May 2020 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

call for papers - HELMeTO-2020, un workshop internazionale per la didattica universitaria telematica
by don Luca Peyron May 16, 2020

May 16, 2020

Il 17 e 18 settembre 2020 si terrà il II workshop HELMeTO – International Workshop on Higher Education Learning Methodologies and Technologies Online – focalizzato su metodologie e tecnologie per la didattica a distanza (DAD) presso l’Università degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro alla presenza di Keynote Talk internazionali . La deadline per l’invio dell’abstract è il 31 maggio 2020 Per chi fosse interessato. Buon lavoro dl https://www.cremit.it/helmeto-2020-workshop-internazionale-didattica-telema… _________________________ www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

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Finding the ‘Common Good’ in a Pandemic
by don Luca Peyron May 16, 2020

May 16, 2020

Buongiorno a tutti, mi pare non sia ancora passato in lista. Buona lettura dl https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/opinion/covid-ethics-politics.html _________________________ www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

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OpenSAFELY - A new way to study medical records
by Giovanni Biscuolo May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

Roberto Dolci <rob.dolci(a)aizoon.us> writes: > Ed anche Looking without looking > https://www.economist.com/node/21786103?frsc=dg%7Ce perche’ il tema > dell’accesso ai dati necessari per gli studi epidemiologici e’ caldo Molto interessante, grazie! --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Instead, its coders wrote software which let them perform their analysis within that data centre. Even then, Dr Goldacre’s crew were not given free rein to poke around inside TPP’s systems. Instead they wrote a series of programs which let them interrogate the patient records through a secure connection. A log was also kept of all queries that the group ran on the records—thus the watchers were themselves watched. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Pare sia proprio vero, da https://opensafely.org/: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- Security All data that carries any privacy risk (even a theoretical risk, and even when pseudonymised) remains within the secure data centre of the electronic health record vendor, where it already resides. This also means that all activity is logged for independent review. All processing takes place in the same secure data centre, where the patients’ electronic records were already stored. The only information to ever leave the data centre is summary tables (with low numbers suppressed) from statistical models. Within the data centre, all pseudonymised data is stored in a tiered system of increasingly less disclosive data stores tailored to each analysis. All underlying software and research code is open to review for security profiling, scientific evaluation, and to re-use as open source tools improving science across the community. Overall this approach is therefore highly secure, and supports high quality science: in contrast to working on intermittent “data extracts”, our approach also ensures that the statistical models run across up-to-date records, which is vital during a global health emergency. Further details on security and governance are given below. [...] The UK, with the NHS, is the only country on the planet with the scale of data needed to deliver these analyses. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Pero, però.... il codice è qui e ho dato una rapida occhiata: https://github.com/ebmdatalab/opensafely-risk-factors-research Licenza... non pervenuta (per come è pubblicato ora _tutto_ è "All rights reserved" [1]), per ora c'è scritto: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- All the software is Open Source; however, it's recently come to our attention the code may include some commercial IP, so we have temporarily removed it from Github until we address that. We expect the code to be published again in during the week commencing 18 May. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- La ricerca è implementata per mezzo di Jupiter Notebook [2], i requisiti per eseguire i notebook sono MS SQL Server (probabilmente usato come database intermedio, compartimentato) e Stata. In altre parole il codice sarà anche open source (una volra risolta la questione indicata nel README e citata sopra) ma il sistema di build, quello per "complilare" il codice, non è affatto libero. Sostituire il requisito di MS SQL Server probabilmente è banale ma tutto il codice Stata andrebbe riscritto in R; non sono un esperto di Stata ma mi pare che nemmeno https://github.com/lbraglia/RStata risolva il problema. Non mi pare proprio il massimo degli esempi di Open Source, insomma :-) ...meglio di niente ma siccome non sono gli ultimi arrivati mi sarei aspettato uno sforzino in più. Diciamo che quantomeno il protocollo adottato dal progetto conferma che «si può fare!». Grazie, Giovanni. [1] scrivere nel README "è open source" non vale come licenza [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Jupyter#Jupyter_Notebook -- Giovanni Biscuolo

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Economist: "Don’t rely on contact-tracing apps"
by J.C. DE MARTIN May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

Don’t rely on contact-tracing apps /Governments are pinning their hopes on a technology that could prove ineffective—and dangerous/ https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/05/16/dont-rely-on-contact-tracing-a…

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Valutazione e comparazione di software open source per le Pubbliche Amministrazioni.
by Angelo Raffaele Meo May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

carissimi, ho assistito ieri , nell'ambito dei "Mercoledì di Nexa", alla presentazione del documento citato in oggetto. Sulla base dell'esperienza pregressa manifesto la mia perplessità per le seguenti ragioni: 1. Il documento ha il titolo sopracitato, ma perchè si parla anche di software proprietario? Perchè uno dei parametri di valutazione riguarda "il numero di dipendenze dal software proprietario"? 2. Uno dei criteri di scelta è il TCO (Total Cost of Ownership"), famigerata invenzione dei tempi in cui presiedevo la Commissione Stanca. A mio giudizio, quello è un concetto truffaldino, perchè dal punto di vista dell'economia del nostro Paese non è la stessa cosa spendere denaro per licenze - perdita secca sulla bilancia commerciale - e spendere soldi per l'assistenza tecnica - un vero e proprio investimento. Io temo che il documento venga in futuro adottato come "relazione comparativa" fra software libero e proprietario per giustificare scelte a favore di questo ultimo. Pertanto il proporrei due enendamenti: 1. Mai parlare di software proprietario. 2. Mai parlare di TCO. Scusate il mio fanatismo. Raf

