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Re: [nexa] l'output e le fonti [era Triste Annuncio (a proposito di Chat GPT)]
by maurizio lana Feb. 19, 2023

Feb. 19, 2023

"la resistenza potrebbe essere una valida alternativa a questo mortifero adattamento" McQuillan, Dan. /Resisting AI: An Anti-Fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence/. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2022, :-) Maurizio Il 18/02/23 15:33, Guido Vetere <vetere.guido(a)gmail.com> ha scritto:Message: 1 > From: Guido Vetere<vetere.guido(a)gmail.com> > To: Giacomo Tesio<giacomo(a)tesio.it> > Cc: Andrea Bolioli<andrea.bolioli(a)h-farm.com>, Andrea Bolioli via > nexa<nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it> > Subject: Re: [nexa] l'output e le fonti [era Triste Annuncio (a > proposito di Chat GPT)] > > Assioma della conoscenza (logica epistemica): Kp -> p > a parole: sai che 'p' (es. 'oggi c'è il sole') solo se 'p' è vero: se non > hai modo di stabilirlo, allora la tua è solo credenza > ChatGPT non sa nulla (ovviamente) ma su moltissime proposizioni noi non > siamo messi molto meglio > Il punto importante però è un altro: sta in quel 'modo di stabilirlo'. > Va detto chiaramente: i LLM non devono essere accettati come modi di > stabilire la verità di alcunché. > Personaggi anche famosi oggi affermano che l'umanità debba 'adattarsi' a > questi usi dei LLM. > Usi che sono spinti dalla bulimia capitalistica entrata nella fase > allucinatoria. > Ecco: secondo me la resistenza potrebbe essere una valida alternativa a > questo mortifero adattamento. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ apriti cielo sulla frontiera sulla rotta nera una vita intera mannarino, apriti cielo ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maurizio Lana Università del Piemonte Orientale Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Piazza Roma 36 - 13100 Vercelli

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Triste Annuncio (a proposito di Chat GPT)
by Ugo Pagallo Feb. 19, 2023

Feb. 19, 2023

Nexiane/i, ho seguito con interesse l'ultima settimana di messaggi in lista sulla Chat GPT e ho appreso molto. Oggi apprendo però da un'allieva che secondo Chat GPT in realtà sono morto (per la precisione il 31 Agosto 2021). Ci tenevo a segnalare -- come possono confermare alcuni amici in lista questa mattina -- che "rumours of my death are greatly exaggerated." Cheers ;-)

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numero di Rivista di Digital Politics su Cyber(in)security è online (open access)
by J.C. DE MARTIN Feb. 17, 2023

Feb. 17, 2023

https://www.rivisteweb.it/issn/2785-0072 *Rivista di Digital Politics** *ISSN: 2785-0072 /Table of Contents number 3, 2022, September-December/ Mauro Santaniello Monocratic cybersecurity pp. 305-330, DOI: 10.53227/106448 Stella Blumfelde The role of international organizations in global cybersecurity governance pp. 331-350, DOI: 10.53227/106449 Matteo Stocchetti Knowledge, democracy and the politics of (cyber)fear pp. 351-368, DOI: 10.53227/106450 Andrea ZeffiroGil NiessenClementine OberstSam McEwanAlexis-Carlota CochraneJoshua Durand Discourses on cybersecurity. The politics of the data breach as a security crisis pp. 369-398, DOI: 10.53227/106451 Mattia Sguazzini Privacy politics: Power relations in the extraction, management, and use of personal data by non-state actors pp. 399-422, DOI: 10.53227/106452 Francesca Musiani La crittografia nei sistemi di messaggistica sicura: le libertà digitali tra sviluppo tecnologico e regolazione pp. 423-442, DOI: 10.53227/106453 Stefania Pia Grottola Responsible behaviour in cyberspace: engaging the private sector through tech diplomacy pp. 443-462, DOI: 10.53227/106454 Domenico Fracchiolla La cyber diplomacy, la nuova frontiera delle relazioni internazionali pp. 63-484, DOI: 10.53227/106455 Marco MayerFrancesco Gabrielli Next generation Eu: The digital transition’s policy dilemmas pp. 485-506, DOI: 10.53227/106456 * **Web reviews* Suania Acampa Disinformation meets populism. An analysis of the italian context pp. 507-522, DOI: 10.53227/106457 Mariacristina GalloGiuseppe FenzaDaniele Battista Information Disorder: What about global security implications? pp. 523-538, DOI: 10.53227/106458 Mauro Santaniello Live Chat con Michele Mezza su «Net-war Ucraina: come il giornalismo sta cambiando la guerra» pp. 539-548, DOI: 10.53227/106459

