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Due recensioni di "Platform Capitalism" di Nick Srnicek
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 3, 2017

Aug. 3, 2017

(HT Antonio Aloisi) * Notes on Platform Capitalism** *By Mark Carrigan on February 16, 2017 http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/19138 *Book Review: Platform Capitalism by Nick Srnicek** *By Sin Yee Koh http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/06/05/book-review-platform-cap… /If you are interested in this book, you may also like to read Nick Srnicek’s short essay on Platform Capitalism, published on LSE RB on 24 February 2017, or listen to a recording of his LSE Lit Fest panel discussion with Luke Dormehl and Laurie Penny on ‘The Future of Humanity’ ./

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Paper: "Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 2, 2017

Aug. 2, 2017

Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City 58 Pages Posted: Robert Brauneis <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=329492> George Washington University - Law School Ellen P. Goodman <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=333377> Rutgers Law School Date Written: August 2, 2017 Abstract Emerging across many disciplines are questions about algorithmic ethics – about the values embedded in artificial intelligence and big data analytics that increasingly replace human decisionmaking. Many are concerned that an algorithmic society is too opaque to be accountable for its behavior. An individual can be denied parole or denied credit, fired or not hired for reasons she will never know and cannot be articulated. In the public sector, the opacity of algorithmic decisionmaking is particularly problematic both because governmental decisions may be especially weighty, and because democratically-elected governments bear special duties of accountability. Investigative journalists have recently exposed the dangerous impenetrability of algorithmic processes used in the criminal justice field – dangerous because the predictions they make can be both erroneous and unfair, with none the wiser. We set out to test the limits of transparency around governmental deployment of big data analytics, focusing our investigation on local and state government use of predictive algorithms. It is here, in local government, that algorithmically-determined decisions can be most directly impactful. And it is here that stretched agencies are most likely to hand over the analytics to private vendors, which may make design and policy choices out of the sight of the client agencies, the public, or both. To see just how impenetrable the resulting “black box” algorithms are, we filed 42 open records requests in 23 states seeking essential information about six predictive algorithm programs. We selected the most widely-used and well-reviewed programs, including those developed by for-profit companies, nonprofits, and academic/private sector partnerships. The goal was to see if, using the open records process, we could discover what policy judgments these algorithms embody, and could evaluate their utility and fairness. To do this work, we identified what meaningful “algorithmic transparency” entails. We found that in almost every case, it wasn’t provided. Over-broad assertions of trade secrecy were a problem. But contrary to conventional wisdom, they were not the biggest obstacle. It will not usually be necessary to release the code used to execute predictive models in order to dramatically increase transparency. We conclude that publicly-deployed algorithms will be sufficiently transparent only if (1) governments generate appropriate records about their objectives for algorithmic processes and subsequent implementation and validation; (2) government contractors reveal to the public agency sufficient information about how they developed the algorithm; and (3) public agencies and courts treat trade secrecy claims as the limited exception to public disclosure that the law requires. Although it would require a multi-stakeholder process to develop best practices for record generation and disclosure, we present what we believe are eight principal types of information that such records should ideally contain

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Sweden scrambles to tighten data security as scandal claims two ministers
by Alberto Cammozzo Aug. 2, 2017

Aug. 2, 2017

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/01/sweden-scrambles-to-tigh…> Sweden’s government has sought urgent assurances on data security from national agencies including the health, education and pensions services after a huge leak of private and sensitive information that has cost two ministers their jobs. Amid reports by the Dagens Nyheter newspaper that confidential medical details were being handled by unscreened IT workers in Romania, the national broadcaster SVT said data outsourcing arrangements at six state agencies were being checked. ...

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Germania: "Center for Advanced Internet Studies"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 2, 2017

Aug. 2, 2017

In UK e Germania si moltiplicano i centri studi dedicati a Internet - l'ultimo di cui sono venuto a conoscenza è questo: *Center for Advanced Internet Studies* http://www.cais.nrw/ *Our goals* /The Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAIS) aims at playing an active role in the shaping of the rapid social, political and economic changes brought about by digitalization and is dedicated to promoting an ongoing dialogue between science and society.// // //CAIS sees itself as a place of innovative and interdisciplinary research and as an initiator of critical public debate among stakeholders who face the challenges and opportunities of digitalization and are committed to developing a normative framework for life in a digital society./ Ma noi italiani stiamo a posto con il pistacchio di Bronte e i ristoranti per turisti. juan carlos

