June 2020 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Semplificazione PA (punto 23 Piano Colao)
by Diego.Latella June 9, 2020

June 9, 2020

Buongiorno, Ho letto il punto 23 del "Piano Colao" (scaricato stamani dal sito di Repubblica), cioe' il punto relativo alla "semplificazione PA". Mi ha colpito, nella parte "Azioni Specifiche" il testo che segue: "Ridurre l'area di responsabilità dei dipendenti pubblici conseguente all'adozione di procedure governate da algoritmi (Cons. St. sentenza n. 8472/2019)" Non ho avuto la pazienza di leggere la sentenza citata, anche perche' non mi e' chiaro se sia indicata come esempio "positivo" o "negativo" (nella visione del "Piano"), ma l'azione suggerita mi sembra preoccupante perche', se non ho capito male, tende a deresponsabilzzare i pubblici dipendenti che assumono decisioni sulla base del ("conseguenti al") risultato di algoritmi, senza meglio specificare come queste decisioni siano conseguenti ai risultati degli algoritmi (il dipendete publico e' esonerato dal valutare il risultato o dal motivarlo ecc ecc?). E inoltre non vengono minimamente considerate paculiarita' degli algoritmi (corretti? spiegabili? open source? ecc ecc) Mi auguro di aver capito male. Per il resto, nulla di nuovo: ancora una volta per _semplificare_ la PA, invece di _aggredire _e _modificare _le _norme_ e le _procedure_ che regolano ("regolano", mah ...) la burocrazia, si insiste sulla semplice informatizzazione delle _procedure esistenti _(come si evince anche dal titolo del punto (a)). Ancora una volta, quindi, la farraginosita' e delle procedure burocratiche viene semplicemente _implementata_ telematicamente invece di essere _semplificata_. E cosi ad essa si aggiungeranno altri problemi dovuti ai bachi del software ... DL -- Dott. Diego Latella - Senior Researcher CNR-ISTI, Via Moruzzi 1, 56124 Pisa, Italy (http:www.isti.cnr.it [1]) FM&&T Lab. (http://fmt.isti.cnr.it) http://www.isti.cnr.it/People/D.Latella - ph: +390506212982, mob: +39 348 8283101, fax: +390506212040 =================== The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn how to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task. Above all, remember your humanity. -- Sir Joseph Rotblat I don't quite know whether it is especially computer science or its subdiscipline Artificial Intelligence that has such an enormous affection for euphemism. We speak so spectacularly and so readily of computer systems that understand, that see, decide, make judgments, and so on, without ourselves recognizing our own superficiality and immeasurable naivete with respect to these concepts. And, in the process of so speaking, we anesthetise our ability to evaluate the quality of our work and, what is more important, to identify and become conscious of its end use. […] One can't escape this state without asking, again and again: "What do I actually do? What is the final application and use of the products of my work?" and ultimately, "am I content or ashamed to have contributed to this use?" -- Prof. Joseph Weizenbaum ["Not without us", ACM SIGCAS 16(2-3) 2--7 - Aug. 1986] Links: ------ [1] http://www.isti.cnr.it

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IBM is exiting the face recognition business - Axios
by Alberto Cammozzo June 9, 2020

June 9, 2020

<https://www.axios.com/ibm-is-exiting-the-face-recognition-business-62e79f09…> In a letter to members of Congress on Monday, IBM said it is exiting the general-purpose facial recognition business and said it opposes the use of such technology for mass surveillance and racial profiling. Why it matters: Facial recognition software is controversial for a number of reasons, including the potential for human rights violations as well as evidence that the technology is less accurate in identifying people of color. What he's saying: "IBM no longer offers general purpose IBM facial recognition or analysis software," CEO Arvind Krishna said in the letter. "IBM firmly opposes and will not condone uses of any technology, including facial recognition technology offered by other vendors, for mass surveillance, racial profiling, violations of basic human rights and freedoms, or any purpose which is not consistent with our values and Principles of Trust and Transparency." The big picture: An IBM representative told Axios that the decisions were made over a period of months and have been communicated with customers, though this is the first public mention of the decision. IBM said it will "no longer market, sell or update these products" but will support existing clients as needed.

