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[NEXA][Copyright]Office a 29 dollari nei paesi emergenti.
by Dott. Valentin Vitkov July 23, 2009

July 23, 2009

A presto, V http://punto-informatico.it/2678668/PI/News/apple-rinnega-netbook.aspx Sperimentazioni del genere sono già state avviate in paesi in via di sviluppo, o in mercati emergenti come quello cinese, in cui, stando ai dati forniti da Microsoft, sino a poco tempo fa il 95 per cento dei pacchetti Office installati era pirata. In tal senso, il taglio dei prezzi è visto come l'incentivo utile a spingere gli utenti a spendere poco per ottenere un prodotto originale. Il test iniziato lo scorso settembre nel paese asiatico, che prevede la vendita di Office a soli 29 dollari, è andato a gonfie vele, portando a Redmond un incremento delle vendite dell'800 per cento. Tale risultato ha spinto l'azienda a fissare come definitivi i prezzi.

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White Paper EFF: "Surveillance Self-Defense International"
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 23, 2009

July 23, 2009

http://www.eff.org/wp/surveillance-self-defense-international Surveillance Self-Defense International July, 2009 6 Ideas For Those Needing Defensive Technology to Protect Free Speech from Authoritarian Regimes and 4 Ways the Rest of Us Can Help Introduction: The Internet remains one of the most powerful means ever created to give voice to repressed people around the world. Unfortunately, new technologies have also given authoritarian regimes new means to identify and retaliate against those who speak out despite censorship and surveillance. Below are six basic ideas for those attempting to speak without falling victim to authoritarian surveillance and censorship, and four ideas for the rest of us who want to help support them. I. Ideas for Activists and Others Facing Authoritarian Regimes 1. 1. Understand Risk Assessment The first step in trying to defend yourself against digital surveillance and censorship is to understand the concept of risk assessment. Risk assessment is the process of deciding what threats you face, how likely and serious they are, and how to prioritize the steps you can take to protect yourself. EFF’s section on risk assessment in Surveillance Self-Defense can help you with this assessment.1 2. 2. Beware of Malware Malware is a catch-all term for computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, keystroke loggers, spyware, rootkits and any other kind of software that makes a computer spy on you or act against your interests. If a government is able to install malware on the computer you are using, then it doesn't matter what other steps you take: your files and communications will be subject to surveillance. If you have your own computer, you need to be sure to install security updates and run anti-virus or rootkit scanning software. You also need to understand that these measures only offer limited protection. For one guide to anti-virus and firewall software, see the Tactical Technology Collective's "Security in a Box" guide. It is important to note that if you are using a shared computer, such as a computer at an Internet cafe or a library, the risk of surveillance by malware may be greater. If you need to use a public computer for sensitive communications, you should use a bootable USB device or CD (such as Incognito) to mitigate the risks posed by malware. You can use a bootable USB or CD for the most sensitive things you do with your own computer, too. 3. 3. Choose the Least-Risky Communications Channels You should be careful in choosing the channels through which you communicate with other individuals and activists. * Talking in person is usually the safest way to speak (unless others are watching you, or your location is bugged). * Understand the risk associated with phone calls. Most governments are able to record who calls whom, and when, all of the time. Currently, most governments outside the US/EU have a more limited, albeit unknown ability to record and listen to the phone calls themselves. For instance, it is believed that they will be able to tap phones, but only a limited number (perhaps a few thousand) at any given moment. You should always assume that a call to or from a phone belonging to an activist, or regularly used for activism, may be bugged. * Avoid SMS text messages. These pass unencrypted through major telecommunication providers and are easy for a government to harvest and analyze on a massive scale. * Protect Internet communications by using encryption2 and by choosing (preferably offshore) service providers that are trustworthy and unlikely to cooperate with your government. Here are two channels which are easy to use and which offer some protection: o Use the OTR instant messaging plugin. This is easy if you and the people you communicate with can install the Pidgin or Adium X instant messaging programs on your computers. Details on how to do this are available here. Disable logging to ensure that if your computer is seized, your communications aren't on it. o Use a webmail provider that supports https encryption. Services like RiseUp.net place a premium on their users' privacy. Gmail supports encryption, but you must enable it in your settings and consider whether you can trust Google not to hand your communications to your government.3 Make sure every that time you send or receive an email, the pages uses https — otherwise, your messages could be intercepted. There are many other ways to arrange for secure communications, although many require more technical expertise. See SSD for further detail with respect to securing email. * Encrypted Voice-over-IP is possible, but many VoIP services do not support it. Two exceptions are ZPhone and Skype. Unencrypted VOIP is very easy to tap, including most telephone cabinets at Internet cafes. The level of security afforded by the popular commercial VoIP service Skype is unknown. We believe that countries with sophisticated intelligence services will find ways to defeat Skype's security, while less sophisticated intelligence services may be confounded by it. China is known to have produced its own trojan-infected version of Skype. It is also known that there are weaknesses in Skype's security architecture.4 You should assume that the intelligence services of countries like the U.S., Israel, Russia, or Cuba could defeat Skype's encryption. But as far as is known, most less developed countries are unlikely to be able to decrypt Skype's communications in the near future. 4. 