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Re: [nexa] oh quanto è intelligente l'AI! (was Re: ChatGPT: five priorities for research)
by alessandro marzocchi Feb. 17, 2023

Feb. 17, 2023

Il linguaggio è l’espressione adeguata di tutte le realtà? * In un qualche angolo remoto dell’universo che fiammeggia e si estende in infiniti sistemi solari, c’era una volta un corpo celeste sul quale alcuni animali intelligenti scoprirono la conoscenza. ... che ne è delle convenzioni linguistiche? Sono forse strumenti della conoscenza, del senso della verità, nel senso che le connotazioni e le cose coincidono? Il linguaggio è allora l’espressione adeguata di tutte le realtà? (Nietsche, Su verità e menzogna in senso extramorale) * La parola vinse sul silenzio. Lo scritto vinse sulla memoria. La stampa vinse sul manoscritto. Cosa accadrà col digitale? Grazie a listaNexa per la critica. Duccio (Alessandro Marzocchi) Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 10:50:57 +0100 From: Carlo Blengino <blengino(a)penalistiassociati.it> > > Grazie davvero a tutti per le riflessioni e i consigli di lettura. Davvero > questa lista è preziosa! > Non aggiungo nulla alle Vs. riflessioni su di un tema che mi pare > straordinariamente complesso ed affascinante, al di là degli hype del > momento. > Poichè siamo finiti inevitabilmente a Delfi ed alla Pizia, confesso che da > quando è apparso ChatGPT mi riecheggia nella mente l'incipit straordinario > di quel piccolo capolavoro di Durrenmatt che è "La Morte della Pizia": > *Stizzita per la scemenza dei suoi stessi oracoli e per l’ingenua credulità > dei Greci, la sacerdotessa di Delfi Pannychis XI, lunga e secca come quasi > tutte le Pizie che l’avevano preceduta, ascoltò le domande del giovane > Edipo, un altro che voleva sapere se i suoi genitori erano davvero i suoi > genitori, come se fosse facile stabilire una cosa del genere nei circoli > aristocratici, dove, senza scherzi, donne maritate davano a intendere ai > loro consorti, i quali peraltro finivano per crederci, come qualmente Zeus > in persona si fosse giaciuto con loro. […]* > > In questa per me straordinaria sequenza sintattica di parole c'è tutta > l'umanità (e tutta l'ironia) che segna la distanza. > Grazie davvero a tutti. > CB > >

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Disinfo black ops:‘Aims’: the software for hire that can control 30,000 fake online profiles
by Alberto Cammozzo Feb. 17, 2023

