- nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Arm’s cheap and flexible plastic microchip could create an ‘internet of everything’
by don Luca Peyron July 24, 2021

July 24, 2021

Buona lettura dl https://www.theverge.com/2021/7/23/22590001/arm-plasticarm-cheap-flexible-p… _________________________ don Luca Peyron Direttore Ufficio per la Pastorale Universitaria Arcidiocesi di Torino www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

1 0

The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Digital Economy: Dispelling Persistent Myths by Nikolas Guggenberger :: SSRN
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 24, 2021

July 24, 2021

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3802559 (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

3 2

"Social è responsabilità" - seminario MediaLaws 26 luglio ore 18.30
by Marco Bassini July 23, 2021

July 23, 2021

Buonasera, ho il piacere di segnalare il seminario online di presentazione del libro di Antonio Palmieri "Social è responsabilità!" che si terrà sotto l'egida di MediaLaws lunedì prossimo alle 18.30. Allego la locandina. Per iscrizioni, è possibile scrivere a eventi(a)medialaws.eu Un cordiale saluto e l'augurio di un buon weekend Marco Marco Bassini Bocconi University "A. Sraffa" Department of Legal Studies Via Roentgen, 1 20136 Milan - Italy room 1-C1-12 Direct (ITA) +39.02.5836.5611 Mobile (ITA) +39.329.2478832 Coordinator LL.M. in Law of Internet Technology View my LinkedIn profile<https://www.linkedin.com/in/marcobassini/> View my SSRN page<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1151162> View my Google Scholar profile<https://scholar.google.it/citations?hl=en&user=wJyuA6wAAAAJ>

1 0

AI based GitHub copilot
by Enrico Nardelli July 21, 2021

July 21, 2021

https://copilot.github.com/ Come ogni altro strumento estremamente sofisticato, nelle mani dei bravi professionisti sarà enormemente utile, mentre in quelle dei dilettanti temo che condurrà a problemi senza fine. E ciò che secondo me rende la situazione ancora peggiore è che in quest'ambito la differenza tra quelli bravi (senza andare sui geni) e quelli mediocri (senza andare sulla capre) è data da un fattore intorno a 10 (con tutte le incertezze legate ad una stima di questo genere. Per approfondire ecco un link https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/179616/a-good-progr… ) -- EN ===================================================================== Prof. Enrico Nardelli Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli(a)mat.uniroma2.it home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ ===================================================================== --

7 14

Group Privacy - A Defense and an Interpretation (di Luciano Floridi)
by Giacomo Tesio July 20, 2021

