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Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning | Science
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 23, 2019

March 23, 2019

http://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6433/1287.full (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Oltre le bolle e le echo chambers
by don Luca Peyron March 22, 2019

March 22, 2019

Non è inusuale che Netflix, incamerando i dati di visione dei suoi clienti, cerchi il più possibile di personalizzare l’esperienza sulla piattaforma, attraverso una selezione di titoli e perfino di immagini costruita su misura sui gusti di ciascuno. Ricordate le storie a bivi di Topolino? Siamo molto oltre? Scenari interessanti. Buona lettura Dl https://www.wired.it/play/televisione/2019/03/20/love-death-and-robots-ordi…

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Death by a Thousand Clicks: Where Electronic Health Records Went Wrong
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 22, 2019

March 22, 2019

http://fortune.com/longform/medical-records/ (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Medtronic Conexus Radio Frequency Telemetry Protocol Vulnerability
by Giacomo Tesio March 22, 2019

March 22, 2019

The Conexus telemetry protocol utilized within this ecosystem does not implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent short-range access to an affected product, in situations where the product’s radio is turned on, can inject, replay, modify, and/or intercept data within the telemetry communication. This communication protocol provides the ability to read and write memory values to affected implanted cardiac devices; therefore, an attacker could exploit this communication protocol to change memory in the implanted cardiac device. https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-19-080-01 ____ Come minimo, l'azienda andrebbe condannata alla sostituzione del device con uno che applichi le più basilari norme di sicurezza informatica, ma... chi si assume i rischio degli interventi cardio-chirurgici di sostituzione? Qui l'incompetenza qui valica i confini aziendali. Chi ha autorizzato la commercializzazione? Come risponde del danno che ha causato ai malati? Non stiamo parlando di un attacco macchiavellico che sfrutta ignote vulnerabilità zero-day! Il sistema non prevede alcuna autenticazione, alcuna autorizzazione e nessuna protezione crittografica delle comunicazioni! Giacomo

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FreeTube: The Private YouTube Client
by Giacomo Tesio March 22, 2019

March 22, 2019

FreeTube is a YouTube client for Windows, Mac, and Linux built around using YouTube more privately. You can enjoy your favorite content and creators without your habits being tracked. All of your user data is stored locally and never sent or published to the internet. Being powered by the Invidious API, FreeTube has become one of the best methods to watch YouTube privately on desktop. https://freetubeapp.io/ Privacy has become a heated topic over the past few years and consumers have become much more aware of the growing issues with large companies. Personal information and other data are being mass collected for the purpose of "Relevant Advertisements" and suggested content. Consumers that don't like this sort of collection have been trying to hide their habits and switch to alternatives. As these consumers work on a more private life, some have realized the difficulty of moving away certain services like YouTube. Alternatives exist, however these alternatives lack the content that these consumers have become used to. Many will still use YouTube despite the privacy risks that it may have. FreeTube's mission is to help as many people in this group as we can. Our goal is to allow users to watch YouTube in a familiar and user friendly way while minimizing the privacy violations that come from using YouTube. https://freetubeapp.io/about.php ___ Mi sento sempre seriamente... "sporco" a condividere link a YouTube e trovo molto odioso quando video interessanti sono distribuiti SOLO via YouTube (ancora di più quando tali contenuti sono prodotti con soldi pubblici). Io sono in grado di minimizzare la diffusione di informazioni personali, ma mi rendo conto che questo non vale per tutti. Usare FreeTube per accedere non esclude tutte le possibilità di tracciamento, ma ne limita enormemente la portata. Future versioni potrebbero anche ricercare il video su PeerTube escludendo completamente il tracciamento da parte di Google (almeno.. io l'ho proposto agli sviluppatori: https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube/issues/237 ) NOTA: probabilmente YouTube non è la sorgente maggiore di dati personali per Google, Google Analytics è molto più subdolo perché viene installato gratuitamente da sviluppatori web cui non interessa la privacy dei propri visitatori, ma gli utenti non hanno alcun modo per evitare che questo tracci ed incroci ogni più piccola interazione su tutti i siti che lo utilizzano. Un cavallo di troia, invisibile ai più. Anche qui, è possibile mitigare i rischi personali (disabilitando JavaScript), ma l'unica vera soluzione è diffondere la consapevolezza del problema. Particolarmente triste è ritrovarsi su un sito istituzionale o didattico e venire tracciati da Google. Un faro in questo senso è http://fare.polito.it che distribuisce ottimo materiale didattico utilizzando solo 2 cookie tecnici. Giacomo