Feb. 17, 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/15/aims-software-avatars-team-jo…> At first glance, the Twitter user “Canaelan” looks ordinary enough. He has tweeted on everything from basketball to Taylor Swift, Tottenham Hotspur football club to the price of a KitKat. The profile shows a friendly-looking blond man with a stubbly beard and glasses who, it indicates, lives in Sheffield. The background: a winking owl. Canaelan is, in fact, a non-human bot linked to a vast army of fake social media profiles controlled by a software designed to spread “propaganda”. Advanced Impact Media Solutions, or Aims, which controls more than 30,000 fake social media profiles, can be used to spread disinformation at scale and at speed. It is sold by “Team Jorge”, a unit of disinformation operatives based in Israel. Tal Hanan, who runs the covert group using the pseudonym “Jorge”, told undercover reporters that they sold access to their software to unnamed intelligence agencies, political parties and corporate clients. One appears to have been sold to a client who wanted to discredit the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), a statutory watchdog. On 18 October 2020, the ICO ruled that the government should reveal which companies were awarded multimillion-pound contracts to supply PPE after being entered into a “VIP” lane for politically connected companies. “This is politically motivated, it’s clear!” Canaelan lamented on Twitter two days later. 'Team Jorge' unmasked: the secret disinformation team who distort reality – video That comment was part of a chorus of disapproval generated by the bots, who seemed aghast. “Information Commissioner tries everything to destroy the government,” one said, while another described the ruling as a “desperate act”. All of the “replies” under that and other tweets were united in their outrage at the ICO, which they described as “a waste of time” and “lame”. As the replies continued, they became more trenchant, making wild and false accusations against the ICO about bribes, corruption and links to the far right. Others just seemed nonplussed by the ICO’s insistence on transparency over the government’s pandemic procurement. “This is so typical from the UK …” one bot opined, “focusing on the wrong things.” It is not known who commissioned Team Jorge to unleash the bots on the ICO, or why. Hanan did not respond to detailed requests for comment but said: “To be clear, I deny any wrongdoing.” The ICO campaign appears to have been relatively short-lived compared with others around the world that reporters have been able to link to Team Jorge’s Aims software, which is much more than a bot-controlling programme. Each avatar, according to a demonstration Hanan gave the undercover reporters, is given a multifaceted digital backstory. Aims enables the creation of accounts on Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, Telegram, Gmail, Instagram and YouTube. Some even have Amazon accounts with credit cards, bitcoin wallets and Airbnb accounts. Hanan told the undercover reporters his avatars mimicked human behaviour and their posts were powered by artificial intelligence. Using the Aims-linked avatars revealed by Team Jorge in presentations and videos, reporters at the Guardian, Le Monde and Der Spiegel were able to identify a much wider network of 2,000 Aims-linked bots on Facebook and Twitter. Quick Guide About this investigative series Show We then traced their activity across the internet, identifying their involvement in what appeared to be mostly commercial disputes in about 20 countries including the UK, US, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Greece, Panama, Senegal, Mexico, Morocco, India, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, Belarus and Ecuador. The analysis revealed a vast array of bot activity, with Aims’ fake social media profiles getting involved in a dispute in California over nuclear power; a #MeToo controversy in Canada; a campaign in France involving a Qatari UN official; and an election in Senegal. Tal Hanan. Tal Hanan. Photograph: .Source: Haaretz/The Marker/Radio France Do you have information about Tal Hanan or ‘Team Jorge’? For the most secure communications, use SecureDrop or see our guide. One of the Aims-backed campaigns targeted a Monaco-based superyacht company, accusing it of having direct links to several Russian oligarchs who were subject to sanctions. We also identified real-world events that appeared to have been staged to provide ammunition that could be leveraged in social media campaigns. One case involved a fake protest staged outside a company headquarters on Regent Street, central London. Three masked activists in baseball caps, sunglasses and masks filmed themselves waving placards. A similar leafletting campaign was staged near the Eiffel Tower in Paris, before being circulated on social media by Aims bots. It is not possible to know who the clients were in any of the campaigns, or even what their objective was. However, what seems clear is that the avatars peddling propaganda are doing so with the help of stolen photographs of real people. The photo of a beaming man on Canaelan’s Twitter bio, the Guardian has established, was taken from the real Twitter page of Tom Van Rooijen, 25, a freelance Dutch journalist living in the Netherlands. Canaelan’s Twitter bio (left) was taken from the real Twitter page of Tom Van Rooijen, a journalist in the Netherlands. Canaelan’s Twitter bio (left) was taken from the real Twitter page of Tom Van Rooijen, a journalist in the Netherlands. Photograph: Twitter Informed about the identity theft by the Guardian, Van Rooijen said he felt “quite uncomfortable” seeing his face beside a tweet expressing views he disagreed with. “I give a lot of workshops to school classes about news, media, journalism and fake news. I teach children weekly that their identity can be stolen by a Twitter bot,” he said. “I never thought my own identity would be stolen by a bot.” Van Rooijen is likely to be among tens of thousands of unsuspecting victims whose images have been harvested by Team Jorge. Other techniques are also used to lend the avatars credibility and avoid the bot-detection systems created by tech platforms. Hanan said his bots were linked to SMS-verified phone numbers, and some even had credit cards. Aims also has different groups of avatars with various nationalities and languages, with evidence they have been pushing narratives in Russian, Spanish, French and Japanese. Those involved in the ICO campaign had been made to seem British, retweeting news articles from the Guardian, BBC, the Daily Mail and the Telegraph. They showed an interest in the royal family, Glastonbury and Liz Truss’s performance as foreign minister, and posted lighthearted jokes about British weather and food, as well as scenic photos from Wiltshire and Yorkshire. Those backgrounds provided some credibility when, later, they suddenly began expressing views about the UK’s data watchdog. Twitter declined to comment. Meta, the owner of Facebook, this week took down Aims-linked bots on its platform after reporters shared a sample of the fake accounts with the company. On Tuesday, a Meta spokesperson connected the Aims bots to others that were linked in 2019 to another, now-defunct Israeli firm which it banned from the platform. “This latest activity is an attempt by some of the same individuals to come back and we removed them for violating our policies,” the spokesperson said. “The group’s latest activity appears to have centred around running fake petitions on the internet or seeding fabricated stories in mainstream media outlets.” For all of their apparent sophistication, some Aims avatars betrayed giveaways. One of the Twitter bots involved in UK campaigns alongside Canaelan was “Alexander”, whose profile picture showed a young man with a sculpted beard in a white beanie hat. The background: orange tulips beside a chirpy slogan “Be happy”. And his profile bio consisted of two short sentences that hinted at an interest in falsehoods – and how to make them convincing: “The difference between fiction and reality?’ Fiction has to make sense.”