July 20, 2021

This chapter identifies three problems affecting the plausibility of group privacy and argue in favor of their resolution. The first problem concerns the nature of the groups in question. It argues that groups are neither discovered nor invented, but designed by the level of abstraction (LoA) at which a specific analysis of a social system is developed. Their design is therefore justified insofar as the purpose, guiding the choice of the LoA, is justified. This should remove the objection that groups cannot have a right to privacy because groups are mere artefacts (there are no groups, only individuals) or that, even if there are groups, it is too difficult to deal with them. The second problem concerns the possibility of attributing rights to groups. It is argued that the same logic of attribution of a right to individuals may be used to attribute a right to a group, provided one modifies the LoA and now treats the whole group itself as an individual. This should remove the objection that, even if groups exist and are manageable, they cannot be treated as holders of rights. The third problem concerns the possibility of attributing a right to privacy to groups. Here, the paper argues that sometimes it is the group and only the group, not its members, that is correctly identified as the correct holder of a right to privacy. This should remove the objection that privacy, as a group right, is a right held not by a group as a group but rather by the group’s members severally. The solutions of the three problems supports the thesis that an interpretation of privacy in terms of a protection of the information that constitutes an individual — both in terms of a single person and in terms of a group — is better suited than other interpretations to make sense of group privacy. Continua (disponibile per intero) su https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3854483 Per quel che conta, ho trovato interessantissima la riflessione. > social groups should neither be conceived as mere conventions or > artefacts (invented) nor assumed to exist before the interest in > identifying them is specified (discovered). > They are more or less correctly and successfully designed by our > epistemological interests and practices together with the ontological > constraining affordances provided by the world. Ragionando sull'attribuzione di diritti a gruppi sociali, definirli come "designed" significa riconoscere una autonomia / responsabilità politica (a chi li progetta) ma limitata dalle "constraining affordances" per cui viene effettuata la definizione [1]. > Of course the grouped (profiled) individuals may not know > that they have been profiled, e.g. by automatic algorithms, and may > never discover that they have been treated as a group. > This is not the point. > What I am arguing is that if they end up being profiled and this > profiling becomes explicit, what gives the group the initial > possibility of reacting to it is the “interested” practice of > profiling it in the first place, not some pre-existing ontological > status of the group as a group, that would allegedly predate the > profiling [...] > All this explains why profiled individuals often object not so much > to the treatment of themselves as members of a group but to the very > profiling in the first place. It is not being a slice the problem, > the problem is being severed from the cake in the first place. Questo non può non far pensare a Google FLoC: se un gruppo assume il diritto alla tutela della propria riservatezza nel momento in cui viene identificato [2], anche sostenere di non poter identificare i singoli membri del gruppo perde istantanemente rilevanza. Sulla questione se i gruppi [3] possano avere diritti, io avrei optato per una dimostrazione costruttivista: esistono moltissime leggi che assegnano diritti a gruppi determinati, dunque questi possono avere diritti. Basti pensare al primo comma dell'articolo 29 della nostra Costituzione: > La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della famiglia come società > naturale fondata sul matrimonio. Al di là delle conclusioni, che condivido pienamente, ho trovato particolarmente importante e condivisibile quanto segue: > More than a century later, privacy requires a radical > re-interpretation. Such a reinterpretation is achieved by considering > each individual person or group as constituted by his, her or its > information, and hence by understanding a breach of an individual’s > informational privacy as a form of aggression towards that > individual’s identity. [...] > > Looking at the nature of an individual person or group as being > constituted by that individual’s information enables one to > understand the right to privacy as a right to immunity from unknown, > undesired, or unintentional changes in one’s own identity as an > informational entity, both actively and passively.