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Italy plans to extend telecoms data retention and increase censorship powers
by Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists Aug. 1, 2017

Aug. 1, 2017

Una sintesi in inglese di quanto è stato inserito nella "Legge europea 2017" che ha un impatto sui digital rights https://edri.org/italy-plans-extend-telecoms-data-retention-increase-censor… (Our first contribution as EDRi Observer) Fabio

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Palantir: the ‘special ops’ tech giant that wields as much real-world power as Google
by Alberto Cammozzo Aug. 1, 2017

Aug. 1, 2017

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/30/palantir-peter-thiel-cia-data…> Palantir, the CIA-backed startup, is Minority Report come true. It is all-powerful, yet no one knows it even exists. Palantir does not have an office, it has a “SCIF” on a back street in Palo Alto, California. SCIF stands for “sensitive compartmentalised information facility”. Palantir says its building “must be built to be resistant to attempts to access the information within. The network must be ‘airgapped’ from the public internet to prevent information leakage.” ... In 2004, Peter Thiel – the billionaire PayPal co-founder, Facebook investor and and latter-day Trump ally – created Palantir alongside Nathan Gettings, Joe Lonsdale, Stephen Cohen and Alex Karp. Their intention was to create a company that took Big Data somewhere no one else dared to go. In 2013, Karp, Palantir’s CEO, announced that the company would not be pursuing an IPO, as going public would make “running a company like ours very difficult”. This is why. Palantir watches everything you do and predicts what you will do next in order to stop it. As of 2013, its client list included the CIA, the FBI, the NSA, the Centre for Disease Control, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, Special Operations Command, West Point and the IRS. Up to 50% of its business is with the public sector. In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture arm, was an early investor. ... Palantir does not just provide the Pentagon with a machine for global surveillance and the data-efficient fighting of war, it runs Wall Street, too. Palantir is exactly what it says it is: a giant digital eye like Saruman’s seeing stone in The Lord of the Rings. On the streets of Chicago and Los Angeles, Palantir is getting closest to Philip K Dick’s vision of the future, now. In the film, a premonition of an Orwellian thought-police state, crime rates drop to zero as the pre-crime unit successfully imprisons thousands of individuals for merely thinking of committing a felony. ... One could argue that sophisticated pre-crime algorithms are not necessary when being black and male is seen as reason enough for the police to swoop. What predictive policing has done is militarise American cities, creating a heightened culture of suspicion and fear in areas where tensions are highest and policing is already most difficult. Officers being led to certain neighbourhoods solely because of an algorithm is enough to cause tension; enough to ignite a powder keg and push a delicate policing situation over the edge. ...

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GPL e` un contratto
by Guido Noto La Diega Aug. 1, 2017

Aug. 1, 2017

"Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on the unsigned GNU GPL fails to plausibly demonstrate mutual assent, that is, the existence of a contract. Not so. The GNU GPL, which is attached to the complaint, provides that the Ghostscript user agrees to its terms if the user does not obtain a commercial license. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial license, and represented publicly that its use of Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a contract.” Un commento qua http://www.technollama.co.uk/us-court-declares-gpl-is-a-contract -- Guido Dr Guido Noto La Diega Lecturer in Law @ Northumbria University CEO @italiot | Fellow @ Nexa Center for Internet & Society | Founder @DPA2018 Northumbria Law School City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST noto.la.diega(a)gmail.com +44(0)191 349 5562 Twitter @guidonld You can access my papers on Academia.edu <http://northumbria.academia.edu/GuidoNotoLaDiega> and on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1794950>) This e-mail and any attachment hereto are strictly confidential and are exclusively intended for the person above identified. Without intended recipient’s entitlement, use, copy and dissemination of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received it in error, please advice us immediately by telephone and return the documents received to the above address, deleting the files. Thank you. Unless necessary, please do not print this e-mail.