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IBM will no longer offer, develop, or research facial recognition technology - The Verge
by J.C. DE MARTIN June 9, 2020

June 9, 2020

https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/8/21284683/ibm-no-longer-general-purpose-fa… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Teledidattica: proprietaria e privata o libera e pubblica?
by Giacomo Tesio June 8, 2020

June 8, 2020

Ciao, vorrei condividere con voi questa ottima lettura: https://www.roars.it/online/teledidattica-proprietaria-e-privata-o-libera-e… Per quel che conta, da informatico E cittadino, anche io condivido le preoccupazioni e lo sbigottimento di Maria Chiara. > È però chiaro, perfino a chi, come me, conosce l’informatica > solo per sentito dire, che una comunità universitaria e di ricerca > collettivamente incapace di mantenere e sviluppare > un’infrastruttura propria, di controllare i propri dati e di > promuovere e sviluppare competenze proprie pagherà un > prezzo infinitamente alto in termini di sapere, di potere e di > libertà, perché sarà sempre più dipendente – entro ambienti > di scelta disegnati da altri – da sistemi e da > conoscenze che non le appartengono. > > Non si limiterà, cioè, a mettere i propri dati sul computer > di qualcun altro, fuori d’Italia, ma sarà usata da strumenti > e ambienti di scelta disegnati da qualcun altro, e cioè da > multinazionali private che traggono profitto dal commercio > di manipolazione e sorveglianza. E formerà, per le aziende > italiane, tecnici a loro volta incapaci di farne a meno, > perché nient’altro è stato loro insegnato. Io posso dire che quanto descritto da Maria Chiara corrisponde tragicamente con la mia esperienza diretta nel mondo del lavoro. Giacomo

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IFDAD 2020
by Stefano Quintarelli June 8, 2020

June 8, 2020

Dear Colleagues, IFDaD is an international forum on Digital and Democracy (ifdad.org) that will be held at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice + Fondazione Giorgio Cini on December 10-11, 2020, Venice. The forum aims to be a meeting place between politics and academics being aware that laws, institutions and organizations with secular foundations, with their times and human scale are not compatible with the scale and speed of the immaterial world exploited for political purposes. Submissions will undergo a single blind peer review and the selected proceedings will be published by CEUR in the CEUR-WS.org: AI*IA Series. CEUR is a free open-access publication service of Sun SITE Central Europe. BioLaw Journal may consider conference papers in the area of law, artificial intelligence, life sciences and bioethics for publication but selected papers need to be extended and adapted according to the journal’s requirements. Jeffrey Sachs, Gianluca Misuraca, Romano Prodi and Dave Eggers are among the key speakers. Registration to the conference is free of charge until sold out. Travel grants with limited funding are available applying at info(a)ifdad.org with a cv and a motivation letter In the case of restrictions on mass gatherings and large events or on travels, e.g. due to Covid-19, IFDaD 2020 will be held online. Below you will find the important dates and the titles of the tracks. IMPORTANT DATES July 31st 2020 Submission deadline October 10th 2020 Communication of the Accepted Paper November 10th 2020 Camera-ready deadline The call for paper and further information at this link https://www.ifdad.org /---------------------------------------------------------------/ CONFERENCE TRACKS TRACK 1 | Democracy and political decision Analysis from an individual standpoint: develop effective, accountable and transparent Institutions. The role of technology in pursuing such aims. Computer aided policy making, civic artificial intelligence. How artificial intelligence could assist citizens in activating their rights, including information and participation rights. The changing role of institutions based on inclusive voting. How e-voting can help the formulation of parliamentary and assembly proceedings (e.g. critical situation like COVID-19). Balance between representative system and direct or deliberative participation. TRACK 2 Social involvement and participation Analysis from a society standpoint: ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels. How people are engaged and eventually become part of the organization. How people are educated and informed; how the public opinion is formed and can be oriented; how media and platforms should work to promote democracy and human rights (top down flows). Citizen inclusion and digital divide: gender, age, education. TRACK 3 Participation and functioning of parties Analysis from a body standpoint: broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance. How people opinion is collected, structured and analyzed; how people self-organize to form political entities; the role of participatory budgeting, e-Consultation, e-Polling, and e-Legislation [citizen assemblies, popular initiatives, petitions (bottom up flows)]. Parties’ internal operation: frameworks for a political ERP system. TRACK 4 Information access and integrity Analysis from a institution standpoint: ensure public access to sound information and protect fundamental freedoms in accordance with national legislation and international agreements. How people are informed about the work of organizations (including PA). Methods to finance political parties and campaigns; methods for countering corruption; how to address the self-propagation issue in the political class (i.e. people getting in power and then doing whatever it takes to stay there and/or get a private financial gain). Big data, fake news and democracy manipulation: after Cambridge Analytica. The scientific committee and the organizing committee are looking forward to meeting you in Venice! https://ifdad.org

