Ho trovato questo articolo di LYNN M. LOPUCKI estremamente interessante. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954173 Le conclusioni sembrano interessati da un punto di vista legale (almeno così sembrani ad un profano come me) ma sono ingenuamente catastrofiste da un punto di vista tecnico. Siamo tanto vicini a produrre intelligenze artificiali generali quanto siamo vicini a visitare la galassia di Andromeda. Il vero pericolo delle Artificial Entities non sta nella loro mente artificiale, ma in quelle biologiche che le controllerebbero senza risponderne. Di seguito abstract e conclusioni: In a 2014 article, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm by putting it in control of a limited liability company. Bayern’s demonstration coincided with the development of “autonomous” online businesses that operate independently of their human owners—accepting payments in online currencies and contracting with human agents to perform the off-line aspects of their businesses. About the same time, leading technologists Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking said that they regard human-level artificial intelligence as an existential threat to the human race. This Article argues that algorithmic entities—legal entities that have no human controllers—greatly exacerbate the threat of artificial intelligence. Algorithmic entities are likely to prosper first and most in criminal, terrorist, and other anti-social activities because that is where they have their greatest comparative advantage over human-controlled entities. Control of legal entities will contribute to the threat algorithms pose by providing them with identities. Those identities will enable them to conceal their algorithmic natures while they participate in commerce, accumulate wealth, and carry out anti-social activities. Four aspects of corporate law make the human race vulnerable to the threat of algorithmic entities. First, algorithms can lawfully have exclusive control of not just American LLC’s but also a large majority of the entity forms in most countries. Second, entities can change regulatory regimes quickly and easily through migration. Third, governments— particularly in the United States—lack the ability to determine who controls the entities they charter and so cannot determine which have non-human controllers. Lastly, corporate charter competition, combined with ease of entity migration, makes it virtually impossible for any government to regulate algorithmic control of entities. [...tutto l'articolo...] CONCLUSIONS AEs are inevitable because they have three advantages over humancontrolled businesses. They can act and react more quickly, they don’t lose accumulated knowledge through personnel changes, and they cannot be held responsible for their wrongdoing in any meaningful way. AEs constitute a threat to humanity because the only limits on their conduct are the limits the least restrictive human creator imposes. As the science advances, algorithms’ abilities will improve until they far exceed those of humans. What remains to be determined is whether humans will be successful in imposing controls before the opportunity to do so has passed. This Article has addressed a previously unexplored aspect of the artificial-intelligence-control problem. Giving algorithms control of entities endows algorithms with legal rights and gives them the ability to transact anonymously with humans. Once granted, those rights and abilities would be difficult to revoke. Under current law, algorithms could inhabit entities of most types and nationalities. They could move from one type or nationality to another, thereby changing their governing law. They could easily hide from regulators in a system where the controllers of nonpublicly-traded entities are all invisible. Because the revocation of AEs’ rights and abilities would require the amendment of thousands of entity laws, the entity system is less likely to function as a means of controlling artificial intelligence than as a means by which artificial intelligence will control humans. Entity law is not only incapable of regulating AEs, it is incapable of regulating much of anything. The entity system is grounded in three principles. First, an entity can incorporate anywhere, regardless of the location of its operations. Second, an entity chartered in one jurisdiction can do business in virtually any other jurisdiction. Third, while operating in those other jurisdictions, the entity continues to be governed by the entity law under which it was formed. Together, those principles implicitly define a regulatory competition through the sale of entity charters. Each government competes for a share in billions of dollars of revenues annually by promoting and selling its entities and the regulation that accompanies them. To regulate is to restrict. A competition to sell restrictions will, of course, be won by the jurisdiction that provides the fewest. Thus, the natural culmination of charter competition is a system that does not restrict at all. That result is not unintended. It is essentially what Romano touted as the “genius of American corporate law.”328 By embracing the charter competition, the United States has become the world’s largest supplier of anonymous entities and enabled its corporate service providers to achieve the world’s lowest rate of compliance with the international standards designed to prevent terrorist financing and money-laundering. Because they believed that government should not regulate the relationship among the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders, charter competition advocates have perpetuated a system that hardly regulates at all. What the advocates apparently failed to realize is that entity law applies to much more than the entities’ internal affairs. AEs have no internal affairs, yet entity law will govern the key issues that determine their viability. Chartering governments decide who—or what—can have the rights of a person by acting through an entity. Chartering governments also decide what information about the human actors will be available to the public, what information will be available to police and prosecutors, how quickly that information will be made available and at what expense, how quickly and easily an entity can flee a jurisdiction to avoid the jurisdiction’s current or proposed regulations, and even whether a tort creditor can recover against an entity’s owner. Chartering governments decide these issues even when the effects are felt entirely outside the chartering jurisdiction. The AE threat dramatically illustrates the fundamental weakness of regulatory competition as a policy tool. Once the charter competition was up and running, the economic, political, and legal systems adjusted. Ending the competition now would be so disruptive it is almost impossible. The entity system is not merely a system that will not regulate when regulation is not needed, it is a system that cannot regulate even when regulation is needed. The assertion that charter competition is harmless because entity law governs only entities’ internal affairs is no longer plausible. As the example of AEs illustrates, entity law governs far more than the internal affairs of a corporation. It determines the very nature of the corporate personality. The survival of the human race may depend on recognition of that fact.