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Cohem (Paper): "Law for the Platform Economy"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 11, 2017

Aug. 11, 2017

*Law for the Platform Economy* UC Davis Law Review, Forthcoming 51 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2017 Julie E. Cohen Georgetown University Law Center Date Written: June 22, 2017 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991261 Abstract This article explores patterns of legal-institutional change in the emerging, platform-driven economy. Its starting premise is that the platform is not simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a new infrastructural formation (although it is also all of those things). Rather, it is the core organizational form of the emerging informational economy. Platforms do not enter or expand markets; they replace (and rematerialize) them. The article argues that legal institutions, including both entitlements and regulatory institutions, have systematically facilitated the platform economy’s emergence. It first describes the evolution of the platform as a mode of economic (re)organization and introduces the ways that platforms restructure both economic exchange and patterns of information flow more generally. It then explores some of the ways that actions and interventions by and on behalf of platform businesses are reshaping the landscape of legal entitlements and obligations. Finally, it describes challenges that platform-based intermediation of the information environment has posed for existing regulatory institutions and traces some of the emerging institutional responses. Keywords: platforms, data, algorithms, information, intermediation, institutions

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Fwd: [IP] re Apple refuses to override user location spying choices
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 11, 2017

Aug. 11, 2017

Controcanto su Apple e AML. juan carlos -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [IP] re Apple refuses to override user location spying choices Resent-Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 01:22:56 +0200 Resent-From: d004620(a)polito.it Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 19:21:51 -0400 From: Dave Farber <farber(a)gmail.com> Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net To: ip <ip(a)listbox.com> > Begin forwarded message: > > *From: *John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com <mailto:gnu@toad.com>> > *Subject: **Re: [IP] Apple refuses to override user location spying > choices* > *Date: *August 10, 2017 at 6:18:57 PM EDT > *To: *dave(a)farber.net <mailto:dave@farber.net> > *Cc: *"ip" <ip(a)listbox.com <mailto:ip@listbox.com>> > >> Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save >> countless lives >> >> https://thenextweb.com/apple/2017/08/10/apple-refuses-enable-iphone-setting… >> >>> OK why Apple are you refusing? Dfarber > > Because they've stopped beating their wives, of course. > > [first, note that the above URL contains covert tracking information, > that "#.tnw_O0GihW8u" on the end. Lauren, Dave, don't you strip that > stuff off before sending it to hundreds or thousands of friends? You > should!] > > I'm not a big Apple defender, but Apple is probably making the right > choice here. The extremely slanted article that Dave and Lauren > forwarded neglects to mention giving users real choice about their own > privacy. It also neglects the use of large-company Internet-based > physical tracking services that are required and used for this > supposedly "simple" AML (Advanced Mobile Location) feature. > > If users have location services turned off, they should stay off, even > for emergency calls. I don't want Apple (or Google especially) > overriding my choices about whether my phone is going to track me. > Especially not with the explicit connivance of government and > supranational eurocrats. These guys are famous for forcing stupid > privacy choices on the public (like the RFID chips in passports, > chosen because the immigration bureaucrats didn't consider merely > moving their OCR passport readers 20 feet back along the queue of > incoming people). > > On my own free software Android phone I enable the phone to find its > location via receive-only radio transmissions from GNSS satellites > (US's GPS, Europe's GLONASS, and China's Beidou satellites). This > enables my free software mapping application (OsmAnd, which uses the > free culture OpenStreetMap database, which is stored directly in my > phone) to help me navigate. Neither Android nor OsmAnd is reporting > either my general position or my specific location to ANY satellites > nor ANY servers anywhere. (Yes, Virginia, it is possible and easy to > use mapping applications that DO NOT report your location to Apple, > Google, Bing, NSA, or anybody else. Of course, Apple, Google, Bing, > and NSA don't tell you that.) > > I explicitly do not turn on "WiFi" or "GSM base station" location > services. That's because these services both require that the phone > first listen to the local radio environment, and then REPORT that > radio environment to servers run by large companies, via the Internet. > These servers, run by Apple or Google or their subcontractors, store > that information, and then reply to my phone with location information > about those specific WiFi access points and those specific GSM cell > towers. In both cases, some big company has silently collected a data > point about where my phone is, and thus where I am. And they are > under no obligation to me to use that information solely for my own > benefit; quite the opposite. They use it for their OWN benefit, and > even use it to build up their databases about WiFi access points they > haven't yet discovered. They use it to sell things to me. They use > it to report me to government agencies and civil suit opponents under > subpoenas, wiretap orders, or National Security Letters. Etc. > > The article about AML was closely cribbed from press releases and > other info published by EENA, the European Emergency Number > Association, a nonprofit funded by EU project funding and by commercial > vendors who sell to police agencies.