March 2022 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Conferenza GARR - Palermo - 18-20/05/2022
by Damiano Verzulli March 30, 2022

March 30, 2022

Carissim*, ritengo che la densità e l'altezza della gran parte dei contenuti che transitano su questa lista sia di assoluto rilievo. Ritengo, altresì, che sia estremamente utile "discutere" di tali temi, meglio ancora se al di fuori della nostra "bolla". È per questo che --seppur con imperdonabile ritardo-- inviterei _TUTT*_ a sottomettere una proposta di intervento alla prossima Conferenza GARR, che si terra' --finalmente in presenza, dopo due anni!-- a Palermo, il prossimo maggio (18-20). A differenza del WorkShop GARR (che ha un taglio molto "operativo" e, tendenzialmente, un focus sugli aspetti piu' "tecnici" legati all'infrastruttura ed ai servizi GARR), la Conferenza è l'occasione per discutere di temi piu' "alti". Discutere --fra gli altri-- esattamente di quei temi che spesso alimentano questa lista. Putroppo la scadenza per la CFP è fissata al prossimo 3/4 [1]. Sono fiducioso, pero', che la stesura di una bozza di proposta (anche solo di 2500 caratteri), non dovrebbe essere compito impossibile. Un caro saluto, DV [1] https://www.eventi.garr.it/it/conf22/call-for-paper -- Damiano Verzulli e-mail: damiano(a)verzulli.it --- possible?ok:while(!possible){open_mindedness++} --- "...I realized that free software would not generate the kind of income that was needed. Maybe in USA or Europe, you may be able to get a well paying job as a free software developer, but not here [in Africa]..." -- Guido Sohne - 1973-2008 http://ole.kenic.or.ke/pipermail/skunkworks/2008-April/005989.html

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Fidenza: Carta dell’assegnatario
by 380° March 30, 2022

March 30, 2022

Buongiorno nexiane, qui non c'è di mezzo una app o "il digitale", quindi è un po' OT... https://www.lindipendente.online/2022/03/23/il-comune-di-fidenza-introduce-… «Il Comune di Fidenza introduce la patente a punti per le case popolari» --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] la “Carta dell’assegnatario”, riportante un punteggio iniziale di 50 punti. Attraverso il comportamento dei residenti il credito potrà lievitare o diminuire: nel caso in cui si esaurissero tutti i punti a disposizione, gli assegnatari sarebbero costretti a lasciare l’alloggio. [...] Tra i divieti, figurano “l’utilizzo di barbecue e griglie sul balcone” (pena la perdita di 10 punti) o l’ospitare “persone estranee al nucleo senza la preventiva autorizzazione del Comune e/o dell’Ente gestore”, comportamento che si tradurrebbe in una multa di 50 euro e nella decurtazione di 25 punti dalla “Carta dell’assegnatario”. Per quanto riguarda, invece, gli spazi comuni è vietato consumare alcolici o “distribuire cibo alle popolazioni libere di colombi e volatili in genere”, pena la perdita di 10 punti. [...] All’interno del nuovo regolamento vengono poi citati altri due modi per ottenere un punto da aggiungere al proprio credito: “sistemando un danno provocato” o partecipando alle iniziative per “imparare a vivere bene insieme”. La misura, che ha già provocato diversi malumori nella popolazione locale, segue la strada tracciata da altre amministrazioni italiane, come nel caso dei cinque Comuni del Parmense (Felino, Sala Baganza, Collecchio, Traversetolo e Montechiarugolo) che nel 2019 escogitarono il sistema degli alloggi popolari a punti [...] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Il regolamento completo è disponibile qui: https://www.aziendacasapr.it/documents/20182/49198/RegolamentoFidenza2022/8… La "Tabella A" a pagina 38 del PDF contiene un elenco di divieti e obblighi davvero... IMPRESSIONANTE; dubito seriamente che molti di quei divieti (vietato consumare alcolici, andiamo!) resisterebbero in una causa in tribunale a seguito di sfratto per esaurimento dei punti Pare non sia niente di nuovo visto che in alcuni comuni è in vigore qualcosa di simile (ma non si sa in che termini) dal 2019, chissà come sono andate quelle esperienze. Saluti, 380° -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

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Chris Hedges, "On Being Disappeared"
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 29, 2022

March 29, 2022

*On Being Disappeared* /The entire archive of six years of my show On Contact has been disappeared from YouTube./ Chris Hedges The entire archive of On Contact, the Emmy-nominated show I hosted for six years for RT America and RT International, has been disappeared from YouTube. Gone is the interview with Nathaniel Philbrick on his book about George Washington. Gone is the discussion with Kai Bird on his biography of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Gone is my exploration with Professor Sam Slote from Trinity College Dublin of James Joyce’s “Ulysses.” Gone is the show with Benjamin Moser on his biography of Susan Sontag. Gone is the show with Stephen Kinzer on his book on John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles. Gone are the interviews with the social critics Cornel West, Tariq Ali, Noam Chomsky, Gerald Horne, Wendy Brown, Paul Street, Gabriel Rockwell, Naomi Wolff and Slavoj Zizek. Gone are the interviews with the novelists Russell Banks and Salar Abdoh. Gone is the interview with Kevin Sharp, a former federal judge, on the case of Leonard Peltier. Gone are the interviews with economists David Harvey and Richard Wolff. Gone are the interviews with the combat veterans and West Point graduates Danny Sjursen and Eric Edstrom about our wars in the Middle East. Gone are the discussions with the journalists Glenn Greenwald and Matt Taibbi. Gone are the voices of those who are being persecuted and marginalized, including the human rights attorney Steven Donziger and the political prisoner Mumia Abu Jamal. None of the shows I did on mass incarceration, where I interviewed those released from our prisons, are any longer on YouTube. Gone are the shows with the cartoonists Joe Sacco and Dwayne Booth. Melted into thin air, leaving not a rack behind. I received no inquiry or notice from YouTube. I vanished. In totalitarian systems you exist, then you don’t. I suppose this was done in the name of censoring Russian propaganda, although I have a hard time seeing how a detailed discussion of “Ulysses” or the biographies of Susan Sontag and J. Robert Oppenheimer had any connection in the eyes of the most obtuse censors in Silicon Valley with Vladimir Putin. Indeed, there is not one show that dealt with Russia. I was on RT because, as a critic of US imperialism, militarism, the corporate control of the two ruling parties, and especially because I support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement against Israel, I was blacklisted. I was on RT for the same reason the dissident Vaclav Havel, who I knew, was on Voice of America during the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. It was that or not be heard. Havel had no more love for the policies of Washington than I have for those of Moscow. [...] continua qui: https://chrishedges.substack.com/p/on-being-disappeared

