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Final Committee Report on the Boeing 737 MAX
by Giovanni Biscuolo Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

Buonasera, comunicato stampa di oggi del comitato investigatovo governativo USA sull'incidente in oggetto. Executive summary: il MACS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), il sistema software progettato per impedire al pilota di mandare in stallo un aereo aerodinamicamente molto instabile, è quello che ha *letteralmente* manovrato gli aerei fino allo schianto al suolo perché un sensore ha indicato al software che l'aereo stava salendo troppo rapidamente e invece non era affatto vero; i piloti non sono stati in grado di intervenire manualmente nonostante i ripetuti tentativi di "tirare la cloche". Boeing e FAA sapevano di tutti i difetti - emersi dall'analisi dei rischi - ma per COMPETERE sul mercato hanno nascosto praticamente tutto, anche ai piloti che non hanno potuto intervenire per aggirare guasto del MACS. Un disastro storico che si conclude con un'altrettanto storico rapporto. Quello che non capirò MAI è perché chi progetta 'ste cose non è obbligato a inserire un "panic button" che consenta a chi sa il fatto suo di escludere i sistemi automatici in caso di necessità; forse nel rapporto, che non ho letto, c'è una spiegazione… però è disumano. https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/after-18-month-investi… --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX From the Report: “The MAX crashes were… a horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA” Washington, D.C. — Today, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the Committee’s final report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report, prepared by Majority Staff, lays out the serious flaws and missteps in the design, development, and certification of the aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months of each other that killed a total of 346 people, including eight Americans. The Committee’s 238-page report, which points to repeated and serious failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), contains five central themes and includes more than six dozen investigative findings. These themes include: * Production pressures that jeopardized the safety of the flying public. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus’ new A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line. * Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS, the software designed to automatically push the airplane’s nose down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that MCAS existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction. * Culture of Concealment. Boeing withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the pilot described as “catastrophic.” Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond to this condition within four seconds. * Conflicted Representation. The FAA’s current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public. The report documents multiple instances in which Boeing employees who have been authorized to perform work on behalf of the FAA failed to alert the FAA to potential safety and/or certification issues. * Boeing’s Influence Over the FAA’s Oversight Structure. Multiple career FAA officials have documented examples where FAA management overruled a determination of the FAA’s own technical experts at the behest of Boeing. These examples are consistent with results of a recent draft FAA employee “safety culture” survey that showed many FAA employees believed its senior leaders are more concerned with helping industry achieve its goals and are not held accountable for safety-related decisions. “Our report lays out disturbing revelations about how Boeing—under pressure to compete with Airbus and deliver profits for Wall Street—escaped scrutiny from the FAA, withheld critical information from pilots, and ultimately put planes into service that killed 346 innocent people. What’s particularly infuriating is how Boeing and FAA both gambled with public safety in the critical time period between the two crashes,” Chair DeFazio said. “On behalf of the families of the victims of both crashes, as well as anyone who steps on a plane expecting to arrive at their destination safely, we are making this report public to put a spotlight not only on the broken safety culture at Boeing but also the gaps in the regulatory system at the FAA that allowed this fatally-flawed plane into service. Critically, our report gives Congress a roadmap on the steps we must take to reinforce aviation safety and regulatory transparency, increase Federal oversight, and improve corporate accountability to help ensure the story of the Boeing 737 MAX is never, ever repeated.” “The Committee’s thorough investigation uncovered errors that are difficult to hear, but necessary to confront about the 737 MAX certification,” Chair Larsen said. “This report, combined with the findings and recommendations from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations, National Transportation Safety Board, Joint Authorities Technical Review and other entities, serve as a roadmap for changes to the FAA certification process. The 346 victims of the two tragic crashes and their families, as well as the traveling public rightfully expect Congress to act. As the Committee moves into the next phase of oversight, I will continue to work with Chair DeFazio and my colleagues to address the significant cultural and structural deficiencies identified in the report in order to improve safety.” Additional information: At the direction of Chair DeFazio and Subcommittee Chair Larsen, the Committee launched an investigation into the design, development, and certification of the 737 MAX, and related issues, in March 2019, shortly after the second crash involving a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. As part of the 18-month long investigation, the Committee held five public hearings with more than 20 witnesses; wrote nearly two dozen oversight letters, obtained an estimated 600,000 pages of documents from Boeing, the FAA, and others; received information and insight from former and current employees who contacted the Committee directly through the Committee’s whistleblower link; and interviewed dozens of current and former Boeing and FAA employees. To access the Final Report, newly released accompanying records, including transcribed interviews of both senior Boeing and FAA officials about the 737 MAX, as well as past statements, hearing video, and more, click here. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Il report completo è disponibile qui: https://transportation.house.gov/download/20200915-final-737-max-report-for… Qui tutto il materiale pubblicato dal comitato investigativo: https://transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/boeing-737-max-investig… Saluti, Giovanni. -- Giovanni Biscuolo

