April 2020 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Re: [nexa] Immuni - software libero (nexa Digest, Vol 132, Issue 62)
by Diego Latella April 17, 2020

April 17, 2020

Grazie Beppe! Stavo per scrivere unpost, ma mi hai tolto le parole di bocca! > Message: 6 > Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 13:03:24 +0200 > From: Giuseppe Attardi <attardi(a)di.unipi.it> > To: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it > Subject: Re: [nexa] Immuni - software libero > Message-ID: <AC756A95-ECCD-4100-8F17-4B9D32883FE1(a)di.unipi.it> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Spero anch'io sia software libero, ma il testo della delibera dice solo che acquisiscono la licenza d'uso, non quella sui sorgenti. > Andrebbe fatta subito chiarezza su questo punto. > > Inoltre mi lascia perplesso anche l'"appalto di servizio gratuito", che farebbe pensare che il servizio venga gestito interamente all'interno della ditta. > Dovrebbe invece essere gestito dal SSN su server interamente sotto il suo controllo, in quanto detiene informazioni sulla salute dei cittadini. [... OMISSIS ...] > Ho altri dubbi sul funzionamento della app Immuni: dalla descrizione riportato sui giornali, sembra in grado di inviare una notifica ai cittadini contagiati. > Quindi, diversamente dal protocollo Apple&Google, conserva informazioni sufficienti per risalire ai cittadini. > > Gradirei capirne di più. > > Grazie > > -- Beppe Diego ========================================= E non sta andando per niente bene.

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Re: [nexa] Immuni - software libero
by Giuseppe Attardi April 17, 2020

April 17, 2020

Spero anch’io sia software libero, ma il testo della delibera dice solo che acquisiscono la licenza d’uso, non quella sui sorgenti. Andrebbe fatta subito chiarezza su questo punto. Inoltre mi lascia perplesso anche l’"appalto di servizio gratuito”, che farebbe pensare che il servizio venga gestito interamente all’interno della ditta. Dovrebbe invece essere gestito dal SSN su server interamente sotto il suo controllo, in quanto detiene informazioni sulla salute dei cittadini. Dai conti che ho fatto, secondo il modello di framework Apple&Google, il totale dei dati da gestire è piuttosto ridotto, meno di 16GB totali. Quindi si tratta di un compito perfettamente gestibile senza necessità di risorse esorbitanti. Il limite riguarda il traffico giornaliero necessario perché ciascun italiano che usa la app possa verificare se è stato a breve distanza da un contagiato negli ultimi 14 giorni. Si tratterebbe di 1PB di traffico giornaliero. Ho altri dubbi sul funzionamento della app Immuni: dalla descrizione riportato sui giornali, sembra in grado di inviare una notifica ai cittadini contagiati. Quindi, diversamente dal protocollo Apple&Google, conserva informazioni sufficienti per risalire ai cittadini. Gradirei capirne di più. Grazie — Beppe > On 17 Apr 2020, at 11:50, nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it wrote: > > From: Marco Ciurcina <ciurcina(a)studiolegale.it <mailto:ciurcina@studiolegale.it>> > To: nexa(a)server-nexa.polito.it <mailto:nexa@server-nexa.polito.it> > Subject: Re: [nexa] Immuni - software libero > Message-ID: <8068332.YzpX5A8b4E@mac1> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > In data venerdì 17 aprile 2020 10:16:17 CEST, Giovanni Biscuolo ha scritto: >> DISPONE di procedere alla stipula del contratto di concessione gratuita >> della licenza d’uso sul softwaredi contact tracinge di appalto di >> servizio gratuito con la società Bending Spoons S.p.a. > speriamo che si stia parlando di licenza di software libero e che quindi il > codice potrà essere a disposizione di tutti.. > m.c.