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Restaurant worker uses Auckland woman's contact tracing details to hit on her
by Davide Brunello May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

Dear all, non-technical example of contract tracking apps misuses/vulnerabilities? https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2020/05/auckland-woman-creeped-o… Thanks Davide

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la soluzione tedesca al tracciamento digitale dei contatti
by Enrico Nardelli May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

è descritta qua https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation e un confronto molto preliminare con la soluzione inglese https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52650576 -- EN ===================================================================== Prof. Enrico Nardelli Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli(a)mat.uniroma2.it home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ ===================================================================== --

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😱 Legge francese contro l’odio online (grazie a Guido Scorza per la segnalazione mi era sfuggita)
by Anna Masera May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/05/13/la-loi-contre-la-haine-sur… https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/05/14/odio-online-per-contrastarlo-la…

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COVID-19, le ricerche scientifiche viaggiano a una velocità pericolosa con il rischio di alimentare disinformazione e complotti
by don Luca Peyron May 15, 2020

May 15, 2020

Un pezzo riccamente documentato che mi pare metta in evidenza rischi reali. Buon lettura e buona giornata dl https://www.valigiablu.it/covid-19-giornalismo-ricerca-scienza-disinformazi… _________________________ www.universitari.to.it via XX settembre 83, Torino tel. 011 5156239

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Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much | MIT Technology Review
by Alberto Cammozzo May 14, 2020

May 14, 2020

<https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/11/1001541/iceland-rakning-c19-cov…> When Iceland got its first case of covid-19 on February 28, an entire apparatus sprang into action. The country had already been testing some people at high risk of catching the virus, thanks to DeCode genetics, a local biotech company. Once the arrival of the disease was confirmed, it began rapidly rolling out public testing on a much wider scale. The government, meanwhile, quickly built a team of contact tracers to interview those with a positive diagnosis and track down people they’d been in contact with. Within a few weeks, Icelanders had another high-tech tool at their disposal, too: a government-backed automated tracing app. Related Story A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. There's a deluge of apps that detect your covid-19 exposure, often with little transparency. Our Covid Tracing Tracker project will document them. Rakning C-19, which launched in early April, was hailed as a way to “make the tracing of transmissions easier” at the time. It tracks users’ GPS data to compile a record of where they have been, allowing investigators—with permission—to look at whether those with a positive diagnosis are potentially spreading the disease. And it gained traction quickly: according to MIT Technology Review’s Covid Tracing Tracker, it has the largest penetration rate of all contact trackers in the world, having been downloaded by 38% of Iceland’s population of 364,000. But despite this early deployment and widespread use, one senior figure in the country’s covid-19 response says the real impact of Rakning C-19 has been small, compared with manual tracing techniques like phone calls. “The technology is more or less … I wouldn’t say useless,” says Gestur Pálmason, a detective inspector with the Icelandic Police Service who is overseeing contact tracing efforts. “But it’s the integration of the two that gives you results. I would say it [Rakning] has proven useful in a few cases, but it wasn’t a game changer for us.” Technological limits Pálmason joined the covid tracing team 10 days after the first registered incident, when the country’s case numbers were in the 60s. He says there have been instances where the data was useful, but that the impact of automated tracing has been exaggerated by people eager to find technological solutions to the pandemic. “It's understandable, because an app is stuff that you can buy,” he says. “But I make it super clear to everyone that manual tracing is no less important.” That perspective should be cautionary for other countries currently working on their own automated contact tracing services. Many other governments are still in the early stages with their own standalone apps, or are building services based on the as-yet-unreleased technology being developed by Apple and Google. Many are hopeful that the vast reach of these Silicon Valley giants will overcome some of the social and technical hurdles faced by tracing apps. But if a small, socially- cohesive, and geographically isolated nation like Iceland can only achieve 38% penetration, that could suggest that efforts in other countries will struggle to get the level of adoption required. Other factors Still, Iceland has managed to flatten its coronavirus curve and keep its outbreaks largely under control. Today it has had just over 1,800 confirmed cases and 10 deaths. Case numbers have remained more or less static for several weeks, and the last confirmed covid-19 death was on April 19. Related Story India is forcing people to use its covid app, unlike any other democracy Millions of Indians have no choice but to download the country’s tracking technology if they want to keep their jobs or avoid reprisals. This is all despite the fact that the country has not enacted many of the more drastic social policies seen elsewhere—an approach that has lead to some criticism. While movement has been curtailed and there have been restrictions on the size of gatherings, primary schools and even some restaurants have remained open, using a mixture of social distancing and a “bubble” strategy where classes and workplaces are divided into discrete units that do not interact with each other. [...]

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