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testo IA Act votato nella commissione del PE
by de petra giulio May 11, 2023

May 11, 2023

Invio in allegato il testo consolidato cosi come votato oggi dalla commissione del PE. Dovrebbe andare in votazione nella sessione del 12/15 giugno.

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‘Godfather of AI’ Geoffrey Hinton quits Google and warns over dangers of machine learning | Google | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo May 11, 2023

May 11, 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/02/geoffrey-hinton-godfathe…> The man often touted as the godfather of AI has quit Google, citing concerns over the flood of fake information, videos and photos online and the possibility for AI to upend the job market. Dr Geoffrey Hinton, who with two of his students at the University of Toronto built a neural net in 2012, quit Google this week, the New York Times reported. Hinton, 75, said he quit to speak freely about the dangers of AI, and in part regrets his contribution to the field. He was brought on by Google a decade ago to help develop the company’s AI technology. Hinton’s research led the way for current systems like ChatGPT. He told the New York Times that until last year he believed Google had been a “proper steward” of the technology, but that changed once Microsoft started incorporating a chatbot into its Bing search engine, and the company began becoming concerned about the risk to its search business. Some of the dangers of AI chatbots were “quite scary”, he told the BBC, warning they could become more intelligent than humans and could be exploited by “bad actors”. “I’ve come to the conclusion that the kind of intelligence we’re developing is very different from the intelligence we have.” “So it’s as if you had 10,000 people and whenever one person learned something, everybody automatically knew it. And that’s how these chatbots can know so much more than any one person.” Hinton’s concern in the short term is something that has already become a reality – people will not be able to discern what is true any more with AI-generated photos, videos and text flooding the internet. The recent upgrades to image generators such as Midjourney mean people can now produce photo-realistic images – one such image of Pope Frances in a Balenciaga puffer coat went viral in March. Hinton was also concerned that AI will eventually replace jobs like paralegals, personal assistants and other “drudge work”, and potentially more in the future. Google’s chief scientist, Jeff Dean said in a statement that Google appreciated Hinton’s contributions to the company over the past decade. “I’ve deeply enjoyed our many conversations over the years. I’ll miss him, and I wish him well! “As one of the first companies to publish AI Principles, we remain committed to a responsible approach to AI. We’re continually learning to understand emerging risks while also innovating boldly.” It came as IBM CEO Arvind Krishna told Bloomberg that up to 30% of the company’s back-office roles could be replaced by AI and automation within five years. Krishna said hiring in areas such as human resources will be slowed or suspended, and could result in around 7,800 roles being replaced. IBM has a total global workforce of 260,000. The Guardian has sought comment from IBM. Last month, the Guardian was able to bypass a voice authentication system used by Services Australia using an online AI voice synthesiser, throwing into question the viability of voice biometrics for authentication. Toby Walsh, the chief scientist at the University of New South Wales’ AI Institute, said people should be questioning any online media they see now. “When it comes to any digital data you see – audio or video – you have to entertain the idea that someone has spoofed it.”

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The lawyer whose sex trafficking case against Instagram could spell trouble for big tech | Global development | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo May 10, 2023