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"Ex-Google CEO funneled money into the White House science office"
by J.C. DE MARTIN March 29, 2022

March 29, 2022

* **Ex-Google CEO funneled money into the White House science office* Eric Schmidt’s contributions raised ethical concerns, Politico reported By Nicole Wetsman Mar 28, 2022, 1:11pm EDT [...] continua qui: https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/28/22999754/eric-schmidt-google-money-white…

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La legge cinese sulla protezione delle informazioni personali: un GDPR con caratteristiche cinesi?
by Giacomo Tesio March 28, 2022

March 28, 2022

Salve Nexa, vi segnalo questa interessantissima analisi comparativa di Davide Clementi fra il GDPR europeo ed il PIPL cinese. https://www.diritticomparati.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Clementi_Early_v… Giacomo

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Re: [nexa] i gravi limiti del software libero
by Giuseppe Attardi March 28, 2022

March 28, 2022

All’MIT AI Lab ai tempi di RMS io c’ero e posso confermare qual era la mentalità e lo spirito che circolava. Il sistema operativo del PDP-10 se lo erano fatti in casa e si chiamava ITS (Incompatible Time Sharing) e la sicurezza era data da “security by obscurity”, come diceva Richard Greenblatt, ossia dovevi essere in grado di capire il codice per capire come aggirarlo. Ma se eri in grado di farlo, diventavi automaticamente parte della comunità, e pertanto si presumeva che aderissi ai suoi principi. E i principi comprendevano operare nell’interesse comune ed essere orgoglioso e gratificato dagli altri per i propri “hack”, dove hack stava per “ganzata”, soluzione o meccanismo furbo e originale. Per esempio RMS era divertito di stupirmi dicendo che col tasto Esc-E si chiamava l’ascensore al piano e sorrideva quando reagivo come se mi stesse prendendo in giro. Oppure Danny Hillis che mi chiama in sala macchine (BTW, completamente aperta) per farmi vedere un bastone con delle lucette in cima che scuotedo formava la scritta Hello nell’aria. I video terminali del PDP-10 avevano una grafica gestita centralmente, per cui potevi switchare su uno qualunque degli schermi e vedere quello che gli altri facevano istante per istante, oltre ad avere accesso ai file di tutti perché non c’era protezione. Capitava ad esempio che qualcuno entrasse sul tuo schermo e ti desse consigli su quello che stavi facendo. Sapendo che qualcuno poteva stare a guardarti, era ovvio evitare di compiere azioni sbagliate. Quindi confermo che la motivazione originale di RMS era quella di poter continuare a divertirsi e inventare senza limiti, tra di un gruppo di persone speciali con interessi simili. Il gruppo era molto ristretto e altamente elitario: dovevi dimostrare la tua capacità tecnica per esservi ammesso. Inoltre ciascuno lavorava in isolamento ai propri progetti, non era un lavoro di gruppo, a parte gli scambi di vedute che si svolgevano spesso alle 2 di notte in un ristorante di China Town a Boston. Questo vale anche oggi, dove oltre 93% dei progetti su GitHub è gestito da una singola persona, mentre quelli più articolati spesso hanno alle spalle aziende o organizzazioni. https://increment.com/open-source/the-rise-of-few-maintainer-projects/ Non credo che RMS intendesse estendere il modello a una comunità larghissima su scala mondiale. Quando lanciò la sua mail di richiesta di aiuto per sviluppare un sistema operativo “free”, penso che si volesse rivolgere a qualche centinaio di persone in altre università, e comunque a gente in grado di sviluppare software. Si trattava di una mossa disperata, una message in the bottle, dopo diversi mesi in cui si era consumato lavorando quasi senza dormire, per replicare il software che avevano portato in Symbolics gli altri membri della gang, con la complicità del direttore Pat Winston, che vi aveva ceduto i diritti. Il passaggio da Free Source a Open Source ha comportato quindi un passaggio da una piccola comunità di sviluppatori altamente specializzati ad una ampia platea di “free rider”, che al massimo contribuiscono segnalando bug. Sul fatto che un suo limite fosse di essere Americano, direi che si guardava sempre attentamente dal rischio di essere inquadrato in qualche posizione politica e in particolare di avere posizioni anticapitaliste o socialiste: eravamo nel mezzo della guerra fredda, poco dopo la fine della guerra del Vietnam. Ma non credo affatto che egli abbia ”involontariamente infuso la propaganda politica USA di quegli anni di guerra fredda”. Ci teneva però a precisare “free as in freedom, not as a free beer”, per chiarire di non essere contro il profitto né contro il mercato. Mi piace l’interpretazione di Tesio che lo spirito originale in Stallman era motivato dalla voglia di curiosità oltre che da un anelito di libertà. — Beppe > On 26 Mar 2022, at 10:03, nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it wrote: > >>> On Fri, 25 Mar 2022 14:30:03 +0100 Andrea Trentini wrote: >>> >>> Il software libero, sin dalla sua definizione, soffre dei limiti >>> culturali del contesto in cui è nato. >> >> questi limiti mi sfuggono... > > Ahimé, non solo a te! > > > Il limite più grave è stato l'inconsapevole confusione di RMS > nell'identificare il valore alla base del movimento del software > libero, che ne ha determinato il nome. > > Una bella intervista che ripropone quel processo è quella di Rob Lucas, > del 2018 [1] > ``` > I was inspired by the attitude at the mitai Lab, where the hackers > said: ‘We’re not going to let the administrators tell us how to do > things; we’re going to work on what they need, but we will decide how; > and we won’t let them implement computer security to restrict us with.’ > This was a conscious decision of the hackers who had written the > time-sharing system, which they’d started a couple of years before I > got there. Their attitude was, yes, the administrators could fire us, > but we were not going to suck up to them. [...] > We were there because we were free to improve the system and do useful > things, the way we wanted to, and not be treated like people who had to > obey all the time. [...] > > Minsky, I was told, didn’t like having doors locked, because he had a > tendency to lose his keys. So the doors to the Lab and all the offices > inside it were always open. There were no passwords for the > time-sharing system. There was no file protection—literally: anybody > could sit down at any console and do anything. [...] > > The point is that when people share a computer, either they do so as a > community, where they trust each other and resolve disputes, or it’s > run like a police state, where there are a few who are the masters, who > exercise total power over everyone else. [...] > > we developed a culture of welcoming everyone to come and work on > everything, and share. So, we resisted security measures. Anyone could > look at anyone else’s terminal through the system. > > But the kids, teenagers coming in over the internet—Arpanet, as it was > then—they would watch, and they would learn things. > ``` > > RMS descrive una comunità che condivideva l'accesso al PDP-10, in > equilibrio dinamico su 3 valori: > > - libertà > - comunione > - curiosità > > RMS poi continua: > > ``` > # So they could watch people programming? > > Yes, they could. Our way of dealing with kids coming in over Arpanet > was to socialize them. We all participated in that. For example, there > was a command you could type to tell the system to shut down in five > minutes. The kids sometimes did that, and when they did we just > cancelled the shutdown. They were amazed. They would read about this > command and think, surely it’s not going to work, and would type it—and > get an immediate notification: ‘The system is shutting down in five > minutes because of . . . ’ > > # It sounds like chaos. > > Except it wasn’t, you see. There was always a real user, who would just > cancel the shutdown and say to that person, ‘Why did you try to shut > the machine down? You know we’re here using it. You only do that if > there’s a good reason.’ > And the thing is, a lot of those people felt outcast by society—they > were geeks; their families and their fellow students didn’t understand > them; they had nobody. And we welcomed them into the community and > invited them to learn and start to do some useful work. > > It was amazing for them not to be treated as trash. > ``` > > Nella sua formulazione del software libero, sin dalla scelta del nome > valore fondamentale, RMS ha involontariamente infuso la propaganda > politica USA di quegli anni di guerra fredda. > > E così comunità e curiosità sono sparite ed è rimasta solo la libertà, > un valore importantissimo, ma purtroppo da un lato totalizzante > dall'altro ambiguo, perché può essere limitato ad una prospettiva > completamente individualista, mentre il software libero non può > esistere senza una comunità. > > Ma il vero valore fondante dell'etica hacker è la curiosità, il > desiderio di sperimentare, creare, acquisire nuove conoscenze. > > E' sempre la curiosità che spinge un hacker a creare qualcosa di nuovo. > > > Inoltre la curiosità NON è un valore totalizzante, non si può > giustificare una guerra con la curiosità, mentre innumerevoli > carneficine sono state combattute sia in nome della libertà > che in nome della comunione. > E ce li ritroviamo a scontrarsi in vari modi ancora oggi, nelle loro > banalizzazioni novecentesche: liberismo vs comunismo. > > > Il primo fondamentale errore di RMS è stato fondare il software libero > sulla libertà invece che sulla curiosità, sul desiderio di conoscere e > creare cose nuove, da cui derivano sia il bisogno di libertà che quello > di comunità/comunione. > > A sua discolpa c'è che era Americano, nato, cresciuto ed educato a pane > e propaganda da guerra fredda. > > > Questo peccato originale però ha reso il software libero vulnerabile e > ne hanno approfittato rapidamente le aziende, con l'invenzione > dell'open source e la diffusione delle licenze permissive. > > > Negli anni innumerevoli tecniche sono state inventate per privatizzare > il software libero, per sottrarre di fatto agli utenti le libertà che > il software libero intendeva garantire loro. > > Le licenze permissive, in primis, che rendono banale l'embrace, extend, > extinguish (vedi WhatsApp con XMMP, come esempio). > > Il SaaSS, che la AGPLv3 ha rinunciato a gestire [2]. > > E ultimo ma non meno importante, la violazione automatizzata delle > licenze copyleft da parte di GitHub CopyALot^W Copilot (e future > incarnazioni). > > E poi Tivoitization, DRM, patenti, incremento artificiale della > complessità del software... > > Sulla privacy, che pure è precondizione della libertà degli utenti, > il software libero non ha ricette. > > > Ed infondo, le 4 libertà si stanno riducendo a privilegi DA ANNI! > > Quanti di noi sanno leggere il software libero che utilizzano? > Quanti hanno il tempo di farlo? > > > > Il software libero perde terreno da anni. > > Perché? > > > Vi sono molte ragioni naturalmente, ma tutte sono riconducibili a quel > singolo peccato originale. > > > La libertà senza comunione caratterizza l'individuo senza comunità. > > Ma gli individui, soli, soccombono ad un'industria forte, ben > organizzata e soprattutto politicamente consapevole. > > Gli hacker vengono usati e poi marginalizzati. > E quando alzano la testa dal pc, tutti a strapparsi le vesti. > > > > Questi sono i gravi limiti del software libero. > > Dobbiamo andare oltre, superarli. Eventualmente cambiare definizioni. > > > O del software libero non resterà che una "F" in "OSS" > > > Giacomo

