- nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

A Global System of Work, A Global System of Regulation?: Crowdwork and Conflicts of Law by Miriam A. Cherry :: SSRN
by J.C. DE MARTIN Jan. 29, 2020

Jan. 29, 2020

A Global System of Work, A Global System of Regulation?: Crowdwork and Conflicts of Law Tulane Law Review, Vol. 94, 2019 Saint Louis University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-11 63 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2020 Last revised: 26 Jan 2020 Miriam A. Cherry Saint Louis University - School of Law Abstract On-demand platforms are changing and reshaping our conceptions of both the firm and the work relationship in far-reaching and critical ways, allowing companies to hire workers and to seek customers across national boundaries. Confronted with low pay, wage theft, and other problematic working conditions, gig workers around the world have turned to the courts, attempting to invoke the protections of traditional labor and employment law. While some commentators believe existing forms of labor and employment regulations can stretch to cover on-demand work, others have called for new legal initiatives specifically crafted for online platforms. The goal of this paper is to provide a global framework for thinking about the on-demand business model and these assorted conflicts of law and jurisdictional issues. The Maritime Labor Convention is discussed as an analogous regulatory scheme. Throughout, the paper emphasizes the need for further coordinated multilateral study, discussion, and regulatory action to assist both crowdworkers and businesses as they navigate the on-demand model of production. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523303 (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

1 0

Hunting UEFI Implants
by Giacomo Tesio Jan. 29, 2020

Jan. 29, 2020

Lettura interessante dal punto di vista tecnico e politico. https://blogs.gnome.org/hughsie/2020/01/27/hunting-uefi-implants/ Di seguito ometto i passaggi più tecnici, per riportare le considerazioni che credo possano essere interessanti per Nexa. Ovviamente, la soluzione proposta non può funzionare. E incrementerebbe il potere delle poche aziende "affidabili" (tutte rigorosamente USA). E' dunque probabile che verrà accolta con entusiasmo dal mercato. Giacomo ____ My fellow students were a mixture of security professionals and employees from various government departments from all over the world. We talked, a lot. My personal conclusion quite simply is that we’re failing as an industry. In the pursuit to reduce S3 resume time from 2s to 0.5s we introduce issues like the S3 bootscript vulnerability. With the goal to boot as quickly as possible, we only check the bare minimum certificate chain allowing additional malicious DXEs to be added to an image. OEMs are choosing inexpensive EC hardware from sketchy vendors that are acting as root of trust and also emulating hardware designed 30 years ago, whilst sharing the system SPI chip. By trying to re-use existing power management primitives like SMM as a security boundary the leaky abstractions fail us. Each layer in the security stack is assuming that the lower below it is implemented correctly, and so all it takes is one driver with SMM or CSME access to not check a memory address in a struct correctly and everything on top (e.g. BootGuard, ALSR, SELinux, etc) is broken. Coreboot isn’t the panacea here either as to get that to run you need to turn off various protections [...] Worst still, if you allow your “assumed secure” laptop out of sight then all bets are off with security. About a quarter of people at the UEFI training had their “travel laptop” tampered with at some point – with screws missing after “customs inspections” or with tamper seals broken after leaving a laptop in a hotel room. You really don’t need to remove the screws to image a hard drive these days. But, lets back away from the state-sponsored attacker back to reality for a minute. The brutal truth is that security costs money. [...] My proposal would be as follows: - SEC1: SecureBoot, BIOS_WE, BLE, SMM_BWP, and updates on the LVFS, with no existing detectable SMM issues (like ThinkPwn for example) - SEC2: PRx set correctly, if not using BootGuard or BIOSGuard, with PCR0 attestation data - SEC3: BootGuard enabled, with the EC controller requiring signed images - SEC4: Intel BIOSGuard or HP SureStart - SEC5: Hardware attestation like Apple T2 or Google Titan [...] Perhaps we could let the consumer vote with their wallet and make the ecosystem more secure.