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Carta nazionale dei servizi, una rivoluzione mancata.
by Antonio Iacono Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

Il primo gennaio del 2006 entrava in vigore il Decreto Legislativo 7 marzo 2005, n. 82 meglio conosciuto come Codice dell'amministrazione digitale (CAD). L'articolo 64 del decreto nella sua stesura originaria era il seguente. "Modalita' di accesso ai servizi erogati in rete dalle pubbliche amministrazioni". E il comma 1: "La carta d'identita' elettronica e la carta nazionale dei servizi costituiscono strumenti per l'accesso ai servizi erogati in rete dalle pubbliche amministrazioni per i quali sia necessaria l'autenticazione informatica." Niente di più semplice e, nel contempo, rivoluzionario. Ma, come in altre occasioni, anche stavolta il legislatore non aveva "fatto i conti con l'oste", e l'oste, in questo caso, era la Pubblica Amministrazione. L'articolo 64, in 14 anni dall'entrata in vigore, ha subito ben 12 modifiche, quasi una l'anno. Le prime modifiche erano proroghe. Il legislatore (evidentemente consigliato dai tecnici interpellati) dava inizialmente il termine alle pubbliche amministrazioni di adeguarsi entro il 31/12/2007. Termine che, di anno in anno, in occasione del cosiddetto "Milleproroghe" spostava in avanti, arrivando al 31/12/2011, dopodiché il comma che fissava il termine veniva definitivamente abrogato. Si è arrivati così al 2013, l'anno di SPID. La CNS e la CIE, come strumenti per l'accesso ai servizi erogati in rete dalle pubbliche amministrazioni avevano fallito. Le colpe, come al solito, non sono solo da una parte, ma, a mio modesto parere, se li dovrebbero addossare in parti più o meno uguali, legislatore (politici e tecnici di riferimento), P.A., cittadini ed imprese. Eppure bastava così poco, configurare Apache o qualsiasi altro webserver, ad esempio, non è complicatissimo e allora cosa è andato storto? Parafrasando quello che ho scritto da un'altra parte "The last thing society needs is for engineers in enclaves like Silicon Valley to deploy AI tools for global problems they know little about", è la difficoltà (per non dire incapacità) dei decisori (politici, tecnici, alti funzionari) a mettersi nei panni dei cittadini (comprendendo in questa fascia anche i dipendenti pubblici non tecnici). L'Italia in questi 15 anni è stata letteralmente inondata di smart-card, di CNS e CRS, alcune Regioni hanno speso e continuano a spendere milioni. Ma mai che nessuno si fosse messo nei panni del cittadino che riceve la smart-card che, ricordiamoci non è un pezzetto di plastica dal costo insignificante ma uno strumento con una tecnologia avanzata. Anche qui, sarebbe bastato spendere qualche euro in più, una tantum, ed inviare anche il lettore di smart card. Sarebbe bastato scrivere le istruzioni in modo chiaro, sarebbe bastato realizzare software semplici, sarebbe bastato formare i dipendenti pubblici a fornire PIN e PUK e istruzioni base e coloro che l'avessero chiesto. Niente di tutto questo. E alla fine qualcuno avrà pensato, beh, dato che gli italiani almeno il telefonino lo sanno usare facciamo questa cosa di SPID e non se ne parli più. La verità è che gente come Claude Shannon ne nasce una ogni cento anni, che riusciva a rendere semplice e ordinata una complessità disordinata. Antonio