4. Use Encryption to Prevent Surveillance and Censorship of your Web Usage Censorship and surveillance of Internet connections are intimately connected: it is difficult to censor communications without at the same time being able to watch and understand them, because it is difficult for the censorship system to tell the difference between the communications it intends to block and those it does not. There are many ways to use encryption to protect your communications against surveillance and censorship. You can use some Internet services with their own encryption built-in (see above for instant messaging, or webmail using https). But if you want to use encryption to protect all of your web browsing, try one of the following: * Use Tor. Tor will encrypt your communications and bounce them around the planet before sending them on to their destination. It offers a high level of protection against eavesdropping by your government5 and is not hard to use. The greatest challenge with using Tor is that it often slows browsing down a great deal; expect page loads to be slowed down by ten seconds or more. If you live in a country where the very fact that you use Tor might be seen as grounds for singling you out for arrest, further surveillance, or other unwelcome scrutiny, you should only use Tor in combination with a Tor Bridge. See section 6 below. * Use an encrypted proxy or Virtual Private Network (VPN) to tunnel your traffic overseas. This approach offers slightly less protection than Tor but tends to be faster. There are many ways you can try this: o Use a public, SSL-encrypted proxy server. Understand that unless you know who runs a proxy, there is a chance that it is run by your adversary. o If you have access to a Linux or Unix account overseas, you can instantly create your own encrypted proxy server using the ssh program (which comes installed on Mac OS X and Linux computers, and can be easily installed on Windows). Here are two pages discussing how to do that. o Use a service like Hotspot Shield. o Use an overseas VPN service. Companies such as Relakks sell access to services of this sort. 5. 5. Be Careful of What and Where You Publish * Avoid publishing material under your own name, or including facts that might be clues to your identity, unless you are willing to take the risk that authorities will target you for reprisals. * Avoid publishing material through hosting services that have a commercial presence in your country, or which are likely to cooperate with your country's government. Be aware that some countries have treaties which lead them to assist other countries' law enforcement requests. * Only publish material through services that use https. You should see the https prefix in the browser address bar, and an unbroken lock icon in your browser window: not just during login, but the entire time you are using the site. 6. 6. Should I use a Tor Bridge? Tor Bridges are a more discreet way to connect to the Tor network. Normally, if you use Tor, someone watching the network could observe that your computer was connected to the Tor network.6 If you use a Tor Bridge instead, it will be much harder to tell that you are using Tor. If you use Tor and live in a country with a strong tradition of Internet censorship, your government might suddenly start blocking connections to the public Tor network. In that case, you should have a Tor Bridge address ready for use if that happens. If you live in a country where the mere fact of using Tor might expose you to unwelcome attention or worse, you should never use Tor without configuring it to connect through a bridge. You can find information about how to configure Tor to use a bridge at: https://www.torproject.org/bridges You can find some addresses of Tor bridges at https://bridges.torproject.org/, or by sending email to bridges(a)torproject.org with the line "get bridges" by itself in the body of the mail. II. How Can I Help Others Around the World Escape Surveillance and Censorship? Perhaps you don't live under an authoritarian regime, but you'd like to help people who do. At the moment, here are our main suggestions: 1. 1. Run a Tor Relay Donate some of your bandwidth by relaying encrypted traffic between Tor nodes. Follow the instructions at the Tor Project's website, but be sure to disable exiting from your machine, unless you intend to run an exit node (see section 3 below). 2. 2. Run a Tor Bridge Act as a bridge, to help people in countries with extreme Internet-censorship and surveillance practices. If you aren't sure whether you should run a relay or a bridge, read the Tor Project's advice on the subject. 3. 3. Consider Running a Tor Exit Node Unlike running Tor relays and bridges, running a Tor exit node requires significantly more care, organization, and commitment. Tor exit nodes are the machines which pass traffic out of the Tor network and on to its final destination on the Internet. Exit nodes are vital to the operation of the Tor network. But, unlike the rest of the network, much of the traffic they carry is unencrypted. Tor exit nodes are the machines that will be fetching websites for dissidents in Iran or Burma to read; they are the machines that will be sending blog posts on behalf of those dissidents; they are the machines that will leave digital logs behind on the websites and servers they visit. But because Tor can be used for any purpose, it is also possible that Tor exit nodes will generate complaints about copyright infringement, web-spamming or other forms of antisocial network activity – and those would be associated with the exit node's IP address. If you decide to run a Tor exit node, it is important to anticipate the possibility of such complaints, and ensure that you don't get blamed for antisocial things that a few of the hundreds of thousands of Tor users do. You should therefore read the Tor project's advice on running exit nodes. 4. 4. Run a Proxy for Friends If you have friends in a country where Internet censorship is a problem, you could run a private proxy for them. Unfortunately, in order to do this securely you will need to obtain an SSL certificate for the proxy; this is quite an involved process. If you run a Unix-like operating system, understand what shell access is, and trust your friends, you could give them shell accounts to use to create a personal proxy with ssh -D. 1. 1. Many aspects of the SSD website were designed for people living under U.S. laws; these may not be applicable in other places, but the risk assessment principles are universal. 2. 2. Encryption uses math to transform a message in a way that makes it unreadable to anyone except those that have a means of decrypting the message. You can protect the security and privacy of your information by encrypting it before sending it over the Internet. If encryption is used properly, the information should only be readable by you and the intended recipient. 3. 3. Google Gmail is a good choice from a computer security perspective: it gives you secure email and instant messaging with other people who use Gmail in https mode. The biggest problem with Gmail is that Google might be compelled by your country's laws to disclose your email to the government. This is especially a risk in Western countries, and any other countries where Google has offices and corporate operations that might subject it to local law. Smaller services like RiseUp.net are exposed to fewer jurisdictions, but you should be mindful that your government might regard the very fact that you use a small, privacy-preserving email service as grounds for suspicion. 4. 4. Problems include: the fact that Skype is typically installed from http:// sites and could readily be tampered with by a third party; the fact that the Skype corporation acts as an authentication and PKI broker, and could itself execute man-in-the-middle attacks; and the fact that remote code execution bugs are periodically found in Skype. For a detailed analysis of Skype's cryptographic design, see http://www.secdev.org/conf/skype_BHEU06.handout.pdf. 5. 5. Note that while Tor always prevents eavesdropping by your network, ISP and government, you should be careful sending usernames and passwords over http:// with it, since those have to leave the Tor network and travel to the web server unencrypted. https:// websites are safer in that respect. 6. 6. The signs are that your computer connects to a large number of Internet addresses, all of which are in the public directory of Tor nodes.

