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Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology
by Giovanni Battista Gallus April 11, 2020

April 11, 2020

"Across the world, governments and health authorities are working together to find solutions to the COVID-19 pandemic, to protect people and get society back up and running. Software developers are contributing by crafting technical tools to help combat the virus and save lives. In this spirit of collaboration, Google and Apple are announcing a joint effort to enable the use of Bluetooth technology to help governments and health agencies reduce the spread of the virus, with user privacy and security central to the design." https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/apple-and-googl… Un commento al volo: nella documentazione leggo "Will only be used for contact tracing by public health authorities for COVID-19 pandemic management". Nella seconda fase, si tratterà di una funzionalità integrata nel sistema operativo... Cosa mai potrà andare storto? GB Gallus

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Piano di interventi attuato a Wuhan
by Claudia Giulia April 10, 2020

April 10, 2020

Qui il piano di interventi usato per tenere sotto controllo il COVID19 a Wuhan Testo: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2764658 (nella barra in grigio ci sono altre info e grafici) c. Inviato da iPhone

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ACLU: The Limits of Location Tracking in an Epidemic
by Stefano Zacchiroli April 10, 2020

April 10, 2020

https://www.aclu.org/aclu-white-paper-limits-location-tracking-epidemic Posizione sensata e ragionevole, che passa in rassegna molte delle possibilità discusse (qui in lista e altrove). -- Stefano Zacchiroli . zack(a)upsilon.cc . upsilon.cc/zack . . o . . . o . o Computer Science Professor . CTO Software Heritage . . . . . o . . . o o Former Debian Project Leader & OSI Board Director . . . o o o . . . o . « the first rule of tautology club is the first rule of tautology club »

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Google tracked his bike ride past a burglarized home. That made him a suspect.
by Alberto Cammozzo April 10, 2020

April 10, 2020

Questa notizia è di marzo, ma ci può aiutare a capire i rischi nell'uso della geolocalizzazione. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-tracked-his-bike-ride-past-burg…> The email arrived on a Tuesday afternoon in January, startling Zachary McCoy as he prepared to leave for his job at a restaurant in Gainesville, Florida. It was from Google’s legal investigations support team, writing to let him know that local police had demanded information related to his Google account. The company said it would release the data unless he went to court and tried to block it. He had just seven days. “I was hit with a really deep fear,” McCoy, 30, recalled, even though he couldn’t think of anything he’d done wrong. He had an Android phone, which was linked to his Google account, and, like millions of other Americans, he used an assortment of Google products, including Gmail and YouTube. Now police seemingly wanted access to all of it. “I didn’t know what it was about, but I knew the police wanted to get something from me,” McCoy said in a recent interview. “I was afraid I was going to get charged with something, I don’t know what.” There was one clue. In the notice from Google was a case number. McCoy searched for it on the Gainesville Police Department’s website, and found a one-page investigation report on the burglary of an elderly woman’s home 10 months earlier. The crime had occurred less than a mile from the home that McCoy, who had recently earned an associate degree in computer programming, shared with two others. Now McCoy was even more panicked and confused. He knew he had nothing to do with the break-in ─ he’d never even been to the victim’s house ─ and didn’t know anyone who might have. And he didn’t have much time to prove it. McCoy worried that going straight to police would lead to his arrest. So he went to his parents’ home in St. Augustine, where, over dinner, he told them what was happening. They agreed to dip into their savings to pay for a lawyer. The lawyer, Caleb Kenyon, dug around and learned that the notice had been prompted by a “geofence warrant,” a police surveillance tool that casts a virtual dragnet over crime scenes, sweeping up Google location data — drawn from users’ GPS, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and cellular connections — from everyone nearby. The warrants, which have increased dramatically in the past two years, can help police find potential suspects when they have no leads. They also scoop up data from people who have nothing to do with the crime, often without their knowing ─ which Google itself has described as “a significant incursion on privacy.” Do you have a story to share about how police use new technology or surveillance tools? Contact us Still confused ─ and very worried ─ McCoy examined his phone. An avid biker, he used an exercise-tracking app, RunKeeper, to record his rides. The app relied on his phone’s location services, which fed his movements to Google. He looked up his route on the day of the March 29, 2019, burglary and saw that he had passed the victim’s house three times within an hour, part of his frequent loops through his neighborhood, he said. “It was a nightmare scenario,” McCoy recalled. “I was using an app to see how many miles I rode my bike and now it was putting me at the scene of the crime. And I was the lead suspect.” [...]

