Caspita! Sono riusciti a resistere ben 4 giorni al potere lobbistico di Google! Un record! Qui in Italia quanti sono quelli che anche solo ci provano? E voi negli Stati Uniti, come state messi? Quante sono le organizzazioni che provano a prendere il toro per le corna? Quante quelle che piagnucolano ma si fanno comunque finanziare? Come avevo scritto, hanno nominato Mozilla per il premio giusto, ma per la ragione sbagliata. DNS-over-HTTPS infatti è solo un piccolo dettaglio (per quanto utile all'interno di un attacco per inviare dati all'esterno attraverso un canale sicuro ed insospettabile) rispetto alla montagna di problemi tecnici che Mozilla ha introdotto nell'architettura del Web. E che si rifiuta, a tutt'oggi di affrontare. On 11/07/2019, Stefano Zacchiroli <zack@upsilon.cc> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 05, 2019 at 09:00:32AM +0200, Giacomo Tesio wrote:
https://www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/uk-isp-group-names-mozilla-internet...
https://www.ispa.org.uk/ispa-withdraws-mozilla-internet-villain-nomination-a...
ISPA withdraws Mozilla Internet Villain Nomination and Category Posted on 9th July 2019
Credo possa essere utile a questa lista leggere il comunicato intero. Non cita direttamente il problema geopolitico, ma ai punti 3, 4 e 5 lo lascia intendere a chi abbia un minimo di competenza in merito. Dopo la parte che hai citato, infatti il testo prosegue: While we are withdrawing the nomination, we still believe that it is important to properly scrutinise the implementation plans for DoH. Below we set out our position in more detail and we will continue to develop this position and engage with our members, browser and app companies, DNS resolvers and vendors, policymakers and the wider Internet community on this issue. Any implementation of DoH (or equally any other flavour of encrypted DNS) should be capable of achieving the expected privacy and security benefits, while at the same time being mindful of the complex internet eco system, as well as the different user relationship and trust models that are in play. 1. User choice: An application switching to DoH should ensure that this switch does not undermine choices that have been previously made by the user. For example, if parents have decided to filter an internet connection in their home via network or local level DNS controls, these choices should not simply be ignored by the application. 2. User consent: Any application switching to DoH should ensure that the decision to switch resolvers is made by a user who is: a/ fully informed about the implications of switching resolvers, and b/ fully capable of expressing consent, e.g. relevant admin rights need to be protected and decisions should be made by main account holders Furthermore, DoH discovery and selection should allow users to change their resolver selections as they wish too, e.g. they may wish to revisit selections when new resolvers become available. 3. Data protection: Any application switching to DoH should ensure that a DoH resolver fully complies with the local data protection requirements. 4. Security: Any application switching to DoH should ensure that the selected DoH provider is capable of replicating existing security policies and capabilities such as malware protection that are currently in place for that user. 5. Online safety: Any application switching to DoH should ensure that the selected resolver should be capable of replicating the online safety policies that are currently in place for that user. 6. User and access-network-operator support: If DoH doesn’t work or is slow, a customer’s internet access will be affected. The customer will contact their ISP, not the DoH provider, but the ISP won’t be able to fix things for them. As a minimum, any application switching to DoH should ensure that the selected resolver should provide a 24/7 user call centre reachable via low-cost/local rate telephony and an online support capability. Support for fault-diagnosis and resolution between ISP, resolver and users should also be provided. There are numerous other areas that we could go into, e.g. how DoH affects enterprise networks, or content caching, and the points raised in this post are only an initial outline. We recognise that things have started moving at Internet Engineering Task Force level, for example, and look forward to engaging in a constructive discussion. ____ Speriamo veramente che si avvii un dialogo costruttivo sull'architettura emergente del Web! Un dialogo in cui voci diverse ed indipendenti dai grandi player possano chiedere a questi di RISPONDERE degli errori madornali che hanno compiuto e stanno compiendo. Giacomo