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App e tecnologie digitali in Africa contro il COVID 19
by Antonio Vetro' April 17, 2020

April 17, 2020

Cliccando sulla mappa interattiva, apparirà una breve scheda informativa sulle iniziative con componenti tecnologiche (digitali) dei vari Paesi africani (per quelli su cui ci sono informazioni): https://cio-mag.com/covid19/ <https://cio-mag.com/covid19/> Le schede sono brevi ma in francese. Un caro saluto antonio

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NYT: An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts
by J.C. DE MARTIN April 17, 2020

April 17, 2020

From The New York Times: *An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts* /Asian countries have invested heavily in digital contact tracing, which uses technology to warn people when they have been exposed to the coronavirus. Massachusetts is using an old-fashioned means: people./ https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-tra…

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PEPP-PT: Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
by J.C. DE MARTIN April 16, 2020

April 16, 2020

Iniziativa di molti attori, tra cui Politecnici di Zurigo e Losanna, INRIA, KU Lovanio e varie università tedesche. Dall'Italia direi (correggetemi se sbaglio) solo la Fondazione ISI di Torino. juan carlos ------ https://www.pepp-pt.org/ *Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing* (PEPP-PT) makes it possible to interrupt new chains of SARS-CoV-2 transmission rapidly and effectively by informing potentially exposed people. We are a large and inclusive European team. We provide standards, technology, and services to countries and developers. We embrace a fully privacy-preserving approach. We build on well-tested, fully implemented proximity measurement and scalable backend service. We enable tracing of infection chains across national borders. Our privacy core: anything we provide is based on voluntary participation, provides anonymity, does not use personal data nor geolocation information, operates in full compliance with GDPR, and has been certified and tested by security professionals. Read here for a brief description of our privacy enforcing flow. * **WHAT WE OFFER* PEPP-PT was created to assist national initiatives by supplying ready-to-use, well-tested, and properly assessed mechanisms and standards, as well as support for interoperability, outreach, and operation when needed. *The PEPP-PT mechanisms will have these core features:* Well-tested and established procedures for proximity measurement on popular mobile operating systems and devices. Enforcement of data protection, anonymization, GDPR compliance, and security. International interoperability to support tracing local infection chains even if a chain spans multiple PEPP-PT participating countries. Scalable backend architecture and technology that can be deployed with local IT infrastructure. Certification service to test and ensure local implementations use the PEPP-PT mechanisms in a secure and interoperable manner. Our reference implementation is available under the Mozilla License Agreement. To find out more about the additional services we offer to support infrastructure and installation campaigns to enable country-specific applications, please download our Manifesto. *The virus has spread quickly and knows no political boundaries. To bring it under control, we must act in the same manner; speed and international cooperation are essential to protect health, privacy, and the economy.* Find out more about our view of the current situation and why we believe proximity-tracing is the appropriate solution to resuming a normal life, opening our borders, and restarting the economy. We invite all countries to participate and use what we have to offer. We are stronger together against SARS-CoV-2. Please contact us if you are interested in using our services or contributing.

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COVID-Tech: Emergency responses to COVID-19 must not extend beyond the crisis AND COVID-19 pandemic adversely affects digital rights in the Balkans FROM EDRi-gram 18.7 [notsp]
by Diego Latella April 16, 2020

April 16, 2020

FROM: EDRi-gram 18.7, 15 April 2020 COVID-Tech: Emergency responses to COVID-19 must not extend beyond the crisis https://edri.org/emergency-responses-to-covid-19-must-not-extend-beyond-the… Among other things you read: "On 19 March 2020, the [Poland] efforts to tackle the spread of coronavirus received widespread attention when the government announced the use of a 'Civil Quarantine' app which they explained would require people in quarantine to send geo-located selfies within 20 minutes of receiving an alert - or face a visit from the police. according to the announcement, the app even uses controversial facial recognition technology to scan the selfies. Early in April, the Polish government looked to make the use of the app mandatory" and "The UK's Coronavirus Act was passed on 25 March 2020, giving the UK government a suite of extraordinary powers for a period of 2 years. [ ... ] The UK has also come under fire for the sharp rise in disproportionate police responses since the introduction of the Bill, including stopping people from using their own gardens or using drones to chastise dog walkers. If not properly limited by law, these powers (and their abuse) have the potential to continue in ordinary times, further feeding the government's surveillance machine." ------- COVID-19 pandemic adversely affects digital rights in the Balkans https://edri.org/covid-19-pandemic-adversely-affects-digital-rights-in-the-… Among other things you read: "Governments in Montenegro and Moldova made public the personal health data of people infected with COVID-19, while official websites and hospital computer systems suffered cyber-attacks in Croatia and Romania. Some countries like Slovakia are considering lifting rights enshrined under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), while Serbia imposed surveillance and phone tracking to limit freedom of movement." and "In neighboring Montenegro, the National Coordination Body for Infectious Diseases decided to publish the names and surnames of people who must undergo quarantine online, after it determined that certain persons violated the measure, and as a result "exposing the whole Montenegro to risk."" --------------- Diego -- ========================================= E non sta andando per niente bene.

