All Hail the Un-Tech Election https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/06/technology/election-tech.html?referringS… (Sent using a mobile device - please excuse typos and brevity)

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