Temo ci sia il rischio non saprà mai: occorre puntare a evitare che dubbi di questo tipo si presentino in futuro.

Dobbiamo garantire che le attività umane sul genoma portino la firma di chi le fa, proprio per evitare che le responsabilità possano essere eluse.

Una specie di targa, di marchio di fabbrica, o di green pass, se vogliamo.

I laboratori BSL4 o comunque quelli che modificano organismi pericolosi dovrebbero aggiungere il watermark sul genoma che conservano, manipolano e usano.

In caso di leak accidentale si potrà risalire al laboratorio di origine.

Le tecnologie per farlo apparentemente ci sono, si chiamano "DNA watermarking" anche se sono concepite prevalentemente per l'attribuzione di proprietà, ad esempio per la protezione di brevetti su DNA modificato.

Nel nostro caso la tecnologia dovrebbe garantire il non ripudio, quindi per evitare che un laboratorio possa negare l'autenticità del watermark e respingere l'attribuzione.

Mi pare ci sia già del lavoro fatto in tale direzione [1] da parte di team interdisciplinari di informatici e biologi.

Alberto

[1] Kar, D. M., Ray, I., Gallegos, J., & Peccoud, J. (2018). Digital Signatures to Ensure the Authenticity and Integrity of Synthetic DNA Molecules. Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop on - NSPW ’18. doi:10.1145/3285002.3285007
<https://sci-hub.se/https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3285002.3285007>

On 20/09/21 13:32, 380° wrote:
Buongiorno,

so che è un palese off-topic per questa lista, anche se /vagamente/
tratta di fake-news e disinformazione diffusa anche per mezzo del web.

Ovviamente tratta sì di tecnologia, la tecnologia delle ricerche di
laboratorio sugli agenti patogeni, editing genetico incluso.

Secondo voi che SARS-CoV-2 sia zoonotico o no fa davvero la differenza,
sapendo quello che (non) sappiamo dei centri di ricerca che trattano
questi agenti patogeni?


«An appeal for an objective, open, and transparent scientific debate
about the origin of SARS-CoV-2»

Published:September 17, 2021

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02019-5

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)02019-5/fulltext

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---

[...] There is so far no scientifically validated evidence that directly
supports a natural origin. [...] The fact that the causative agent of
COVID-19 descends from a natural virus is widely accepted, but this does
not explain how it came to infect humans.

[...] supports the natural origin hypothesis, but suffers from a logical
fallacy: it opposes two hypotheses—laboratory engineering versus
zoonosis—wrongly implying that there are no other possible
scenarios. [...] the absence of traces of reverse-engineering systems
does not preclude genome editing, which is performed with so-called
seamless techniques.

Finally, the absence of a previously known backbone is not a proof,
since researchers can work for several years on viruses before
publishing their full genome (this was the case for RaTG13, the closest
known virus, which was collected in 2013 and published in 2020).

[...] documented cases of laboratory escapes of SARS-CoV [...]

Although considerable evidence supports the natural origins of other
outbreaks (eg, Nipah, MERS, and the 2002–04 SARS outbreak) direct
evidence for a natural origin for SARS-CoV-2 is missing. After 19 months
of investigations, the proximal progenitor of SARS-CoV-2 is still
lacking. Neither the host pathway from bats to humans, nor the
geographical route from Yunnan (where the viruses most closely related
to SARS-CoV-2 have been sampled) to Wuhan (where the pandemic emerged)
have been identified.

[...] the international research community has no access to the sites,
 samples, or raw data.

[...] A research-related origin is plausible. Two questions need to be
addressed: virus evolution and introduction into the human population.

[...] Some unusual features of the SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence suggest
that they may have resulted from genetic engineering, an approach widely
used in some virology labs.  Alternatively, adaptation to humans might
result from undirected laboratory selection during serial passage in
cell cultures or laboratory animals, including humanised mice.  Mice
genetically modified to display the human receptor for entry of
SARS-CoV-2 (ACE2) were used in research projects funded before the
pandemic, to test the infectivity of different virus strains. Laboratory
research also includes more targeted approaches such as gain-of-function
experiments relying on chimeric viruses to test their potential to cross
species barriers.

A research-related contamination could result from contact with a
natural virus during field collection, transportation from the field to
a laboratory, characterisation of bats and bat viruses in a laboratory,
or from a non-natural virus modified in a laboratory. There are
well-documented cases of pathogen escapes from laboratories.  Field
collection, field survey, and in-laboratory research on potential
pandemic pathogens require high-safety protections and a strong and
transparent safety culture. However, experiments on SARS-related
coronaviruses are routinely performed at biosafety level 2, which
complies with the recommendations for viruses infecting non-human
animals, but is inappropriate for experiments that might produce
human-adapted viruses by effects of selection or oriented mutations.

[...] Beyond this issue, it is important to continue debating about the
risk–benefit balance of current practices of field and laboratory
research, including gain-of-function experiments, as well as the human
activities contributing to zoonotic events.

[...]

--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---


«This time you've gone too far,
I told you, I told you, I told you, I told you»
[Digging In The Dirt by Peter Gabriel, 1992]



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