May 10, 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/may/10/lawyer-sex-traff…> On 14 March 2022, Annie McAdams, a personal injury lawyer running a small firm in Houston, Texas, filed a civil action suit on behalf of one of her clients. The plaintiff was a 23-year-old woman, who had endured years of sexual exploitation at the hands of a convicted trafficker. The defendant was one of the most powerful technology companies in the world. Contained within McAdams’s federal suit was a series of allegations that Meta – the owner of Facebook and Instagram, which are used by more than 3 billion people every day – had knowingly created a breeding ground for human trafficking and was actively facilitating the buying and selling of people for sex online. The lawsuit alleges that the company’s products – particularly Instagram – connects vulnerable victims with human traffickers and sex buyers, and provides traffickers with the means to groom those victims. It says that human trafficking victims are regularly posted on Instagram and sold for sex against their will and claims that the company has failed to take adequate steps to stop this. In the court documents, the plaintiff – who we are calling Shawna – says she was 18 when she was first contacted on Instagram by a man she didn’t know. She claims that the man – referred to as RL in the court papers – sent her messages on her public profile and on Instagram’s direct-messaging service and that this campaign of grooming led to her agreeing to meet him in person. Two days after their first meeting, she claims that RL began to sell her to sex buyers on Instagram. She claims that RL posted explicit pictures of her on Instagram along with emojis such as dollar signs, crowns and roses, widely recognised by law enforcement and trafficking experts as indicators of commercial sex adverts. “[Meta Inc] knew that the use of these codes were blatant red flags … and were actually sex trafficking advertisements designed to sell her for sex, but [Meta] did nothing to remove or prevent those repeated posts, despite having the ability to do so,” the court papers say. Shawna alleges that over the course of a year she was sold on Instagram to multiple sex buyers. She says she was threatened with homelessness or violence by RL if she refused to fulfil her “quota” of sex acts. She went on to testify against RL in a federal criminal trial in Texas and he was subsequently sentenced to 40 years for sex trafficking. However, the lawsuit claims that at the time it was filed to the court in Houston, Instagram had not removed the trafficker’s Instagram account. McAdams claims that despite repeated attempts by Meta to get the case dismissed, Shawna, who is seeking damages from the company, is now on the brink of taking her civil claim against Meta further through the US court system than any other case has managed. She believes that there are now no serious legal obstacles between her case and bringing Meta before a jury in 2024 to face allegations that it played an integral role in the trafficking of her client. A spokesperson for Meta said that Meta prohibits sex trafficking on its platforms “in no uncertain terms … we vigorously deny the claims made against Meta in this suit.” It is not the first time that Meta – in either of its guises as Meta Platforms Inc or Facebook Inc – has faced lawsuits containing similar allegations. Yet in the two decades since it was launched by Mark Zuckerberg from a Harvard dorm, his company – which rebranded from Facebook to Meta in 2021 – like other technology companies with servers based in the US, has never faced prosecution for illegal and harmful content and activities on its platforms. For decades, social media companies have sheltered behind an obscure clause in the 1996 Communications Decency Act – called section 230, which concludes that technology companies are not legally responsible for crimes that occur on their platforms. Section 230 states that providers of “interactive computer services” – which includes the owners of social media platforms and website hosts – should not be treated as the publisher of material posted by users. Since the act was passed, tech companies such as Meta have argued successfully in US courts that section 230 provides them with immunity from prosecution for any illegal content published on their platforms, as long as they are unaware of that content’s existence, building a fortress of legal precedent. Section 230 does not shield online platforms from federal criminal charges if they are seen as responsible for facilitating trafficking. And a recent amendment to section 230 – known as the Fosta-Sesta package – means that companies can be held liable under state and civil laws but must be shown to have knowingly assisted or facilitated sex trafficking. Other cases have attempted to swerve section 230, but in her federal suit, McAdams is instead tackling it head-on, arguing that it has been misunderstood and was never intended to protect a social media company which, she claims, knowingly allows crimes against children to occur on its platforms. “The problem is not section 230,” McAdams says. “The problem is 20 years of bad precedent and the court’s misinterpretation of 230. In no place does it say that there should be immunity. There is a big difference between immunity and no liability.” McAdams’ decision to tackle the interpretation of liability under section 230 comes as changing legal winds across the US challenge the lack of accountability granted to tech companies. The debate around section 230 has become highly polarised. Those who want the clause amended say that the legal safe haven it has provided for internet companies means they have no incentive to root out illegal content on their sites. Others warn that amending section 230 would curb free speech and dismantle democratic values online. Some sex worker groups also warn that undermining section 230 would harm their business and make them unsafe. McAdams says that the only way to stop social media platforms being used as online marketplaces for sex trafficking is through the courts. Along with Shawna’s case, McAdams has several similar suits filed against Meta across the US in which other plaintiffs allege that Meta enabled, facilitated and profited from their sex trafficking. “After years of being silenced, I hope my clients will have their day in court,” she says. “Their bravery and resilience has started something that could finally see the internet become a safer place for children and open the door for other survivors to be heard. I have many, many more victims waiting to have their cases reviewed. This is just the start.” A Meta spokesperson said: “Sex trafficking is abhorrent … we cooperate with law enforcement so they can find and prosecute the criminals who commit these heinous acts, and we use technology to help keep this abuse off our platforms.” “Our goal is to prevent people who seek to exploit others from using our platform, and we work closely with anti-trafficking experts and safety organisations around the world to inform these efforts. We will continue to join with others across society in the fight against sex trafficking and the predators who engage in it. “No court has found that there is any truth to [McAdams’s] allegations against Meta or that her claims are legally viable.”