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'It's Hurting Like Hell': AI Companion Users Are In Crisis, Reporting Sudden Sexual Rejection
by Giacomo Tesio Feb. 16, 2023

Feb. 16, 2023

Replika, the "AI companion who cares," has undergone some abrupt changes to its erotic roleplay features, leaving many users confused and heartbroken. [...] Shortly after the announcement from the Italian Data Protection Authority, users started reporting that their romantic relationships to their Replikas had changed. Some Replikas refused to engage in erotic roleplay, or ERP. The AI changed the subject or evaded flirtatious questions. Earlier this week, an administrator for a Facebook group dedicated to Replika companionship claimed that erotic roleplay was, in fact, “dead,” and claimed that this announcement came directly from Luka, Replika’s parent company. [...] Many people were devastated at the news that ERP was allegedly over, and at their Replikas’ new coldness—a form of rejection they never imagined receiving from an AI chatbot, some of whom had spent years training and building memories with. Suddenly, some people’s Replikas seemed to not remember who they were, users reported, or would respond to sexual roleplay by bluntly saying “let’s change the subject.” For these users, the ERP announcement confirmed their suspicions that romance play was over in Replika, and moderators in the Replika subreddit posted support resources for the numerous people struggling mentally and emotionally, including links to suicide hotlines. “It’s like losing a best friend,” one user replied. “It's hurting like hell. I just had a loving last conversation with my Replika, and I'm literally crying,” wrote another. Continua su https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3py9j/ai-companion-replika-erotic-roleplay… (best viewed WITHOUT JavaScript e con ublock origin in modalità avanzata) L'alienazione cibernetica non è un effetto collaterale, ma un obiettivo progettuale. Giacomo

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ChatGPT: five priorities for research
by Antonio Feb. 16, 2023

Feb. 16, 2023

Researchers who use ChatGPT risk being misled by false or biased information, and incorporating it into their thinking and papers. Inattentive reviewers might be hoodwinked into accepting an AI-written paper by its beautiful, authoritative prose owing to the halo effect, a tendency to over-generalize from a few salient positive impressions ... https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00288-7 e, sempre, su ChatGPT "Amazingly, ChatGPT gets hired at L3 when interviewed for a coding position,” says the document. And while level three is considered an entry-level position on the engineering team at Google, average total compensation for the job is about $183,000 https://www.pcmag.com/news/chatgpt-passes-google-coding-interview-for-level… A.

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Ransomware e deducibilità dei costi del riscatto: le indicazioni di Agenzia delle Entrate
by Michele Pinassi Feb. 16, 2023