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kill cloud - cosa ne pensate?
by karlessi March 28, 2022

March 28, 2022

Buongiorno, in questi giorni a Berlino colleghi di C.I.R.C.E. collaborano alla conferenza DNL #26 - The Kill Cloud https://www.disruptionlab.org/the-kill-cloud personalmente non ne so nulla. certo nutro una forte avversione per quello che ho già definito sistema militare-industriale in ogni sua forma. vent'anni fa con Elèuthera pubblicammo "Il mondo sotto sorveglianza" di Duncan Campbell e da allora questa avversione si è sempre più radicalizzata, per cui dopo Echelon altre "rivelazioni" di whistleblowing, da Wikileaks in poi, mi sono sempre parse piuttosto ovvie. Però ho anche sempre pensato che tutto sommato esistesse un "fuori", una possibilità (faticosa e difficile) di non collaborazione, di diserzione rispetto a questi sistemi. Ora ho dato un occhio ai video dei diversi panel della conferenza di cui sopra: due ex dipendenti google sul Project Maven di qualche anno fa (c'entrava anche Microsoft, Palantir e molti altri); due ex militari dell'aviazione statunitense che praticamente identificano la nostra dipendenza da app e da smartphone con un'arma in mano ai militari. E così via. sono scettico in generale, ancor di più quando si ascoltano resoconti di ex spie o ex militari o insomma pentiti di tutte le risme. troppe sigle, troppi nomi... però la cosa mi interroga. cerco di formulare una domanda, magari in lista c'è chi può dare qualche lume o aiutarmi a capirci qualcosa: se grandi aziende, anche GAFAM, collaborano direttamente con i militari fornendo dati aggregati per localizzare le persone, riconoscimento facciale etc. ha senso dire che, in fondo, non solo le tecnologie di sorveglianza sono strutturalmente parte del complesso militare-industriale, ma anzi gli apparecchi stessi sono di per sé al servizio di quel sistema? Ovvero, ogni umano possessore e utilizzatore di smartphone nella sua attività quotidiana, del tutto slegata da attività militari, aiuta quel sistema a fortificarsi ed espandersi? scusate la vaghezza, forse ci vorrebbe un esempio preciso, non so: usare Google Maps in effetti fornisce dati utili per aumentare la precisione dei sistemi localizzazione e puntamento (droni ecc.)? la pratica della diserzione mi pare l'unica via praticabile, eppure rimane di fatto un'opzione piuttosto teorica anche per me. ditemi perfavore che sono esagerazioni e generalizzazioni fuori luogo grazie k. -- "tecnologie appropriate - https://alekos.net" "pedagogia hacker - https://circex.org"