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Cracks in the Knowledge System: Whose Knowledge is Valued in a Pandemic and Beyond?
by Giovanni Biscuolo Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

Buongiorno, forse per catturare l'attenzione, nel titolo e nell'articolo parla molto di covid-19 MA è una scusa, il covid-19 non c'entra proprio un bel niente. Pone un serio problema di epistemologia, nel quale "il digitale" e Internet giocano da qualche lustro un ruolo *fondamentale*: è anche per questo che propongo qui questo pezzo. Oserei definire questo articolo come "un brogliaccio" di un opera in tre volumi dal titolo «Il Capitale Scientifico» :-D Cracks in the Knowledge System: Whose Knowledge is Valued in a Pandemic and Beyond? By Jon Harle - 10 September 2020 https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/10/09/2020/cracks-knowledge-system… --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] the processes of exclusion that are baked into the ways in which we produce, communicate and use knowledge. [...] Taking a longer term and systemic view would mean thinking not just about research (i.e. how knowledge is produced by researchers) but also systems of education, and particularly higher education, that create our professional and practitioner communities, and systems of decision-making, that determine how evidence is used in government and elsewhere. Here are some of the things we need to think about. 1. Whose knowledge counts and what types of evidence are valued? [...] But it is not only a question of disciplinary weight. The source of funding, and the origins of researchers, influence the methodologies used and what comes to count as knowledge. [...] [...] the question of whose knowledge also has a darker side – one that connects instantly to the racism that infects much of our discourse on knowledge. [...] 2. What do decision makers need and what systems have they got to make use of it? AKA – supply vs usefulness [...] Experts who are better connected to policy spaces or to the media are likely to be privileged in the debate. [...] [...] If organisations lack the structures for commissioning or evaluating evidence, then decision makers will be forced to rely on what they get, when they get it, rather than being able to generate what they need when they need it. It probably looks very different to someone working in local government too. They might be unable to access disaggregated data on which to base their own decisions, or lack the resources and capacities to generate their own. [...] 3. Who can access digital knowledge and tools? Who can work and who can study? [...] But going digital also creates new exclusions. It’s much harder to participate when your connectivity is poor or comes at greater personal expense. [...] [...] When we rely so much on digital networks we also need to think about the knowledge that is rendered inaccessible by the languages in which we’ve digitised it, or even invisible by its complete lack of digitisation. [...] 4. Questioning norms and what counts as excellent research [...] In the process of adapting research processes, some researchers have reflected on the extent to which Northern researchers and “capacity builders” are needed – or not. But further disruption is needed too. Any “better” future will only happen by unsettling the prevailing structures for creating, contesting and deploying knowledge. More Southern researchers doing the work isn’t enough if that work is still constrained (explicitly or implicitly) by the norms and metrics which decide what “excellence” and “quality” look like. Those tend to be set in the North and are then pushed into Southern systems, directly or indirectly as a result of funding. [...] Most critically, we need to recognise that inequity within knowledge systems is not an accident. It is fundamentally about power, and it therefore follows that to address these inequities we must be prepared to disturb those asymmetries – and to be ready to change our own role. See more, in the full paper "(In)equitable knowledge systems: before, during and beyond a pandemic." [1] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- SE quanto sostenuto "fa senso", allora direi che si sposa MOLTO bene con quanto sostenuto nell'articolo segnalato da Giacomo il 10 Settembre scorso del Guardian: «How philanthropy benefits the super-rich» https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/sep/08/how-philanthropy-benefits-t… Domanda: la filantropia crea diseguaglianze nel modo in cui si produce, comunica e utilizza la conoscenza? Domanda: non è che la scienza è usata sempre di più come sistema di potere per dare valore di evidenza oggettiva a interessi particolari soggettivi? Mi sbilancio e faccio un esempio: le teorie economiche della scuola Austriaca? Se sì, la comunità scientifica riconosce che questo è un problema? É in grado di affrontarlo? Benvenuti nel secolo della crisi della scienza! :-D Saluti, Giovanni. [1] https://www.inasp.info/sites/default/files/2020-08/EKES-COVID.pdf -- Giovanni Biscuolo