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Su Kindle (articolo Slate di Manjoo)
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 22, 2009

July 22, 2009

Why 2024 Will Be Like Nineteen Eighty-Four How Amazon's remote deletion of e-books from the Kindle paves the way for book-banning's digital future. By Farhad Manjoo Posted Monday, July 20, 2009, at 5:53 PM ET Let's give Amazon the benefit of the doubt—its explanation for why it deleted some books from customers' Kindles actually sounds halfway defensible. Last week a few Kindle owners awoke to discover that the company had reached into their devices and remotely removed copies of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Animal Farm. Amazon explained that the books had been mistakenly published, and it gave customers a full refund. It turns out that Orwell wasn't the first author to get flushed down the Kindle's memory hole. In June, fans of Ayn Rand suffered the same fate—Amazon removed Atlas Shrugged, The Fountainhead, and The Virtue of Selfishness, with an explanation that it had "recently discovered a problem" with the titles. And some customers have complained of the same experience with Harry Potter books. Amazon says the Kindle versions of all these books were illegal. Someone uploaded bootlegged copies using the Kindle Store's self-publishing system, and Amazon was only trying to look after publishers' intellectual property. The Orwell incident was too rich with irony to escape criticism, however. Amazon was forced to promise that it will no longer delete its customers' books. [...] http://www.slate.com/id/2223214/pagenum/all/#p2