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Microsoft is using illegal bribes in the Middle East and Africa. Why is the SEC turning a blind eye?
by Alberto Cammozzo March 26, 2022

March 26, 2022

<https://www.lioness.co/post/microsoft-is-using-illegal-bribes-in-the-middle…> I was recruited by Microsoft in 1998, and I helped bring the company’s products throughout the Middle East and Africa for the next 20 years. I was successful and received many promotions. But eventually, I noticed something strange: many employees younger than me, in lower positions, were driving luxury cars and purchasing homes sometimes worth millions of dollars. For my part, I could not afford to buy a home, let alone anything else luxurious, despite my career success. I wondered, naively, whether these colleagues had families with money—but if so, why would they be working on a Microsoft sales team? I put the thought out of mind as Microsoft’s business in the Middle East and Africa boomed. I established contracts in the public sector in Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Qatar, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and many other countries. I sold licensing and solutions to Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior, and National Guard. The Sub-Saharan Africa team I built generated $1 million in 2002; a year later, our revenue was over $15 million. This is, of course, a tiny amount compared to the $4 billion Microsoft now banks in the region, with its near monopoly. To accomplish this kind of growth in such a short time, Microsoft has long utilized a network of partners known as Licensing Solution Partners, who are authorized to engage with large public customers because they possess certain technical and business competencies. Together with these partners, Microsoft brings e-health solutions to hospitals and GPS and digitized services (such as online tax payments) to government agencies. The partner then takes a share of Microsoft’s licensing sales revenue, usually 10–15 percent. One way Microsoft closes deals using these partners is to create a business investment fund to pay for training or pilot projects that could cement longer-term deals. As the director of public sector and emerging markets for the Middle East and Africa, I had oversight of the requests for these funds. In 2016, a request came through in the amount of $40,000 to accelerate closing a deal in one African country. When I looked through the submission, I immediately knew something was wrong. The customer did not appear in Microsoft’s internal database of potential clients. On top of that, the partner in the deal was underqualified for the project’s outlined scope, and he wasn’t even supposed to be doing business with Microsoft: he had been terminated four months earlier for poor performance on the sales team, and corporate policy prohibits former employees from working as partners for six months from their departure without special approval. I brought these issues up with the Microsoft services architect who wrote the request, asking why she didn’t take the work in this case to our very capable in-house team, Microsoft Services. She said our in-house daily rate is very expensive, and she needed a less expensive team to handle the pilot. Still suspicious, I escalated the issue to my manager, and then to the human resources and legal departments. I took the business investment fund very seriously, and wondered why we would be giving money to a partner who could not achieve the desired results. The legal and HR teams put a stop to the $40,000 spend, but to my surprise, did not look deeper into the Microsoft employees who were orchestrating the fake deal. Meanwhile, the woman’s manager sought me out, angry that I had bypassed him; I told him I was only following company policy. Soon after, he was promoted and became my manager. He immediately scheduled a one-on-one meeting, in which he told me our job is to bring as much revenue as we can to Microsoft. He added, “I don’t want you to be a blocker. If any of the subsidiaries in the Middle East or Africa are doing something, you have to turn your head and leave it as is. If anything happens, they will pay the price, not you.” When I said I would not block anything unless it violated company policy, his tone took a sharp turn. He shouted that I was not capable of doing this business and couldn’t close deals. But my 18-year track record spoke for me. I requested a meeting with his boss, a vice president. When I told her what had happened, she asked whether I had any personal issues with him, and suggested the three of us meet, but the meeting was never scheduled. So, I emailed Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and an HR executive to explain that I felt mistreated by this manager. The aforementioned vice president immediately got back in touch with me, to say that by escalating the matter to Nadella, I had just “booked a one-way ticket out of Microsoft.” After this exchange, I began to be left off of important deals. My manager prevented me from attending a trip with a delegation from the Egyptian army, another to Morocco’s Ministry of Justice, and many more. I showed proof of my blocked travel requests to the vice president for the Middle East and Africa, explaining that cutting me out of business trips was negatively affecting our customers, but nothing was done. A general manager told me people panicked when I came to the subsidiary offices, and I had become “one of the most hated persons in Africa.” Only later did I realize this was because I asked too many questions; I was stopping people from skimming money off their deals. Eventually, Microsoft put me on a “performance improvement plan,” even though I was one of the highest performers on the team. When I refused to acknowledge the plan, the company ended my employment in June 2018 and gave me two months’ notice. I was, of course, shocked to be fired, given my achievements and long tenure. But in 2020, a much clearer picture emerged of why executives had wanted to shut down my lines of questioning. A former colleague based in Saudi Arabia who had become upset by what he saw taking place at Microsoft began forwarding me emails and documentation—and I learned that the corruption went much deeper than I had suspected. Examining an audit of several partners conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, I discovered that when agreeing to terms of sale for a product or contract, a Microsoft executive or salesperson would propose a side agreement with the partner and the decision maker at the entity making the purchase. This decision maker on the customer side would send an email to Microsoft requesting a discount, which would be granted, but the end customer would pay the full fee anyway. The amount of the discount would then be distributed among the parties in cahoots: the Microsoft employee(s) involved in the scheme, the partner, and the decision maker at the purchasing entity—often a government official. For instance: In three of the seven sampled transactions, _discounts_ <https://58a44b37-ba55-451b-989d-b8bc5339d45f.usrfiles.com/ugd/58a44b_210851…> worth more than $5.5 million were not passed through to the end customers—in this case, two government-controlled entities. Another _audit report_ <https://58a44b37-ba55-451b-989d-b8bc5339d45f.usrfiles.com/ugd/58a44b_456f67…> showed a deal with the Saudi Ministry of the Interior in which a $13.6 million discount did not pass through. Further audits of deals in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia found a total of $20 million unaccounted for—and this involved only two partners out of hundreds across the region. Were an audit conducted for all of the partners using these