[...] > > The identity-constituting interpretation suggests that a group’s > informational sphere and the identity of a group are co-referential, > or two sides of the same coin. The right to privacy, both in the > active and in the passive sense just seen, shields the group’s > identity. This is why privacy is extremely valuable and ought to be > respected. [...] > > If some information is finally acknowledged to be a constitutive part > of personal and group identity, then one day it may become strictly > illegal to trade in some kinds of information, exactly as it is > illegal to trade in human organs (including one’s own) or slaves. > [...] > > A further issue that might be illuminated by looking at privacy from > an identityconstituting perspective are those of confidentiality and > intimacy, two intrinsically groupbased phenomena. [...] > Confidentiality and intimacy create a bond that is hard and slow to > forge properly, yet resilient to many external forces when finally in > place, as the group (the supra-agent) is stronger than the > constitutive agents themselves. [...] But it is also a bond > that is brittle and difficult to restore when it comes to internal > betrayal, since the disclosure, deliberate or unintentional, of some > personal information in violation of confidence can entirely and > irrecoverably destroy the intimacy and privacy of the new, > supra-agent born out of the joining agents, by painfully introducing > discord. [...] > > It is therefore a very dangerous fallacy to think that, if we protect > personal data that identify people individually, the protection of > groups of people will take care of itself. Una considerazione che invece manca nel testo riguarda le relazioni fra i gruppi stessi, laddove ciascun individuo appartiene inevitabilmente a più gruppi contemporaneamente. Se posso profilare, tracciare ed influenzare un gruppo, posso influenzare anche tutti i gruppi che lo contengono (e probabilmente quelli che ne condividono alcuni membri, seppure in modo più complesso). Dunque tutelare la privacy di un gruppo è tutelare la privacy di tutti. Un'altra considerazione interessante che non viene analizzata consiste nella relazione fra il gruppo ed i suoi membri laddove il gruppo detenga un proprio diritto alla privacy: se infatti il gruppo ha un diritto alla privacy, i membri oltre ad un diritto individuale alla tutela della propra privacy e di quella del gruppo, acquisiscono anche un DOVERE a rispettare e tutelare la privacy del gruppo stesso. Diventa infatti chiaro che diffondere dati personali su sé stessi è diffondere dati personali sul gruppo (e su tutti i suoi membri). In altri termini, come spesso ho sentito dire a Maria Chiara Pievatolo, la privacy è un po' come una mascherina chirurgica: la mia protegge voi, la vostra progegge noi. Giacomo [1] Floridi definisce "constraining affordance" a pagina 6 come "my preferred definition of data", ma sebbene il contesto dell'articolo non sia esplicitamente informatico, questa definizione è piuttosto pericolosa, in quanto omette e nasconde l'azione umana di scegliere e di esprimere (o stabilire come esprimere) una informazione in un dato impresso su un supporto. I dati sono sempre espressione diretta o indiretta ("through technological mediations", per usare le parole di Floridi) dell'uomo e come tali ne rispecchiano i limiti evolutivi e culturali nonché gli interessi politici. Noi possiamo costruire spettrometri per rappresentare (come dati che possiamo interpretare) lunghezze d'onda che non possiamo vedere, ma solo perché ne percepiamo e distinguiamo alcune. Ma il modo in cui le rappresentiamo (lunghezze d'onda) potrebbe non avere molto a che fare con la realtà sottostante, esattamente come avveniva con la teoria corpuscolare. In altri termini, i dati di un problema sono sempre espressione di una mente umana che li ha selezionati come rilevanti ed ha deciso come rappresentarli (eventualmente "through technological mediations"). Se accettiamo che l'esperienza soggettiva di un fenomeno sia distinto dal fenomeno stesso, tale esperienza va distinta sia dalla sua rappresentazione mentale (informazione) sia dalla sua rappresentazione trasferibile/comunicabile (il dato). Collassare fenomeno, informazione e dato (peraltro in una parola già abbondantemente sovraccaricata come "dato") è pericoloso perché fa apparire il dato come misura oggettiva, mentre è sempre rappresentazione di una esperienza soggettiva (seppure talvolta mediata da un automatismo che incapsula ed esegue la volontà e gli interessi di chi lo costruisce). [2] "identificato" nel senso che diventa targettizzabile, indipendentemente dall'associazione di un identificativo esplicito (come un nome od un numero) che potrebbe non essere estraibile, ad esempio, dalle matrici che una "rete neurale artificiale" opaca esegue. [3] è interessante considerare una prospettiva sistemistica alternativa rispetto questa modellazione dei gruppi come detentori di diritti: i ruoli. Laddove il gruppo aggrega individui secondo un livello di astrazione rilevante (quelli che sono predicati logici applicabili ad un insieme), il ruolo "frammenta" l'individuo secondo i suoi interessi come una proprietà dell'individuo stesso. Naturalmente è possibile passare da ruolo a gruppo e da gruppo a ruolo (da "appartenenete a" ad "appartiene a" e vice-versa), ma ragionare anche per ruoli, rivela che ogni individuo ha il diritto di scegliere di modulare la privacy rispetto a ruoli diversi in modo diverso. Il mio diritto individuale alla privacy potrebbe essere applicato separatamente a diversi ruoli (come visitatore di un sito internet, amministratore di un server, padre, marito, programmatore) e potrebbe anche includere il diritto a tenere i dati relativi ai diversi ruoli SEPARATI fra loro (ancor prima che riconducibili o meno alla mia identità). In altri termini, la mia visita ad un sito internet non dovrebbe essere accessibile ad altri che al server che la gestisce per fornirmi quanto ho esplicitamente richiesto. Cedere a terzi i dati relativi a quel ruolo costituirebbe una violazione del mio diritto a tenere separati i diversi ruoli che adotto.

