I servizi in Canada e Israele sono preoccupati per gli interventi (russi e cinesi) nei social che mirerebbero ad accentuare la frammentazione politica e la polarizzazione sociale. *Election meddling by foreign powers already underway, says Canadian spy agency* <https://intelnews.org/2019/04/09/01-2527/> CSE CanadaThe manipulation of social media by foreign governments aiming to sow division in Canada ahead of the country’s federal election in October is growing, according to the country’s signals intelligence agency. In a report published Monday, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada’s national communications interception agency, warns that election meddling by foreign powers is already taking place. The report, titled “2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process”, says that voters, as well as specific political figures, have been targeted by foreign powers since 2015 in the North American country. The foreign intelligence agencies behind the efforts to manipulate Canada’s electoral process have systematically attempted to “polarize Canadians or undermine Canada’s foreign policy goals”, says the report. These efforts will continue and intensify in the run-up to October, claims the report, and concludes by warning that Canadians should expect to “encounter some form of foreign cyber interference ahead of, and during, the 2019 federal election”. However, foreign cyber interference on the scale that was experienced in the months leading up to the 2016 presidential election in the United States is improbable, according to the CSE. Meanwhile, in an unrelated development, the former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada’s primary national intelligence service, said in an interview last week that Ottawa would have to be patient in dealing with Russia and —especially— China. Speaking at a public forum hosted by the Canadian International Council in Vancouver, Richard Fadden noted that neither China nor Russia wish to go to war with the West. What they want instead is to “fragment the West” and thus increase their own influence on the international scene, said Fadden, who directed the CSIS from 2009 to 2013. It would be fair for Canada to “poke back”, he said, but would have to be “careful how [to] do it”, he added. “We need to be realistic. We’re dealing with an emergent superpower and […] we’re going to have to be patient”, Fadden concluded. Anche qui: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/canada-election-meddling-socia...> *Why Are Israeli Elections Extremely Sensitive to Fake News?* <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-are-israeli-elections-extremely-sensitive-fake-...> [...] Political, economic, and social splits are the most important elements in the creation and distribution of fake news. Malicious actors tend to use fake news in order to heighten existing tensions between political, social, or religious groups. This weakened social cohesion makes societies more vulnerable to foreign influence campaigns. Many of the Russian trolls messages on social networks during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections did not focus on the presidential candidates, but rather were aimed at increasing tensions between American voters in the various issues of American society, especially between black and white Americans. By strengthening the conflicts, the Russian trolls sought to weaken the societal unity in the United States and public confidence in the U.S. democratic structure thereby influencing voting patterns. Israel’s inherent political instability, along with the great fragmentation of Israeli society, makes the country particularly vulnerable to foreign influence activities. Those who want to influence Israeli politics and foreign policy by disseminating fake news on social networks will be able to invest relatively limited and short-term efforts to exploit the existing divisions within the country. At the end of January, the technology firm Vocativ unveiled Iranian influence efforts, mainly on Twitter, which reached an estimated target audience of half a million Israeli users a month. The bots often rephrased authentic news headlines in a controversial manner to incite divisive responses from the electorate, focusing on issues such as wealth inequality, sexual harassment, poverty in Israel, and undermining of the Supreme Court. If successful, these efforts could lead to a shift of three or four seats on the electoral map, which may be very significant for determining the winning candidate of the upcoming elections. The Israeli answer to disinformation activities Despite the fateful potential of foreign influence campaigns, Israel - the "startup nation" - is lagging behind other countries in dealing with these campaigns. While some countries have developed coherent strategies for dealing with fake news, such as Denmark’s establishment of an inter-ministerial task force to counter influence operations in 2017, the current Israeli steps against online disinformation campaigns rely only on ad-hoc measures. For example, since the beginning of the election campaign, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked with Twitter to identify and block more than 400 accounts that spread fake news. But what will happen after April 9? It can be assumed that regardless of the level of the foreign involvement in the upcoming elections, proposals to establish a permanent and long-term policy for dealing with foreign disinformation campaigns will be discussed. Based on worldwide experience and taking into account the Israeli reality, there are two steps that can be considered for effective Israeli policy. In 2017, the Central Elections Committee formulated recommendations to update the Propaganda Methods Law, which had not been updated since 1959. The recommendations included creating a duty of transparency for political publications on social networks (a step now being implemented by the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, Judge Hanan Melcer), the prohibition of advertising of sponsored ads on networks on election day, the explicit prohibition to publish racist content during the elections, and improving  the transparency of  published election surveys. The legislative process for approving the recommendations was stalled, so its completion is vital. The second measure should be educational. In countries such as Canada, Belgium, and Croatia, there are varied media literacy campaigns and the Luxembourgian government implemented a national digital education strategy within its education system. Online influence operations for political needs are not limited to election campaigns and are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Therefore, it is important that the Israeli government formulate and implement relevant policies as soon as possible.