February 2019 - nexa - server-nexa.polito.it

Shoshana Zuboff Explains the Age of Surveillance Capitalism
by J.C. DE MARTIN Feb. 2, 2019

Feb. 2, 2019

https://theintercept.com/2019/02/02/shoshana-zuboff-age-of-surveillance-cap… (Sent from my wireless device; please excuse brevity and typos (if any))

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Seminario di discussione su “The Game” di Alessandro Baricco | 1 febbraio 2019
by Francesco Ruggiero Feb. 2, 2019

Feb. 2, 2019

Carissimi, scrivo per segnalarvi il seminario interno di Nexa che avrà luogo il *1** febbraio 2019 *dalle ore 16.00 alle ore 20.00 e che sarà condotto da *Enrico Donaggio.* Titolo: *Tra grande narrazione e storytelling: raccontare la rivoluzione digitale.* *Seminario di discussione su “The Game” di Alessandro Baricco, Einaudi Editore.* "Quella che stiamo vivendo non è solo una rivoluzione tecnologica fatta di nuovi oggetti, ma il risultato di un'insurrezione mentale. Chi l'ha innescata - dai pionieri di Internet all'inventore dell'iPhone - non aveva in mente un progetto preciso se non questo, affascinante e selvaggio: rendere impossibile la ripetizione di una tragedia come quella del Novecento. Niente più confini, niente più élite, niente più caste sacerdotali, politiche, intellettuali. Uno dei concetti più cari all'uomo analogico, la verità, diventa improvvisamente sfocato, mobile, instabile. I problemi sono tradotti in partite da vincere in un gioco per adulti-bambini. Perché questo è The Game." Grazie e buona giornata, Francesco -- Francesco Ruggiero Communication Manager Nexa Center for Internet & Society Politecnico di Torino - DAUIN Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 24 - 10129 Torino web: http://nexa.polito.it mail: francesco.ruggiero(a)polito.it tel: 011 090 7219

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Everything you need to know about Facebook, Google’s app scandal | TechCrunch
by Alberto Cammozzo Feb. 2, 2019

Feb. 2, 2019

<https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/01/facebook-google-scandal/> Facebook and Google landed in hot water with Apple this week after two investigations by TechCrunch revealed the misuse of internal-only certificates — leading to their revocation, which led to a day of downtime at the two tech giants. Confused about what happened? Here’s everything you need to know. How did all this start, and what happened? On Monday, we revealed that Facebook was misusing an Apple-issued enterprise certificate that is only meant for companies to use to distribute internal, employee-only apps without having to go through the Apple App Store. But the social media giant used that certificate to sign an app that Facebook distributed outside the company, violating Apple’s rules. The app, known simply as “Research,” allowed Facebook unparalleled access to all of the data flowing out of a device. This included access to some of the users’ most sensitive network data. Facebook paid users — including teenagers — $20 per month to install the app. But it wasn’t clear exactly what kind of data was being vacuumed up, or for what reason. It turns out that the app was a repackaged app that was effectively banned from Apple’s App Store last year for collecting too much data on users. Apple was angry that Facebook was misusing its special-issue enterprise certificates to push an app it already banned, and revoked it — rendering the app unable to open. But Facebook was using that same certificate to sign its other employee-only apps, effectively knocking them offline until Apple re-issued the certificate. Then, it turned out Google was doing almost exactly the same thing with its Screenwise app, and Apple’s ban-hammer fell again. [...] Because Facebook’s Research and Google’s Screenwise apps were distributed outside of Apple’s App Store, it required users to manually install the app — known as sideloading. That requires users to go through a convoluted few steps of downloading the app itself, and opening and trusting either Facebook or Google’s enterprise developer code-signing certificate, which is what allows the app to run. Both companies required users after the app installed to agree to an additional configuration step — known as a VPN configuration profile — allowing all of the data flowing out of that user’s phone to funnel down a special tunnel that directs it all to either Facebook or Google, depending on which app you installed. This is where the Facebook and Google cases differ. Google’s app collected data and sent it off to Google for research purposes, but couldn’t access encrypted data — such as the content of any network traffic protected by HTTPS, as most apps in the App Store and internet websites are. Facebook, however, went far further. Its users were asked to go through an additional step to trust an additional type of certificate at the “root” level of the phone. Trusting this Facebook Research root certificate authority allowed the social media giant to look at all of the encrypted traffic flowing out of the device — essentially what we call a “man-in-the-middle” attack. That allowed Facebook to sift through your messages, your emails and any other bit of data that leaves your phone. Only apps that use certificate pinning — which reject any certificate that isn’t its own — were protected, such as iMessage, Signal and additionally any other end-to-end encrypted solutions. [...]

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ancora sulla app network root (per teenager e no) di FB e GOOGL?
by gabriele elia Feb. 1, 2019

Feb. 1, 2019

https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/01/facebook-google-scandal/ interessante ...

