Hawley-Google-Apple-Letter-COVID19-Tracing.pdf
Il senatore Hartley solleva un punto interessante sulla persistenza dello schema di privacy: una versione successiva di una app rispettosa della privacy potrebbe non esserlo più, e accedere per altri scopi anche ai dati già raccolti. Se quasi nessuno legge l'informativa prima di aggiungere una app nuova, chi si cura di quelle degli aggiornamenti? <https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Hawley-Google-Appl...> Your recently announced project to respond to COVID–19 by tracking when and where Americans interact with each other raises serious concerns. Especially because of Google’s poor record on privacy, I fear that your project could pave the way for something much more dire. The possible implications this project could have for privacy are alarming. For example, your materials state that the data necessary for this project will be anonymized. But anonymity in data is notoriously unstable. Data typically can be reidentified simply by cross-referencing it with another data set. Pairing the data from this project with the GPS data that both your companies already collect could readily reveal individual identities. Worse, when paired with other data sets, the data from this project could create an extraordinarily precise mechanism for surveillance. Both your companies collect GPS data, but the GPS system has significant limits. It works poorly indoors and cannot pinpoint the floor a person is on. Combining the data from this project with GPS data (or other data, such as Wi-Fi positioning), could greatly erode privacy by making precise surveillance much easier. Americans are right to be skeptical of this project. Even if this project were to prove helpful for the current crisis, how can Americans be sure that you will not change the interface after the pandemic subsides? Once downloaded onto millions of phones, the interface easily could be edited to eliminate previous privacy protections. And any privacy protection that is baked into the interface will do little good if the apps that are developed to access the interface also choose to collect other information, like real-time geolocation data. When it comes to sticking to promises, Google’s record is not exactly reassuring. Last year a Google representative had to admit, under oath, that Google still tracks location history even when a person turns location history off. As the Associated Press put it, “Google wants to know where you go so badly that it records your movements even when you explicitly tell it not to.” A project this unprecedented requires an unprecedented assurance on your part. Too often, Americans have been burned by companies who calculated that the profits they could gain by reversing privacy pledges would outweigh any later financial penalty levied against the company. The last thing Americans want is to adopt, amid a global emergency, a tracking program that then becomes a permanent feature in our lives. If you seek to assure the public, make your stake in this project personal. Make a commitment that you and other executives will be personally liable if you stop protecting privacy, such as by granting advertising companies access to the interface once the pandemic is over. The public statements you make now can be enforced under federal and state consumer protection laws. Do not hide behind a corporate shield like so many privacy offenders have before. Stake your personal finances on the security of this project. I look forward to hearing about how you intend to try to provide Americans with assurance. Sincerely, A Josh Hawley United States Senator
Grazie Alberto, ho scritto ieri Il punto è che "dopo", anche se del tutto inutile per lo scopo dichiarato, l'infrastruttura di sorveglianza rischia di rimanere presente in milioni di dispositivi, pronta per altri scopi. Il suo raggio d'azione può essere progressivamente esteso nel tempo, dal coronavirus ad altri virus, ad altre malattie, e pian piano allargato, mediante successivi aggiornamenti automatici, come avviene per le tante app sul nostro smartphone, per altri obiettivi (sempre nell'interesse del bene comune, sia chiaro!). https://link-and-think.blogspot.com/2020/04/la-lotta-per-la-privacy-e-lotta-... È confortante ricevere conferma che non si è soli nelle riflessioni critiche... Ciao, Enrico Il 23/04/2020 11:08, Alberto Cammozzo ha scritto:
Il senatore Hartley solleva un punto interessante sulla persistenza dello schema di privacy: una versione successiva di una app rispettosa della privacy potrebbe non esserlo più, e accedere per altri scopi anche ai dati già raccolti.
Se quasi nessuno legge l'informativa prima di aggiungere una app nuova, chi si cura di quelle degli aggiornamenti?