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Has coronavirus opened the door to mass electronic surveillance in the UK? | Gaby Hinsliff | Opinion | The Guardian
by Alberto Cammozzo April 16, 2020

April 16, 2020

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/15/mass-electronic-surve…> It’s almost a decade since David Cameron scrapped Labour plans for a national ID card, and 13 years since fears about the government tracking all our movements helped kill off pay-as-you-go road pricing. The idea of a “black box” in the car, logging every mile driven, was deemed too creepy, even though in hindsight it could have lowered carbon emissions years ago by discouraging drivers from making unnecessary trips. But Britons guard their privacy jealously, at least outside wartime. It’s surprising, then, how little debate there has been about the electronic surveillance culture this epidemic threatens to bring with it. This isn’t about police sending up drones to shame Peak District ramblers, or threatening to snoop through supermarket shoppers’ trolleys to check their trips were really necessary, but about what happens after lockdown is over. Matt Hancock, the health secretary, confirmed at the weekend that the government is seeking to develop a phone app allowing people to record their own symptoms, and receive alerts if other users they’ve been in contact with have fallen ill. Well, of course he did: this is the man who once invented the Matt Hancock app, for everyone desperate to keep up with all the Matt Hancock news. But what if this is more about Matt Hancock keeping up with you? Any future tracing app would almost certainly be voluntary in Britain, with strict confidentiality promised to protect users’ privacy. It could be a godsend for people with vulnerable relatives, giving early warning of any brush with the virus that would help them to avoid unwittingly passing it on. True, we’d be meekly handing over intimate details of our movements and social circles to an alliance of government and tech companies, but arguably that’s no more information than we blithely give away by opening Google Maps or Facebook. Like staying home to save lives, getting the app could become seen as the socially responsible thing to do, helping save jobs by allowing a gradual return to normal while lowering the risk of reigniting infection. But, given that this could be a far longer lasting change to everyday life than lockdown, it’s staggering how little we have been prepared for it. In authoritarian states such as Russia or China, the fear is surely that tracking systems could be abused. When Chinese citizens with a green code (for low infection risk) can go out, while a yellow or red code (denoting contact with an infected person, or confirmed infections) means restrictions, how easy would it be to punish political dissidents by tampering with their codes to keep them under effective house arrest? In Britain, the worry is more that everyday life could swiftly become difficult for those unwilling to sign up. Even if it’s strictly voluntary, are we so sure that unscrupulous employers wouldn’t demand applicants install the app as a condition of hiring, that rogue landlords won’t try to discriminate against tenants who can’t show they have it, that insurers won’t seek to restrict health cover accordingly? Could airlines insist you get it before you fly, to protect fellow passengers? The risk is of creating another kind of hostile environment for those who resist. And that’s to say nothing of questions about what access the security services might eventually seek to the data, or whether electronic tracking could become a habit that sticks once the epidemic is over. (Maybe road pricing isn’t so dead after all.) It’s easy to see why government doesn’t want to have this conversation now, arguing that talk of exit strategies risks distracting from core messages about staying home. Although Dominic Raab is expected to announce on Thursday that lockdown won’t be lifted until after 7 May, that’s simply the earliest date for review; there’s no guarantee it won’t drag on longer. Yet the implications of something like this need to be thoroughly explored before we move from blanket lockdown into what could be a more fluid and personalised version, where we might get something like our lives back but have to live with knowing they could be snatched away again. Ironically, it’s probably those libertarians howling loudest for an end to lockdown now who’d naturally hate the idea, while for others it will sound like a price worth paying for escape. Right now, I’d probably download it like a shot. But until some basic questions are answered, we just don’t know what we might be sacrificing for freedom.