1 0

Hit by a ransomware attack? Your payment may be deductible
by Stefano Traverso July 20, 2021

July 20, 2021

Buongiorno a tutti, Condivido questo articolo che non mi sembra di aver visto circolare su questa lista. https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-government-and-politics-d8c1… Immagino che l’obiettivo sia di permettere all’azienda vittima di sopravvivere garantendo futuro a lavoratori e famiglie. Ma mi chiedo quanto sia corretto che uno stato faccia pagare ai contribuenti (quegli stessi lavoratori) i danni causati da criminali e manager negligenti. E in Italia? I ransom sono deducibili? Grazie, Stefano -- [signature_513209660] Stefano Traverso, PhD Research Lead Ermes – Intelligent Web Protection www.ermes.company<https://www.ermes.company/> Mobile : +39 331 455 9794

1 0

What is Pegasus spyware and how does it hack phones? | Surveillance | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo July 19, 2021

July 19, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/what-is-pegasus-spyware-and-ho…> What is Pegasus spyware and how does it hack phones? Pegasus can infect a phone through ‘zero-click’ attacks, which do not require any interaction from the phone’s owner to succeed. NSO Group software can record your calls, copy your messages and secretly film you David Pegg and Sam Cutler Sun 18 Jul 2021 17.00 BST Last modified on Mon 19 Jul 2021 09.53 BST It is the name for perhaps the most powerful piece of spyware ever developed – certainly by a private company. Once it has wormed its way on to your phone, without you noticing, it can turn it into a 24-hour surveillance device. It can copy messages you send or receive, harvest your photos and record your calls. It might secretly film you through your phone’s camera, or activate the microphone to record your conversations. It can potentially pinpoint where you are, where you’ve been, and who you’ve met. Pegasus is the hacking software – or spyware – that is developed, marketed and licensed to governments around the world by the Israeli company NSO Group. It has the capability to infect billions of phones running either iOS or Android operating systems. The earliest version of Pegasus discovered, which was captured by researchers in 2016, infected phones through what is called spear-phishing – text messages or emails that trick a target into clicking on a malicious link. Quick Guide What is in the Pegasus project data? Show Since then, however, NSO’s attack capabilities have become more advanced. Pegasus infections can be achieved through so-called “zero-click” attacks, which do not require any interaction from the phone’s owner in order to succeed. These will often exploit “zero-day” vulnerabilities, which are flaws or bugs in an operating system that the mobile phone’s manufacturer does not yet know about and so has not been able to fix. In 2019 WhatsApp revealed that NSO’s software had been used to send malware to more than 1,400 phones by exploiting a zero-day vulnerability. Simply by placing a WhatsApp call to a target device, malicious Pegasus code could be installed on the phone, even if the target never answered the call. More recently NSO has begun exploiting vulnerabilities in Apple’s iMessage software, giving it backdoor access to hundreds of millions of iPhones. Apple says it is continually updating its software to prevent such attacks. Technical understanding of Pegasus, and how to find the evidential breadcrumbs it leaves on a phone after a successful infection, has been improved by research conducted by Claudio Guarnieri, who runs Amnesty International’s Berlin-based Security Lab. “Things are becoming a lot more complicated for the targets to notice,” said Guarnieri, who explained that NSO clients had largely abandoned suspicious SMS messages for more subtle zero-click attacks. Pegasus: the spyware technology that threatens democracy – video 04:55 Pegasus: the spyware technology that threatens democracy – video For companies such as NSO, exploiting software that is either installed on devices by default, such as iMessage, or is very widely used, such as WhatsApp, is especially attractive, because it dramatically increases the number of mobile phones Pegasus can successfully attack. As the technical partner of the Pegasus project, an international consortium of media organisations including the Guardian, Amnesty’s lab has discovered traces of successful attacks by Pegasus customers on iPhones running up-to-date versions of Apple’s iOS. The attacks were carried out as recently as July 2021. Forensic analysis of the phones of victims has also identified evidence suggesting NSO’s constant search for weaknesses may have expanded to other commonplace apps. In some of the cases analysed by Guarnieri and his team, peculiar network traffic relating to Apple’s Photos and Music apps can be seen at the times of the infections, suggesting NSO may have begun leveraging new vulnerabilities. Where neither spear-phishing nor zero-click attacks succeed, Pegasus can also be installed over a wireless transceiver located near a target, or, according to an NSO brochure, simply manually installed if an agent can steal the target’s phone. Once installed on a phone, Pegasus can harvest more or less any information or extract any file. SMS messages, address books, call history, calendars, emails and internet browsing histories can all be exfiltrated. “When an iPhone is compromised, it’s done in such a way that allows the attacker to obtain so-called root privileges, or administrative privileges, on the device,” said Guarnieri. “Pegasus can do more than what the owner of the device can do.” Lawyers for NSO claimed that Amnesty International’s technical report was conjecture, describing it as “a compilation of speculative and baseless assumptions”. However, they did not dispute any of its specific findings or conclusions. NSO has invested substantial effort in making its software difficult to detect and Pegasus infections are now very hard to identify. Security researchers suspect more recent versions of Pegasus only ever inhabit the phone’s temporary memory, rather than its hard drive, meaning that once the phone is powered down virtually all trace of the software vanishes. One of the most significant challenges that Pegasus presents to journalists and human rights defenders is the fact that the software exploits undiscovered vulnerabilities, meaning even the most security-conscious mobile phone user cannot prevent an attack. “This is a question that gets asked to me pretty much every time we do forensics with somebody: ‘What can I do to stop this happening again?’” said Guarnieri. “The real honest answer is nothing.”