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"Internet Economics is a Thing and we Need to Take Note"
by J.C. DE MARTIN Feb. 1, 2019

Feb. 1, 2019

Internet Economics is a Thing and we Need to Take Note Geoff Huston <https://labs.ripe.net/Members/gih> — 20 Dec 2018 / /// /In this article I talk about consolidation, the fact that more and more data traffic goes ‘dark’ and the importance of open measurement platforms and open data sets. We need public measurements that are impartial, accurate, comprehensive and of course unbiased as an essential precondition for the fair and effective operation of markets./ [...] continua qui: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/gih/internet-economics-is-a-thing-and-we-need…

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Re: [nexa] Valore legale della blockchain e smart contract: primo, via libera al Senato
by Giuseppe Attardi Feb. 1, 2019

Feb. 1, 2019

Sarà interessante capire come farà l'AgID a normare con degli standard un meccanismo che vuol essere per definizione incontrollabile: "l’Agenzia per l’Italia digitale (Agid) entro 90 giorni individuerà gli standard tecnici che i documenti informatici gestiti in questo modo devono rispettare affinché abbiano valore giuridico effettivo." Per esempio, come si garantisce che la blockchain esisterà tra cento/duecento anni? Se mi faccio una blockchain tra i miei amici, avrà valore giuridico? Come si garantisce che non ci sia una maggioranza di miners in grado di controllare la blockchain? Non basterebbe un servizio gestito da un'autorità pubblica, che si presume trusted in quanto sotto controllo pubblico, dove depositare i documenti firmati con firma elettronica? Non essendo un esperto, ne ho parlato con un professore che è considerato tra i maggiori esperti in Italia, ma la sua risposta non mi ha convinto. Mi parlava del caso di una banca che vorrebbe usare la blockchain per garantirsi rispetto ai clienti che impugnano i contratti dopo averli firmati. Ma del perché tra una banca e un cliente non ci debba essere fiducia, ha detto che "è così". Ci vuole pur sempre un notaio per verificare che i documenti firmati corrispondano alla volontà di chi li sottoscrive. "Blockchain technology helps to establish date, time and place of origin and prevents tampering with an electronic document during delivery from the source to destination. A notary public is not involved with document delivery. A notary verifies the ID of the document signer to prevent fraud, and checks for awareness and volition. A notary is also authorized to take the sworn statement of a witness under oath or affirmation. Blockchain software cannot issue or attach a government-approved notarial certificate to a document. Only a human notary can do that." Sono grato a chiunque mi aiuti a capire. Grazie -- Beppe On 1/30/2019 12:00, nexa-request(a)server-nexa.polito.it wrote: > "Primo via libera alla norma – come emendamento al decreto > Semplificazioni, > ora al Senato – che inserisce per la prima volta nel nostro ordinamento le > “tecnologie basate su registri distribuiti come la Blockchain” e una > definizione di smart contract. Il primo aspetto è “la possibilità di dare > un valore giuridico a una transazione che sfrutti un registro elettronico > distribuito e informatizzato, senza passare da notai o enti certificatori > centrali”, spiega Fulvio Sarzana, avvocato e membro del team degli esperti > blockchain avviato dal ministero dello Sviluppo economico. > «La norma sullo smart contract invece dà a un contratto eseguito in > automatico da un programma informatico il valore giuridico di un contratto > normale, scritto e firmato», aggiunge Sarzana." > > https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tecnologie/2019-01-23/valore-legale-blockch… > > > -- Guido Guido Noto La Diega, PhD FHEA Senior Lecturer / European > Research Partnerships Coordinator @ Northumbria Law School Director > @italiot | Fellow @nexacenter | Co-convenor @NINSOrig | Co-founder > @DPA2018 Northumbria Law School City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne > NE1 8ST noto.la.diega(a)gmail.com +44(0)191 349 5562 You can access my > papers on Academia.edu > <http://northumbria.academia.edu/GuidoNotoLaDiega> and on the Social > Science Research Network (SSRN > <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1794950>)

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WIRED: San Francisco Could Be First to Ban Facial Recognition Tech
by Alberto Cammozzo Feb. 1, 2019

Feb. 1, 2019

<https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-could-be-first-ban-facial-recogni…> If a local tech industry critic has his way, San Francisco could become the first US city to ban its agencies from using facial recognition technology. Aaron Peskin, a member of the city’s Board of Supervisors, proposed the ban Tuesday as part of a suite of rules to enhance surveillance oversight. In addition to the ban on facial recognition technology, the ordinance would require city agencies to gain the board’s approval before buying new surveillance technology, putting the burden on city agencies to publicly explain why they want the tools as well as the potential harms. It would also require an audit of any existing surveillance tech—things like gunshot-detection systems, surveillance cameras, or automatic license plate readers—in use by the city; officials would have to report annually on how the technology was used, community complaints, and with whom they share the data. Those rules would follow similar ordinances passed in nearby Oakland and Santa Clara County. But with facial recognition, Peskin argues an outright ban makes more sense than regulating its use. “I have yet to be persuaded that there is any beneficial use of this technology that outweighs the potential for government actors to use it for coercive and oppressive ends,” he says. [...]

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