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Reminder | 130° Mercoledì di Nexa | 10 Giugno 2020
by Nexa Media June 8, 2020

June 8, 2020

Gentilissimi, vi ricordiamo che mercoledì 10 giugno, dalle ore 18.00 alle ore 20.00, si svolgerà il 130° Mercoledì di Nexa, con un incontro dal titolo: *Potere computazionale. L'impatto delle ICT su diritto, società, sapere*. Ospiti: Prof.**/Massimo Durante //(Università di Torino e Fellow Centro Nexa)/ e///Prof. //Luciano Floridi//(University of Oxford)./ L'incontro si svolgerà in *modalità telematica*, utilizzando il software open source di conference call *Jitsi Meet*. Per chi vorrà partecipare live al seminario sarà quindi possibile accedere alla conference call attraverso il seguente link: https://meet.nexacenter.org/MercolediNexa Per chi non potrà partecipare alla conference call sarà possibile, come di consueto, seguire il seminario live via web sul canale YouTube del Centro Nexa all'indirizzo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ARoAw-7jYU Maggiori informazioni sull'incontro sono disponibili alla pagina: https://nexa.polito.it/mercoledi-130 Cordiali saluti,   -- Anita Botta Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino – DAUIN Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 - 10129 Torino _web:_ https://nexa.polito.it/ _mail:_anita.botta@polito.it <mailto:anita.botta@polito.it> tel: 011 090 7219

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Cloud act e sovranità dei dati
by Diego Giorio June 8, 2020

June 8, 2020

https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-… Buona settimana a tutti [https://d110erj175o600.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/daskal-.jpg]<https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-…> Tutta la verità sul Cloud Act, la legge che solleva timori sulla sovranità dei dati - CorCom<https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/digital-economy/cloud/tutta-la-verita-…> In un contributo esclusivo per CorCom, Jennifer Daskal, docente presso l'American University Washington College of Law spiega nel dettaglio ambiti di applicazioni e limiti della norma. "Non è ... www.corrierecomunicazioni.it

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Sono secoli che l'automazione bara
by Antonio Casilli June 8, 2020

June 8, 2020

Articolo davvero ben fatto (si tratta in realtà di un book review essay) di Edward Jones-Imhotep apparso nella rivista universitaria History and Technology. Attraverso un'analisi della "metafisica della agency" degli automi del XVIII secolo, riesce a dire cose molto interessanti sui pretesi exploits dell'IA contemporanea e sul miraggio del lights-out manufacturing (o fabbrica senza operai). The ghost factories: histories of automata and artificial life Edward Jones-Imhotep 20 May 2020 https://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07341512.2020.1757972 Cheers, --a -- Antonio A. Casilli Professor, Telecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris Member, Interdisciplinary Institute for Innovation (i3 UMR 9217 CNRS) Associate Member, LACI-IIAC (EHESS) Faculty Fellow, Nexa Center for Internet & Society *We respect your right to disconnect. This email send time is due to my own workflow efficiency. You are in no obligation to take action or reply to it outside your office hours.*

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Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully - about:intel
by Alberto Cammozzo June 7, 2020