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Reports to help combat COVID-19 - The Keyword
by Alberto Cammozzo April 10, 2020

April 10, 2020

<https://www.blog.google/technology/health/covid-19-community-mobility-repor…> As global communities respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increasing emphasis on public health strategies, like social distancing measures, to slow the rate of transmission. In Google Maps, we use aggregated, anonymized data showing how busy certain types of places are—helping identify when a local business tends to be the most crowded. We have heard from public health officials that this same type of aggregated, anonymized data could be helpful as they make critical decisions to combat COVID-19. Starting today we’re publishing an early release of our COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports to provide insights into what has changed in response to work from home, shelter in place, and other policies aimed at flattening the curve of this pandemic. These reports have been developed to be helpful while adhering to our stringent privacy protocols and policies. The reports use aggregated, anonymized data to chart movement trends over time by geography, across different high-level categories of places such as retail and recreation, groceries and pharmacies, parks, transit stations, workplaces, and residential. We’ll show trends over several weeks, with the most recent information representing 48-to-72 hours prior. While we display a percentage point increase or decrease in visits, we do not share the absolute number of visits. To protect people’s privacy, no personally identifiable information, like an individual’s location, contacts or movement, is made available at any point. We will release these reports globally, initially covering 131 countries and regions. Given the urgent need for this information, where possible we will also provide insights at the regional level. In the coming weeks, we will work to add additional countries and regions to ensure these reports remain helpful to public health officials across the globe looking to protect people from the spread of COVID-19. [...]

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Snowden Warns Governments Are Using Coronavirus to Build 'the Architecture of Oppression' - VICE
by Alberto Cammozzo April 10, 2020

April 10, 2020

<https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bvge5q/snowden-warns-governments-are-usi…> The future may be unpredictable, but global pandemics aren’t. There isn’t a single government on the planet that hasn’t been warned, repeatedly, that at some point a viral pandemic will sweep the globe, causing untold death and economic disruption. And yet most failed to prepare for the novel coronavirus. “Every academic, every researcher who's looked at this knew this was coming,” says famed whistleblower Edward Snowden in an exclusive interview with VICE co-founder Shane Smith. “Yet when we needed it, the system has now failed us, and it has failed us comprehensively.” Snowden is the first guest in the new “Shelter in Place” series debuting on VICE TV on Thursday at 10 p.m. EST, which looks at the global response to COVID-19 and its lasting impact around the world. Smith will discuss these themes, as well as how to survive quarantine, with a host of thinkers from science, entertainment, economics, and journalism. In the premiere episode, Smith talks to Snowden, who blew the lid off of the National Security Agency’s surveillance of the American people in 2012. In the interview conducted from Smith’s home in Santa Monica over video chat, the two tackle topics including the lack of preparedness in the face of a global pandemic, how long this will be a threat to humanity, and whether the power we’re handing to global leaders will come back and bite us in the ass. Smith: Why does it seem like we're so ill-prepared? Snowden: There is nothing more foreseeable as a public health crisis in a world where we are just living on top of each other in crowded and polluted cities, than a pandemic. And every academic, every researcher who's looked at this knew this was coming. And in fact, even intelligence agencies, I can tell you firsthand, because they used to read the reports had been planning for pandemics. Are autocratic regimes better at dealing with things like this than democratic ones? I don't think so. I mean, there are arguments being made that China can do things that the United States can't. That doesn't mean that what these autocratic countries are doing is actually more effective. If you're looking at countries like China, where cases seem to have leveled off, how much can we trust that those numbers are actually true? I don't think we can. Particularly, we see the Chinese government recently working to expel Western journalists at precisely this moment where we need credible independent warnings in this region. It seems that [coronavirus] may be the greatest question of the modern era around civil liberties, around the right to privacy. Yet no one's asking this question. As authoritarianism spreads, as emergency laws proliferate, as we sacrifice our rights, we also sacrifice our capability to arrest the slide into a less liberal and less free world. Do you truly believe that when the first wave, this second wave, the 16th wave of the coronavirus is a long-forgotten memory, that these capabilities will not be kept? That these datasets will not be kept? No matter how it is being used, what’ is being built is the architecture of oppression.