practices, I believe the sums of money found to be stolen would be enormous. Where did these millions of dollars go? The documents from my ex-colleague clarified other situations that had raised red flags for me years before. In a 2015 meeting with members of the Nigerian Parliament, the president of the Senate complained to me that the government had paid $5.5 million for Microsoft licenses for hardware they did not possess. This should never have happened, because Microsoft’s standard practice was to meet with the National Assembly’s IT department and financial controller to check the number of computers needing licenses before submitting any proposal. Likewise, auditors _discovered_ <https://m.al-sharq.com/article/23/01/2017/%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D…> that Qatar’s Ministry of Education was paying $9.5 million annually over seven years for Microsoft Office and Windows licenses they weren’t using—as they didn’t even have any PCs or laptop computers! Others have _called out_ <https://twitter.com/africatechie/status/951865749173424131?s=20&t=LWiAU605u…> a similar scheme in Cameroon, where neither the government nor Microsoft would confirm whether 500,000 purchased Office Academy 365 licenses were actually in use. In Saudi Arabia, when the Ministry of Health uncovered a $1.5 million payment for Skype licenses that were never provided, the ministry’s chief information officer demanded that 10,000 licenses be delivered in 72 hours or he would conduct an audit. Of course, that money had already been distributed among those involved in the scam. Microsoft immediately provided new licenses before the side agreements could be exposed. Another spreadsheet revealed a “bad debt” write-off for a few Saudi partners of $18.6 million in one quarter alone. Millions of dollars vanished in just three months! The spreadsheet does not show where that money went, but what is notable—and suspicious—is that several Microsoft employees were previously employed by two of the partners the bad debt was attributed to, and the son of one of those partner’s owners was also employed by Microsoft. Another common practice revolved around creating fake purchase orders, which sales managers presumably used to increase their compensation. In 2017, it was suspected that one sales manager forged the signature of the Saudi National Guard’s deputy minister on a fake Microsoft purchase order. I have evidence that people on Microsoft’s legal, HR, and finance teams—as well as officials from the region’s public sector—knew about this forgery. When the matter was investigated, the sales manager threatened to speak out about the widespread corruption he had seen at the company. I heard that Microsoft paid him to leave quickly and quietly, took no legal action against him, and did not report the forgery. I am not the only person at Microsoft who has alleged corrupt practices. I know of five others from various departments who were terminated or pushed to resign for raising flags about inconsistencies in finances. For example, a whistleblower filed an anonymous_complaint_ <https://techcentral.co.za/eoh-microsoft-ensnared-in-sec-corruption-complain…> with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleging the South African Department of Defense overpaid Microsoft partner EOH Mthombo for software licenses. According to the complaint, the deal—in which middleman EOH received $8.4 million, far more than Microsoft made—was flagged to a Microsoft compliance officer, but no action was taken by the company. The whistleblower contends that this was because EOH was helping Microsoft with a $50 million contract for the South African Police Service. One might question how much these examples implicate Microsoft itself. Could they be isolated incidents that escaped the company’s notice? Given the flags raised by auditors, employees, and government officials in multiple countries, this seems highly unlikely. A further incident reveals Microsoft is not an unwitting party here. In 2013, it was discovered internally that a member of the sales team managing one country’s government contracts was taking money from the business investment fund for a “pilot program” at a company in another country—but the company was his own, and the program was fake. HR and legal department executives confronted the employee, who threatened to expose the scale of corruption inside Microsoft; he then resigned and joined a rival company the next day. Later, at an annual meeting in Turkey, the vice president and the HR director for the region publicly stated that no action had been taken against the employee because Microsoft was aware that punishment for this sort of crime in the man’s home country was severe, and had therefore declined to pursue a case. In my estimation, a minimum of $200 million each year goes to Microsoft employees, partners, and government employees. Experience leads me to believe that 60–70 percent of the company’s salespeople and managers in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Europe are receiving these payments. Among the customers who I believe have received this money are government officials in Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. To anyone who has been following Microsoft closely, this won’t come as a shock. In 2019, the company_paid_ <https://fcpablog.com/2019/07/22/microsoft-pays-25-million-to-resolve-widesp…> a penalty to the U.S. government of $25.3 million for allowing bribery and kickbacks in Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Turkey. At the time, Microsoft president Brad Smith proclaimed_publicly_ <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/07/22/microsoft-president-br…> that the “improper payments” were an “unacceptable” practice, and that “there is no room for compromise when it comes to ethical business practices.” One term of the 2019 settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) was to terminate a contract with a specific partner. Although Microsoft formally terminated the contract, it is still working with this partner through a third-party company—and still engaging in bribery and kickbacks in other countries. What /is/ a shock: This time around, the SEC and DOJ have both declined to investigate Microsoft over the same types of bribes in the Middle East and Africa. They acknowledged my evidence (which I submitted three times) yet did not take up the case, claiming that the current pandemic has prevented them from gathering more evidence from abroad—even though I have already provided documentation that I believe shows Microsoft is in breach of the 2019 agreement and is still participating in corrupt business practices in direct violation of U.S. law. Governments across the Middle East and Africa are throwing away millions of public dollars on unused Microsoft products so a few select officials, partners, and employees can enrich themselves. Microsoft is allowing employees to steal from its own pockets and from the governments of the countries it operates in to help cement its monopoly on the continent. As the manager told me all those years ago, all that matters is that Microsoft earns as much money as possible. Employees who break the law in service of this goal are living lavish lifestyles, while those who speak up are ostracized and pushed out. I expected better of a United States company. As I alleged in my complaint to the SEC, Microsoft is violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and continues to do so brazenly. And why wouldn’t they? By declining to investigate these allegations and the evidence I’ve given them, the SEC and DOJ have given Microsoft the green light. /As of the time of publication, Microsoft and the SEC did not respond to our requests for comment. /