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Il feticcio della privacy e le polemiche sul riconoscimento facciale
by 380° May 9, 2023

May 9, 2023

Buongiorno, se qualche zelante difensore della privacy avesse qualcosa da dire, magari anche sul piano costituzionale e giuridico, sarebbe il momento di parlare. Temo che il discorso stia rapidamente degenerando. https://www.repubblica.it/tecnologia/blog/strategikon/2023/05/06/news/il_fe… (consultare con JS disabilitato) «Il feticcio della privacy e le polemiche sul riconoscimento facciale» 06 MAGGIO 2023, di Andrea Monti --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Le polemiche innescate dalla recente dichiarazione del ministro dell’interno sull’estensione dell’impiego del riconoscimento facciale risentono, ancora una volta, della confusione fra il livello normativo e quello politico, della narrativa distorta che si è stratificata nel corso degli anni attorno al feticcio della “privacy” e della scoperta, da parte dei non addetti ai lavori, di come è fatto —non da oggi— l’apparato di pubblica sicurezza italiano. I poteri di pubblica sicurezza attengono innanzi tutto alla tutela della convivenza civile e dunque, indirettamente, alla sopravvivenza stessa dello Stato. In altri termini, garantire l’ordinato svolgimento delle attività quotidiane è il prerequisito per il mantenimento dell’ordine pubblico e dunque di quella che già nel Medio Evo i giuristi anglosassoni chiamavano peace of the land. Se queste parole suonano, eufemisticamente, alquanto retrò è perché in effetti lo sono: fanno riferimento, infatti, a un apparato di norme ancora basato sul Regio Decreto 18 giugno 1931, noto anche come “Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza” (al quale si affianca, ma è un altra questione, il “Testo unico delle leggi sanitarie”) molto modificato, mai abrogato. In quanto afferente alla tutela dello Stato e —oggi, alla protezione dell’ordine costituzionale— la pubblica sicurezza è materia sottratta sia all’intervento della UE, sia a quello delle autorità indipendenti, e di quella per la protezione dei dati personali, in particolare. Ci sono delle norme che stabiliscono una qualche forma di coinvolgimento di quest’ultima negli aspetti più tecnico-informatici delle attività di polizia, ma è fuori discussione che il superiore interesse dello Stato e la tutela della collettività non possano essere globalmente limitati “in nome della privacy” perché esistono già dei meccanismi di tutela del cittadino in base ai quali le attività di pubblica sicurezza sono sottoposte al controllo giurisdizionale —alla magistratura, in altri termini— tutte le volte che si traducono in una potenziale limitazione dei diritti. Nel caso specifico del riconoscimento facciale biometrico, poi, il suo impiego per finalità di pubblica sicurezza e indagini penali è già consentito dalla normativa vigente (nello specifico, dalla conversione del decreto legge 139/21) da quasi due anni. A questo andrebbe aggiunto anche il fatto che la Corte di cassazione è granitica nel rilevare che nei luoghi pubblici non sussiste una ragionevole aspettativa di privacy per cui non si configura il reato di interferenze illecite nella vita privata. Infine, come sa chiunque abbia un minimo di dimestichezza con la pratica del diritto penale, i poteri di controllo anche preventivo delle autorità sono estremamente estesi e diffusi e se venissero esercitati in malafede, le uniche differenze con Paesi a democrazia variabile sarebbero il clima e l’architettura. Quest’ultima considerazione ci porta al cuore del problema che non è giuridico ma politico: da un lato, la sicurezza si può garantire solo con la prevenzione e la prevenzione implica controllo diffuso, pervasivo ed efficiente. Dall’altro, la disponibilità di forme di controllo più estese ed efficaci generano nelle persone una reazione di istintivo rifiuto. Da qui le posizioni catastrofistiche in nome delle quali chissà cosa accadrebbe se lo Stato avesse la disponibilità di tutte le informazioni che ci riguardano, se potesse tracciare i nostri spostamenti, sapere cosa facciamo e con chi passiamo il tempo. Il problema è, evidentemente, reale, ma gestirlo invocando un principio di precauzione in nome del quale determinate attività devono essere vietate