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Garante Privacy in audizione - su tecnologia e Covid - Camera dei Deputati
by Claudia Giulia April 9, 2020

April 9, 2020

Audizione informale, in videoconferenza (8 Aprile 2020) sull'uso delle nuove tecnologie e della rete per contrastare l'emergenza epidemiologica da Coronavirus https://www.gpdp.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9308774

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Contact Tracing: Chi decide chi è un contatto a rischio, l'algoritmo o il medico?
by Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) April 9, 2020

April 9, 2020

Ciao a tutti, in questo grande discutere sul tema del contact tracing nel rapporto con la protezione dei dati, osservo che veramente in pochi valutano gli aspetti di utilità funzionale, entrando nel merito della procedura gestionale sanitaria. Tutti nel ragionare si focalizzano molto sulla tecnologia tracciante "bluetooth si, GPS no, Celle solo aggregate, etc" . Ma in questo dibattito, quanti ragionano sul "come" e "da chi" queste informazioni potrebbero venire usate in modo utile? Perché ho il grosso dubbio che tutto il discorso del proximity tracing bluetooth abbia una utilità marginale, vi prego seguitemi nel discorso, magari mi sbaglio. Quando ho elaborato settimane orsono il mio esercizio di ricerca sul Contact Tracing, mi sono concentrato solo sulla utilità funzionale all'interno delle procedure correntemente fatte, facendo l'esercizio di applicare e usare il dato di cella, senza trattare il dato identificativo: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vb1g7xYqLuFyml25vB2da5gfh9LbwQ82YYFxqcf… IMHO il migliore sforzo dovrebbe essere idealmente quello di portare efficienza tecnologica "all'interno delle procedure attualmente in essere". Ora, stiamo osservato che soluzioni "app based" di contact tracing digitale basate sul bluetooth, vedono un orientamento che mette d'accordo tecnologhi e giuristi sul fronte della protezione dei dati. Eppure ho il sentimento che ci sia un errore di fondo, che fanno in molti, abbagliati dalla supposta efficienza della tecnica di proximity location che mette tutti d'accordo, e cioè: Il Contact Tracing Digitale, non rimpiazza il Contact Tracing Tradizionale, ma è a questo di ausilio. Se condividiamo quanto sopra, allora saremmo pronti a porci la prossima domanda, basata sull'assunto che la procedura di CT ha come risultato principale l'individuazione e rintracciamento di chi è epidemiologicamente definito come "Close Contacts" [1] : Chi decide se un contatto di un contagiato, è epidemiologicamente definibile un "Close Contacts"? Qui abbiamo grosso modo due scelte, su chi debba decidere chi sia un "Close Contacts": a) L'algoritmo del sitema di CT Digitale oppure b) Il personale sanitario, che effettua l'intervista di contact tracing, sulla base dell'intervista di contact tracing Qui nei confronti avuti in queste settimane, osservo che c'è chi interpreta il "Contact Tracing Digitale" come una soluzione algoritmicamente in grado di individuare i "Close Contacts". Io non ci giurerei più di tanto. Proviamo ad elaborare questi scenari, entrando nel merito di come avviene proceduralmente il lavoro del personale sanitario, partendo dai requisiti della definizione di "Close Contact". Un Close Contact, escludendo i casi di operatori sanitari e di procedura da individuazione su aeroplano, secondo ECDC e WHO sono: 1) A person living in the same household as a COVID-19case 2) A person having had directphysical contact with a COVID-19 case (e.g. shakinghands) 3) A person having unprotected direct contact with infectious secretions of a COVID-19 case (e.g. being coughed on, touching used paper tissues with a bare hand) 4) A person having had face-to-face contact with a COVID-19 case within2 metres[2]and > 15 minutes 5) A person who was in a closed environment(e.g.classroom,meetingroom, hospital waiting room, etc.) with aCOVID-19casefor 15 minutes or moreand at a distance of less than 2 metres A questo punto proviamo a domandarci se "l'algoritmo", in autonomia, sia è in grado di identificare le casistiche