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CIEB: Parere sulla fine apparente dell’emergenza sanitaria
by 380° March 26, 2022

March 26, 2022

Buongiorno Nexiane (nel senso di persone), sia chiaro: questo è un palese e clamoroso OT, siete avvisate. Il Comitato Internazionale per l’Etica della Biomedicina (CIEB) ha pubblicato ieri un nuovo parere, intitolato «Parere sulla fine apparente dell’emergenza sanitaria», che illustra come il complesso di misure militar-amministrative emergenziali introdotte col covid-19 ora diventano permanenti. https://www.ecsel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/VIII-Parere-del-CIEB.pdf Il documento purtroppo (come gli altri pareri del CIEB) è solo in PDF, quindi lo copio integralmente sotto in formato testuale. Auguri di cuore! Saluti, 380° P.S.: essendo un palese OT, direi che non è il caso di discuterne in lista, servirebbe solo a fare ulteriore casino. --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Negli stessi giorni in cui l’opinione pubblica è polarizzata dalla guerra in Ucraina, il CIEB richiama l’attenzione sulla disciplina introdotta dal Decreto-Legge n. 24/22 (cosiddetto Decreto-Legge Riaperture) che – contrariamente a quanto annunciato a più riprese dal Governo e dai media – estende oltre il 31 marzo 2022, in alcuni casi a tempo indeterminato, le misure connesse allo stato di emergenza sanitaria. Pur essendo formalmente volto a «superare lo stato di emergenza dettando le disposizioni necessarie alla progressiva ripresa di tutte le attività in via ordinaria», il Decreto-Legge Riaperture disciplina: - la facoltà per le Amministrazioni di adottare fino al 31 dicembre 2022 «ordinanze» recanti «misure derogatorie» alla disciplina e alla ratio stessa del Decreto-Legge Riaperture; - il potere del Ministero della Salute, in relazione «all’andamento epidemiologico», di «adottare e aggiornare linee guida e protocolli connessi alla pandemia da Covid-19» volti a regolare, tra l’altro, «lo svolgimento in sicurezza dei servizi e delle attività economiche, produttive e sociali»; - la proroga al 30 aprile 2022, al 30 giugno 2022 o al 31 dicembre 2022, secondo i casi, del complesso delle misure connesse all’emergenza, tra cui l’adempimento dell’obbligo vaccinale per talune categorie professionali, nonché l’introduzione di nuove e ulteriori sanzioni ad hoc per i soggetti inadempienti, quali il demansionamento e la sostituzione con soggetti vaccinati; - la raccolta, il trattamento e la condivisione, anche su piattaforme telematiche internazionali, dei dati relativi, tra l’altro, alla sorveglianza epidemiologica e microbiologica del virus SarsCov-2 e al numero dei tamponi antigenici rapidi effettuati; - il trasferimento delle competenze e delle funzioni attribuite al Commissario straordinario per la gestione dell’emergenza Covid ad una struttura denominata «Unità per il completamento della campagna vaccinale e per l’adozione di altre misure di contrasto alla pandemia» destinata a operare fino al 31 dicembre 2022. L’analisi dei contenuti sostanziali della disciplina introdotta dal Decreto-Legge Riaperture deve procedere congiuntamente alla valutazione di elementi ulteriori, quali: 1) La formale adozione del Decreto-Legge Riaperture è stata espressamente annunciata dal Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri durante la conferenza stampa del 17 marzo 2022. È quindi singolare che la pubblicazione del Decreto sia avvenuta il 24 marzo 2022, dopo un intervallo di tempo idoneo a valutare il grado di accettabilità sociale del provvedimento, a dirottare l’attenzione del più vasto pubblico dalle disposizioni volte a penalizzare singole categorie professionali, nonché a modificare il testo del Decreto medesimo, ove necessario, prima della sua pubblicazione e della sua entrata in vigore. 2) Sotto quest’ultimo aspetto va rilevato che il testo del Decreto-Legge entrato in vigore ridimensiona alcuni sviluppi prospettati dalla relativa bozza diffusa al momento della conferenza stampa del 17 marzo 2022. Il riferimento va, in particolare, alla citata «Unità per il completamento della campagna vaccinale e per l’adozione di altre misure di contrasto alla pandemia», di cui la bozza prevedeva l’istituzione presso il Ministero della Difesa, nonché la sua sostituzione, entro il 1° gennaio 2023, con una ulteriore «Unità di gestione delle emergenze», emergenze non altrimenti specificate. 3) Il mantenimento dell’obbligo vaccinale e di Green Pass era stato prospettato, già prima dell’adozione del Decreto-Legge Riaperture, dalle dichiarazioni rilasciate dal consulente del Commissario straordinario dell’emergenza Covid, secondo cui entro il mese di giugno 2022 gli organi competenti avrebbero deciso se «fare una nuova vaccinazione di massa a tutta la popolazione generale» degli italiani, precisando al riguardo che «la questione non è tanto che faccia male fare la quarta o la quinta dose» del cosiddetto vaccino anti-Covid, quanto la sua «fattibilità e accettabilità sociale» [1]. Nello stesso senso si era espresso, con specifico riferimento al Green Pass, il presidente della Federazione nazionale degli ordini dei medici e degli odontoiatri (Fnomceo), il quale aveva auspicato che «non si smantelli il Green Pass dopo la fine dello stato di emergenza», trattandosi «di un diritto degli italiani» [2]. Sul piano normativo va inoltre rilevato che: i) nel febbraio 2022 la Commissione europea ha presentato una proposta di regolamento volta a prorogare la validità del «Certificato Covid digitale dell’UE» fino al 30 giugno 2023, trattandosi, secondo le dichiarazioni rese dal Commissario europeo per il Mercato Interno, di «uno standard globale» [3]; ii) nel febbraio 2022 il Governo italiano, regolando la materia per la quinta volta in sei mesi, ha esteso «a tempo indeterminato» la validità del Green Pass di alcune categorie di soggetti. 4) Se il Decreto-Legge Riaperture motiva formalmente la disciplina da esso introdotta in base alla constatazione che «persistano comunque esigenze di contrasto del diffondersi della pandemia da COVID-19», sul piano della comunicazione istituzionale ulteriori motivazioni si ricavano dalle dichiarazioni rese dal Presidente del Consiglio nella citata conferenza stampa del 17 marzo 2022, secondo cui: 1) «grazie ai vaccini sono stati evitati quasi 80.000 decessi in più nel solo 2021»; 2) «l'anno scorso l’economia italiana è cresciuta al 6,5% grazie al Green Pass»; 3) «stiamo valutando l'ipotesi di una quarta dose a fasce generazionali più avanzate»; 4) «un’altra pandemia potrebbe rivelarsi importante tra qualche tempo»; 5) «vogliamo costruire una struttura permanente di preparazione a reagire a questi fenomeni»; 6) «gradualmente questa struttura perde il carattere di emergenza, acquista quello di ordinarietà» [4]. Sulla scorta di queste considerazioni, e tenuto conto che le dichiarazioni del Presidente del Consiglio poc’anzi riportate si pongono in evidente contrasto con i dati pubblicati su riviste scientifiche internazionali [5] e ripresi anche dalla giurisprudenza italiana [6], il CIEB non può fare a meno di evidenziare: i) il progressivo rafforzamento e ampliamento dell’approccio neo-paternalistico avviato dal Governo con la “spinta gentile” alla vaccinazione nell’ambito della gestione del Covid; ii) il rischio che la fine apparente dell’emergenza sanitaria distragga l’opinione pubblica dalla trasformazione delle misure restrittive imposte in forza del Covid da eccezionali e temporanee a strutturali e permanenti, quale preludio di nuove forme di normalità e di socialità. Tutto ciò premesso, il CIEB: - invita a prendere coscienza del deficit democratico derivante dall’impianto normativo volto a trasformare il metodo emergenziale in normale metodo di governo destinato a soggiogare permanentemente i cittadini anche mediante il ricorso a strumenti di pretesa “premialità” quale è il Green Pass fondato – allo stato attuale – sull’obbligo vaccinale; - richiama l’attenzione, nella prospettiva appena evidenziata, sui rischi di una futura militarizzazione del metodo emergenziale, già prospettata dalla bozza di Decreto-Legge Riaperture; - auspica che il Parlamento riprenda a esercitare le proprie prerogative sovrane adottando quanto prima una legge che abolisca definitivamente e senza infingimenti il Green Pass, nonché sfiduciando qualsiasi tentativo volto a introdurre e/o mantenere forme analoghe di certificazione di dati sensibilissimi quali sono i dati sanitari dei cittadini; - mette in guardia dal rischio che il nuovo stato di emergenza adottato in ragione della guerra in Ucraina possa giustificare l’introduzione di «una logica di razionamenti» [7] che potrebbero essere gestiti secondo criteri “premiali”. CIEB, 25 marzo 2022 Il testo originale del Parere è pubblicato sul sito. www.ecsel.org/cieb [1] Cfr. https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/profezia-sulla-quarta-dose-spunta-d…. [2] Cfr. https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2022/03/lordine-dei-medici-chiede-di-non-sm…. [3] Cfr. https://www.quotidianosanita.it/governo-e-parlamento/articolo.php?articolo_…. [4] Cfr. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2022/03/17/covid-da-aprile-via-il…, nonché https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qk7VUd7jbrY&t=1588s. [5] Cfr., tra gli altri, H. Wang et al., Estimating excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic: a systematic analysis of COVID-19-related mortality, 2020–21, in The Lancet, 2022; https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02796-3; [6] Cfr. l’ordinanza del Consiglio di giustizia amministrativa per la Regione siciliana del 16 marzo 2022. [7] https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2022/03/17/ucraina-draghi-se-serve-l… --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- -- 380° (Giovanni Biscuolo public alter ego) «Noi, incompetenti come siamo, non abbiamo alcun titolo per suggerire alcunché» Disinformation flourishes because many people care deeply about injustice but very few check the facts. Ask me about <https://stallmansupport.org>.

