Gli USA e la Germania stanno ponendosi seriamente il problema della digital sovereignity. Un thread interessante si sta sviluppando su internetpolicy@elists.isoc.org, di cui riporto due interventi. Here is an analysis of the USA's refusal to allow Alipay (a Chinese company) to acquire Moneygram: https://www.internetgovernance.org/2018/01/05/cfius-blocks-deal-u-s-becoming... A quote from paper on "Digitalisation and developing countries: A review of the business and policy landscape" written by Jeet Parminder for the Commonwealth Secretariat. Here is a draft of the soon to be published paper: http://www.itforchange.net/sites/default/files/1468/digital_industrialisatio... But the EU has begun to face tough choices on continuing with such a lassez faire approach to digital economy. Following a national controversy on takeover of a German robotics firm by a Chinese company, Germany has instituted new rules to block such takeovers if they go against country's strategic interest.[1] “The enterprises that might raise German public order or security concerns are dealing with critical infrastructure, especially software in the fields of telecommunication, cloud-computing, energy and water, finance and insurance, healthcare, transport and food industry.”[2] In a sign of the emerging internal contradictions in the Northern digital economy approach, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) responded to these new rules by asserting that it “rejects a law on foreign trade that increasingly blocks investments”.[3] Taking a cue from Germany, a similar regulation is being considered at the EU level. Quoting from a Reuters article: The proposal could give the EU — which can already block takeovers on antitrust grounds — power to scrutinize “investments in the EU of strategic importance both from an economic and security perspective”. That would include defence, transport infrastructure and critical and cutting-edge technologies and could be extended to deals that put at risk a vaguely defined ‘economic prosperity’, according to the proposal from the European Commission’s industry department seen by Reuters. The paper makes several references to China, citing, as one hypothetical example of an undesirable deal, a company receiving funds from the Chinese government to enable it to buy a European company to make a “strategic penetration of the EU market”.[4] Intelligence infrastructures (involving data and digital intelligence) in all key sectors could soon face similar scrutiny, because they are evidently the most critical elements or layers for all sectors, exercising a ‘brain-like’ controlling influence on them. Capturing the critical data and digital intelligence layer of every sector is the central business model of sectoral-platform owning corporations. The phrase ‘strategic penetration of the market’ perfectly fits this business model. Going by the EU rules under discussion, in the future domestic protections against marketplace/platform owning foreign companies cannot be ruled out. References [1] Reuters. (July 2017). ‘China worried over Germany’s new takeover rules’, The National. Retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/…/china-worried-over-germany-s-n… [2] Beiten Burkhardt. ‘Germany tightens its rules on foreign corporation acquisitions and proposes an EU regulation’, Lexology. Retrieved from https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx… [3] Pamela Barbaglia, Rene Wagner and Arno Schuetze. (July 2017). ‘Update 3 - Germany sets EU tone with tighter curbs on foreign takeovers’, CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/…/reuters-america-update-3-germany-set… 4 Francesco Guarascio. (March 2017). ‘EU plans measures to block foreign takeovers of strategic firms’, Reuters. Retreived from https://www.reuters.com/…/eu-plans-measures-to-block-foreig… 5 China has been careful to avoid getting into platform owning businesses in the EU and the US, where it has focused on high tech business acquisitions. It now faces regulatory opposition in this regard. Were it to get into platform business, the clamour and opposition are only going to be much greater.
Grazie Beppe- argomento "caldo" A. 2018-01-08 13:24 GMT+01:00 Giuseppe Attardi <attardi@di.unipi.it>:
Gli USA e la Germania stanno ponendosi seriamente il problema della digital sovereignity. Un thread interessante si sta sviluppando su internetpolicy@elists.isoc.org, di cui riporto due interventi.
Here is an analysis of the USA's refusal to allow Alipay (a Chinese company) to acquire Moneygram:
https://www.internetgovernance.org/2018/ 01/05/cfius-blocks-deal-u-s-becoming-chinese/
A quote from paper on "Digitalisation and developing countries: A review of the business and policy landscape" written by Jeet Parminder for the Commonwealth Secretariat. Here is a draft of the soon to be published paper: http://www.itforchange.net/sites/default/files/1468/ digital_industrialisation_in_developing_countries.pdf
But the EU has begun to face tough choices on continuing with such a lassez faire approach to digital economy. Following a national controversy on takeover of a German robotics firm by a Chinese company, Germany has instituted new rules to block such takeovers if they go against country's strategic interest.[1] “The enterprises that might raise German public order or security concerns are dealing with critical infrastructure, especially software in the fields of telecommunication, cloud-computing, energy and water, finance and insurance, healthcare, transport and food industry.”[2] In a sign of the emerging internal contradictions in the Northern digital economy approach, the Federation of German Industries (BDI) responded to these new rules by asserting that it “rejects a law on foreign trade that increasingly blocks investments”.[3] Taking a cue from Germany, a similar regulation is being considered at the EU level. Quoting from a Reuters article:
The proposal could give the EU — which can already block takeovers on antitrust grounds — power to scrutinize “investments in the EU of strategic importance both from an economic and security perspective”. That would include defence, transport infrastructure and critical and cutting-edge technologies and could be extended to deals that put at risk a vaguely defined ‘economic prosperity’, according to the proposal from the European Commission’s industry department seen by Reuters. The paper makes several references to China, citing, as one hypothetical example of an undesirable deal, a company receiving funds from the Chinese government to enable it to buy a European company to make a “strategic penetration of the EU market”.[4]
Intelligence infrastructures (involving data and digital intelligence) in all key sectors could soon face similar scrutiny, because they are evidently the most critical elements or layers for all sectors, exercising a ‘brain-like’ controlling influence on them. Capturing the critical data and digital intelligence layer of every sector is the central business model of sectoral-platform owning corporations. The phrase ‘strategic penetration of the market’ perfectly fits this business model. Going by the EU rules under discussion, in the future domestic protections against marketplace/platform owning foreign companies cannot be ruled out.
References [1] Reuters. (July 2017). ‘China worried over Germany’s new takeover rules’, The National. Retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/…/ china-worried-over-germany-s-n… [2] Beiten Burkhardt. ‘Germany tightens its rules on foreign corporation acquisitions and proposes an EU regulation’, Lexology. Retrieved from https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx… [3] Pamela Barbaglia, Rene Wagner and Arno Schuetze. (July 2017). ‘Update 3 - Germany sets EU tone with tighter curbs on foreign takeovers’, CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/…/reuters-america-update-3- germany-set… 4 Francesco Guarascio. (March 2017). ‘EU plans measures to block foreign takeovers of strategic firms’, Reuters. Retreived from https://www.reuters.com/…/eu-plans-measures-to-block-foreig… 5 China has been careful to avoid getting into platform owning businesses in the EU and the US, where it has focused on high tech business acquisitions. It now faces regulatory opposition in this regard. Were it to get into platform business, the clamour and opposition are only going to be much greater.
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A Dicorinto -
Giuseppe Attardi