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AI Has Beaten Humans at Lip-reading - MIT Technology Review
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 22, 2019

March 22, 2019

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602949/ai-has-beaten-humans-at-lip-readi… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Countering the geographical impacts of automation: Computers, AI, and place disparities
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 21, 2019

March 21, 2019

https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-the-geographical-impacts-of-a… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Il corso EduHack è ufficialmente online!
by Francesco Ruggiero March 20, 2019

March 20, 2019

Carissimi, vi segnalo che dal 18 marzo il corso EduHack <https://eduhack.eu/course/> è ufficialmente online. Prende dunque il via un percorso sperimentale di formazione che tra il 2019 e il 2020 coinvolgerà attivamente le università partner del Consorzio Edu-Hack: l'Universidad Internacional de la Rioja <https://eduhack.eu/partners/unir/> sarà la prima tappa, a cui seguiranno l'Università di Coventry <https://eduhack.eu/partners/coventry-university/> e il Politecnico di Torino <https://eduhack.eu/partners/nexa-center/>, capofila e coordinatore del progetto. Edu-Hack, progetto co-finanziato dal programma Erasmus+ <http://www.erasmusplus.it/> della Unione Europea, è un percorso di formazione destinato ai docenti universitari che desiderano imparare a utilizzare gli strumenti digitali per produrre nuove esperienze di insegnamento e apprendimento, sperimentando strumenti e approcci innovativi. In questa prospettiva, Edu-Hack incoraggia a usare l’Open Web e a produrre e riutilizzare risorse educative aperte, promuovendo la collaborazione e l’interazione con gli altri, fuori e dentro la sua comunità. Per maggiori informazioni visitate la pagina: https://eduhack.eu/ oppure scrivete a mattia.plazio(a)polito.it Grazie per l'attenzione, Francesco -- Francesco Ruggiero Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino - DAUIN Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 - 10129 Torino web: http://nexa.polito.it mail: francesco.ruggiero(a)polito.it tel: 011 090 7219

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Una macchina pensa ma non vive, un'intervista con il filosofo italiano Carlo Sini • cheFare
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 20, 2019

March 20, 2019

https://www.che-fare.com/dal-web/automa-marco-liberatore-intervista-carlo-s… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Proposed Federal Law Broadens Regulatory Landscape for Facial Recognition Technology - Lexology
by Alberto Cammozzo March 20, 2019

March 20, 2019

<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5d0d5f9-f275-4eab-871d-c09e…> On March 14th, U.S. Senators Roy Blunt of Missouri and Brian Schatz of Hawaii introduced a bill to regulate the commercial applications of facial recognition technology. The bill, “The Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019” (“the Act”), would prohibit certain entities from using facial recognition technology and data without first obtaining user consent. While there have been many privacy-focused bills introduced at the federal level, the Act stands out, as it appears to have both bipartisan legislative backing and support from the tech industry. OVERVIEW Scope The Act applies to private entities that collect, store, or process facial recognition data, and regulates how and when they may use “facial recognition technology.” “Facial recognition data” is defined under the Act as any unique attribute or feature of the face of a consumer that is used by facial recognition technology to uniquely identify a specific individual, while “facial recognition technology” is defined as technology that analyzes facial features and is used for the purposes of unique personal identification. Federal, state, and local governments are exempt, along with law enforcement, national security, and intelligence agencies. Also of note, the Act differentiates between processors and controllers, mirroring the language and meaning used in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Requirements The Act prohibits controllers (i.e., the entities making decisions regarding how data is processed) from knowingly using facial recognition technology to collect facial recognition data unless the controller obtains affirmative consent from the consumer and provides the consumer with proper notice. Such notice must: Inform consumers that facial recognition technology is present; Provide information about where the consumer can learn more about the facial recognition technology being used; and Provide documentation that includes information explaining the capabilities of the technology in terms that consumers can understand. The Act further prohibits covered entities from: Using facial recognition technology to discriminate against consumers; Repurposing facial recognition data for a purpose that is different from those disclosed to the consumer; Sharing the data with an unaffiliated third party without affirmative consent that is separate from the affirmative consent required for initial collection of facial recognition data; and Conditioning service on consent by a consumer, when the use of facial recognition technology is not necessary for that service. The Act also seeks to reduce possible bias in facial recognition technology, requiring covered entities to engage in meaningful human review before making any final decision based on the output of facial recognition technology that may result in foreseeable, material “harm” to a consumer, or may be unexpected or “highly offensive” to a consumer. Relatedly, if an entity makes a facial recognition technology available as an online service, that entity must allow an independent third party to conduct tests of the technology for accuracy and bias. [...]

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