June 7, 2020

Red herring, anche per Didier Bigo. <https://aboutintel.eu/covid-digital-tracking/> [...] Unity in the folly of technological solutionism Despite the diversity of situations in Europe — we have clearly seen structural differences in terms of public health and economic robustness — a kind of consensus has emerged. It revolves around a form of “technological solutionism” and presents digital tracing applications as a way to overcome all the problems this pandemic has tossed at us. In his book on the moral consequences of digital technologies, Morozov already brought to light this shared “folly” of technological solutionism. This is the belief that the digital supersedes the physical and that you can solve every problem with a click. In the field of security, ranging from sanitary emergencies to defence and police, a similar belief has emerged. I have previously shown this to be a product of a transnational guild of digital technology professionals involved in security matters and of their influence over power circles to manage border controls, security, and interoperability. As this group — which includes strategic communications and advertising companies — is involved at the highest level of government in different EU countries, its influence on managing the crisis ends up superseding the influence of health professionals. In the absence of a vaccine, they turned social acceptance of the confinement measures (and their rebranding of it) into something radically new. The priority communicated in the media seemed to be that the positive news of a digital solution should make up for the bad news of high death tolls, and so the countries worst hit by the pandemic were most keen on counterbalancing their poor performance with a brand-new and ever-so promising app. A collective belief that the internet, algorithms, and artificial intelligence will beat the virus Hundreds of proposals came from all over the world. The computer industry — from the most powerful players (GAFAM in the lead, but also industries involved in cyber defence) to young “start-ups” — is now promising to be able to track individuals. They propose to do so by identifying and geolocalising them, tracking the actions of their data, reconstructing their past activities on the net and elsewhere, and especially by associating these data with health profiles. This might suggest whether these individuals were, or are, sick (declared or not) and if they are in low- or high-risk areas as the virus spreads, even if in such models there is hardly any area free of risk. Following the spread of the virus will therefore be based on data from multiple web servers, centralised or not, through the use of mapping tools and linking the status of a specific person with their travel via a specific application — either with a smartphone or an autonomous Bluetooth card, as considered in New Zealand. Some applications envisage to also have real-time “flags” about the status of individuals who are obliged to move and have contact with the public. While some countries are (considering) making participation mandatory, most democracies are pursuing voluntary applications based on “privacy by design” to respect the GDPR and more generally the privacy rights of its citizens. But the fact that they therefore choose to anonymise the data collected is not proof that privacy will not be affected or that discrimination will not occur. Notice how quickly policymakers have officially accepted and launched media campaigns that the internet, algorithms, and artificial intelligence can block the advance of the virus. Maybe they think that even if the selected apps will not really work in practice, they might nevertheless assuage the critics of severe confinement and create some hope in the public that it will recover (parts of) its mobility. Costs of compliance and other hidden motives Unfortunately, this mobility is not a sign of freedom of movement enjoyed as a right. Rather it comes with the cost of compliance, including the cost of providing personal data and accepting surveillance measures for the greater good. Tracing applications do not contribute much to public health, however, if they are not combined with widespread testing. Instead, they can also be seen as a building block in the management of public opinion, as if participating in the (voluntary) application was de facto a poll in favour of the government and an acceptance of its emergency powers. A ‘bio-digital-surveillance’ has emerged from the Covid-19 outbreak as the only political ‘option’ ostensibly suited to relax confinement, even in democratic settings. But this political thinking has simultaneously created confusion about the functions of the digital apps and the medical strategies they are supposed to implement. Their purposes are multifold and not always oriented towards health. Some of these surveillance tools are tracing and localising sick individuals, while others are preventing them from moving without warning. Some are also designed beyond the scope of individual movement to trace personal encounters, with the possibility of demanding that a visit be paid to the hospital, police station, or town hall to register as potentially sick. Some of the apps also intend to identify via algorithms all possible unexpected encounters with a sick person (still without symptoms) and to transform these different encounters into cases of “suspicion”, without the cooperation of the individuals. This digital tracing is presented as a great innovation, but in fact it is everything but new. Its digitality certainly conveys the image of instantaneity and efficiency, but the logic at work is old. Since the cholera epidemics of the 19th century, contact tracing has been considered a better, more targeted, and therefore more democratic practice than generalised confinement. It emerged from the production of specific knowledge about virus ecology and replaced the types of plague confinements we had before. In 1854, John Snow — one of the founders of modern epidemiology — established a cartography to validate his hypothesis of the role of water in the spread of cholera. But to track the virus, yesterday like today, it is necessary to collect much more data on the individuals who are infected. What drives this grand digital strategy? The key factor in discerning between the blind confinement of all people in a given area, be they sick or not, and the selective confinement of sick individuals is the visibility of transmission and its mechanisms. This is what eliminates false correlations and enables areas to “reopen”, at least for healthy individuals. Data collection, mapping, and population tracing are only meaningful if they are followed by a systematic screening through tests that are applied to everyone and periodically renewed. Without this two-step strategy, of which the second is crucial, there is no point to develop the first. As I have pointed out in my book “Data Politics”, raw data do not exist. Instead, politicians construct how