2 1

90° Nexa Lunch Seminar | 28 Luglio 2021 | Modalità Telematica
by Nexa Media July 19, 2021

July 19, 2021

Gentilissimi, vi segnaliamo che il 90° Nexa Lunch Seminar, /*"Lo stato della censura Internet nel 2020: aggiornamenti dall'Osservatorio Aperto delle Interferenze di rete"*/, con ospite *Arturo Filastò* (Fellow Centro Nexa), si svolgerà *mercoledì 28 luglio, dalle ore 13.00 alle ore 14.00*, in modalità telematica, utilizzando la piattaforma di videoconferenza BigBlueButton. Sarà possibile partecipare al seminario connettendosi al seguente indirizzo: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent <https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent> Nexa Center for Internet and Society Newsletter Se non visualizzi correttamente questo messaggio clicca qui <https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-90> NEXA 90° Nexa Lunch Seminar Mercoledì 28 luglio 2021, ore 13.00 - 14.00 Politecnico di Torino https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-90 <https://nexa.polito.it/lunch-90> Lo stato della censura Internet nel 2020: aggiornamenti dall’Osservatorio Aperto delle Interferenze di rete Speaker Arturo Filastò (Fellow Centro Nexa) This event will be webcast live: https://nexa.polito.it/nexa-hangout-on-air <https://nexa.polito.it/nexa-hangout-on-air> L'INCONTRO SI SVOLGERÀ IN MODALITÀ TELEMATICA UTILIZZANDO IL SOFTWARE DI CONFERENCE CALL *BIGBLUEBUTTON*. Per partecipare all'incontro: https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent <https://didattica.polito.it/VClass/NexaEvent> Dal 2012 *OONI*, l’osservatorio aperto delle interferenze di rete, investiga su come e dove avviene la *censura su internet nel mondo*, e lo fa tramite un software libero che può essere usato su mobile o desktop. I dati vengono quindi pubblicati tutti in *Open Data*. Il *2020* è stato un anno molto intenso su diversi fronti, incluso quello della censura internet: sempre di più il blocco di contenuti online viene infatti utilizzato quale strumento per arginare rivolte popolari, per evitare che si diffondano informazioni durante le elezioni o addirittura per prevenire l’accesso a informazioni sul COVID-19. Durante l’intervento verranno presentati i *risultati* di varie investigazioni condotte da OONI, e dai suoi partner, sulla censura internet nel mondo. Alcuni dei risultati che presenteremo includono: come le app di messaggistica e social media sono stati bloccati in *Togo, Burundi e Tanzania* durante le elezioni; come il *Myanmar* ha bloccato l’accesso a siti che sostengono di diffondere “fake news”; come l’*Iran* ha bloccato temporaneamente l’accesso alla versione persiana di Wikipedia; come la *Bielorussia* ha implementato blocchi di siti web e un blackout di internet a seguito di rivolte popolari, come l’*Iran* ha bloccato il protocollo DNS over TLS; come il *Venezuela* ha bloccato l’accesso a siti di informazioni sul COVID-19. BIOGRAFIA - e informazioni supplementari [Filastò] *Arturo FILASTÒ* ha fondato OONI (Open Observatory of Network Interference) nel 2011 e da allora è il Project Lead. In passato ha lavorato per il Tor Project come sviluppatore e ha creato un numero di progetti di software libero per promuovere i diritti digitali, quali GlobaLeaks e Tor Atlas. È inoltre il co-fondatore e ha servito come vice-presidente del Centro Hermes per la Trasparenza e Diritti Umani in Rete. Arturo ha studiato Matematica e Informatica all’Università di Roma “La Sapienza”. *Letture consigliate e link utili:* * OONI Probe: LINK <https://ooni.org/install/> * OONI Explorer: LINK <https://explorer.ooni.org/> * Myanmar blocks “fake news” websites amid COVID-19 pandemic: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-myanmar-blocks-websites-amid-covid19/> * Iran temporarily blocks the Farsi language edition of Wikipedia: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-blocks-farsi-wikipedia/> * Burundi blocks social media amid 2020 general