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Loops, ladders and links: the recursivity of social and machine learning
by Antonio Iacono Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11186-020-09409-x ... we argue that machine learning implementations are inclined, in many respects, towards the degradation of sociality. Consequently, new implementations are been called upon to judge and test the kind of solidaristic associations that machine learned systems have themselves produced, as a sort of second order learning process. Our conclusion is a call to action: to renew, at the social and machine learning interface, fundamental questions of how to live and act together.

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Trade unions’ responses to Industry 4.0 amid corporatism and resistance
by Antonio Iacono Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2020-21.pdf

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Australian security cameras hacked, streamed on a Russian-based website
by Antonio Iacono Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-24/security-cameras-hacked-streamed-on-… La notizia è recente ma il sito in questione (insecam.org) è lì da anni, pure con parecchie telecamere italiane.

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Just Eat to stop using gig economy workers - BBC News
by J.C. DE MARTIN Sept. 16, 2020

Sept. 16, 2020

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53780299 (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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monitoraggio PNSD
by Andrea Trentini Sept. 15, 2020

Sept. 15, 2020

Ciao, qualcuno di voi sa se ci sono opendata sul monitoraggio del Piano Nazionale Scuola Digitale? Io sto cercando ma non trovo un gran che (eufemismo), sembra che i dati, ammessane l'esistenza, possano trovarsi nel "portale SIDI" cui non ho accesso... Grazie mille -- |_|o|_| Andrea Trentini - http://atrent.it |_|_|o| Dipartimento di Informatica |o|o|o| Università degli Studi di Milano

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Chi conserva il web in Italia?
by Elena Marangoni Sept. 15, 2020

Sept. 15, 2020

Spesso ci si chiede cosa ne sarà della memoria della nostra epoca data la labilità e difficoltà di conservazione del web, che rappresenta la sede di una porzione sempre più cospicua di produzione di contenuti e conoscenza. La Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze contribuisce da alcuni a dare una risposta con il suo progetto di Web Archiving che fa parte di "Magazzini Digitali" e che adesso si dota di un'interfaccia pubblica su Archive.it L'annuncio qui <https://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/le-collezioni-di-siti-web-della-bncf-libera…> e maggiori informazioni qui: https://www.bncf.firenze.sbn.it/biblioteca/web-archiving/ Un esempio positivo di come un'istituzione pubblica riesca a reinterpretare e aggiornare i propri compiti tradizionali, come quello del deposito legale, che mi sembra di potenziale interesse per la lista, un saluto Elena Marangoni --- Servizi bibliografici digitali Università degli Studi di Torino Direzione Ricerca e Terza Missione via Bava, 31 - 10124 Torino Tel. +39 0116703918www.sba.unito.it

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Nvidia is acquiring Arm for $40 billion
by Giacomo Tesio Sept. 15, 2020

Sept. 15, 2020

Arm will operate as a division of Nvidia and will remain headquartered in the UK, and, will “continue to operate its open-licensing model, while maintaining its global customer neutrality,” the company said. But the deal is still likely to face intense regulatory scrutiny. [...] Nvidia once had big ambitions to make CPUs for phones but had little success. This acquisition could obviously change that, but it appears that at least initially the focus will be on data centers. “What will change is the rate of our roadmap. We know for sure that data centers and clouds are clamoring for the Arm microprocessor, the Arm CPU,” Huang tells Forbes. “Energy efficiency directly translates to computing capacity, computing throughput, and the cost of provisioning service.” Continua su https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/13/21435507/nvidia-acquiring-arm-40-billion… Giacomo

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