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covid-19: la sorveglianza digitale si stia dimostrando molto efficace...
by Giovanni Biscuolo April 15, 2020

April 15, 2020

Buonasera nexiani, il "contact tracing" è un ferro vecchio ed è incontrovertibile che qualcuno ha già stabilito che la "sorveglianza digitale" lo deve sostituire (poi _magari_ non ci riesce, ma il solo tentativo mi rattrista) Non è la prima volta che questa tesi viene presentata come "la verità"... e a me non sembra affatto un caso. Comunque, oggi 15/04/2020 al TG2 ore 13:00, servizio n. 15, durata 1'29" [1] (trascrivo le parti interessanti, il grassetto è mio) --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Vediamo ora come in Asia vengono tracciati e monitorati i casi positivi, con Giulia Apollonio Telecamere a riconoscimento facciale piazzate ovunque [...] a Whuan questo è stato il prezzo del ritorno alla normalità. Si torna a circolare grazie ad app e geolocalizzazioni che fanno la differenza [...] difficile da immaginare in Europa. [...] Nessuno si fa problemi di privacy, una questione culturale in Asia, domina un'idea collettiva della società ed è un **fatto** che la sorveglianza digitale si stia dimostrando molto efficace nella lotta al virus [...] --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Non importa capire davvero come ciascun sistema sanitario sia davvero riuscito a tenere sotto controllo o _riportare_ sotto controllo la doffusione del contagio, la sintesi è "sorveglianza digitale űber alle". Non seguo con sufficiente perizia la TV, tuttavia mi pare che sia un discorso abbastanza ripetuto in talk show, giornali, telegiornali e trasmissioni stile bar sport: propaganda oggi, propaganda domani, si sa mai che anche gli occidentali la smettano di farsi tutti 'sti problemi con la privacy e finalmente si lascino sorvegliare senza brontolare, con tecniche sofisticatissime, sempre per il loro bene, senza dar retta a quei fanfaroni/complottisti che trovano perfino spazio sul NYT! Noi siamo qui a spaccare il capello in quattro sui dettagli delle app e sulla necessità di dimostrare seriamente che davvero il tracciamento digitale fatto come privacy comanda faccia la differenza... ma probabilmente stiamo perdendo tempo: mi sa che il copione è già tutto scritto (un lungo lavoro di anni di sceneggiatura), da _domani_ inizia la messa in scena dello spettacolo dei prossimi trent'anni e quello che ci aspetta non mi piace per niente. D'altronde la salute è una questione suprema e bisogna conseguirla con qualunque mezzo, no? Auguri di cuore a tutte e tutti noi. Saluti, Giovanni [1] link diretto da usare con mpv o vlc et simili: http://2uscreativem3-vh.akamaihd.net/i/podcastcdn/NewsVod/TG2_EV/12260210_,… -- Giovanni Biscuolo Xelera IT Infrastructures

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Editoriale NYT International Human Rights / European Digital Rights contro le "app taumaturgiche"
by Antonio Casilli April 15, 2020

April 15, 2020

Surveillance won’t stop the coronavirus. Algorithms used to power this technology are vulnerable to discrimination, bias and error. Adequate health care, protective equipment and sufficient testing, will do more good than another hackathon. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/opinion/coronavirus-surveillance-privacy…

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Contact Tracing con dati di cella in repubblica ceca
by Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) April 15, 2020

April 15, 2020

Czech's Contact Tracing "Hygienists will track infected person's movement based on card payments and mobile operator data from the previous five days." https://www.praguemorning.cz/czech-republic-smart-quarantine/ Sarebbe molto interessante raccogliere la loro esperienza, in termini di reale efficacia di CT. Fabio

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