to collect and organise data and the data in turn construct policies on knowledge foundations that are being built up and based on differentiated premises (data politics). This is true also for health. Tracing apps do not directly oppose the free movement of individuals and are not based on their absolute confinement; they aim to create personal security belts around each circulating individual to avoid contamination. But they are a question of temporality as much as of space. If there is one characteristic of modern pandemics, it is that in the absence of a vaccine, it is now instead possible — thanks to the speed of digital technology and data networking — to know more or less in real time the “channels” of viral propagation. These can be correlated with modes of transmission, identifying risk populations in real time and thus avoiding bureaucratic slowness (as Google Flu did, but unsuccessfully so). In theory, this enables authorities to anticipate the spread so that medical infrastructure is there when it’s needed, or at least faster than before (although, in the case of the Ebola epidemic, big data was actually of no help at all). It is therefore not surprising that all states with tech industry capabilities are seeking to combine digital traceability with the imperatives of non-contamination in order to restore a degree of conditional freedom of movement. The freedom to work is deemed to be of particular importance in that regard, in order to limit the economic effects of containment. It can also be argued that the focus on the digital is all the more emphasised since the resilience of the hospital sector has previously been so weakened by austerity policies (a card France and the UK seem to be playing). The focus on the digital becomes a “mask” for past failures and risks being a pure simulation policy if digital tracing is not linked to a generalised testing policy. This is because digital data are not capable of detecting anything if they are not accompanied by concrete and widespread measures, such as the test booths used in South Korea. Urgent need for a citizen design protocol to prevent a control society As Dominique Boullier has forcefully pointed out in his comparison of the citizen-centred design in different applications: What is crucial to understand is that digital applications are therefore not a solution to the pandemic in and of themselves, but rather need to be connected with a health strategy of testing and a citizen-oriented design. If not, the applications may create a whole series of additional problems in addition to the lack of free movement by depriving citizens of other liberties, as well as by contributing to the progressive installation (by ratchet effect) of a control society that jeopardises privacy and fundamental rights by default. That is why it must be stressed that current proposals for tracing applications must in no way be judged on their technical performances (including privacy design only). They must be judged by following a “citizen design” protocol, which in this case must start from a genuine clinical definition of health objectives. If we are not careful, Covid-19 applications could become routine surveillance measures for the purpose of overseeing compliance with the rules, including progressive deconfinement of a part of the population, as well as punishment for patients who do not declare themselves. This would be a most successfully failed ultra-solution in the sense that Watzlawick has proposed. In this case, these ultra-solutions would add mass surveillance of populations and discrimination to the suppression of individual freedom of movement. Conclusions Those countries which were least prepared for the pandemic have sought the most refuge in digital techno-solutionism, trying to divert attention from the catastrophe they failed to prevent. Tracing applications have also become quite popular in countries which hope to step up their digital sovereignty by propping up their own technological industry. Strategic communications companies have instrumentalised these sentiments in order to help governments convince the public to participate in the collection of their health data in the name of national health. To slow the pace of, or to prevent, a control society, it would be necessary to at least create strong sunset clauses and oversight mechanisms for the entire process, with the possibility to stop the collection of data after the emergency. We must order the destruction of sensitive data that are stored during the pandemic and refuse that the process is repurposed for other reasons. The laws and decrees which are legitimating these applications certainly have to rely on existing oversight mechanisms: data protection, ethics guidelines, sanitary codes, and/or ombudspersons. This is badly needed to avoid having only ad hoc technical oversight. The various governments genuinely ready to pursue a citizen-centred design and to safeguard privacy must also enhance the collaboration between these oversight structures and reinforce their powers, including, for example, sanctions against data brokers should they be using these data for commercial interests. Therefore, what matters in the long-term is which digital platforms will manage the applications after the pandemic has been brought under medical control, which public-private assemblages will have consolidated their power and profits, and which uses of health data will continue after the crisis. There is every reason to believe that the implementation of applications whose data are certainly anonymised during the process, but are later sent to interoperable systems, will finally connect the health data of individuals with police and border-crossing data identification systems. This is likely to integrate different spaces, from the most local (municipalities) to the transnational spaces of the global North (airports, train stations, etc.). This dystopian scenario needs to be rejected without ambiguity by organising a reinforcement of human rights legislation both internally and at the EU level. De-anonymisation mechanisms through cross-referencing of data are increasingly effective, and data brokerage companies have shown that they can already know our private information and personal thoughts without necessarily needing our name (Cambridge Analytica). If sensitive health data is circulating and is a source of profit, then it is likely that the routine use of such applications for surveillance purposes, and the dependence of free movement on authorisation, is a serious risk for democratic societies as a whole. In Europe, it will be difficult to find national solutions to limit the power of the transnational guild of digital technology professionals. Our greatest hope may come from listening seriously to the warnings of constitutional and human rights lawyers, as well as pushing the European courts via strong civic mobilisation to have their say in this debate. After all, it concerns the very core of our democratic societies. [...]