election: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-burundi-blocks-social-media-amid-election/> * Tanzania blocks social media on election day: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-tanzania-blocks-social-media-tor-election-day/> * Belarus protests: From internet outages to pervasive website censorship: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-belarus-internet-outages-website-censorship/> * Bloquean sitio sobre coronavirus COVID-19 organizado por la AN y Juan Guaidó: LINK <https://vesinfiltro.com/noticias/bloqueado_portal_coronavirus_AN> * DNS over TLS blocked in Iran: LINK <https://ooni.org/post/2020-iran-dot/> Che cosa sono il Centro Nexa e i cicli di incontri “Mercoledì di Nexa” e “Nexa Lunch Seminar” <https://www.facebook.com/nexa.center/> <https://twitter.com/nexacenter> <https://www.youtube.com/user/NexaCenter> #nexalunchseminar <https://twitter.com/search?q=%23nexalunchseminar&src=typd> #ArturoFilastò <https://twitter.com/hellais> Il Centro Nexa su Internet & Società del Politecnico di Torino (Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica) dal 2006 è un centro di ricerca indipendente e interdisciplinare che, in collaborazione con l'Università di Torino, studia Internet (e più in generale le Tecnologie digitali) e i suoi rapporti con la società. Maggiori informazioni all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/about <http://nexa.polito.it/about>. Durante i “*Mercoledì di Nexa*”, che si tengono *ogni 2° mercoledì del mese* alle *ore 18 in punto*, il Centro Nexa su Internet e Società apre le sue porte non solo agli esperti e a tutti coloro i quali lavorano con Internet, ma anche a semplici appassionati e cittadini. Il ciclo di incontri intende approfondire, con un linguaggio preciso ma accessibile, i temi legati alla Rete: motori di ricerca, Creative Commons, social networks, open source/software libero, neutralità della rete, libertà di espressione, privacy, file sharing, big e open data, smart cities e molto altro. Al centro di quasi tutti gli incontri un ospite pronto a dialogare con i direttori del Centro Nexa, il Prof. Juan Carlos De Martin del Politecnico di Torino e il Prof. Marco Ricolfi dell'Università di Torino, nonché lo staff e i Fellows del Centro Nexa. Maggiori informazioni sui Mercoledì di Nexa, incluso un elenco di tutti i “Mercoledì” passati, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi <http://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi>. Si segnala inoltre che dal maggio 2012 *ogni 4° mercoledì* del mese *dalle ore 13 alle ore 14* il Centro Nexa organizza anche i "*Nexa Lunch Seminar*". Una lista di tutti i “Lunch Seminar” passati è disponibile all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-seminars <http://nexa.polito.it/lunch-seminars>. See our events calendar <http://nexa.polito.it/events> if you're curious about future luncheons, discussions, lectures, and conferences not listed in this email. Our events are free and open to the public, unless otherwise noted. Responsabile Comunicazione Centro Nexa su Internet & Società: *Anita Botta*, tel: +39 011 090 7219, Mob: +39 347 131 3903, anita.botta(a)polito.it <mailto:anita.botta@polito.it>. Maggiori informazioni sui Mercoledì di Nexa e i Nexa Lunch Seminar, sono disponibili all'indirizzo: http://nexa.polito.it/events <http://nexa.polito.it/events>. Weekly Events Newsletter. Sign up <http://nexa.polito.it/mailing-lists> to receive this newsletter if this email was forwarded to you. To manage your subscription preferences, please click here <https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa>. Connect & get involved: Jobs, internships, and more <http://nexa.polito.it/get-involved>. Cordiali saluti,   -- Anita Botta Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino – DAUIN Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 - 10129 Torino _web:_ https://nexa.polito.it/ <https://nexa.polito.it/> _mail:_anita.botta@polito.it <mailto:anita.botta@polito.it> tel: 011 090 7219