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[Fwd: [IRP] facebook and privacy - canada]
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 22, 2009

July 22, 2009

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: [IRP] facebook and privacy - canada Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 09:02:20 +0100 From: Lisa Horner <lisa(a)global-partners.co.uk> To: irp <Irp(a)lists.internetrightsandprinciples.org> Thought this might be of interest to people looking at privacy and social networking -- extracted from the EPIC newsletter... ======================================================================= [4] Canadian Commissioner Holds that Facebook Must Strengthen Privacy ======================================================================= The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada released a Report of "Findings into the Complaint Filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic" against Facebook, Inc. The complaint was filed by the CIPPIC under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, and contained twenty-four allegations concerning a range of Facebook business practices. The PIPEDA covers privacy protections by private data holders, including the actions of third parties to whom the data holders provide information. It requires data holders to obtain individual consent for any use of such data, and requires data holders, upon request, to provide details regarding the nature of information held, and a list of all third parties to whom the information has been provided. The charges include allegations that Facebook fails to inform users: how it uses the personal information it collects; the extent of disclosures of such information to the more than 950,000 third-party application developers; of new uses of the personal data collected; of monitoring for anomalous behavior; and, of persistent cookies in mobile Facebook. The complaint further alleges that Facebook fails to allow for deletion (as opposed to deactivation) of user accounts or obtain consent from non-users for upload and storage of personal information. Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart stated that while Facebook has clearly made efforts to maintain user privacy, "we found serious privacy gaps in the way the site operates." Facebook has agreed to many of the Commission's recommendations, and has also proposed what the Commission calls "reasonable alternatives" to others. The company has not, however, addressed all of the recommendations, noting that under the current "statement of rights and responsibilities" it would have to consult users regarding changes to certain policies. The Commission, however, states in its report that "[w]hile we understand the importance Facebook places on user feedback, the legislative requirements and obligations imposed by the Act are not contingent on user approval." The Commission will review Facebook's new policies in 30 days to assess that the company is in compliance with the ruling. If Facebook's changes are unsatisfactory, the Commission can take the issue to Federal Court to enforce the recommendations. In June, the Article 29 Working Party warned about the dissemination and use of information available on Social Networking Sites for other secondary, unintended purposes. Earlier, in February, Facebook had announced that it was opening its site governance to user voting after the new Terms of Service were widely criticized, and were to be the subject of an EPIC complaint to the Federal Trade Commission. Facebook restored the old terms and sought user feedback on the new terms. About 75 percent of the users voted to adopt new terms re-drafted from user feedback. Under the updated terms, users have the right to "own and control their information." Facebook had also taken some steps to improve account deletion, to limit sublicenses, and reduce data exchanges with application developers. EPIC supported the adoption of the new terms. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: http://www.priv.gc.ca/index_e.cfm Report of Findings into the Complaint Filed by the CIPPIC against Facebook, Inc. under PIPEDA: http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.cfm Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA): http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.cfm#appendixB Article 29 Working Party Opinion of Social Networking Sites: http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/Opinion_SNS_090316_Adopted.pdf Facebook Privacy Policy: http://www.facebook.com/policy.php Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities: http://www.facebook.com/terms.php EPIC - Facebook Privacy: http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/ EPIC - Social Networking Privacy: http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/ ___________________________________________________________ *Lisa Horner* *Head of Research & Policy **Global Partners and Associates*** 338 City Road, London, EC1V 2PY, UK Office: + 44 207 239 8251 Mobile: +44 7867 795859 *lisa(a)global-partners.co.uk <mailto:lisa@global-partners.co.uk>** **www.global-partners.co.uk <http://www.global-partners.co.uk/>** * _______________________________________________ IRP mailing list IRP(a)lists.internetrightsandprinciples.org http://lists.internetrightsandprinciples.org/listinfo.cgi/irp-internetright…

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Pirate Bay ?
by Marco Ciurcina July 21, 2009