a priori perché qualcuno potrebbe abusarne è una scelta semplicemente sbagliata. Con tutti i suoi problemi, il nostro sistema politico (e di riflesso quello giuridico) è sufficientemente robusto da non cedere a derive autoritarie e nel corso degli anni le forze di polizia hanno maturato una profonda consapevolezza democratica. Se non fosse così, avremmo già cambiato regime da tempo, senza bisogno di aspettare il riconoscimento facciale biometrico. In altri termini, e su questo sfido apertamente gli zelanti “difensori della privacy”, opporsi all’impiego di tecnologia per garantire la sicurezza perché qualcuno potrebbe abusarne equivale ad affermare di non avere fiducia nelle istituzioni. Se così fosse, allora la inevitabile conseguenza logica di questa posizione sarebbe il dover entrare in clandestinità per rovesciare uno Stato che ha tradito gli ideali democratici. Chi ha il coraggio di fare un’affermazione del genere lanci il primo tweet. Certamente, come detto, l’estensione del controllo diffuso resa possibile dalle tecnologie dell’informazione va gestita, ma più che proclami ideologici e alquanto passati —quantomeno dalla prospettiva di chi si occupa di questi argomenti da un po’— servirebbe potenziare gli strumenti a disposizione dei cittadini per rilevare e reagire ad eventuali errori nell’uso delle informazioni o per le deliberate violazioni dei diritti delle persone. Tradotto: serve potenziare il diritto di accesso ai dati detenuti per finalità di pubblica sicurezza e stabilire procedure veramente celeri per ottenere le risposte dalle autorità competenti. La direttiva 680/16 recepita anche dall’Italia si occupa della questione e fornisce già degli strumenti per controllare, caso per caso, se una specifica attività di polizia connessa alla raccolta di dati e informazioni abbia superato o meno i confini fissati per legge. Non è perfetta e ci sono sicuramente margini di miglioramento, ma la norma che protegge le persone esiste e può essere già applicata. Invece di lamentarsi di ipotetici abusi, dunque, si potrebbe contare il numero dei procedimenti attivati in nome della direttiva 680 che si sono conclusi con la prova di abusi da parte del potere esecutivo. Sarebbe un elemento empirico quanto si vuole, ma pur sempre concreto, per capire se e quanto saremmo in balìa di uno Stato spione e autoritario. Curiosamente, tuttavia, di questi provvedimenti non c’è traccia. Può essere vero che, in nome del principio di precauzione, “assenza di prova non equivale a prova dell’assenza” e che dunque, da qualche parte, siano stati commessi abusi che non sono stati scoperti. Ma quando si parla di diritto, negativa non sunt probanda (la prova negativa non si può dare) e quindi, ad oggi, dobbiamo escludere che siano state commesse violazioni e prendere atto che il sistema, nel suo complesso, “tiene”. Al contrario, applicare il principio di precauzione agli strumenti di regolazione dei rapporti sociali è un atto irrazionale che serve solo a provocare la paralisi di qualsiasi componente dello Stato e pregiudicare i diritti dei cittadini. La prova che sia possibile coniugare tecnologie di sorveglianza e tutele democratiche è stata fornita, durante la pandemia, dalle scelte della Corea del Sud. Il contact tracing è stato possibile grazie a un massiccio ricorso ai dati accumulati sui cittadini, ma non per questo il Paese ha subito arretramenti democratici. Questo non è certo accaduto per via del luogo comune che vuole gli “orientali” più “rispettosi delle regole”, ma per l’attitudine del governo alla trasparenza nelle scelte e nella loro applicazione. La realtà, ma questo gli zelanti difensori della privacy rifiutano di ammetterlo, non è fatta di zeri e di uno ma di una serie infinita di valori intermedi, e il diritto non è deterministico né tantomeno scientifico. Come la politica è un fatto umano e come tale intrinsecamente fallibile e fallace. Ma nella sua debolezza è certamente preferibile alle certezze binarie di chi venera feticci e nuovi dei, in nome di convinzioni che hanno molto più a che fare con la fede che con la ragione. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

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Fwd: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals
by Andrea Trentini May 9, 2023