(*) The article and the EENA press > release carefully neglect to point out how the government-requested > AML feature would both override the user's location privacy settings, > and would report the user's location to some large faceless > corporation: > > "The process is completely automated. ... turn[s] on GNSS (global > navigation satellite system) and Wi-Fi. The phone then automatically > sends an SMS to emergency services, detailing the location of the > caller." > > The "report my location to large corporation" step between "turn on > Wi-Fi" and "send an SMS to emergency services" has conveniently been > ignored by this slanted article. It's all about Saving the Children, > not about Government Mandated Citizen Tracking Via Megacorps. The > "ignore my privacy settings" step isn't mentioned either; instead, > EENA is quoted as saying "accurate location information should be sent > during ALL emergency calls (emphasis theirs)" -- regardless of the > user's privacy choices. After all, who's in charge here? The > police agencies, or the citizen? > > The article also doesn't report that a significant fraction of calls > to government emergency services (911 in the US; 112 in Europe) are > spurious, typically "pocket dials". AML would report your location to > a company and to the emergency bureau, not just for real 911 calls > that you make in an emergency, but for every 911 pocket dial as well. > Try a web search for "911 pocket dial" for tons of links like these: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pocket_dialing#Accidental_calling_of_emergenc… > https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/remember-to-lock-your-phone-91… > http://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/man-dies-911-dispatchers-mistake-call-for-p… > http://abcnews.go.com/US/911-pocket-dial-leads-arrest-burglary-charges/stor… > https://www.yahoo.com/gma/blogs/abc-news/apparent-butt-dial-oregon-police-l… > http://www.pennlive.com/nation-world/2014/12/woman_25_arrested_after_pocket… > > This vague ETSI tech report for AML is the best technical description > available of the service: > > http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103300_103399/103393/01.01.01_60/tr_103… > > It notes that if you're roaming in another country, either the SMS > containing your location will go to your home country (not to the > local emergency dispatcher -- another location information leak), or > the phone will need to contain a database of countries and their > dispatcher SMS numbers, plus a mechanism for regularly updating this > database. The report ignores the idea that the emergency dispatchers > in each country should be able to forward such information to the > right country's dispatchers; the standard tries to push all the > complication into the phone firmware. > > It also states that: > > "The use of AML software should be invisible to the user so > as not to confuse them when they are trying to get help. > > No record of the SMS message should be available to > the user either during or after the emergency call." > > In other words, don't tell the user that you spied on them, and don't > let them see any record of your spying. > > It also notes that turning on location services can drain the battery, > thus terminating the voice 911 call earlier. > > It also says that a Time of Positioning should be sent in the SMS > message; "the handset should attempt to use the time established by an > NTP server, this should be possible if a network connection is > available." So now there's a second access to an NTP server somewhere > on the Internet, that AML is requiring the handset to do, invisibly. > > It's getting less and less simple, the more we look into the details... > > Meanwhile, the proponents(*) have this to say: > > http://www.eena.org/download.asp?item_id=209 > > "Are there any privacy risks? > > No. ..." > > John > > (*) EENA says it's a nonprofit, not a regulator. But it lobbies for > and coordinates 1300 police agency bureaucrats from all over Europe > and the world. It's funded by ~400K euros of project funding from the > EU government, plus 90 corporate members each paying 10,000 euros a > year for the privilege of marketing their products to the 1300 "no > membership fee" bureaucrat members; total about 1.1M euros a year. We > are seeing more orgs like this, full of officials but exempt from FOIA > and sunshine laws, pushing totalitarian "solutions" that then their > members go back and mandate in their own jurisdictions. AAMVA is a > big one in the US, pushing the idea that to solve "terrorism", > everyone needs a government issued ID, tied to a national ID database, > just to exist or travel. Its membership: Heads of Departments of > Motor Vehicles in each state -- the ones who issue those ID cards. > They decline to allow privacy activists to join their membership, > conferences, or discussions; we tried.