covid-19 di "Close Contact" . Nel caso "1": a-intervista: Può essere rilevato e fornito dal contagiato nella intervista b-algoritmo: Può essere rilevato dall'algoritmo Nel caso 2: a-intervista: Può essere rilevato e fornito dal contagiato nella intervista b-algoritmo: NON può essere rilevato dall'algoritmo Nel caso 3: a-intervista: Può essere rilevato e fornito dal contagiato nella intervista b-algoritmo: NON può essere rilevato dall'algoritmo Nel caso 4: a-intervista: Può essere rilevato e fornito dal contagiato nella intervista b-algoritmo: NON può essere rilevato dall'algoritmo (L'algoritmo non sa' se contagiato e contatto sono "faccia a faccia", non sa' se si tratta di attesa per entrare al supermercato con mascherine protette, etc) Nel caso 5: a-intervista: Può essere rilevato e fornito dal contagiato nella intervista b-algoritmo: NON può essere rilevato dall'algoritmo, perché non può sapere se ci si trova all'interno di un ambiente chiuso A questo punto possiamo affermare che *l'algoritmo non è in grado di rilevare ed identiciare un "Close Contact"* così come epidemiologicamente definto, quando si va ad impiegare un sistema di proxymity bluetooth. Eccoci, torniamo al punto iniziale, la decisione se un contatto è un "Close Contact" la prende il personale sanitario, sulla base della intervista di contact tracing, cioè il Contact Tracing Digitale, da solo serve a niente. A questo punto dobbiamo domandarci: D-1) Ma allora a che serve questo bluetooth? D-2) E in quale modo si potrebbe rendere utile veramente? IMHO, data l'analisi di cui sopra, l'unico modo con cui si ottiene una utilità da tutto questo sistema di raccolta dati, è che questi siano disponibili come ausilo *DURANTE L'INTERVISTA DI CONTACT TRACING* (secondo quanto scrisi nel mio paper originale sull'uso dei dati di cella), ovvero che consentano al personale sanitario di accompagnare l'intervista, circostanziandola e contestualizzandola. Immaginiamo il personale sanitario con il suo telefono con la "app di contact tracing di backoffice per personale sanitario" che, autorizzato dal contagiato, vanno a guardare assieme lo storico dei contatti rilevati dalla sua "app", su una timeline, e annotino il contesto in cui questi sono stato avvenuti. Già, perché senza avere il contesto, non è possibile definire cosa sia un "Close Contact" secondo la definizione epidemiologica dello stesso. La app e i suoi dati, quindi, diventano un utile ausilio alla memoria del contagiato, nella sua intervista di contact tracing, e vedono la sua utilità effettiva per l'identificazione dei contatti sulla base di "quanto si ricorda il contagiato" nella intervista. Se quanto sopra affermato è vero, la app bluetooth di prossimità serve veramente a poco, senza essere coadiuvata da una raccolta delle informazioni di localizzazione geografica, perché lo scopo diventa quello di "assistere" il percorso mnemonico del contagiato durante l'intervista. Quindi, secondo quanto finora ipotizzato in questa digressione, l'app che registra solo i dati di bluetooth non serve a niente, a meno di non essere corredata da informazioni di geo-localizzazione (seppur approssimative), che consentano in questo percorso assistito di intervista di riportare più agevolmente alla memoria del contaggiato il "contesto" (Quel giorno, a quell'ora, si trovava nel posto X, che era chiuso/aperto, e faceva Y). Solo avendo il Contesto, il personale sanitario può dare una tassonomia epidemiologica del contatto, definendolo "Close Contact" o meno, quindi decidendo se, tramite i dati di contatto bluetooth raccolti, sia il caso di avviare la procedura di gestione. In sintesi, *il dato di bluetooth as it is a me pare serva veramente a poco*, se non coadiuvato dalla informazione geo-referenziata ("GPS" o "Cloud Location Service), il tutto al fine di consentire una "intervista di contact tracing" assistita e arricchita dai dati, cioè uno strumento di backoffice per gli stakeholder coinvolti in questo processo. Mi sono sbagliato? Spero di si. Fabio [1] Il Close Contact è definito qui https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/covid-19-public-he…