1 0

Revealed: leak uncovers global abuse of cyber-surveillance weapon | Surveillance | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo July 18, 2021

July 18, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/revealed-leak-uncovers-global…> Human rights activists, journalists and lawyers across the world have been targeted by authoritarian governments using hacking software sold by the Israeli surveillance company NSO Group, according to an investigation into a massive data leak. The investigation by the Guardian and 16 other media organisations suggests widespread and continuing abuse of NSO’s hacking spyware, Pegasus, which the company insists is only intended for use against criminals and terrorists. Pegasus is a malware that infects iPhones and Android devices to enable operators of the tool to extract messages, photos and emails, record calls and secretly activate microphones. The leak contains a list of more than 50,000 phone numbers that, it is believed, have been identified as those of people of interest by clients of NSO since 2016. Forbidden Stories, a Paris-based nonprofit media organisation, and Amnesty International initially had access to the leaked list and shared access with media partners as part of the Pegasus project, a reporting consortium. The presence of a phone number in the data does not reveal whether a device was infected with Pegasus or subject to an attempted hack. However, the consortium believes the data is indicative of the potential targets NSO’s government clients identified in advance of possible surveillance attempts.

1 0

An Ugly Truth by Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang review – Facebook’s battle for domination | Journalism books | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo July 18, 2021