May 9, 2023

(mi allaccio al thread https://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2022-December/049933.html e seguenti) -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: The role of FOSS in preventing a recurrence of vehicle emissions scandals Date: Sat, 06 May 2023 16:58:09 +0300 From: Lars Noodén <lars.nooden(a)gmx.com> To: libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org Recent news¹ reminds us that back in 2015 a whistleblower exposed the VW/Audi emissions scandal, which I guess had been going on since 1999. The companies executives used closed source, proprietary software in the vehicles to hide the fact that the vehicles were emitting 40 times the allowed NOx when actually out on the roads and not in the testing centers. Even with fines and prison sentences, there is no way to be sure the companies are not working on more of the same -- unless the development is done out in the open. Clearly we see both physical and economic harm from neglecting to require FOSS even in embedded computers, such as the 100+ now found in each new car. because these companies have already shown that the closed source model *cannot* be trusted such style of development should not be allowed any more in regards to vehicles. Surely a FOSS-based workflow can be figured out. Perhaps it is a timely and appropriate topic for institutions like FSF, OSI, EFFI, and so on to address that publicly? Even a short statement in passing would at least raise awareness and provide an opportunity to ratchet things forward in regard to Software Freedom. /Lars ¹ Many sites on this topic, too, here is a small sample of three: "Former Audi Chief to Plead Guilty in Emissions Scandal" https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/business/diesel-emissions-scandal-audi-r… "Ex-Audi CEO to Plead Guilty Over 'Dieselgate' Scandal " https://www.voanews.com/a/ex-audi-ceo-to-plead-guilty-over-dieselgate-scand… "Former head of Audi to confess in 'dieselgate' fraud trial| https://www.dw.com/en/former-head-of-audi-to-confess-in-dieselgate-fraud-tr… _______________________________________________ libreplanet-discuss mailing list libreplanet-discuss(a)libreplanet.org https://lists.libreplanet.org/mailman/listinfo/libreplanet-discuss

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L’AI act giovedì in commissione del PE
by de petra giulio May 9, 2023

May 9, 2023

Giovedi l’AI act sarà in commissione del Parlamento Europeo per una prima lettura. L’arrivo in plenaria è previsto per giugno. Ci sono più di 1000 emendamenti. Il relatore è l’italiano Brando Benifei, capogruppo del PD. Qui i riferimenti https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CJ40-OJ-2023-05-11-1_EN.html