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The Coronavirus Crisis and EU Adequacy Decisions for Data Transfers
by Claudia Giulia April 9, 2020

April 9, 2020

FYI https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/04/03/the-coronavirus-crisis-and-eu-adequac… ciao CG

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Progetto COUGHVID - Screening using Cough Sounds
by Maria Margherita Salvadori April 9, 2020

April 9, 2020

Segnalo questo progetto di ricerca dell'EPFL teso a fare uno screening sulla base del rumore prodotto dalla tosse. In copia la email del gruppo di ricerca e del giovane ricercatore che me lo ha segnalato. Un cordiale saluto, Margherita > Ciao, > > > Ecco qua un po di link riguardo al nostro progetto ed una selezione quelli > che penso siano piu rilevanti o informativi: > > > Il nostro sito: > > https://coughvid.epfl.ch/ > > > Presentazione video del progetto > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hnDxTnZJj8&feature=emb_logo > > > Il prototipo dell app che non è ancora rilasciata comunque: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJN3KLbd2zg&feature=youtu.be > > > Presentazione a slide del progetto: > > > https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10Sm3qCxBMFhMvcCzOO8_4NtezrF57Aw_xGV… > > > > > <https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10Sm3qCxBMFhMvcCzOO8_4NtezrF57Aw_xGV…> > > <https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10Sm3qCxBMFhMvcCzOO8_4NtezrF57Aw_xGV…> > COUGHVID - LauzHack2020 Presentation - Google Präsentationen > <https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/10Sm3qCxBMFhMvcCzOO8_4NtezrF57Aw_xGV…> > docs.google.com > An AI-Based App for COVID-19 Screening using Cough Sounds > > > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJN3KLbd2zg&feature=youtu.be> > COUGHVID App walkthrough - YouTube > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJN3KLbd2zg&feature=youtu.be> > www.youtube.com > This video shows the functionalities of the app, and how the user > interfaces with it. Sounds brought by :https://www.bensound.com > > > > > > > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hnDxTnZJj8&feature=emb_logo> > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hnDxTnZJj8&feature=emb_logo> > COUGHVID: AI-Based App for Screening COVID-19 Using Coughing - YouTube > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hnDxTnZJj8&feature=emb_logo> > www.youtube.com > > > > <https://coughvid.epfl.ch/> > Coughvid <https://coughvid.epfl.ch/> > coughvid.epfl.ch > Cough-based screening for COVID-19 > > > > > https://devpost.com/software/coughvid-ai-based-app-for-covid-19-screening-u… > > > > > <https://devpost.com/software/coughvid-ai-based-app-for-covid-19-screening-u…> > COUGHVID: AI-Based App for Screening COVID-19 Using Coughing | Devpost > <https://devpost.com/software/coughvid-ai-based-app-for-covid-19-screening-u…> > devpost.com > COUGHVID: AI-Based App for Screening COVID-19 Using Coughing - At the > Embedded Systems Lab. (ESL) of EPFL, we propose to leverage signal > processing... > > >

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