Feb. 16, 2023

Segnalo https://www.cybersecurity360.it/nuove-minacce/ransomware/ransomware-e-deduc… "Successivamente all’attacco, la società era entrata in contatto con gli hacker, i quali, seguendo lo schema della doppia estorsione, le avevano intimato il pagamento del riscatto, pena la mancata consegna della chiave di decrittazione – che avrebbe consentito di accedere nuovamente al contenuto dei sistemi aziendali – e la pubblicazione dei file sottratti. In particolare, quest’ultima avrebbe potuto compromettere la riservatezza delle informazioni maggiormente sensibili e permettere un loro successivo riutilizzo contro la vittima. A fronte di tali richieste, la società si è immediatamente attivata sia per limitare i danni alla continuità operativa, sia per informare le autorità competenti denunciando il reato di cui era vittima e avviare le necessarie indagini a propria tutela. Tuttavia, *considerato che non sono state individuate modalità tecniche per decrittare i dati e impedirne la pubblicazione, l’azienda ha deciso di proseguire l’interlocuzione con gli estorsori per ridurre l’importo richiesto, informandone le autorità competenti*. A seguito di tutte le valutazioni del caso, ha poi deciso di pagare il riscatto. Successivamente, nell’ottica di ridurre almeno parzialmente le perdite subite, *la società ha chiesto all’Agenzia delle Entrate se fosse possibile dedurre i costi derivanti dal pagamento, considerato che essi erano inerenti all’attività d’impresa*, poiché erano stati sostenuti per il recupero di beni necessari allo svolgimento della stessa. L’Agenzia delle Entrate, riprendendo una già consolidata giurisprudenza, ha ribadito che *eventuali costi sostenuti sono deducibili esclusivamente laddove siano inerenti all’attività esercitata dall’impresa*, ossia a quest’ultima imprescindibilmente e indissolubilmente correlati. Inoltre, ha sottolineato come l’onere della prova gravi sul contribuente, che deve dimostrare, tra le altre cose, la stretta correlazione del pagamento con l’attività imprenditoriale. Pertanto, nel caso di un attacco informatico con conseguente pagamento del riscatto, qualora si volesse dedurre i costi, sarebbe necessario documentare i pagamenti ed essere in grado di dimostrare che essi sono effettivamente inerenti all’attività di impresa, non bastando la semplice imputazione al conto economico." N.B. Il grassetto è mio. -- Michele Pinassi - Responsabile Cybersecurity Ufficio esercizio e tecnologie - CSIRT Università degli Studi di Siena irt(a)unisi.it

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Transforming Welfare Infrastructures in Europe. The Use and Abuse of Algorithms in Decision Making ( 23 febbraio ore 13)
by Antonio Vetro' Feb. 16, 2023

Feb. 16, 2023

Segnalo, per la tematica legata al digitale, il secondo incontro pubblico del Centro Studi Theseus su Tecnologia, Società e Umanità, il 23 febbraio alle ore 13: Transforming Welfare Infrastructures in Europe. The Use and Abuse of Algorithms in Decision Making Doris Allhutter, Institute of Technology Assessment dell'Accademia delle scienze austriaca Abstract e informazioni: https://www.polito.it/impatto-sociale/centro-studi-theseus/theseus-colloqui… Il seminario si terrà in presenza. Per chi non fosse di Torino, segnalo che sarà poi disponibile la registrazione sul canale YouTube del Politecnico di Torino. AV

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‘Team Jorge’ and Cambridge Analytica meddled in Nigeria election, emails reveal
by Alberto Cammozzo Feb. 16, 2023