July 18, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/jul/18/an-ugly-truth-inside-facebook…> How many books are there about Facebook? I’ve lost count. Many of them belong to the genre of the “insider” story – by an early investor in the company, perhaps; or by a supposed intimate of its founder and Supreme Leader; or by an ex-employee with a bad conscience for the societal damage for which he (and it’s always a he, by the way) has been responsible; or (occasionally) by a vigorous critic of social media such as Siva Vaidhyanathan or Franklin Foer. I’ve read most of these and so approached An Ugly Truth with a degree of scepticism on account of its subtitle: “Inside Facebook’s Battle for Domination”. But this book is different. For one thing, its co-authors are not “insiders”, but a pair of experienced New York Times journalists who were members of a team nominated in 2019 for a Pulitzer prize. Much more importantly, though, they claim to have conducted over 1,000 hours of interviews with 400-odd people, including Facebook executives, former and current employees and their families, friends and classmates, plus investors and advisers to Facebook, and lawyers and activists who have been fighting the company for a long time. So if this is an “insider” account, it’s better sourced than all of its predecessors in the genre. We’ll get to what this account reveals in a moment, but first let’s clear up the title. It comes from the header on an internal memo sent by Andrew Bosworth (AKA “Boz”), a senior Facebook executive and one of Mark Zuckerberg’s closest confidants. “So we connect more people,” it says. “That can be bad if they make it negative. Maybe it costs someone a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools. And still we connect people. The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto good.” In a way, this tells you everything you need to know about Facebook. The only thing Boz omitted to mention is that the more people Facebook “connects”, the more money it makes. And the view from its HQ is that it’s still early days in the growth story. After all, Facebook currently has 2.8 billion monthly active users and there are 7.8 billion people on the planet at the moment. Which means, in the megalomaniacal view of the company’s Supreme Leader, that leaves 5 billion still to be “connected”. Only then – when every sentient being on the planet is on Facebook – will the world’s problems be solved. And if you think I’m making this up, then an inspection of some of Zuckerberg essays on his Facebook page may give you pause. Although progress to world domination has, to date, been progressing according to plan, there have been some hiccups – or, at any rate, PR problems – on the way. In focusing their inquiry, Frenkel and Kang have largely concentrated on what’s gone on within Facebook over just four years – from the 2016 presidential election that brought Trump to power to Biden’s election in 2020. They had plenty of material to go on. Among other things, this period includes: Russian hacking of the Clinton campaign; its consummate exploitation of Facebook’s advertising system to disseminate disinformation and introduce chaos into public discourse; the Trump campaign’s mastery of those same systems for the same purposes; the Cambridge Analytica scandal; the smear campaign against George Soros; the way in which Facebook’s expansion into Myanmar facilitated a genocidal campaign against the country’s Rohingya Muslims; the livestreaming by the shooter of the Christchurch massacre in 2019; and the use of Facebook by the insurgents to plan (and livestream) the attack on the US Capitol on 6 January. The co-authors’ exhumation of these ghastly skeletons makes for gripping as well as depressing reading. Two things in particular stand out. The first is that, in most of the cases, people within Facebook were aware of – and alarmed about – what was happening on the company’s systems, either because they had detected them or had been alerted by well-informed outsiders. And yet, when they communicated their concerns to people above them in the managerial hierarchy, nothing much happened – which possibly explains why in some cases Zuckerberg seemed to be unaware of the looming crises until it was too late to claim ignorance. Many Facebook employees are anguished about what their employer has been doing in its relentless quest for growth The most striking example of this is what happened when internal investigators led by the cybersecurity guru Alex Stamos uncovered the extent of Russian meddling on Facebook’s systems. Stamos’s attempts to alert his superiors to what was going on were brushed off. All mention of Russia in his draft white paper were deleted by senior staff. But as news media began to suss that something big was up, it was decided that the company’s board should be briefed on it the day before its quarterly meeting on 7 September 2017. On 6 September, therefore, Stamos gave a presentation to a delegated subcommittee of three board members. They were stunned and furious in an expletive-deleted way. “How the fuck are we only hearing about this now?” said Erskine Bowles, who had been Bill Clinton’s chief of staff. The full board meeting was equally fractious. But nothing substantive happened. Why? Because the board members serve entirely at Zuckerberg’s pleasure. In its regular filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company sums it up nicely: “Mark Zuckerberg, our founder, chairman and CEO, is able to exercise voting rights with respect to a majority of the voting power of our outstanding capital stock and therefore has the ability to control the outcome of matters submitted to the stockholders for approval, including the election of directors and any merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of our assets. This concentrated control could… result in the consummation of such a transaction that our other stockholders do not support.” Zuckerberg could fire the entire board and there is nothing that anyone could do about it. This extraordinary document is nowhere cited in An Ugly Truth, and yet it underpins its entire narrative. One of the book’s striking revelations is that there is more anxiety inside the company than we realised. Many Facebook employees have been anguished, frustrated or angry about what their employer has been doing in its relentless quest for growth. Some have tried to alert their superiors to their concerns. But time and again the bad news hasn’t persuaded those bosses because they didn’t sync with the overriding imperative of endless corporate growth. And, as HL Mencken famously observed, it’s difficult to explain something to someone whose salary depends on not understanding it. Zuckerberg’s obsession with growth is what underpinned the Myanmar catastrophe. Facebook rolled into a country with no democratic traditions, providing connectivity for people who had never before used the internet. The company’s executives knew zilch about the country other than it was promising territory for their CEO’s cherished “next one billion” project. In entering Myanmar, Facebook had – as the book puts it – “thrown a lit match on to decades of simmering racial tension and had then turned the other way when activists pointed to the smoke slowly choking the country”. In the end, human rights officials estimated that 24,000 Rohingya were murdered and 700,000 Muslims fled to Bangladesh. And while this was going on, the inflammatory rhetoric of 18 million Facebook users that fuelled the genocide was monitored by just five native Burmese speakers, the book reports, none of whom was actually based in Myanmar. So the “ugly truth” about Facebook is that it’s an immensely powerful corporation with a toxic business model, led by an autocratic founder who is hell-bent on world domination. A prominent critic of the company once observed that “the problem of Facebook is Facebook”. Wrong. The problem of Facebook is Zuckerberg. And the question posed by this splendid book is: what are we going to do about him?

1 0