1 0

Lo stato d'animo di chi twitta
by don Luca Peyron Jan. 29, 2020

Jan. 29, 2020

Buongiorno a tutti, segnalo un sito interessante: http://www.emojitracker.com/ il cui scopo è tracciare in tempo reale l'uso di emoticon su Twitter. Ridere fino alle lacrime pare sia il mood preferito dai nostri contemporanei. Buon tutto dl _________________________ www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

1 0

5G Security
by Giacomo Tesio Jan. 29, 2020

Jan. 29, 2020

Una panoramica chiara e comprensibile che dovrebbe arrivare a chiunque abbia ruoli decisionali in merito all'adozione e alla distribuzione di sistemi basati sul protocollo 5G. La prospettiva è molto US-centrica, ma le considerazioni di Schneier sono molto più preoccupanti in Europa. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/01/china_isnt_the_.html Giacomo _____ The 5G security problems are threefold. First, the standards are simply too complex to implement securely. This is true for all software, but the 5G protocols offer particular difficulties. Because of how it is designed, the system blurs the wireless portion of the network connecting phones with base stations and the core portion that routes data around the world. Additionally, much of the network is virtualized, meaning that it will rely on software running on dynamically configurable hardware. This design dramatically increases the points vulnerable to attack, as does the expected massive increase in both things connected to the network and the data flying about it. Second, there's so much backward compatibility built into the 5G network that older vulnerabilities remain. 5G is an evolution of the decade-old 4G network, and most networks will mix generations. Without the ability to do a clean break from 4G to 5G, it will simply be impossible to improve security in some areas. Attackers may be able to force 5G systems to use more vulnerable 4G protocols, for example, and 5G networks will inherit many existing problems. Third, the 5G standards committees missed many opportunities to improve security. Many of the new security features in 5G are optional, and network operators can choose not to implement them. The same happened with 4G; operators even ignored security features defined as mandatory in the standard because implementing them was expensive. But even worse, for 5G, development, performance, cost, and time to market were all prioritized over security, which was treated as an afterthought. Already problems are being discovered. In November 2019, researchers published vulnerabilities that allow 5G users to be tracked in real time, be sent fake emergency alerts, or be disconnected from the 5G network altogether. And this wasn't the first reporting to find issues in 5G protocols and implementations. [...] 5G security is just one of the many areas in which near-term corporate profits prevailed against broader social good. In a capitalist free market economy, the only solution is to regulate companies, and the United States has not shown any serious appetite for that. What's more, U.S. intelligence agencies like the NSA rely on inadvertent insecurities for their worldwide data collection efforts, and law enforcement agencies like the FBI have even tried to introduce new ones to make their own data collection efforts easier. Again, near-term self-interest has so far triumphed over society's long-term best interests. [...] The geopolitics of 5G are complicated, involving a lot more than security. China is subsidizing the purchase of its companies' networking equipment in countries around the world. The technology will quickly become critical national infrastructure, and security problems will become life-threatening. Both criminal attacks and government cyber-operations will become more common and more damaging. Eventually, Washington will have do so something. That something will be difficult and expensivelet's hope it won't also be too late.

1 0

Facial Recognition Is Only the Beginning | Public Books
by J.C. DE MARTIN Jan. 29, 2020

Jan. 29, 2020

https://www.publicbooks.org/facial-recognition-is-only-the-beginning/ (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

1 0

Summer School - Algoritmic State, Market and Society, Florence 13-17 July
by Giovanni De Gregorio Jan. 28, 2020