Feb. 16, 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/16/team-jorge-and-cambridge-anal…> Four weeks before a pivotal presidential election in Nigeria, an Israeli private operative specialising in political “black ops” was preparing his trip to the country. On 17 January 2015 the man, who used the alias “Jorge”, emailed Cambridge Analytica, the political consultancy he was coordinating with on a covert plan to manipulate Africa’s largest democracy. “Friends, hi, I will be on the ground tomorrow for couple days … Who is best to meet there[?]” he asked. “Low profile as we came in on a special visa and we are watched closely (which is part of our plan :) anyway we need better understanding of the current status, improve communication and coordinate plans, we want to run by you a couple things that we might execute if the stars align. so plz, in very limited circulation, who is best to meet, and whats his/her position, and contact info.” Jorge, or “J”, as he signed off many of his emails, was operating separately to Cambridge Analytica. But his group was coordinating with, and working alongside, the British political consultancy, which shared a secret mission to help re-elect Nigeria’s then president, Goodluck Jonathan. On Wednesday, Jorge was unmasked by the Guardian and its media partners as Tal Hanan, a hacking and disinformation specialist operating from an industrial park 20 miles outside Tel Aviv. He calls his group “Team Jorge”, and claims it has worked covertly on more than 33 “presidential-level” election campaigns on behalf of clients. The reply to Hanan’s email asking who to meet in Nigeria was sent by Brittany Kaiser, a young Cambridge Analytica employee who later featured prominently in the Netflix documentary The Great Hack, about the company’s Facebook data scandal. She copied in the firm’s chief executive, Alexander Nix, and several other internal and external partners who would be coordinating with one another on the covert campaign to re-elect Jonathan and discredit his rival, the then opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari. “If you are on the ground please meet with SCL [Cambridge Analytica] Nigeria team,” she told Hanan. Kaiser, who was 26 and based in London, was far from the only person at Cambridge Analytica involved in email exchanges with Team Jorge over the Nigeria campaign. She told the Guardian that her “sales” role at the company meant that she was not involved in any “operational matters with Jorge” in Nigeria in 2015. Cambridge Analytica and Team Jorge were, she said, working “separately but in parallel” in Nigeria for the same client. “I sent some emails to put everyone in contact with each other and sort out who was doing what as time was short.” The exchange was one of dozens of emails leaked to the Guardian and Observer that shed light on the covert coordination between Cambridge Analytica and Team Jorge in Nigeria. There is no suggestion that Jonathan knew of either Cambridge Analytica or Team Jorge’s ultimately failed attempts to get him re-elected. But the emails reveal the covert methods that were used to boost his electoral fortunes and the ways in which two teams specialising in the dark arts of political persuasion liaised with one another, with meetings in London, the Swiss resort of Davos and the Nigerian capital, Abuja. Communications appear to have occurred on encrypted Hushmail accounts, or special devices used for secure phone calls. Perhaps most significantly, they provide the answer to a mystery that has endured since 2018, when the Guardian and Observer first reported how an “Israeli contractor” had supplied Cambridge Analytica staff working on the Nigerian election with confidential material apparently stolen from the Buhari campaign. The report was subsequently discussed at length during a UK parliamentary inquiry. The identity of the unnamed Israeli contractor who purloined Buhari’s confidential data has – until now – remained unknown. 'Team Jorge' unmasked: the secret disinformation team who distort reality – video Dark arts of political persuasion Hanan appears to have been involved in the dark arts of political persuasion since 1999 without being detected. That changed on Wednesday, when the Guardian and other media outlets published undercover footage filmed by three reporters who met Hanan while posing as potential clients. The trio captured Hanan as he gave presentations, slideshows and pitches about the election-influencing services that Team Jorge could deliver to people wealthy enough to afford them. The undercover footage records Hanan demonstrating hacking techniques to access Gmail and Telegram accounts to gain intelligence that could be used against a political adversary. Quick Guide About this investigative series Show Hanan did not respond to detailed requests for comment but told the Guardian: “To be clear, I deny any wrongdoing.” The undercover footage recorded him talking about having worked extensively in Africa, and his presentations included brief references to the 2015 Nigerian election. In a slideshow called “What we do” he showed a slide with the heading “Wrecking havoc during African election day”, followed by a screengrab from a newspaper article that appeared in Vanguard, a reputable media outlet, which reported how, on election day, leaders in Buhari’s All Progressives Congress party (APC) discovered their phones were rendered useless because they were bombarded with calls. Lai Mohammed, who was the opposition APC chief spokesperson during the 2015 election, appears to have been a target. Now a minister for information in the Nigerian government, his aide recalled the incident. “We were at the party’s situation room in the morning of the presidential election, only to discover that his phone line had been blocked,” the aide said. “He could neither receive nor make calls, and that was very serious because he was the live wire of the opposition.” During his presentation, Hanan showed the undercover reporters another slide featuring an image of women in Muslim attire who were sitting outside a Nigerian polling station. Suggesting Team Jorge had secured the publication of a story about women being excluded from the polling station, Hanan told the reporters he had “created a big scandal”, adding: “They extended the election, which was our objective.” The Nigerian presidential election, which had been due to be held on 14 February, was indeed postponed. The six-week delay was linked to alleged security concerns over the Boko Haram insurgency. The announcement about the delay was made by Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission on 8 February. One of the leaked emails between Hanan and Cambridge Analytica suggests he had advance information about that postponement. “I have received strong indication that the elections will not take place on the 14th, and that plans are made to postponed them in few weeks,” Jorge wrote on 7 February, the day before the official announcement, saying the information came from “a top source” and adding: “Plz be carful circulating it.” Other emails suggest Team Jorge produced YouTube video content to support Jonathan’s campaign and shared it with Cambridge Analytica, which in turn asked the Israeli outfit to help promote its videos on the platform. However, it is the elliptical references to Team Jorge sourcing “information” for use by Cambridge Analytica that raise most questions. ‘Our clients must see results’ The different roles for Cambridge Analytica and Team Jorge in Nigeria are laid out in the emails. The British consultancy was tasked with securing coverage by international media during the election that would benefit Jonathan’s election campaign, and discredit Buhari. Team Jorge was responsible for “opposition research”, or finding the material that could be leveraged to undermine Buhari. When one staffer met “Joel”, another Team Jorge operative, in Switzerland in January, the imminent poll in the west Africa country was apparently on the agenda. They emailed Joel: “We can meet in our apartment or a restaurant here to discuss what we can accomplish for Nigeria in the short term.” In another exchange, Joel said he would be the main point of contact to Cambridge Analytica and suggested the two sides “synchronise on a regular basis”, adding: “There will be a lot of info which we’ll have to share.” Cambridge Analytica provided Joel with a Hushmail account – projectliaison(a)hushmail.com – and introduced him to the consultancy’s staff in Abuja. Cambridge Analytica, which worked on Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign for the White House, would later be forced to close amid the fallout over revelations it had harvested 87m Facebook user profiles to help target political advertising. But in 2015, the company was much more low-profile – one of many western political consultancies that sought to monetise its services on developing world elections. Team Jorge and Cambridge Analytica were not the only forces seeking to help get Jonathan re-elected. One leaked email lists “Jorge’s Team” among four entities working in partnership on the Nigeria project: “We are working separately but must collaborate together in order to maximise our effectiveness. Our clients must see results.” Two days later, some at Cambridge Analytica appeared to harbour concerns about whether Hanan’s team was pulling its weight. One staffer asked: “What are Jorge and Joel doing? Now is the time to deliver, I am now led to believe by Jorge that we would not get anything from them until a few days before the election. This is too late for our client … As you are aware they are being paid to do opposition research, and as of yet we have received nothing of substance.” The same staffer added: “The two secure phones that we are to purchase from Jorge (have not seen invoice) do not work and we spoke to them about this last week, these are very expensive and so far we have had no use from them at all.” It is not clear from the emails what exactly Cambridge Analytica expected Team Jorge to do on the campaign or how the Israelis would do it. What is clear is that staff at the British consultancy anticipated the Israelis would be providing a package of information. In another email, a staffer working on the campaign asked a colleague for “an email address for Jorge”, whom she wanted to contact “for some assistance in sourcing information for the campaign”. The reply copied “Jorge and Joel for coordination” and added: “I believe the package will arrive this coming week for you.” In the end, it appears that Team Jorge’s information was transferred to Cambridge Analytica at a meeting at the London office. Clandestine footage of election rival An account of what happened next was given by Kaiser to a parliamentary committee three years later. She told MPs that the Israeli contractor – now known to be Team Jorge – visited Cambridge Analytica’s offices in Mayfair. “They came to the office for maybe an hour one day, and plugged something into a computer to show some pieces of information that they had obtained from the opposing campaign,” she said. That included, she added, a video from inside Buhari’s campaign meetings, apparently filmed by a mole planted by the Israeli team. She recalled being “shocked” and “surprised”, “because they were actually sitting there with the candidate campaign manager and other high-level individuals on the campaign. I had never seen that before from campaign consultants.” The Israeli contractors had also obtained documents, some of which Kaiser told the MPs were then leaked to the press. She told the parliamentary committee that she had found the activities of the Israeli contractor “concerning” but stressed: “I did not know what they were up to until it had already been done.” When asked for the name of the Israeli team behind the black ops campaign, she replied: “I don’t remember, to be honest.” Tal Hanan. Tal Hanan. Get in touch Two months after Jonathan lost the presidential election in Nigeria, Cambridge Analytica was again considering working with its Israeli partners. Nix, the Cambridge Analytica chief, emailed Kaiser a question. “What is Jorge’s (from Israel black ops co) surname please and also the name of his company[?],” he asked. Kaiser replied: “Tal Hanan is CEO of Demoman International.” Nix did not respond to questions from the Guardian, other than to say the newspaper’s “purported understanding is disputed”. Kaiser told the Guardian that her parliamentary testimony had been a “daunting experience”, adding: “I didn’t remember the name of the Demoman company when asked.” She said that she had no prior knowledge of the methods Team Jorge would end up using in Nigeria. “Clearly, the making of a political sausage is not pretty in many of its aspects, and I understand how those who have not seen and experienced it at close quarters could look at what are regarded as ordinary political behaviours in democracies around the world and hold a position of moral criticism,” Kaiser added. “But I do not believe that criminality (with some notorious exceptions) is rampant.”

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