Buongiorno Roberto, «It all starts from realising that deflating digital power isn’t just about governing data: it’s the walls of the underlying systems we have to tear down.» Grazie per questo articolo, è un ottimo riassunto dell'ENORME problema riguardo la sovranità digitale, un problema che il mercato non risolverà mai da solo e QUINDI rischia di determinare un conflitto durissimo per il controllo delle tecnologie digitali (truccate). La soluzione NON è cercare di regolamentare come viene distrubuito il software truccato o costruito l'hardware con software truccato incorporato. Men che meno cercare di rappezzare Internet con illusori protocolli o cercare di mettere una toppa giuridica a come questa sia abusata per raccogliere dati a strascico. La sola e unica soluzione c'è, è complessa ma non complicata: liberare il digitale fino all'ultimo granello di silicio; software libero e hardware design libero per ogni dispositivo digitale, dall'orologio in su... c'è QUASI tutto per farlo :-D Roberto Resoli <roberto@resolutions.it> writes:

Sul potere delle aziende informatiche, ormai superiore a quello degli stati.

"One key lesson requires distinguishing the problem of privacy from that of platform power. It is possible to be strongly in favour of a decentralised approach, as I am (as a co-developer of the open-source DP-3T system that Apple and Google adapted),

Scusa se faccio il pignolo ma abbiamo già verificato che il componente principale del sistema di exposure notification, quello che fornisce le API alle App, è distribuito in forma binaria e SOLO attraverso la piattaforma proprietaria Google Play (e la relativa di iOS che non so come si chiama) http://server-nexa.polito.it/pipermail/nexa/2020-May/018003.html Non vorrei che passasse il messaggio che il sistema (non la singola App) sia open source :-) A parte questo il resto dell'articolo è pieno di cose interessanti (e di un paio di chicche in merito alla storia del passaporto e dello strano intervento di Cédric O al parlamento francese)

while being seriously concerned about the centralised control of computing infrastructure these firms have amassed."

https://amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/01/apple-google-contact-t...

Link non AMP ;-) https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/... --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- [...] The history of passports – which were introduced as a seemingly temporary measure during the first world war, but were retained in response to fears about spreading the Spanish flu – shows that pandemics can significantly influence our social infrastructure. [...] In the French parliament, O stated that it was no coincidence that the UK and France were going against the grain, given that they were “the only two European states with their own nuclear deterrent”. [...] they continued the bizarre path, seen in recent years from politicians around the world, of treating these firms like sovereign nations, hoping that they recognised each other’s legitimacy and that their “officials” could come to some agreement. [...] Data is just a means to an end, and new, cryptographic tools are emerging that let those firms’ same potentially problematic ends be reached without privacy-invasive means. These tools give those controlling and co-ordinating millions or even billions of computers the monopolistic power to analyse or shape communities or countries, or even to change individual behaviour, such as to privately target ads based on their most sensitive data — without any single individual’s data leaving their phone. [...] This approach is effectively what underpins the Apple-Google contact-tracing system. It’s great for individual privacy, but the kind of infrastructural power it enables should give us sleepless nights. Countries that expect to deal a mortal wound to tech giants by stopping them building data mountains are bulls charging at a red rag. In all the global crises, pandemics and social upheavals that may yet come, those in control of the computers, not those with the largest datasets, have the best visibility and the best – and perhaps the scariest — ability to change the world. Law should be puncturing and distributing this power, and giving it to individuals, communities and, with appropriate and improved human-rights protections, to governments. To do so, we need new digital rights. Data protection and privacy laws are easily dodged or circumvented by technical assurances of confidentiality: we need something more ambitious to escape the giants’ walled gardens. A “right to repair” would stop planned obsolescence in phones, or firms buying up competitors just to cut them off from the cloud they need to run. A “right to interoperate” would force systems from different providers, including online platforms, to talk to each other in real time, allowing people to leave a social network without leaving their friends. These interventions need strong accompanying oversight to maintain security and privacy, and stop unwanted side-effects or government abuse, such as the outlawing of end-to-end encryption to oppress dissidents and whistle-blowers. It all starts from realising that deflating digital power isn’t just about governing data: it’s the walls of the underlying systems we have to tear down. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Saluti, Giovanni -- Giovanni Biscuolo