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"Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save countless lives"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 10, 2017

Aug. 10, 2017

*Apple refuses to enable iPhone emergency settings that could save countless lives* by Már Másson Maack Despite being relatively easy, Apple keeps ignoring requests to enable a feature called Advanced Mobile Location (AML) in iOS. Enabling AML would give emergency services extremely accurate locations of emergency calls made from iPhones, dramatically decreasing response time. As TNW covered before, Google’s successful implementation of AML for Android is already saving lives. But where Android users have become safer, iPhone owners have been left behind. The European Emergency Number Association (EENA), the organization behind implementing AML for emergency services, released a statement today that pleads Apple to consider the safety of its customers and participate in the program: “As AML is being deployed in more and more countries, iPhone users are put at a disadvantage compared to Android users in the scenario that matters most: An emergency. EENA calls on Apple to integrate Advanced Mobile Location in their smartphones for the safety of their customers.” […] Continua qui: https://thenextweb.com/apple/2017/08/10/apple-refuses-enable-iphone-setting…

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Nuovi documenti GAO e Chatham House
by Diego Latella Aug. 9, 2017

Aug. 9, 2017

Carissimi, Alla pagina Computers: National security, War, and Civil Rights <http://uspid.org/compwa.html> del sito web dell’USPID (www.uspid.org <http://www.uspid.org/>) ho appena inserito i link ai seguenti documenti che, spero, siano di vostro interesse: Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are Needed <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-614?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdeliv…> GAO-17-614 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 3, 2017 Defense Cybersecurity: DOD's Monitoring of Progress in Implementing Cyber Strategies Can Be Strengthened <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-512?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdeliv…> GAO-17-512 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 1, 2017 INTERNET OF THINGS: Enhanced Assessments and Guidance Are Needed to Address Security Risks in DOD <http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686204.pdf> GAO-17-668 GAO <http://www.gao.gov/> August 1, 2017 How vulnerable are nuclear weapons to cyber-attacks? <https://www.facebook.com/ChathamHouse/videos/10154932955922689/?utm_source=…> Beyza Unal Chatam House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/> August 1, 2017 The Internet of Things Will Be Even More Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/internet-things-will-be-even-mo…> Hannah Bryce <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/hannah-bryce> Chatam House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/> May 18, 2017 Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat

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GAO Report on "Aviation Security : TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavior al Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities"
by Diego Latella Aug. 9, 2017

Aug. 9, 2017

Maybe you might be interested in the GAO Report on "Aviation Security : TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavior al Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities”: This is what GAO faund: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not have valid evidence that most of the revised behavioral indicators (28 of 36) used in its behavior detection activities can be used to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security. GAO defined valid evidence as original research that meets generally accepted research standards and presents evidence that is applicable in supporting the specific behavioral indicators in TSA's revised list. Original research sources presenting valid evidence are important because the data and conclusions they present are derived from empirical research that can be replicated and evaluated. In GAO's review of all 178 sources TSA cited as support for its revised list, GAO found that 98 percent (175 of 178) of the sources do not provide valid evidence that is applicable to the specific behavioral indicators TSA cited them as supporting. Specifically, Seventy-seven percent of the sources TSA cited (137 of 178) are news articles, opinion pieces, presentations created by law enforcement entities and industry groups, and screen shots of online medical websites that do not meet GAO's definition of valid evidence. Twelve percent of the sources TSA cited (21 of 178) are journal articles, books reviewing existing literature, and other publications that may reference original research in the text, but do not themselves present original analysis, methods, or data whose reliability and validity can be assessed. Eleven percent of the sources TSA cited (20 of 178) are original research sources reporting original data and methods. However, 5 of these sources do not meet generally accepted research standards. Of the 15 sources that meet generally accepted research standards, 12 do not present information and conclusions that are applicable to the specific behavioral indicators TSA cited these sources as supporting. In total, GAO found that 3 of the 178 total sources cited could be used as valid evidence to support 8 of the 36 behavioral indicators in TSA's revised list. More specifically, TSA has one source of valid evidence to support each of 7 indicators, 2 sources of valid evidence to support 1 indicator, and does not have valid evidence to support 28 behavioral indicators. GAO makes no new recommendations in this report. The following is some context information (from the GAO report introduction): Over the past 10 years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has employed thousands of trained behavior detection officers (BDO) to identify passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception at airport screening checkpoints. According to TSA, certain verbal and nonverbal cues and behaviors—TSA’s behavioral indicators—may indicate malintent, such as the intent to carry out a terrorist attack. These behavioral indicators include, for example, assessing the way an individual swallows or the degree to which an individual’s eyes are open. According to TSA, such indicators provide a means for identifying passengers who may pose a risk to aviation security and referring them for additional screening. Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat

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GDPR: ecco l'implementazione nel Regno Unito
by Guido Noto La Diega Aug. 8, 2017

Aug. 8, 2017

Di ieri lo statement of intent inglese. Si segnalano, inter alia - new offence of altering records with intent to prevent disclosure following a subject access request <https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/dpa2018?source=feed_text&story_id=18077726…>- new criminal offence of intentionally or recklessly re-identifying individuals from anonymised or pseudonymised data <https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/dpa2018?source=feed_text&story_id=18077719…> V. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6… -- Guido Dr Guido Noto La Diega Lecturer in Law @ Northumbria University CEO @italiot | Fellow @ Nexa Center for Internet & Society | Founder @DPA2018 Northumbria Law School City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST noto.la.diega(a)gmail.com +44(0)191 349 5562 Twitter @guidonld You can access my papers on Academia.edu <http://northumbria.academia.edu/GuidoNotoLaDiega> and on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1794950>) This e-mail and any attachment hereto are strictly confidential and are exclusively intended for the person above identified. Without intended recipient’s entitlement, use, copy and dissemination of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received it in error, please advice us immediately by telephone and return the documents received to the above address, deleting the files. Thank you. Unless necessary, please do not print this e-mail.