July 21, 2009

http://www.dcia.info/news/newsletter_2009-07-13.htm Welcome Global Gaming Factory Please warmly welcome Global Gaming Factory (GGF) to the DCIA. GGF has the largest network of Internet cafes and gaming centers in the world and provides advertisers, software publishers, and service providers with unprecedented access to the large community of tourists and gamers that visit these centers. GGF's existing wholly owned subsidiaries, Smartlaunch and CyberCafePro, are the leading publishers of cafe management software that is used by thousands of cafes globally. GGF has agreed to acquire P4P Working Group (P4PWG) participant Peerialism, a technology company which has developed next generation file-sharing technology, for $13 million, and The Pirate Bay (TPB), one of the 100 most visited websites in the world, for $7.8 million. Following the completion of these acquisitions, GGF intends to launch new business models that will allow compensation to content rights holders and monetize the bandwidth contributed by P2P users. The responsibility for and operation of the TPB site will be taken over by GGF in connection with closing of the transaction, which is scheduled for August. Peerialism's product for video distribution over the Internet - PeerTV - enables content owners to distribute better quality video at significantly lower costs to many more viewers than alternative approaches. Cost savings are between 50% and 90% depending on network conditions, while the maximum number of simultaneous viewers is almost limitless. Its PeerNet helps broadband operators minimize network traffic by making better use of existing infrastructure. Large and popular content files are temporarily stored and distributed from local P2P-caches in the access networks, reducing peak traffic loads on weak links further up in the network. And finally, Peerialism's P2P Components are tools to build and analyze P2P networks: MyP2PWorld, a complete P2P network simulator; Link Assess, which measures the instantaneous quality of any link between two nodes; and Net Topology, A P2P component to help construct a locality-aware overlay network. Hans Pandeya, CEO of GGF, said, "As a result of the acquisitions of Peerialism and TPB, GGF will have a strategic position in the international digital distribution market. File-sharing traffic is estimated to account for more than half of today's global Internet traffic." He added that technology and broadband providers, service providers, search engines, and rights holders will all benefit from a clearer authorized downloading landscape. "GGF wants to accept the challenge to position itself as a respectable participant in the market and contribute to the Internet's infrastructure, with the goal to establish working models for cooperation and a clear allocation of responsibilities on market terms, respecting both intellectual property (IP) rights and the rights of privacy," the company said.

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NY Times Op-Ed by JZ: "Lost in the Cloud"
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 20, 2009

July 20, 2009

The New York Times July 20, 2009 Op-Ed Contributor Lost in the Cloud By JONATHAN ZITTRAIN Cambridge, Mass. EARLIER this month Google announced a new operating system called Chrome. It's meant to transform personal computers and handheld devices into single-purpose windows to the Web. This is part of a larger trend: Chrome moves us further away from running code and storing our information on our own PCs toward doing everything online - also known as in "the cloud" - using whatever device is at hand. Many people consider this development to be as sensible and inevitable as the move from answering machines to voicemail. With your stuff in the cloud, it's not a catastrophe to lose your laptop, any more than losing your glasses would permanently destroy your vision. In addition, as more and more of our information is gathered from and shared with others - through Facebook, MySpace or Twitter - having it all online can make a lot of sense. The cloud, however, comes with real dangers. (continued ...) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/opinion/20zittrain.html

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Mark Cooper, "Round #1 Of The Digital Intellectual Property War"
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 19, 2009

July 19, 2009

"Round #1 Of The Digital Intellectual Property Wars: Economic Fundamentals, Not Piracy, Explain How Consumers And Artists Won In The Music Sector" Mark Cooper, Director Of Research, Consumer Federation Of America Fellow, Center For Internet And Society http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5916 Abstract: v. qui sotto. Citato da Larry Lessig in "Remix" (nota 32 al Capitolo 5). ciao, juan carlos ABSTRACT Piracy may have been the solvent that dissolved the glue of an anticompetitive, anti- consumer market structure, but its magnitude has been vastly overestimated by the industry and the transformation of the industry is perfectly consistent with economic theory. With the advent of digital technologies, three quarters of the cost of producing a CD come under severe pressure. The fixed costs of distribution all but disappear and intermediary functions of promotion are transformed. The effort by record companies to keep singles out of the market and to keep CD prices high was a bald effort to use market power to prevent consumers from enjoying the benefits of more efficient distribution that would flow to them in a competitive market. The benefits were huge. The number of units purchased by the public has more than tripled – but the vast majority of units sold are singles and most are not owned by record companies. The average price per unit shipped has declined by 70 percent. Gains in consumer surplus are close to $6 billion in 2007 alone. The vast majority of artists were beneficiaries as well. Comparing the sales claimed by record companies to the sales claimed by digital distribution companies, it appears that for every single sold by a record company there are three additional songs sold by an unsigned artist. Of course, the dominant firms in the tight, music oligopoly and the handful of artists who benefits from the blockbuster/star system have suffered a reduction in the rents they collect.