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The chiefs of Facebook, Google and other tech giants aren’t committing to testify to the U.S. Congress on net neutrality
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 1, 2017

Aug. 1, 2017

They had until today to tell a key House committee, which is extending its deadline. BY TONY ROMM ON JULY 31, 2017 3:17 PM https://www.recode.net/platform/amp/2017/7/31/16070176/amazon-facebook-goog… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Forum Innovazione di Roma Capitale
by Marco Scialdone July 31, 2017

July 31, 2017

Ciao, spero che la notizia possa interessare i nexiani romani o che frequentano la Capitale. Come forse alcuni di voi già sanno, sono in corso le iscrizioni al Forum Innovazione di Roma Capitale (c'è tempo fino a venerdì 8 settembre 2017). Il Forum sarà il luogo di costruzione partecipata delle politiche in materia di innovazione nella convinzione che solo da un confronto continuo con i cittadini possano emergere le soluzioni migliori per rendere Roma una città più semplice e moderna. Il Forum lavorerà su singoli progetti, con tempi definiti e risultati verificabili. Qui tutte le informazioni per iscriversi: http://www.comune.roma.it/pcr/it/newsview.page?contentId=NEW1644084 ----- Avv. Marco Scialdone http://www.computerlaw.it Mobile: +393470830540

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Google’s new program to track shoppers sparks a federal privacy complaint
by Alberto Cammozzo July 31, 2017

July 31, 2017

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/07/30/googles-new-pr…>; A prominent privacy rights watchdog is asking the Federal Trade Commission to investigate a new Google advertising program that ties consumers’ online behavior to their purchases in brick-and-mortar stores. The legal complaint from the Electronic Privacy Information Center, to be filed with the FTC on Monday, alleges that Google is newly gaining access to a trove of highly sensitive information -- the credit and debit card purchase records of the majority of U.S. consumers -- without revealing how they got the information or giving consumers meaningful ways to opt out. Moreover, the group claims that the search giant is relying on a secretive technical method to protect the data -- a method that should be audited by outsiders and is likely vulnerable to hacks or other data breaches. “Google is seeking to extend its dominance from the online world to the real, offline world, and the FTC really needs to look at that,” said Marc Rotenberg, the organization’s executive director. Google called its advertising approach "common" and said it had "invested in building a new, custom encryption technology that ensures users' data remains private, secure and anonymous." The Washington Post detailed Google's program, Store Sales Measurement, in May. Executives have hailed it as a “revolutionary” breakthrough in advertisers’ abilities to track consumer behavior. The company said that, for the first time, it would be able to prove, with a high degree of confidence, that clicks on online ads led to purchases at the cash register of physical stores. To do this, Google said it had obtained access to the credit and debit card records of 70 percent of U.S. consumers. It had then developed a mathematical formula that would anonymize and encrypt the transaction data, and then automatically match the transactions to the millions of U.S. users of Google and Google-owned services such as Gmail, search, YouTube and maps. This approach prevents Google from accessing the credit or debit card data for individuals. But the company did not disclose the mathematical formula it uses to protect consumers' data. In a statement, Google said it had taken pains to build custom encryption technology that ensures the data the company receives remains private and anonymous. The privacy organization is asking the government not to take Google’s word for it and to review the algorithm itself. In its complaint, the organization said the mathematical technique that Store Sales Measurement is based on, CryptDB, has known security flaws. Researchers hacked into a CryptDB-protected health-care database in 2015, accessing more than 50 percent of the stored records. Google also would not disclose which companies were providing it with the transaction records. When asked if users had consented to having their credit and debit transactions shared, Google would not specifically say. The company replied it requires that its unnamed partners have “the rights necessary” to use this data. In its complaint, reviewed by The Washington Post, the privacy group alleges that if consumers don’t know how Google gets its purchase data, then they cannot make an informed decision about which cards not to use or where not to shop if they don’t want their purchases tracked. The organization points out that purchases can reveal medical conditions, religious beliefs and other intimate information. Google also told The Post that it does not have access to the names or other personal information of the credit and debit card users, and that it does not share any information about individual Google users with partners. Advertisers receive aggregate information. For example, for an ad campaign for sneakers that received 10,000 clicks, the advertiser learns that 12 percent of the clickers made a purchase. Users can opt out anytime, Google says. To do so, users of Google’s products can go to their My Activity Page, click on Activity Controls, and uncheck “Web and Web Activity,” Google says. The privacy group says the opt-out settings and the descriptions of what users are opting out of are confusing and opaque. The group says the company continues to store server and click data even when Web and App Activity is turned off, and that to opt out of everything requires a labyrinthine process of going to a number of third-party sites. Meanwhile, opting out of location-tracking requires going to a separate button and interface. None of the opt out descriptions specifically describes credit card data. ...

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