"Artificial Intelligence in the Hands of the People: The Rongjiang Experiment"
*Artificial Intelligence in the Hands of the People: The Rongjiang Experiment * /Rongjiang, once one of China’s poorest counties, is turning smartphones, mass training, and collective organisation into a people-centred experiment in artificial intelligence./ 4 September 2026 A small county folded into the mountains of south-west Guizhou, Rongjiang was among the last counties in China to be lifted <http://sjt.guizhou.gov.cn/xwzx/tzgg/202011/t20201125_68082574.html> out of extreme poverty, crossing the line only on 23 November 2020, and as late as 2022 its per-capita output <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmzk/html/2024-05/20/content_26059086.htm> stood at about a third of the national average. ‘Eight parts mountain, one part water, one part field’ is how an old upland saying counted the land in Guizhou — the only province in China without a plain. Its valleys are terraced and narrow, its villages strung along the rivers and ridgelines beneath Moon Mountain. There was never much land here to produce wealth, and no easy road to carry the little produce out. The Red Army crossed these mountains in 1934, on the march that would take it north. Football arrived a decade later, brought <https://www.gxu.edu.cn/info/1004/38867.htm> by students of Guangxi University, evacuated to Rongjiang to escape Japanese aggression. Villagers have organised their own matches nearly every year in the eight decades since. In May 2023, that tradition found a new expression in /Cun Chao/, the Village Super League: a competition organised by villagers, played by villagers, and watched by villagers. Within weeks of its launch, the stadium’s stands were filled to the brim, and footage carried by the short-video platforms drew the eyes of the whole country and then of the world. None of it ran itself. Packing a stadium every weekend, keeping order, feeding the broadcast — all of that took an organisational capacity the county had not required before. This organisational capacity became an engine for real economic outcomes. Tourism revenue rose <https://lac.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1260/1935.htm> from 8.4 billion yuan in 2023 to 10.8 billion in 2024, and the county’s gross domestic product reached 10.496 billion yuan in 2024, a rise of 9.5 per cent. The league brought <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmzk/html/2024-05/20/content_26059086.htm> more than 2,700 new market entities into being, over thirty per cent of the whole prefecture’s new total, and village collective income climbed <https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202508/12/WS689b2077a3104ba1353fc802.html> from 58.9 million yuan in 2022 to 121 million in 2024. It also opened a door to something else entirely. Since 2023 the county has set itself a less likely task: to put artificial intelligence (AI) into the hands of the villagers. It has built no large language model, no data centre, and no semiconductor plant. What it has built instead is its own people, organised across government offices, villages, and enterprises, so that residents who had never written a line of code, among them elderly farmers and village cadres, now use AI in their everyday work. [...] continua qui: https://thetricontinental.org/artificial-intelligence-in-the-hands-of-the-pe...
Artificial Intelligence in the Hands of the People: The Rongjiang Experiment ... https://thetricontinental.org/artificial-intelligence-in-the-hands-of-the-pe...
Grazie JC, di questi articoli ne escono pochi. Di articoli, cioè, che tentano di "raccontare" (termine, ahimé, fin troppo abusato) esperienze concrete e positive (popolari?) dell'utilizzo AI. Che siano in Cina o altre parti del mondo cambia, certo, ma non molto quando si tratta di comunità locali. Da un resoconto così lungo mi sarei però aspettato un'attenzione maggiore verso i "numeri". Ad esempio, mi sarebbe piaciuto sapere come sia stato impiegato l'enorme tempo risparmiato dai "funzionari" o almeno, come sia stato quantificato. "When a match is on, they film it and upload the footage, and the system writes the captions and edits it into a finished clip, ready in under half an hour" "The county reports that a cadre who once spent half a day on a draft now finishes in half an hour" "in the first two and a half months ... cadres saved roughly two working days each" Mmmmmh, allora, facciamo un po' i conti. Mezza giornata di lavoro di un funzionario cinese è all'incirca 4 ore. Con l'AI ha impiegato mezz'ora, quindi ha risparmiato l'88% del suo tempo. Poi però dice che in due mesi e mezzo, mettiamo 50 giorni lavorativi, i funzionari hanno risparmiato due giorni di lavoro a testa, siamo al 4%, c'è una bella differenza. Sembrano conti campati in aria (e di cifre campate in aria, di questi tempi, ne circolano parecchie, tipo il "10% di sterminare l'umanità in 10 anni") ma, nella realtà di tutti i giorni, sono discorsi che si fanno in ogni ambiente di lavoro. Con l'AI si risparmia davvero tempo? I danni prodotti (perché è inutile girarci attorno, questi sistemi danneggiano un po' tutti, persone, ambiente, ecc.) sono davvero giustificati dall'iperproduttività, sempre ammesso che questa sia l'aspirazione dell'intera umanità? Ora i caporioni delle bigtech vogliono mettere un freno, perché al destino dell'umanità loro sì che ci tengono. Ovviamente non credo una parola a quello che dicono [1]. Nel 2025 OpenAI ha incassato 13 miliardi di dollari e ne ha spesi 34 miliardi, una perdita di 21 miliardi che in tempi "normali" avrebbe portato al fallimento. Devono alzare l'asticella o dovranno smantellare tutto, altro che IPO da un trilione di dollari. A. [1] https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2026/04/08/ci-si-puo-fidare-di-sam-altman-e...
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antonio -
J.C. DE MARTIN