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Meet the Secretive US Company Building an ‘Unbreakable’ Internet Inside Russia
by Alberto Cammozzo March 26, 2022

March 26, 2022

<https://www.vice.com/en/article/z3n5e9/russian-internet-lantern> As Russia makes preparations to possibly disconnect from the global internet in a bid to control the narrative around the invasion of Ukraine, one secretive U.S. company is rushing to lay the final pieces of an unbreakable network that the Kremlin won’t be able to take down. The company is Lantern, which says it has seen staggering growth inside Russia in the last four weeks for its app that allows users to bypass restrictions the Kremlin has put in place on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. But now the company is building something even more robust, an internal peer-to-peer network that will allow dissenting voices to continue to upload and share content even if the Kremlin pulls the plug on the internet. “We’ve been putting pieces in place in Russia for the last two years,” Lucas, one of Lantern’s developers, who uses a pseudonym to protect his identity, told VICE News. “So inside Russia right now, Lantern is also this peer-to-peer network that has all of this opposition content that’s distributed internally.” Within the next week, the network will be fully operational, allowing opposition voices to use the Lantern app to post content like videos from protests or updates on the war in Ukraine directly to the Lantern network. This would allow users to share it with other Lantern users without fear that the content will be removed or blocked. The app, which has in the past received funding from the Open Technology Fund, an independent non-profit funded by the U.S government, has become a huge hit in Russia in recent weeks. The amount of traffic passing through Lantern’s servers has risen 100,000% in the last four weeks according to the company, though it did not provide a baseline figure for comparison. Lantern said it would not break out country-level user numbers but told VICE News that globally the app has been downloaded 150 million times and has 7 million active monthly users, double the number it had three years ago. The spike in usage came after the Kremlin began shutting off access to mainstream social media sites while also introducing a law that threatened anyone publishing “fake news” about the war in Ukraine with up to 15 years in jail. The growth has been so rapid that Lantern says Russia this week surpassed China as its biggest market in terms of traffic, though China has been the company’s primary focus for years. The developers have spent years playing a game of cat-and-mouse with the Chinese censors who maintain the Great Firewall, Beijing’s highly sophisticated network of filters, bans, and blocks that prevent the free flow of information online. And just like in China, the developers of Lantern don’t have a clue how so many people in Russia have begun using their app. Tech Russia’s Digital Iron Curtain Is Starting To Take Shape Janus Rose 03.17.22 “It just started to spread and the same thing has happened in every region we’ve been in as well: It’s just word of mouth,” Lantern co-founder Wolf told VICE News. “We still don’t know. There are over 150 million downloads [of the app] and we haven’t spent one cent on marketing. So we’ve no idea how it spreads.” Wolf and Lucas, who have decades of experience building and scaling successful tech products, both use pseudonyms to protect their identities, fearing retaliation from the regimes in Beijing, and now Moscow, for helping people circumvent censorship. Aside from a couple of blog posts on Medium, Lantern has spent no money or effort on advertising or promotion inside Russia, and yet downloads on Google and Apple’s app stores have surged among Russian users eager to get an unfiltered view of the war in Ukraine. Part of the reason for this is that digital rights groups such as Access Now have been recommending Lantern, along with other anti-censorship tools like Tor and TunnelBear, to people in Russia seeking to get access to unfiltered information. “Now I have a window to the normal world from this prison called Russia,” one Russian user said this week in an email to Lucas. As the so-called “Digital Iron Curtain” has closed in recent weeks, Russian users have scrambled to find ways around it. In the days and weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, downloads of the top virtual private network (VPN) apps on Apple and Google’s app stores spiked, CNN reported. Natalia Krapiva, legal counsel with digital rights advocacy group Access Now says she’s unsurprised by the spike in Lantern users but says the number of people inside Russia using these types of tools is still in the minority. We’re definitely seeing them moving from being more of a niche tool turning into something much more widely used,” Krapiva told VICE News. “I wouldn't go so far as to say that the majority of people use them, I think we're still not there. I think there are still a lot of people, especially older, not as tech-savvy people who still don't know what VPNs are, how to use them, or which ones are safe.” While other VPN companies have reported some efforts to disrupt their services in Russia, Lantern works differently from a traditional VPN by focusing on finding ways to access blocked content. As a result, it can be used to access regionally locked down content on services like Netflix or BBC iPlayer, but its censorship-busting technology is more robust. The company says it’s seen no interruption to its services in Russia in recent weeks, largely thanks to the experience it gained battling China’s censors in recent years. “You need to remember that the Russian government is not going to be technically as good as China’s at squeezing our traffic and doing shit to us,” Wolf said. “China has so much more experience of screwing around with international traffic in general.” But Lantern’s ability to bypass the measures the Kremlin has put in place may soon be thwarted because Moscow is considering disconnecting from the global internet completely. The Russian government recently put measures in place that will allow it to disconnect completely from the global internet and rely on a so-called “sovereign internet” that would be entirely under Kremlin control. Just a month ago the idea that the Kremlin would pull the plug on the global internet was dismissed given how interconnected Russia was with the global economy with the global internet. But in the way of severe sanctions, Western companies pulling out of Russia, and the Kremlin already blocking large swathes of the wider internet, the possibility of it happening is increasingly likely. “There's little incentive for Russia to stay connected because the world is already disconnecting Russia themselves,” Krapiva said. “if Russia does disconnect, and then the world disconnects Russia, then we're going to have people just isolated and left alone, only with government surveillance, propaganda, and censorship, and that's not going to be helpful for anyone.” If that happens, Russian internet users won’t be able to access any non-Russian websites, even if they are using services like traditional VPNs, and this is where Lantern’s new peer-to-peer network will become so important, allowing users to continue to communicate and post content on an uncensorable network where videos, images, and other information can be shared freely among users—and there’s nothing the Kremlin can do about it. Lantern was founded in California in 2010 with the goal of keeping “the world’s information, speech, expression, and finance uncensored.” The free version of the app has a data cap of 500MB, but the pro version, which costs $32 a year, has no data cap. It has become hugely popular in China because of its ability to stay one step ahead of the government’s censorship efforts, spreading mainly via word-of-mouth as it’s not available via the Google or Apple app stores inside China. In Russia, like all new markets it enters, Lantern removed the data cap for all users. Despite this, some users still paid for the pro version. “We started to see a lot of revenue coming in from Russia,” Wolf said, adding that financial sanctions against Russia quickly shut off that revenue stream. This is something that has impacted many anti-censorship tools as payment companies have arbitrarily prevented Russians from paying for VPNs or other tools claiming they were doing so in solidarity with Ukraine or simply imposing sanctions. “A lot of it is misguided precisely for the reason that they're actually limiting Russian users ability to get the truth about what's happening in Ukraine and circumvent censorship,” Krapiva said. Demand for the tools like Lantern has rocketed in recent years as internet freedoms globally have been declining for more than a decade. In recent years the company has seen large growth in countries like the United Arab Emirates and Iran, where repressive regimes restrict access to large swathes of online content, including independent media outlets that are critical of the government. As well as the money it earns from its pro users, the company is funded by grants from various bodies, although its parent company, Innovate Labs, doesn’t disclose its sources of funding. One known source of funding, however, is the U.S. State Department, via its Open Technology Fund, which provided a total of $790,000 to Lantern in 2015. Lantern is one of several anti-censorship technologies that the OTF supports, including the encrypted web browser Tor and secure browsing tool Psiphon. The company has so far been reticent to speak to the media because the founders are wary about attracting the attention of regimes like China’s and Russia’s, and the possible fallout for them and their families. “We all have kids,” Wolf said. “We are trying to actively come out of the shadows. We don’t want to be some small confrontational tech company that fights governments, we want to grow to be a cutting-edge tech company. But we’ve got to get the balance right while we figure it all out.” But it’s increasingly hard to stay out of the limelight, as the app’s success in Russia shows, and will soon increase as the company is planning to roll out an even more ambitious product in the coming months. Lantern told VICE News that it is in the final stages of building another product that will allow people all over the world to host information on their own computers in censorship-free countries and provide access to that information to those inside repressive regimes. “People can run the Lantern [node] in these uncensored regions and act as access points for people in censored regions. So if you want to help out in Ukraine, and you’re in Berlin, just fire up Lantern, and it can become the gateway now for someone in Moscow,” Lucas said. To encourage people to set up a Lantern node, the company has created a cryptocurrency called Yinbi, which will be paid to those who allow their computers to act as hubs in this new decentralized network. But for now, Wolf says that Lantern is focused on Russia, and ensuring that no matter what the Kremlin does, its users inside the country will be able to access the information they need if “the Kremlin pulls the plug on the internet.”

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