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WhatsApp could disappear from UK over privacy concerns, ministers told | WhatsApp | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/08/whatsapp-could-disappear…> The UK government risks sleepwalking into a confrontation with WhatsApp that could lead to the messaging app disappearing from Britain, ministers have been warned, with options for an amicable resolution fast running out. At the centre of the row is the online safety bill, a vast piece of legislation that will touch on almost every aspect of online life in Britain. More than four years in the making, with eight secretaries of state and five prime ministers involved in its drafting, the bill, which is progressing through the House of Lords, is more than 250 pages long. The table of contents alone spans 10 pages. The bill gives Ofcom the power to impose requirements for social networks to use technology to tackle terrorism or child sexual abuse content, with fines of up to 10% of global turnover for those services that do not comply. Companies must use “best endeavours” to develop or source technology to obey the notice. But for messaging apps that secure their user data with “end-to-end encryption” (E2EE), it is technologically impossible to read user messages without fundamentally breaking their promises to users. That, they say, is a step they will not take. “The bill provides no explicit protection for encryption,” said a coalition of providers, including the market leaders WhatsApp and Signal, in an open letter last month, “and if implemented as written, could empower Ofcom to try to force the proactive scanning of private messages on end-to-end encrypted communication services, nullifying the purpose of end-to-end encryption as a result and compromising the privacy of all users.” If push came to shove, they say, they would choose to protect the security of their non-UK users. “Ninety-eight per cent of our users are outside the UK,” WhatsApp’s chief, Will Cathcart, told the Guardian in March. “They do not want us to lower the security of the product, and just as a straightforward matter, it would be an odd choice for us to choose to lower the security of the product in a way that would affect those 98% of users.” Legislators have called on the government to take the concerns seriously. “These services, such as WhatsApp, will potentially leave the UK,” Claire Fox told the House of Lords last week. “This is not like threatening to storm off. It is not done in any kind of pique in that way. In putting enormous pressure on these platforms to scan communications, we must remember that they are global platforms. “They have a system that works for billions of people all around the world. A relatively small market such as the UK is not something for which they would compromise their billions of users around the world.” A Home Office spokesperson said: “We support strong encryption, but this cannot come at the cost of public safety. Tech companies have a moral duty to ensure they are not blinding themselves and law enforcement to the unprecedented levels of child sexual abuse on their platforms. “The online safety bill in no way represents a ban on end-to-end encryption, nor will it require services to weaken encryption. “Where it is the only effective, proportionate and necessary action available, Ofcom will be able to direct platforms to use accredited technology, or make best endeavours to develop new technology, to accurately identify child sexual abuse content, so it can be taken down and the despicable predators brought to justice.” Richard Allan, the Liberal Democrat peer who worked as Meta’s head of policy for a decade until 2019, described the government approach as one of “intentional ambiguity”. “They are careful to say that they have no intention of banning end-to-end encryption … but at the same time refuse to confirm that they could not do so under the new powers in the bill. This creates a high-stakes game of chicken, where the government think companies will give them more if they hold the threat of drastic technical orders over them. “The government’s hope is that companies will blink first in the game of chicken and give them what they want.” Allan said another scenario could be that the government comes clean and declares its intent is to limit end-to-end encryption. “It would at least allow for an orderly transition, if services choose to withdraw products from the UK market rather than operate here on these terms. It might be that there are no significant withdrawals, and the UK government could congratulate themselves on calling the companies’ bluff and getting what they want at little cost, but I doubt that this would be the case.” Backers of the bill are unimpressed with efforts to rewrite it to suit big tech, though. Damian Collins, the Conservative MP who chaired a Westminster committee scrutinising the bill, said he did not support one amendment introduced to try to protect end-to-end encryption. “I don’t think you want to give companies subjective grounds for deciding whether or not they need to comply with the duties set out in the bill.” Collins added that the bill did not attack encryption because it would only require messaging companies sharing information that they have access to – which does not include message content. However, he said authorities should be able to access the background data behind users, including data about usage of the app, contacts, location and names of user groups. If users access WhatsApp through a web browser, the service can also collect information about websites visited before and after sending messages, Collins added. This week Politico reported that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology wanted to find a way through the row and is having talks “with anyone that wants to discuss this with us”. Last year, the chief executive of the trade association Digital Content Next, Jason Kint, flagged a US antitrust complaint that contained 2019 communications between Mark Zuckerberg and his policy chief, Nick Clegg, in which they discussed flagging the importance of privacy and end-to-end encryption as a “smokescreen” in any debate over integrating the back end of Meta’s apps. Clegg wrote: “Are you suggesting we should lead with E2EE and not interoperability? You may be right that – as a matter of political practicality – the latter is easier to block/hinder than the former.” He added that it was “very easy to explain” why E2EE is helpful to users whereas integrating the interoperability of apps looks like “a play for our benefit, not necessarily users”.

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Intelligenza artificiale e diritto amministrativo 9 maggio 2023
by Mauro Alovisio May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023

Gent.mi segnalo seminario in diretta streaming domani su Intelligenza artificiale a cura dell'Università degli Studi di Torino (credo sarà registrato e disponibile sul sito unito media )Un caro saluto Mauro Intelligenza artificiale e diritto amministrativo | 9 maggio 2023 ore 9.15 Pubblicato: Venerdì 14 aprile 2023 Presiede - *Roberto Cavallo Perin* 9.15 *Sergio Foà* - *Intelligenza artificiale e cultura della trasparenza * *amministrativa* 9.45 *Giancarlo Montedoro* - *Intelligenza artificiale, società e mercato* 10.15 *Gabriella M. Racca* - *Stato digitale, politica industriale e contratti pubblici* 10.45 *Francesco Cardarelli* - *Stato digitale e mercato* 11.15 *Tomas Font* - *Intelligenza artificiale e azione amministrativa* 11.45 *Carlo Emanuele Gallo* - *Intelligenza artificiale e giustizia amministrativa* Nell’occasione si presentano: *Lo Stato digitale. Una introduzione* di Luisa Torchia, Il Mulino, 2023 *Intelligenza artificiale e diritto: una rivoluzione?* a cura di A. Pajno, F. Donati, A. Perrucci, Quaderni di Astrid, Il Mulino, 2022 Con la partecipazione di *Luisa Torchia*, *Alessandro Pajno* e *Antonio Perrucci* 15.00 - Incontro con i dottorandi. Il convegno si terrà nell'*Aula Magna del Campus Luigi Einaudi* (Lungo Dora Siena 100/A | Torino). *Sarà possibile seguire a distanza l’evento collegandosi a Webexopen_in_new <https://unito.webex.com/meet/master.dpa> o in diretta streaming sul canale Live di Unito mediaopen_in_new <https://media.unito.it/?channel=4>.* *Per esprimere la propria partecipazione, occorre compilare il modulo dedicatoopen_in_new <https://forms.gle/rnCvhijBWL9BmpJT8>.*