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COMMUNIA Copyright Directive Webinars
by Federico Leva (Nemo) June 7, 2020

June 7, 2020

Penso che questo possa interessare a molti da queste parti. Secondo me è particolarmente utile per quei "copyright geek" che hanno seguito la direttiva copyright ma non hanno avuto tempo di (ri)leggere tutto il testo della direttiva e le migliaia di pagine di studi connessi. Iscrivetevi: <https://centrumcyfrowe.pl/en/communia-copyright-directive-webinars/> Ricordo che abbiamo anche una sintesi della situazione in Italia: https://www.notion.so/Italy-ef314e69e7ef42d1893efe5ef0ee39f8 Federico -------- Messaggio inoltrato -------- Oggetto: [Implementation] COMMUNIA Copyright Directive Webinars Dear All, The process of implementation of the new Copyright Directive is speeding up in various countries (see our Implementation Tracker <https://www.notion.so/communia/DSM-Directive-Implementation-Tracker-361cfae…>). Therefore, COMMUNIA has decided to organize a series of webinars aimed at explaining the different provisions of the new Copyright Directive and making suggestions on what to advocate for during the implementation process of those provisions at the national level, to expand and strengthen user rights. The Copyright Directive Webinars are aimed at local advocates and national policymakers and will be conducted by COMMUNIA members and experts that were involved in preparing our Implementation Guidelines <https://www.notion.so/DSM-Directive-Implementation-Guidelines-45233be9c0e14…> . We will hold four webinars of one hour each, as follows: 16/06 (Tuesday) – Press Publishers’ Right (Art. 15): Dimitar Dimitrov 17/06 (Wednesday) – Text and Data Mining and Education Exceptions (Arts. 3-5): Benjamin White and Teresa Nobre 23/06 (Tuesday) – Use of Content by Online Platforms (Art. 17): Teresa Nobre and Paul Keller 24/06 (Wednesday) – Cultural Heritage Provisions (Arts. 6, 8-11, 14): Stephen Wyber, Ariadna Matas and Paul Keller *All webinars will take place from 10.00am to 11.00am CET. You can register for the webinars of your choice here <https://centrumcyfrowe.pl/en/communia-copyright-directive-webinars/>. Remember to register for the seminar up to 24 hours before it starts. We have a limit of 30 participants at each seminar, so please don’t register if you don’t plan to show up. The access info will be shared with those who signed up.* Have a nice day, Natalia Mileszyk Centrum Cyfrowe

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