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Global Network Initiative Releases 2016 Annual Report
by avv. Monica A. Senor Aug. 8, 2017

Aug. 8, 2017

Press release: https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/global-network-initiative-rele… The full report: http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI-Annual-Report-20… Un caro saluto e buona estate a tutti, Monica

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Secrets of Silicon Valley review – are we sleepwalking towards a technological apocalypse?
by Alberto Cammozzo Aug. 7, 2017

Aug. 7, 2017

<https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2017/aug/07/> The first of two episodes of Secrets of Silicon Valley (BBC2, Sunday) was a sobering look at how tech is going to change society quickly and dramatically. The presenter, technology writer Jamie Bartlett, with his scruffy beard and manbun, seems comfortingly analogue compared with the hoodied inventors and venture capitalists he meets. One tells him that anyone who questions the wisdom of where we are heading is “anti-progress”, and finishes with a long and chilling stare. It wasn’t all dystopia. Bartlett visited a Silicon Valley mansion, where young engineers mostly had idealistic visions – one was inventing a way to reverse climate change, another was coming up with a plant-based burger. They tell themselves what all Silicon Valley inhabitants do – that making the world better, and making billions of dollars in the process, are not mutually exclusive. Airbnb executives claim to be connecting people across the world and helping people earn money to pay the rent; the effect is to push up housing costs for locals in cities such as Barcelona. A man from Uber says something vague about how the app is changing the way we use cars to save the world. But the programme shows how it has affected the livelihoods of taxi drivers, and worse, it claimed that, in Hyderabad in India, three Uber drivers have killed themselves. Bartlett does an emotional interview with the widow of one of them ....

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Weinberger: "Pointing at the Wrong Villain: Cass Sunstein and Echo Chambers"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Aug. 7, 2017

Aug. 7, 2017

*Pointing at the Wrong Villain: Cass Sunstein and Echo Chambers* By David Weinberger JULY 20, 2017 HARVARD LAW professor, member of President Obama’s White House, and the most-cited constitutional law professor in the country, Cass Sunstein first addressed the internet’s role in the polarization of our culture 15 years ago. His argument has become an accepted part of any discussion about the net’s failings. Yet, he has now written the same book about this issue for the third time. To be sure, his persistence is laudable, but the problems with his assumptions are only becoming more obvious. The first appearance of this book was as Republic.com in 2001, which Sunstein updated in 2007 as Republic.com 2.0. The latest version, #Republic, retains most of the text from these prior versions with a shift in evidence and examples from websites (2001) and blogs (2007) to social media (2017). The new edition includes elaborations inessential to his argument. Why three times? Perhaps Sunstein is the prophet still unheard in his own land — although, given the prominence of his views, that’s not very plausible. Or perhaps the sins he decries have not become dire enough for us to act. Or perhaps we have failed to achieve the old ideals of civil discourse that he espouses because our new network is exposing a weakness in them. […] Continua qui: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pointing-at-the-wrong-villain-cass-suns…

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Licenze open data: CC-BY 4.0 e sono compatibili? Per EDP si, per OSMF no.
by Maurizio Napolitano Aug. 4, 2017

Aug. 4, 2017

European Data Portal ha pubblicato un sito con le licenze open data e relative compatibilità. https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license Si nota una compatibilità fra CC-BY 4.0 e ODbL https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license?license_id=CC-BY4… Cosa che, invece, la Open Street Map Foundation - dopo aver discusso con creative commons - dice non essere del tutto vera. https://blog.openstreetmap.org/2017/03/17/use-of-cc-by-data/ Mi viene confermato anche in questo thread da Simon Pool - coordinatore del Legal Working Group di OpenStreetMap Foundation https://lists.openstreetmap.org/pipermail/talk/2017-August/078385.html Cosa ne pensate? Addenda: EDP dichiara anche che la licenza ODC-BY è una licenza di tipo share alike e non di tipo attribuzione https://www.europeandataportal.eu/en/content/show-license?license_id=ODC-BY

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