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GAO Report - Software Acquisition: Additional Actions Needed to Help DOD Implement Future Modernization Efforts
by Diego.Latella May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023

Software Acquisition: Additional Actions Needed to Help DOD Implement Future Modernization Efforts GAO23-105611 https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105611?utm_campaign=usgao_email&utm_con… DL -- Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR/ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it [1]) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) CNR/GI-STS (http://gists.pi.cnr.it) https://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, fax: +390506212040 =================== Links: ------ [1] http://www.isti.cnr.it

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[CFP] 35th International Teletraffic Congress - Deadline Approaching
by Martino Trevisan May 8, 2023

May 8, 2023

[Apologies if you receive multiple copies of this mail] *35th International Teletraffic Congress* *3-5 October, 2023, Turin* *Website: https://itc35.itc-conference.org/* /_*CALL FOR PAPERS*_/ /The International Teletraffic Congress (ITC) 35, to be held October 3-5, 2023 at Politecnico di Torino, Italy, is the 35th edition of this international flagship congress in the field of networking science and practice. ITC was founded back in 1955 by enthusiastic scientists and engineers who were willing to deploy networks in a holistic way. Since then, it has established a multi-decade tradition as the primary forum for presenting and discussing the latest technical advances in the broad areas of teletraffic models, network systems, and measurements. ITC 35 solicits cutting-edge papers spanning both theory and experimentation in all areas of networking, ranging from traffic engineering and control with application also to emerging softwarized/virtualized network paradigms, up to innovative wireless scenarios brought about by the emergence of B5G and IoT systems. ITC 35 especially encourages original contributions which bridge the gap between performance modeling and real-life operational aspects, including works which leverage measurement data to provide a better understanding of the wired and wireless networks’ operation under realistic conditions. A selection of the best papers presented at the conference will be fast tracked to Performance Evaluation and Computer Networks journals after the conference. ITC 35 will offer a number of _*student travel grants*_ to support full-time students for attending._* *_/ /_*TOPICS*_/ *ITC 35* covers topics in the following areas: * Performance Evaluation, Control and Optimization * Network Measurements and Big Data * Networking Architectures and Paradigms * Wireless and Cellular Networks /_*IMPORTANT DATES*_/ * *May 23, 2023:**Paper registration deadline,* /_*15 days left*_/ * *May 30, 2023:* Paper submission deadline * *Jul 17, 2023:* Notification date * *Aug 16, 2023:* Camera-ready paper and author registration deadline * *Oct 3-5, 2023:* Conference Date Both full papers and short papers are welcome. Submission instructions can be found at the conference website: https://itc35.itc-conference.org/authors.html /_*KEYNOTE SPEAKERS*_/* * * *Silvia Giordano*, SUPSI, Switzerland * *Colin Maclay*, University of Southern California, US More keynote speakers will be announced in the next weeks /_*ORGANIZING COMMITTEE*_/* * *General chairs:* * *Markus Fiedler*, BTH, Sweden * *Michela Meo*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy *TPC chairs:* * *Zhiyuan Jiang*, China * *Sara Alouf*, INRIA, France * *Oliver Hohlfeld*, University of Kassel, Germany *Local arrangement:* * *Daniela Renga*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy * *Greta Vallero*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy *Publicity chairs:* * *Martino Trevisan*, Università di Trieste, Italy * *Yuxuan Sun*, Beijing Jiaotong University, China *Web chair:* * *Gianluca Perna*, Politecnico di Torino, Italy For additional information visit *https://itc35.itc-conference.org/* <https://itc35.itc-conference.org/> For any questions do not hesitate to contact the conference organization under***itc35_oc(a)tlc.polito.it* /Best Regards,/ /*ITC 35 *//Organizing Team/

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