Jan. 28, 2020

Carissimi, vorrei condividere con voi quest'iniziativa estiva che spero possa essere di vostro interesse: The First Edition of the Summer School on “Algorithmic State, Market and Society”(FLOS) will be held in Florence on 13-17 July 2020. The one-week programme focuses on cutting-edge issues in the field of law and technology focusing especially on automated technologies. This initiative aims to create a multi-stakeholder environment made of scholars, practitioners, students and experts in the field of law, technology and economics. The idea of FLOS has been conceived within the framework of the research group on “Algorithmic State, Market and Society” which has been launched during the inaugural conference on “Constitutional Challenges in the Algorithmic Society” held at the University of Florence and European University Institute in May 2019. FLOS aims to give rigorous and comprehensive training in a wide variety of topics on law and algorithms thanks to the collaboration of distinguished scholars and participants. It embraces law, technology and policy and it is open to policy makers, practitioners, judges, scholars and students. Each day is made of four sessions of one hour and half. Each session deals with different issues in the field of law and algorithms and aims to create the environment for questions and discussions between participants. FLOS is jointly hosted by the University of Florence (Italy), the European University Institute (Florence, Italy), and Bocconi University (Milan, Italy). FLOS is coordinated by professors Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Sartor and Andrea Simoncini and scientifically organised by Erik Longo and Giovanni De Gregorio. For any query or information, please contact Erik Longo (erik.longo(a)unifi.it) and Giovanni De Gregorio (degregorio.giovanni(a)unibocconi.it) You can find more info at http://www.algorithmicstate.eu/summer-school/ Un saluto Giovanni De Gregorio

1 0

Trump contro Apple: l'iPhone del pilota che ha ucciso tre persone va sbloccato. Qual è la posta in gioco
by don Luca Peyron Jan. 28, 2020

Jan. 28, 2020

Come diceva l'indimenticabile Enzo Tortora... dive eravamo rimasti? Buona lettura Dl https://www.valigiablu.it/trump-fbi-apple-crittografia/amp/

1 0

Pour lutter contre les GAFA, Framasoft veut aller plus loin dans la dècentralisation du Web
by don Luca Peyron Jan. 28, 2020

Jan. 28, 2020

Après avoir promu de nombreux outils pour « sortir de Google », l’association française de défense du logiciel libre se concentre maintenant sur des plates-formes décentralisées. Bonne lecture dl https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/12/27/chez-framasoft-des-chatons… _________________________ www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

1 0

Kurt Gödel and the mechanization of mathematics - Essay - Footnotes to Plato - TLS
by J.C. DE MARTIN Jan. 28, 2020

Jan. 28, 2020

Kurt Gödel and the mechanization of mathematics Juliette Kennedy discusses Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems: the ingenious proofs and enduring impact By Juliette Kennedy https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/kurt-godel-incompleteness-theorems/ (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

1 0

magma guide
by Alberto Cammozzo Jan. 28, 2020

Jan. 28, 2020

Internet censorship techniques are constantly evolving. The magma guide's open collaborative structure allows users to distribute, modify, contribute, and review content - ensuring the guide stays as up-to-date as possible. <https://magma.lavafeld.org/> Introduction Conducting research on information controls can be complicated. The magma guide is here to help. This open-licensed, collaborative repository provides the first publicly available research framework for people working to measure information controls and online surveillance activities. In it, users can find the resources they need to perform their research more effectively and efficiently. The guide begins with a general overview of the basics of Internet censorship research ("Getting started"). It then walks users through a series of relevant methodologies, measurements, and analyses. After reviewing the guide, individuals will be able to create their own research plans and make better informed choices regarding the tools and procedures required to perform their work in an ethical and secure manner. The content of the guide represents industry best practices, developed in consultation with networking researchers, activists, and technologists. And it's evergreen, too--constantly updated with new content, resources, and tutorials. The host website is regularly updated and synced to a version control repository (Git) that can be used by members of the network measurements community to review, translate, and revise content of the guide. To get started, simply click on a topic in the left sidebar. Users who are conducting this type of research for the first time should begin with "Getting started" and move in sequential order through the topics. Users who already have a basic or better understanding of this type of work can use the search bar at the top right of this page to find more targeted information. [...]

1 0