Carissime nexiane, Antonio Iacono <antiac@gmail.com> writes:
On 1/8/21, Norberto Patrignani <norberto.patrignani@polito.it> wrote:
puo' essere utile ricordare che molti anni fa la Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility aveva avviato questa riflessione http://cpsr.org/prevsite/conferences/cfp93/waskell.html/
era il 1993, quasi 30 anni fa, e l'organizzazione in questione <sarcasmo> era un noto covo di cospirazionisti dalle teorie assai bislacche sul satanismo </sarcasmo>, talmente bislacche da aver capito che quei sistemi erano ontologicamente inaffidabili.
In quel caso veniva contestato il conteggio elettronico dei voti.
Sì ma "quando" (conteggio o inserimento) viene inserita la digitalizzazione del voto non cambia di una virgola il nocciolo della questione: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- When voters went to the polls in November 1992, few realized that their ballots were being counted privately. Yes, that's right. The majority of votes cast in the recent presidential election were tabulated by secret programs under the proprietary control of the companies that design and sell electronic voting systems to election jurisdictions throughout the country. The instructions in these programs are known only to the people who were paid to create them. The courts have protected the rights of these companies to prevent anyone from independently auditing their tabulating software. [...] Second, since it is impossible to verify that vote tabulating programs are doing what they are supposed to and nothing more, it is impossible to resolve any dispute about whether or not manipulation of votes is taking place. The public debate about alleged vote tampering will continue forever. [...] As long as vote tabulating logic remains part of a set of rules known only to the programmer who wrote the software, the votes of every American citizen will continue to be tabulated secretly. Secret vote counting has no place in a democracy. --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Nel 1993 questo paper aveva già detto TUTTO quello che c'è da sapere sul voto elettronico (voto digitalizzato).
Oggi la questione è ancora più seria, riguarda il voto con modalità elettronica, in cabina o (peggio) da Internet.
Già, non solo i sistemi delle macchine di voto... PURE Internet.
Non so se è passato il lista, tuttavia vale la pena mensionare il grande lavoro fatto dal Comitato per i requisiti del voto in democrazia [1].
[...]
Sì era passato ma ribadirlo fa bene. Tutto è _molto_ utile per ribadire (ANCORA???) quanto un sistema elettorale fondato sul voto elettronico sia vergognosamente INCOSTUTUZIONALE [1] in quanto i voti sono conteggiati con procedure segrete, manipolabili a piacere di chi controlla il software - giova ricordare che AFAIU la totalità del software usato è proprietario e compilato in chissà che modo - oltre a essere un COLABRODO dal punto di vista della sicurezza. Questo è lo stato dell'arte di cosa viene proposto di fare per rappezzare qualche buco del colabrodo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_security#Legislation_and_policy --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- * Implement universal use of paper ballots, marked by hand and read by optical scanner, ensuring a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).[24][25][26] * Phase out touch-screen voting machines – especially the most vulnerable direct-recording electronic (DRE) devices[27] Update pollbooks and other electronic equipment used to check-in voters.[28] * Verify voting results by requiring election officials to conduct risk-limiting audits, a statistical post-election audit before certification of final results.[27][26][28] * Secure voting infrastructure, especially voter registration databases, using cyber hygiene tools such as the CIS “20 Critical Security Controls” or NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework.[29] * Call upon outside experts to conduct cyber assessments – DHS, white-hat hackers, cybersecurity vendors and security researchers – where needed.[30] * Provide resources and training to state and local election leaders for cyber maintenance and on-going monitoring.[30] * Promote information-sharing on cyber threats and incidents in and across the entire voting industry.[31] * Appropriate federal funding to states to implement infrastructure upgrades, audits, and cyber hygiene measures. * Establish clear channels for coordination between local, state, and federal agencies, including real-time sharing of threat and intelligence information.[31] * Maintain DHS's designation of elections as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector.[31] * Require DHS to institute a pre-election threat assessment plan to bolster its technical support capacity to state and locals requesting assistance.[31] Federal legislation has also been introduced to address these concerns. The first bipartisan Congressional legislation to protect the administration of Federal elections against cybersecurity threats – the Secure Elections Act (SB 2261) – was introduced on December 21, 2017 by Senator James Lankford (R-OK).[32] The 2018 Federal Budget (as signed by President Donald Trump) included $380m USD in state funding to improve election security.[33] Each state received a standard payment of $3m USD, with the remaining $230m USD allocated to each state proportionally based on voting age population.[34] Security measures funded included improving cybersecurity (36.3% of funds), the purchase of new voting equipment (27.8%), improvement of voter registration systems (13.7%), post election audits (5.6%), and improving communications efforts (2%). --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Nulla, nada, nothing, NIL viene previsto per almeno tentare (perché farlo davvero è praticamente impossibile) di risolvere il nocciolo del problema: «As long as vote tabulating logic remains part of a set of rules known only to the programmer who wrote the software, the votes of every American citizen will continue to be tabulated secretly. Secret vote counting has no place in a democracy.» (ovviamente non vale solo per gli USA). Comunque nemmeno la disponibilità del codice sorgente basta ad aggiungere un minimo di dignità razionale al processo di voto elettronico. A me fa veramente impressione che ci sia (ANCORA???) chi ha seriamente il coraggio di sostenere che il voto elettronico, e-voting è più cool, sia degno di essere usato in una elezione seria. Le votazioni devono essere fatte all'antica: carta, matite speciali e tanti, tanti scrutatori con rappresentanti di lista per ogni sede di votazione. Saluti, Giovanni. [1] per una qualsiasi costituzione presa *a caso* -- Giovanni Biscuolo