<https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Hawley-Google-Appl...>
Your recently announced project to respond to COVID–19 by tracking when and where Americans interact with each other raises serious concerns. Especially because of Google’s poor record on privacy, I fear that your project could pave the way for something much more dire. The possible implications this project could have for privacy are alarming. For example, your materials state that the data necessary for this project will be anonymized. But anonymity in data is notoriously unstable. Data typically can be reidentified simply by cross-referencing it with another data set. Pairing the data from this project with the GPS data that both your companies already collect could readily reveal individual identities. Worse, when paired with other data sets, the data from this project could create an extraordinarily precise mechanism for surveillance. Both your companies collect GPS data, but the GPS system has significant limits. It works poorly indoors and cannot pinpoint the floor a person is on. Combining the data from this project with GPS data (or other data, such as Wi-Fi positioning), could greatly erode privacy by making precise surveillance much easier. Americans are right to be skeptical of this project. Even if this project were to prove helpful for the current crisis, how can Americans be sure that you will not change the interface after the pandemic subsides? Once downloaded onto millions of phones, the interface easily could be edited to eliminate previous privacy protections. And any privacy protection that is baked into the interface will do little good if the apps that are developed to access the interface also choose to collect other information, like real-time geolocation data. When it comes to sticking to promises, Google’s record is not exactly reassuring. Last year a Google representative had to admit, under oath, that Google still tracks location history even when a person turns location history off. As the Associated Press put it, “Google wants to know where you go so badly that it records your movements even when you explicitly tell it not to.” A project this unprecedented requires an unprecedented assurance on your part. Too often, Americans have been burned by companies who calculated that the profits they could gain by reversing privacy pledges would outweigh any later financial penalty levied against the company. The last thing Americans want is to adopt, amid a global emergency, a tracking program that then becomes a permanent feature in our lives. If you seek to assure the public, make your stake in this project personal. Make a commitment that you and other executives will be personally liable if you stop protecting privacy, such as by granting advertising companies access to the interface once the pandemic is over. The public statements you make now can be enforced under federal and state consumer protection laws. Do not hide behind a corporate shield like so many privacy offenders have before. Stake your personal finances on the security of this project. I look forward to hearing about how you intend to try to provide Americans with assurance. Sincerely, A Josh Hawley United States Senator _______________________________________________ nexa mailing list nexa@server-nexa.polito.it https://server-nexa.polito.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nexa
-- EN ===================================================================== Prof. Enrico Nardelli Dipartimento di Matematica - Universita' di Roma "Tor Vergata" Via della Ricerca Scientifica snc - 00133 Roma tel: +39 06 7259.4204 fax: +39 06 7259.4699 mobile: +39 335 590.2331 e-mail: nardelli@mat.uniroma2.it home page: http://www.mat.uniroma2.it/~nardelli blog: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/blog/enardelli/ http://link-and-think.blogspot.it/ ===================================================================== --
Buongiorno Alberto, Alberto Cammozzo <ac+nexa@zeromx.net> writes:
Il senatore Hartley
Josh Hawley, Sen. Rapubblicano in precedenza Missouri Attorney General
solleva un punto interessante sulla persistenza dello schema di privacy: una versione successiva di una app rispettosa della privacy potrebbe non esserlo più, e accedere per altri scopi anche ai dati già raccolti.
Hawley solleva anche altri punti interessanti, no?
<https://www.hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Hawley-Google-Appl...>
Especially because of Google’s poor record on privacy,
[citation needed] :-O
But anonymity in data is notoriously unstable. Data typically can be reidentified simply by cross-referencing it with another data set.
Tipo l'IP e l'IMEI usati per trasmettere i dati anonimi? Mah? [...]
Combining the data from this project with GPS data (or other data, such as Wi-Fi positioning), could greatly erode privacy by making precise surveillance much easier.
Diffidente! Chissà mai da cosa deriverà questa sua diffidenza?!?
Once downloaded onto millions of phones, the interface easily could be edited to eliminate previous privacy protections. And any privacy protection
Ma no, ma che dice: non è _mai_ successa una cosa del genere, tutti gli aggiornamenti distribuiti attraverso gli App store sono sicuri e a prova di bomba!
Google’s record is not exactly reassuring. Last year a Google representative had to admit, under oath, that Google still tracks location history even when a person turns location history off.
Oibò: Google?!?
Too often, Americans have been burned by companies who calculated that the profits they could gain by reversing privacy pledges would outweigh any later financial penalty levied against the company.
L'incentivo ad infrangere la legge è inferiore rispetto all'incentivo degli incrementi di ricavi finanziari. Alcune rivelazioni del DataGate (Snowden) evidenziano anche che alcune multinazionali sono state finanziate per implementare parte dei programmi di sorveglianza nei quali erano coinvolte. [...]
The public statements you make now can be enforced under federal and state consumer protection laws.
In USA, in Italia voglio proprio vedere chi potrebbe far qualcosa a Google o Apple nel caso di infrazioni di legge: l'antitrust? Altre multe? [...] Saluti, Giovanni -- Giovanni Biscuolo
participants (3)
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Alberto Cammozzo -
Enrico Nardelli -
Giovanni Biscuolo