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Prossimi passi del Centro NEXA
by J.C. DE MARTIN July 18, 2009

July 18, 2009

Cari Nexiani, in previsione della pausa estiva, vi inviamo una sintesi dei principali prossimi appuntamenti del Centro NEXA su Internet & Societa' del Politecnico di Torino e un paio di anticipazioni relativamente a opportunita' di ricerca (che verranno poi, comunque, ampiamente pubblicizzate). I *mercoledi' di NEXA* riprenderanno *mercoledi' 9 settembre 2009*, ore 18-20, presso il Centro NEXA in corso Trento 21 al primo piano, senza alcun ospite, in modo da permetterci di fare il punto della situazione per i mesi a seguire e per dare spazio a chi avesse qualcosa da proporre o raccontare. Gli altri tre mercoledi' fino alla fine dell'anno si terranno sempre il secondo mercoledi' del mese, come da tradizione, ovvero: il *14 ottobre*, l'*11 novembre* e il *9 dicembre*: save the dates! Tra gli appuntamenti, vi segnaliamo innanzittutto la *prima conferenza annuale del Centro NEXA*, che si terrà a Torino il *28 novembre 2009*. La conferenza includera' anche la sessione *CCIT2009*, per fare il punto della situazione di Creative Commons in Italia. Speriamo inoltre, in serata, di offrire un bel *CC Party*. Incidentalmente, la conferenza annuale NEXA verra' preceduta, il *27 novembre*, da una giornata dedicata all'*Open Access *organizzata dal Sistema Bibliotecario del Politecnico di Torino. Lato COMMUNIA, segnaliamo il *workshop COMMUNIA su pubblico dominio e memory institutions* che si terra' a Barcellona il 2 ottobre 2009. Sara' seguito dal workshop COMMUNIA su policy recommendations a inizio febbraio 2010 in Lussemburgo. Infine, vi pre-annunciamo che a breve pubblicheremo bandi per la *ricerca di personale di ricerca*, ovvero: un bravo programmatore per uno studio di fattibilita' per la prosecuzione del progetto NEUBOT (http://nexa.polito.it/neubot) e due persone con competenze tecnico/economiche/giuridiche per un importante studio sul tema dell'identificabilita' delle persone su Internet. I dettagli dei bandi, che resteranno aperti indicativamente fino a fine settembre 2009, appariranno prossimamente sia sul sito ufficiale del Politecnico di Torino sia qui: http://nexa.polito.it/job-openings (oltre che in varie mailing lists, sia italiane sia estere). Grazie a tutti per questo primo anno di attivita' "pubbliche" del Centro: non potevamo pensare di iniziar meglio! Buona estate a tutti, a presto, juan carlos de martin marco ricolfi prof. juan carlos de martin prof. marco ricolfi co-directors / nexa center for internet & society politecnico di torino http://nexa.polito.it

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Re: [nexa] P.I.: "Creative Commons, tutto in una mappa"
by a.dicorinto＠uniroma1.it July 18, 2009

July 18, 2009

Utile puntualizzazione, caro Federico.... non è casuale infatti che abbiamo risposto tanto duramente all'uscita di Assumma secondo cui Internet distrugge la creatività... http://fhf.it/stampa/comunicati-stampa/internet-favorisce-la-creativita-non…

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Re: [nexa] NY Times: "Data.gov to Face a Challenger From Sunlight Labs"
by a.dicorinto＠uniroma1.it July 18, 2009

July 18, 2009

Mi sembra un'ottima notizia per garantire lo scrutinio pubblico dell'azione amministrativa e politica. La trasparenza dei dati e l'uso di tecnologie interoperabili sono cruciali nelle democrazie. Chissà quando lo capiranno i nostri governanti. Qualcuno mi fa il piacere di dirlo a Brunetta? Magari smette di abbaiare e comincia a fare cose utili.

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